Constitutional Protection of Education: A Review of Key Supreme Court Decisions, Schemes and Mind Maps of Law

Download Constitutional Protection of Education: A Review of Key Supreme Court Decisions and more Schemes and Mind Maps Law in PDF only on Docsity! DOCUMENT RESUME ED 224 108 EA 015 193 AUTHOR Uerling, Donald F. TITLE The Supreme Court and Educational Policy: The Protected Interests fn Education. PUB DATE Aug 82 \\N,NOTE 26p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Professors of Educational Administration (36th, San Marcos, TR, August 15-20, 1982). PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150) Legal/Legislative/Regulatory Materials (090) Viewpoints (120) EDRS PRICE MF01/PCO2 Plus Postage. '- DESCRIPTORS '*Access to Education; *Constitutional Law; *Due Process; Educational Discrimination; Educational Opportunities; Elementary Secondary Education; *Equal Education; *Equal. Protection; Expulsion;,Financial Support; Illegal Immigrants; School Support; *Student Rights IDENTIFIERS Fourteenth Amendment; Goss v Lopez; Meyer v Nebraska; *Right to Education; Rodriouez v San Antonio Independent School Dist; Supreme Court ABSTRACT The nature of the interests in education that are protected by the Consti,tution may be ascertained by reference to certain due process and equal protection decisions of the Supreme Court reviewed in this paper. Although education is not a right granted by the Cohstitution, the Court has often recognized the importance of educationt, both to the individual and to thesociety. It seems that in terms of constitutional protections the Court has now accorded a sort of favored legal status toteducation although the exact nature of this status is unclear. The basic ethication necessary for functional literacy may be the extent of the protected interest. Although how this level of education is to be defined or measured is uncertain, what does seem clear is that the Constitution protects the individual against inequitable and unfai'r state action. Whatever educational opportunities the state does choose to provide, neither a discrete class nor'a single individual may be unfairly excluded from access to those opportunities. Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not extend tO every person the guarantee of success, the concepts of due process and equal protection do shield each person from state-imposed failure. (Author/JM) *********************************************************************** * Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made * * from the original document. * ******.***************************************************************** U.S. OEPARTMENT OrEDUCATION NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION 't Otic AWN Ak ,11',UtOiCES 4NfORMAtiON k X NTL8 tfitC, IN, (wen fol)rf04c4 {..,,011. Of 01)J1I,M011 tf) tookp, I, INV ..11de rep, I. trr rj arTr O IN.40\14.,1,,,pCM4A,40.thr)401,4 01.1445.104dvro,t4MINa "PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATE14IAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY erita-ed TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)." The Supreme Court and Educational Policy: The Protected Interests in Education A paper prepared for presentation at the National Conference of Profess9rs of Educational Administration held at Southwest Texas State University San Marcos, Texas August 1982 ' d . ,., by Donald F. Uerling Assistant Professor of.Eduational Administration ThejJniversity of Nebraska-Lincoln Lincoln, Nebraska -3- when the Court not only took a rather broad view of what constituted a protec,ted liberty interest, but also demonstrated a certain willingness'to invalidate legislation that interfered with the exercise of that liberty. The court clearly followed this approach in Meyer. The established doctrine is that this liberty maynot be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the public inter- est, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reason- able relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect. Determination by the legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts. 3 Both the nature of the interest and the intent of the legislation were examined. The Court recognized the importance of education and of access to educational opportunities. "The American people have always regarded education and acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be diligently promoted.- It was also pointed out that parents had a natural duty to give their children a suitable education and that nearly all states enforced that obligation by compulsory attendance laws. The purpose of the legislation was said to be the promotion of civic devel- opment by inhibiting education of the imMature in foreign tongues and ideals before they could learn EngLish and acquire American ideals. The Court acknow- ledged that the state could do much to improve the quality of its citizens, and that it was easy to appreciate the desire of the legislaiure to foster a homo- geneous people with AMerican ideals and the ability to understand discussion of civic matters. However, the Court believed that the legislative interference "with the calling of modern language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of parents to control the education of their own" 5 -4- exceeded the limitations on the power of the state and conflicted with the rights of the teacher. The Court concluded that the statute as plied was arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the compet .ycof the state. Although Meyer did suggest that a child might have a protec ed liberty , interest in education, this view was not specifically followed in\ter decisions. Leyer, did continue to stand for the proposition that education was imp tent, but the protected liberty interest that has continued to be recognized is More in the nature of adults' freedoms in regard to procreation, marriage, and the raising of children. 6 In a number of subsequent education-related cases that involved conflicts between the rights of the individual and the authority of the state, the Court readily recognized the importance of education. However, the issue in these decisions was not whether an individual had some protected right to an educa- tion, but whether the state had the authority to infringe on those freedoms protected by the First Amendment. During the f930's, the Court abandoned the doctrine of substantive review of state legislation, at least in those instancec where no clearly discernible constitutionally protected rights were involved. However, the Court had adopted the incorporation doctrine, by which selected protections of the Bill of RigKts were applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It should be noted that several "landmark" decisions of the Court such as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 7 (public school children cannot be compelled to salute the flag and pledge allegiance), Epperson v. Arkansas 8 (a statute prohibiting the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools was unconstitutiona)), and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent'Community School District 9 (a rule against students wearing black armbands in school was not constitutionally permissible), turned -5- on those freedoms of speech and religion protected by,the First Amendment, , rather than on any specific liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause: An interesting variation on the theme of the importance of education was provided by Wisconsin v. Yoder.VO, That decision turned on the balancing of the state's interest in education with the individual's 'right of freedom of religion. The issue in Yoder was whether the Wisconsin ,ompulsory attendance law that required children to attend school until age sixteen could be enforced against Amish parents. Although the Amish did not object to the elementary education needed to acquire basic skills, they did object to formal education beyond the eighth grade on the grounds that high school education conflicted with Amish -r religious beliefs and practices. The evidence was found to support the Amish claim that enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory formal education beyond the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exer- cise of Vieir religious beliefs. The Court had no doubt as to the power of the State to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education. "Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State." 11 Nevertheless, the State's interest in universal education, however highly regarded, was found to be not totally free from a balancing process when it impinged on fundamental rights and interests, sUch as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The State's duty to protect children from ignorance could not be questioned; however, the Court pointed out that, when Thomas Jefferson emphasized the need for education as a bulwark of a free people against tyranny, there was nothing to indicate he had in mind compulsory education through any fixed a6e beyond a basic education. The Amish provided their children not only with a basic -8- guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court noted that "to separate [minority children] from othersof similar age and qualification f.olely because of their race generates a. feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. .15 The Court concluded that in the field of public education the doc- , trine of separate but equal had no place, and that separate educational facilitieg were inherently unequal. The Brown analysis suggested that in some equal protection Cases the COurt would consider the interaction between the classification utilized and the interest affected. However, it should also be recdgnized that Brown 'Was an --77- equal protection decision in which the racial clapification involved was of more consequence than the nature of the interest in education. This became apparent in subsequent,decisions, as the Court struck down racial classifications used'in,bther contexts. The question of whether there is a, right to an education that is protected by the Constitution of the United States,was squarely confronted EilY the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez. 16 The case involved a constitutional challenge to the Texas school finance legislation. Although the state plan included both state and local funds, there was a heavy reliance on local property taxes, and districts with a high property tax base were able tospend more money per student than those districts with a low property tax base. The issue was whether the state plan, with the interdistrict resource disparities, violated the Equal Protection Clause. A three-judge federal district court found that wealth was a "suspect" classification and that education was a "fundamental" interest, and held that the Texas school finance system was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed that district court judgment in a five-to-Four decision. -9- Rodt.ez was significant not only in terms of the.educational policy considerations, but also because of the framework for equal protection analysis that was provided. The,Court identified two levels of judicial review - a strict scrutin3; test and a rational basis test. The Court had found strict ludicial scrutiny appropriate 'in reviewing legislative judgments that either interfered with fundamental constitution rights or involved suspect classifications. Strict scrutiny meant that die legislatton wa's not entitled to the usual presuMption of validity and the state rather than the Compl&inants must carry a heavy burden of justification. In contrast, the traditional rational basis siandard of review required only that the legislation be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes. The Rodriquez Court concluded that the strict Krutiny test was inappro- priate in that case. FirsX the system dtd not operate to the peculiar disad- vantage of any "suspect" class, because no suspect class of poor people had ever been specifically identified. Second, the system did not interfere with = the exercise 'Cif any "fundamental" riabt, because education was not such a right. It is the Court's resolution of this second issue - Whether education is a fundamental right, in the sense that it is among the rj.ghts and liberties protected by the Constitution - that is the special concern of this paper. Brown, Yoder, tleyer, and a number of other cases were cited in acknowledgment of both the importance of education and.the vital role of education in a free society. How- \\ever, the Court pointed out that "the importance of a service performed by the 'State does not determine whether it must be regardWas fundamental for purposes f examination under the Equal Protection Clause. u17 1 -10- The Court did not believe that it was its function "to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the laws." 18 Nor was the key to discovering whether education was fundamental to be found by comparing the significance of education to that of other rights arid interests. Rather, t'he answer lay "in asSessing whether there is a right to education explicitl,y or impli\citly guaranteed by the Constitution."19 Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected. As we have said, the undisputed importance of education will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual standard for reviewing a State's social and economic 1egislation.2° Those challenging the constitutionality of the state's financing plan 1100. had contended that education was distinguishable from other goods and services provided by the state because of its close relationship to other protected rights and liberties, such as freedom of speech and the intelligent utilization of the right to vote. The Court noted that it had long afforded zealous protection against unjustified interference with the exercise of those rights, but that it had never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority toguaranteethe most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice. The Court did seem to leave open the possibility that some minimal level of education might be constitutionally protected. Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of educati6 is a constitutionally prqtected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas provide an education that falls short. Whatever merit appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system occasioned an'absolute denial of educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no basis for finding an interference with funda- mental rights where only relative differences in spending are -13- on a broad but common ground . . . These perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists 23 The Court also noted that there was no inconsistency between ttiis recognition of the vital significance of public education and the holding in Rodriquez that access to education is not guaranteed by the.Constitution. The teacher's role in the education process was examined and found to be of special significance. Within the public school system, teachers play a critical part in dev.eloping students' attitude toward government and understanding of the role of citizens in our society . . . (T)hrough both the presentation of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence the attitude of students toward 'government, the political process, and a citizen's social responSibilities. This influence is crucial to the continued good health of a democracy. 24 Furthermore, it is clear that all public schools teachers, and not just those responsible for teaching the courses most directly related to government, history, and cimic duties, should help fulfill the broader function of the public school system . . . . Certainly a state also may take account of a teacher's function as an example for students, which exists independently of particular classroom subjects . 25 In light of those considerations, the Court thought it clear that teachers came well within the governmental function principle. Therefore, the Constitution required only that a citizenship requirement for teaching in the public schools bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. The'legitimacy of the state's interest in furthering the educational ,goals outlines in the opinion was undoubted, and the Court found that the citizenship qualification was ra- tionally related to that interest. 5 , -14- In Ambach the importance of education was a factor in the Court's determination that the less demanding rational basis test was appropriate for reviewing state legislation that regulated how education was to be provided. This approach can be compared with that of a 1982 decision in - which the importance of education was a factor the Court took into account in determining that an intermediate level of scrutiny was appropriate for deciding whether a state could refuse to provide a free public education to a certain class of children. The nature orthe right to an education that is in fact protected by the Equal Protection Clause was extended somewhat by the CoUrt in this decition, i which involved two consolidated appeals7Plyler v. Doe and Texas v. Certain Named and Unnamed Undocumented Alien Children. 26 The Texas statutes provided for withholding from local school districts any state funds for the education of children who were not legally admitted into the United States and also authorized local school districts to deny enrollment in their public schools to such children. The issue presented was'whether, consistent with the protection of the Equal Protection Clause, Texas could deny to undocumented school-age children the free public education that it provided to children who were either citizens of the United States or legally admitted aliens. The Court held, in a five- to-four decision, that the Texas statute was unconstitutional. After first concluding that illegal aliens may claim the protection of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court turned to the equal protection analysis. Because it is perhaps the Court's cleareit statement to date regarding the equal protection standards of review (albeit in an opinion joined by only five justices), the.following language is provided. The Equal Protection Clause directs that "all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." (citation ommitted) But so too, "The Constitution does not require 16 1 -15- things which aft different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though theywere the same." (citation omitted) The inftial discretion to determine what is "different" and what is "the same" resides in the legislatures of the states. A legislature must haVe 'Llbstantial latitUde to establish classifications that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accomodate com- peting concerns both public-and private, anhat account for limitations on the praciical ability of the State to remedy every ill. In applying the Equal Protection Clause to most forms of state actiob, we Vius seek only the assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose. But we would not be faithful to our obligatipns under the Fourteenth Amendment if we applied so deferential a standard to every classification. The Equal Protection. Clause was intended as a restriction on st.ate legislative action inconsistent with elemental cobstitUtional premises. Thus we have treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that disadvantaged a "suspect class," or that impinge upon the exercise of a "fundamental right." With respect to such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of equal protection by requiring the State to demonttrate that its classificatfon has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. In addition, we have recognized that certain forms of lggislative classification, while not facially invidious, nenetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties; in these limited circumstances we have sought the assurance that the classification reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the State . 27 The Court then turned to the question of which standard of review was appropriate for this case. In making this determination, both the nature of -18- these illegal alien children of an elementary education, but believed that this was a policy question best left for legislative resolution. Given that illegal aliens did notconstitutesa suspect class and that education--even though its importance was beyond dispute--was not a fundamental right, the four dissenting justices believed that the Court's review should have been limited to whether the legislative classification ,bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. The dissenters belipved that the state had a legitimate reason to so allocate its resources for'education, and that therefore the statute met the rational basis test. An interesting question that was not.clearly answered in this decision is,// whether education per se is a sufficiently important interest to trigger some intermediate level of equal protection scrutiny, or whether this more demanding test will be applied only in these instances involving a denial of education to some discrete class of children. The opinion did seem to suggest that a narrow, majority of the Court may now rank education more highly than other government benefits. Furthermore, both this case andthe Brown desegregation decision seemed to indicate that the Court has been more demanding whenever the classification has not only resulted in a failure to provide equal educational opportunities, but in fact has had the adverse effect of relegating those in the affected class to anAnferior position. PerhaOs the nature of the right to an'education that is protected by the Equal Protection Clause is stated best by the expression "equal educational_ opportunity." Although there may be no substantive right to an education that is.specifically provided for by the Constitution, the doctrine of equal pro- tection does insure that whatever eduCational opportunities the state haS undertaken to provide for the majority, essent'ially the same opportunities must be provided for all. 2 0 -19- IV. THE DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. A 'somewhat different perspective from Mich to consider the nature of the intereits in education that are protected by the Constitution is,provided by the due process analysis. The leading case on the procedural due process rights of public school students was Goss V. Lopez.. 31 In this five-to-four decision, the Court held that students subject to 10-day disciplinary suspensions were entitled to the protections provided by the Due Process Clause. The school officials had contended that because there was no consti- tutional right to an education, the Due Process Clause did nch protect students against suspensions and expulstions. The Court first pointed out that this , contention misconceived the issue, and then provided the proper analysis of the nature of the, protected interests. The Fourteenth Amendment forbade a state to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. However, the protected property interests were not created by the ConstitutiOn, but were created and defined 4y independent sources such as state statutes or other rules that entitled the person to certain benefits. On the basis of state statutes providing for a free public education and for compulsory attendance, these students had legitimate claim's of entitlement to a public education. Such an entitlement was a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause, and could not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to procedural due process. The Due Process Clause also prohibited arbitrary deprivations of liberty, and where a person's reputation was at stake because of what the -20- government was doing to him, protected liberty interests were implicated. A suspension for misconduct could 'damage a student's reputation and interfere with later opportunities for education or employment; therefore, the Consti- tution required that some procedural sprotectkons be afforded! The Court noted that in determining whether dueTrocess requirements applied, it would look not to the weight but to the nature of the interest at stake. Even though a short suspensionwasarelatively mild deprivation, the Court's view was that.as long as a property interest was not de minimis, the gravity was irrelevant to the question of whether the Due Process Clause had to be taken into account Once it was determined that due process applied, the Court turned to the question of what process was due. For short-term suspensions such as those involved in Goss, the Court held that students were entitled to at least some kind of notice and some kind of hearing. For longer suspensions or expulsions, more formal procedures would probably be'required. The question of what process is due, after it has been determined that due process applies, has been explored more thoroughly in cases subsequent to Goss. 32 The Court has stated that this analysis requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that would be affected; second, the risk of error and the probable value of different procedural safe- guards; and third, the state interest, including the function involved and the administrative burdens that the different procedural requirements would entail. That the Court has not recognized education per se as a constitutionally protected right would seem to be of some significance in the context of school discipline. If only the kind of protected property or liberty interest identified in Goss are involved, then as long as school officials follow adequate due process procedures in an administrative hearing, the Court would be unlikely to overturn 29 FOOTNOTES 1. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 2. Id. at 399. 3, Id. at 399-400. 4. Id. at 400. 5. Id. at 401. 6. See, e.g., Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, -40; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 7. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 8. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 9. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 10. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 11. Id: at 213 12. Id. at 237 (White, J., concurring). 13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 14. Id. at 493 15. Id. at 494. 16. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 17. Id. at 30. 18. Id. at 33. 19. Id. at 33-34 , 20. Id. at 35. 21. Id. at 36-37 22. 441 U.S. 68 (1979). 23. Id. at 76-77. 24. Id. at 78-79 25. Id. at 79-80 26. - U.S. -, 50 U.S.L.W. 4650 (1982): 27. Id. at 4654. 25 28. Id. at 4655. 29 Id. at 4657. 30. Id. at 4661, (Burger, C.J. dissenting). 31 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 32. See, e.g.,, Ingraham v. Wilght, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977). 33 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975). 34 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 n. 44 (1977). 35 See, e.g., Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. '632, 640 1 (T04); But cf. Harrah Independent School District v. Martin,,440 U.S. 194, 198 (1979), (tenured teacher's position not an interest entitled to protection as a matter of substantive due process.) % , \\