Download Comparative Analysis of Punitive Damages in Consolidated Cases: NY, CA, FL, and NJ Laws and more Exercises Contract Law in PDF only on Docsity! Παγε 1 οφ 10 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA COURSE EXAMINATION SCHOOL OF LAW Fall 2004 LAW 244: CONFLICT OF LAWS INSTRUCTOR: HERMA HILL KAY TIME ALLOWED: 3½ HOURS CLOSED BOOK EXAMINATION NUMBERS: Please be sure to put your correct Fall exam number on each page of the exam (if typed) or on each blue book. COMPLETION: DO NOT CONTINUE WRITING AFTER TIME HAS BEEN CALLED. Please do NOT leave your bluebook or typed answers on the desk. Exams MUST be turned in to the person in charge. If you finish early, you must turn your exam in to the Registrar’s Office in Room 270 Simon Hall. There are no space limits. Question I. 30% CREDIT On April 1, 2004, the New York Court of Appeals handed down its decision in Broadnax v. Gonzalez, 2 N.Y. 3d 148, 809 N.E. 2d 645 (2004). Broadnax overruled Tebbutt v. Virostek, 65 N.Y. 2d 931, 483 N.E. 2d 1142 (1985), which had held that a pregnant woman could not recover damages for emotional harm when medical malpractice causes a miscarriage or a stillbirth, unless she had also suffered an independent physical injury that was not a normal incident of childbirth. In overruling Tebbutt, the Broadnax court reasoned that the prior case categorically denied recovery “to a narrow, but indisputably aggrieved class of plaintiffs”–mothers who were injured by the Παγε 2 οφ 10 medical caregiver’s negligent infliction of emotional distress. Moreover, the court pointed out that Tebbutt engendered a peculiar result: it exposed medical caregivers to medical malpractice liability for in utero injuries when the fetus survived (and could sue to recover damages for its injuries), but immunized them against any liability if the fetus perished. (The latter result followed because the fetus cannot sue in New York for its own wrongful death, and the parent is also forbidden to bring such an action.) The Broadnax court thus stated its holding: “even in the absence of an independent injury, medical malpractice resulting in miscarriage or stillbirth should be construed as a violation of a duty of care to the expectant mother, entitling her to damages for emotional distress.” Assume that Dr. Jones, a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology, has his primary medical office in New York but lives across the state line in state X. Assume further that Dr. Jones is also licensed to practice medicine in state X, and has a secondary office there. Finally, assume that the highest court of state X adopted the Tebbutt rule in 1990, and continues to follow that rule today. ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND DISCUSS YOUR ANSWERS FULLY: a. How and why would you expect the New York Court of Appeals to decide the following conflicts cases? (a) Nancy Smith, a New York domicillary, is a patient of Dr. Jones, who normally treats her in his New York office. She unexpectedly goes into labor prematurely late on a Saturday night. She telephones Dr. Jones at his home number in state X, and he tells her to call an ambulance and meet him at a state X hospital near his home. She does so. Her baby is stillborn, under circumstances strongly suggesting negligence on the part of Dr. Jones. Nancy files suit for damages against Dr. Jones in New York. (b) Dorothy Green is a domicillary of state X. She is a patient of Dr. Jones, who normally treats her in his state X office. Her expected date of delivery occurs Παγε 5 οφ 10 Florida: Punitive damages: Plaintiff must prove his entitlement to punitive actions in civil cases by clear and convincing evidence. Where the fact finder determines “that the wrongful conduct . . . was motivated solely by unreasonable financial gain and determines that the unreasonably dangerous nature of the conduct, together with the high likelihood of injury resulting from the conduct, was actually known by the managing agent, director, officer, or other person responsible for making policy decisions on behalf of the defendant, it may award an amount of punitive damages not to exceed the greater of: (1.) Four times the amount of compensatory damages awarded to each claimant entitled thereto, . . .; or (2.) The sum of $2 million.” Choice of law: Florida follows the “most significant relationship” approach of the Restatement of Conflict Laws (Second) in Torts cases, in this case §6 and §145. New Jersey: Punitive Damages: In 1995, New Jersey enacted the “Punitive Damages Act.” That act provides in part that punitive damages may be awarded to the plaintiff only if compensatory damages are also awarded, and only if plaintiff proves, by clear and convincing evidence, “that the harm suffered was the result of defendant’s acts or omissions, and such acts or omissions were actuated by actual malice or accompanied by a wanton and willful disregard of persons who forseeably might be harmed by those acts or omissions.” The Act provides that no defendant shall be liable for punitive damages “in an amount in excess of five times the liability of that defendant for compensatory damages or $350,000, whichever is greater.” Prior to the effective date of this Act, New Jersey recognized unlimited punitive damages. Παγε 6 οφ 10 Both before and after the 1995 Act, New Jersey law provided that punitive damages were awarded to penalize and provide additional deterrence against a defendant to discourage similar conduct in the future, not to compensate plaintiffs for their losses. Choice of law: New Jersey follows Currie’s governmental interest analysis. U.S. Supreme Court limitations on punitive damages: The Court has held that the Due Process clause prohibits a state from imposing “grossly excessive” punitive damages upon a tortfeasor and has suggested that Παγε 7 οφ 10 “single-digit multipliers” of compensatory damages such as those contained in the New Jersey and Florida statutes are more likely to comport with due process than double or triple digit multipliers. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (invalidating a punitive damages award of $145 million, when compensatory damages were $1 million). ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND DISCUSS YOUR ANSWERS FULLY: 1. You are the federal district court judge to whom this matter has been transferred. How and why will you decide whether to apply punitive damages to the consolidated cases? Assume that the plaintiffs in each case took VIOXX in the state of their domicile and have filed suit in that state. 2. Assume that you decide to follow the recommendations of the ALI’s Complex Litigation Project § 6.06. Using that approach, which is set out in full below, how and why will you decide whether to apply punitive damages to the consolidated cases? Section §6.06 provides as follows: §6.06 Punitive Damages (a) In actions consolidated under § 3.01 or removed under § 5.01 in which punitive damages are sought and in which the parties assert the application of laws that are in material conflict, the transferee court shall choose the law governing the award of punitive damages by applying the criteria set forth in the following subsections with the objective of applying a single state’s law to all punitive damage claims asserted against a defendant. (b) In determining the governing law under subsection (a), the court shall consider the following factors for purposes of identifying each state having a policy on punitive damages that would be furthered by the application of its laws: (1) the place or places of injury; (2) the place or places of the conduct causing the injury; and (3) the primary places of business or habitual residences of the defendants. (c) If, in analyzing the factors set forth in subsection (b), the court finds that only one state has a policy that would be furthered by the application of its law, that state’s law shall govern. If more than one