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D E P A O TM ENT F THE A R M Y • • E U N I T E D S TAT S O A F A M E R I C R TH I S W E ' LL D E F E ND Joint Publication 3-16 Multinational Operations 01 March 2019 Validated on 12 February 2021 iii SUMMARY OF CHANGES REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-16 DATED 16 JULY 2013 • This publication was validated without change on 12 February 2021 • Removes and replaces Range of Military Options to a Competition Continuum. • Updates and cleans up graphics throughout the joint publication (JP). • Updates several of the quotes and examples throughout the JP. • Terminology and acronyms updated to current lexicon. • Utilizes “national” vice “political” will and decisions throughout. • Updated out of date reference Internet links. • ‘Stability operations’ changed to ‘stability activities’. • Emphasized Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations. • Enhanced the Multinational Logistic section. • Enhanced the Transition to Multinational Operations section. • Updates Appendix A, “Planning Considerations Checklist.” • Updates Appendix B, “Multinational Planning Augmentation Team.” • Updates Appendix C, “Multinational Strategy and Operations Group.” • Adds Appendix D, “Multinational Logistics.” • Adds Appendix E, “Commander's Checklist for Logistics in Support of Multinational Operations.” • Includes “Counter Threat Networks” under “Other Multinational Operations.” Summary of Changes iv JP 3-16 Intentionally Blank v TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................. viii CHAPTER I FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS Multinational Operations Overview ........................................................................... I-1 Strategic Context ......................................................................................................... I-1 Nature of Multinational Operations ............................................................................ I-2 Security Cooperation .................................................................................................. I-5 Security Cooperation Considerations ......................................................................... I-6 Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability ............................................... I-8 CHAPTER II COMMAND AND COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS Command Authority ..................................................................................................II-1 Unified Action ...........................................................................................................II-2 Multinational Force Commander ...............................................................................II-4 Overview of Multinational Command Structures ......................................................II-4 Multinational Command Structures ...........................................................................II-8 Multinational Force Coordination ..............................................................................II-9 Control of Multinational Operations ........................................................................II-17 Interorganizational Cooperation ..............................................................................II-18 CHAPTER III GENERAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS Diplomatic and Military Considerations .................................................................. III-1 Building and Maintaining a Multinational Force..................................................... III-3 Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks ............................................................ III-5 Language, Religion, Culture, and Sovereignty ........................................................ III-6 Legal ........................................................................................................................ III-8 Doctrine and Training ............................................................................................ III-10 Funding and Resources .......................................................................................... III-10 Protection of Personnel, Information, and Critical Assets ..................................... III-11 Rules of Engagement ............................................................................................. III-12 Combat Identification and Friendly Fire Prevention ............................................. III-13 CHAPTER IV OPERATIONS Land Operations ....................................................................................................... IV-1 Maritime Operations ................................................................................................ IV-3 Air Operations .......................................................................................................... IV-4 Space Operations ..................................................................................................... IV-7 Table of Contents viii JP 3-16 Intentionally Blank ix EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW • Describes the strategic context for multinational operations • Discusses the nature and tenets of multinational operations • Describes how security cooperation provides ways and means to help achieve national security and foreign policy objectives • Outlines command and coordination relationships within national and multinational chains of command • Discusses diplomatic and military considerations related to building and maintaining a multinational force • Describes how language, religion, culture, and sovereignty considerations effect planning for multinational operations • Outlines how land, maritime, air, space, information, and cyberspace operations are conducted in a multinational context Fundamentals of Multinational Operations Multinational operations are conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an international organization such as the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Strategic Context Nations form regional and global geopolitical and economic relationships to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), conduct peace operations, and promote their ideals. Cultural, diplomatic, psychological, economic, technological, and informational factors all influence multinational operations and participation. However, a nation’s decision to Executive Summary x JP 3-16 employ military capabilities is always a political decision. Nature of Multinational Operations The tenets of multinational operations are respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, mission focus, team-building, trust, and confidence. While these tenets cannot guarantee success, ignoring them may lead to mission failure due to a lack of unity of effort. National and organizational norms of culture, language, and communication affect multinational force (MNF) interoperability. Security Cooperation US national and Department of Defense strategic guidance emphasizes the importance of defense relationships with allies and partner nations (PNs) to advance national security objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts, and reduce the risk of having to employ US military forces in a conflict. Security cooperation (SC) activities are likely to be conducted in a combatant command’s daily operations. SC advances progress toward cooperation within the competition continuum by strengthening and expanding the existing network of US allies and partners, which improves the overall warfighting effectiveness of the joint force and enables more effective multinational operations. Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability International rationalization, standardization, and interoperability with PNs is important for achieving practical cooperation; efficient use of research, development, procurement, support, and production resources; and effective multinational capability without sacrificing US capabilities. Command and Coordination Relationships Command Authority Although nations will often participate in multinational operations, they rarely, if ever, relinquish national command of their forces. As such, forces participating in a multinational operation will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command. National Command. As Commander in Chief, the President always retains and cannot relinquish Executive Summary xiii case, a calculated diplomatic decision by each potential member of a coalition or alliance. The nature of their national decisions, in turn, influences the multinational task force’s (MNTF’s) command structure. Numerous factors influence the military capabilities of nations. The operational-level commander must be aware of the specific operational limitations and capabilities of the forces of participating nations and consider these differences when assigning missions and conducting operations. MNTF commanders at all levels may be required to spend considerable time consulting and negotiating with diplomats, host nation (HN) officials, local leaders, and others; their role as diplomats should not be underestimated. Building and Maintaining a Multinational Force Building an MNF starts with the national decisions and diplomatic efforts to create a coalition or spur an alliance into action. Discussion and coordination between potential participants will initially seek to sort out basic questions at the national strategic level. Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks The MNFC’s staff should conduct a detailed mission analysis. This is one of the most important tasks in planning multinational operations and should result in a revised mission statement, commander’s intent, and the MNFC’s planning guidance. As part of the mission analysis, force requirements should be identified; standards for participation published (e.g., training-level competence and logistics, including deployment, sustainment, and redeployment capabilities); and funding requests, certification procedures, and force commitments solicited from an alliance or likely coalition partners. Language, Religion, Culture, and Sovereignty Differing languages within an MNF may present a significant challenge to command, control, and communications and potentially affect unity of effort if not mitigated. US forces cannot assume the predominant language will automatically be English, and specifying an official language for the MNF can be a sensitive issue. Therefore, US forces Executive Summary xiv JP 3-16 should make every effort to overcome language barriers. Religion. Each partner in multinational operations requires the capability to assess the impact of religion upon operations. Assigned religious affairs personnel serve as general planning considerations advisers to the command regarding religious factors among the local population, as well as assigned, attached, or authorized personnel. Culture. Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity—the result of their physical environment, economic, political, and social outlook, as well as the values, beliefs, and symbols that comprise their culture. Commanders should strive to accommodate religious and cultural customs, holiday observances, and similar concerns of MNF members. Sovereignty Issues. Sovereignty issues will be among the most difficult problems the MNFC may be required to mitigate. Often, the MNFC will be required to accomplish the mission through coordination, communication, and consensus, in addition to traditional command concepts. National sensitivities must be recognized and acknowledged. Operations Land Operations In most multinational operations, land forces are an integral and central part of the military effort. The level and extent of land operations in a multinational environment is largely a function of the overall military objectives, any national caveats to employment, and the forces available within the MNF. National doctrine and training will normally dictate employment options within the MNF. Nations with common tactics, techniques, and procedures will also experience far greater interoperability. Effective use of SC activities may significantly reduce interoperability problems even for countries with widely disparate weapons systems. Executive Summary xv Maritime Operations During multinational operations, maritime forces can exercise sea control or project power ashore, synchronize their operations with the other MNF components, and support the MNFC’s intent and guidance in accomplishing the MNF mission. Maritime forces are primarily navies and coast guard; however, they may include maritime- focused air forces, amphibious forces, or other government departments and agencies charged with sovereignty, security, or constabulary functions at sea. Air Operations Air operations provide the MNFC with a responsive, agile, and flexible means of operational reach. The MNFC can execute deep operations rapidly, striking at decisive points and attacking centers of gravity. Further, transportation and support requirements can be greatly extended in response to emerging crisis and operational needs. Multinational air operations are focused on supporting the MNFC’s intent and guidance in accomplishing the MNTF mission and, at the same time, ensuring air operations are integrated with the other major MNF operational functions (land, maritime, and special operations forces). Space Operations MNFCs depend upon and exploit the advantages of space-based capabilities. Available space capabilities are normally limited to already deployed assets and established priorities for space system resources. Space systems offer global coverage and the potential for real time and near real time support to military operations. US Strategic Command, through the joint force component commander, enables commands to access various space capabilities and systems. Information All military activities produce information. Informational aspects are the features and details of military activities observers interpret and use to assign meaning and gain understanding. Those aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes that drive behavior and decision making. The joint force commander/MNFC leverages informational aspects of military activities to gain an advantage; failing to leverage those aspects may cede this advantage to others. Leveraging the informational aspects of Executive Summary xviii JP 3-16 Intentionally Blank I-1 CHAPTER I FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS 1. Multinational Operations Overview Multinational operations are conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an international organization such as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Commonly used terms under the multinational rubric include allied, bilateral, coalition, combined, or multilateral. However, within this publication, the term multinational will be used to describe these actions. There are two primary forms of multinational partnership the joint force commander (JFC) will encounter: a. An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. b. A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Coalitions are typically ad hoc; formed by different nations, often with different objectives; usually for a single problem or issue, while addressing a narrow sector of common interest. Operations conducted with units from two or more coalition members are referred to as coalition operations. 2. Strategic Context a. Nations form regional and global geopolitical and economic relationships to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), conduct peace operations (PO), and promote their ideals. Cultural, diplomatic, psychological, economic, technological, and informational factors all influence multinational operations and participation. However, a nation’s decision to employ military capabilities is always a political decision. b. Since Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, the trend has been to conduct US military operations as part of a multinational force (MNF). This could be under the auspices of a NATO operation, which may also include non-NATO nations (e.g., Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in 2011) or an MNF consisting of a coalition of nations that is formed without NATO (e.g., Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, 2014-present). “In the decades after fascism’s defeat in World War II, the United States and its allies and partners constructed a free and open international order to better safeguard their liberty and people from aggression and coercion. Although this system has evolved since the end of the Cold War, our network of alliances and partnerships remain the backbone of global security.” Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America Chapter I I-2 JP 3-16 Therefore, US commanders should be prepared to perform either supported or supporting roles in military operations as part of an MNF. These operations could span the range of military operations and require coordination with a variety of United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, foreign military forces, local authorities, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The move to a more comprehensive approach toward problem solving, particularly in regard to counterinsurgency operations, other counter threat network activities, or stability activities, increases the need for coordination and synchronization among military and nonmilitary entities. For more information on counterinsurgency operations and stability activities, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, Counterinsurgency; JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks; and JP 3-07, Stability. c. Much of the information and guidance provided for unified action and joint operations remains applicable to multinational operations. However, commanders and staffs should account for differences in partners’ laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, capacities, terminology, culture, politics, religion, language, and objectives. There is no “standard template,” and each alliance or coalition normally develops its own protocols and operation plans (OPLANs) to guide multinational action. While NATO Allied doctrine provides guidance and authorities for US forces when operating as part of a larger authorized NATO force, US forces should comply with US joint doctrine if NATO doctrine is in conflict. d. While most partner nations (PNs) recognize the range of military operations terminology, authorities, commitments, and imposed constraints and restraints may not mirror those of US forces who are now utilizing a ‘competition continuum’ (Figure I-1). Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, provides the NATO discussion comparable to JP 3-0, Joint Operations. For instance, some frequent partners do not plan, execute, and assess their Services’ operations from a joint perspective. Therefore, JFCs should establish early and continuous liaison that enhances mutual understanding of each MNFs’ member’s commitment. This enhanced understanding allows the JFC to consider the member’s operational, legal, and logistical constraints and restraints (as prescribed by each partner’s national law and policy) and facilitates operational planning that optimizes each contributing nation’s military capabilities. 3. Nature of Multinational Operations After World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower noted that “mutual confidence” is the “one basic thing that will make allied commands work.” The tenets of multinational operations are respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, mission focus, team- building, trust, and confidence. While these tenets cannot guarantee success, ignoring them may lead to mission failure due to a lack of unity of effort. National and organizational norms of culture, language, and communication affect MNF interoperability. Each partner in unified action has a unique cultural identity. Military forces, civilian agencies, NGOs, and international organizations approach military conflict from different perspectives. Fundamentals of Multinational Operations I-5 synergy and harmony, both within the joint force and with our multinational partners. Coordination and cooperation among organizations are based on trust. Trust is based on personal integrity (sincerity, honesty, and candor). Trust is hard to establish and easy to lose. There can be no unity of effort in the final analysis without mutual trust and confidence. Accordingly, the ability to inspire trust and confidence across national lines is a personal leadership quality to be cultivated. Saying what you mean and doing what you say are fundamental to establishing trust and confidence in an MNF. 4. Security Cooperation a. Security cooperation (SC) provides ways and means to help achieve national security and foreign policy objectives. US national and Department of Defense (DOD) strategic guidance emphasizes the importance of defense relationships with allies and PNs to advance national security objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts, and reduce the risk of having to employ US military forces in a conflict. SC activities are likely to be conducted in a combatant command’s (CCMD’s) daily operations. SC advances progress toward cooperation within the competition continuum by strengthening and expanding the existing network of US allies and partners, which improves the overall warfighting effectiveness of the joint force and enables more effective multinational operations. SC activities, many of which are shaping activities within the geographic combatant commander (GCC) campaign plans—the centerpiece of the planning construct from which OPLANs/concept plans (CONPLANs) are now branches—are deemed essential to achieving national security and foreign policy objectives. SC activities also build interoperability with NATO Allies and other partners in peacetime, thereby speeding the establishment of effective coalitions—a key factor in potential major combat operations with near-peer competitors. b. The Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) provides the foundation for all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments and supports the President’s National Security Strategy. With respect to SC, the GEF provides guidance on building partner capacity and capability, relationships, and facilitating access (under the premise that the primary entity of military engagement is the nation state and the means which GCCs influence nation states is through their defense establishments). The GEF outlines the following SC activities: defense contacts and familiarization, personnel exchange, combined exercises and training, train and equip/provide defense articles, defense institution building, operational support, education, and international armaments cooperation. c. GCC theater strategies, as reflected in their combatant command campaign plans (CCPs), typically emphasize military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities as daily operations. GCCs shape their areas of responsibility through SC activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. The GCC’s CCP provides a framework within which CCMDs conduct cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, SC activities lessen the causes of a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires substantial US military intervention. Chapter I I-6 JP 3-16 d. The CCP is the primary document that focuses on each command’s activities designed to attain theater strategic end states. The GEF and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, (U) Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) (referred to as the JSCP), provide regional focus and SC priorities. e. DOD components may develop supporting plans that focus on activities conducted to support the execution of the CCPs and on their own SC activities that directly contribute to the campaign end states and/or DOD component programs in support of broader Title 10, US Code, responsibilities. The Services conduct much of the detailed work to build interoperability and capacity with NATO Allies and mission partners. For additional information on SC, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation; Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5132.03, Department of Defense Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation; the GEF; and the JSCP. f. The DOD State Partnership Program establishes enduring relationships between emerging PNs of strategic value and individual US states and territories. The DOD State Partnership Program is an important contribution to the DOD SC programs conducted by the GCCs in conjunction with the National Defense Strategy, National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, Department of State (DOS), campaign plans, and theater SC guidance to promote national and combatant commander (CCDR) objectives, stability, and partner capacity. For more detailed discussion on the DOD State Partnership Program, see Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5111.20, State Partnership Program (SPP), and JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. 5. Security Cooperation Considerations a. Foreign internal defense (FID) is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. The focus of US FID efforts is to support the host nation’s (HN’s) internal defense and development, which can be described as the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from security threats. b. US military support to FID should focus on assisting an HN in anticipating, precluding, and countering threats or potential threats and addressing the root causes of instability. DOD employs a number of FID tools that interact with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, support civil administration, provide SC, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to an HN. FID typically involves conventional and special operations forces from multiple Services. Special operations forces (SOF), military information support forces, and civil affairs (CA) units are particularly well suited to conduct or support FID. Fundamentals of Multinational Operations I-7 c. Security force assistance (SFA) is DOD’s activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting institutions. The US military conducts activities to improve the capabilities and capacities of a PN’s (or regional security organization) executive, generating, and operating functions through the execution of one or more SFA tasks, that include organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding/building, or advising. While DOD primarily assists those FSF organized under the national ministry of defense (or equivalent regional military or paramilitary forces), the US military may support and coordinate with other USG departments and agencies that are leading USG efforts to develop or improve forces assigned to other ministries (or their equivalents) such as interior, justice, or intelligence services. d. Successful SFA operations require planning and execution consistent with the following imperatives: (1) Understand the Operational Environment (OE). This includes an awareness of the relationships between the stakeholders within the unified action framework, the HN population, business environment information, and threats. Key to SFA success is an in-depth understanding of the size, organization, capabilities, disposition, roles, functions, and mission focus of the PN’s security force. (2) Ensure Unity of Effort. Unity of command is preferred but often impractical. Command relationships can range from the simple to complex and must be clearly delineated and understood. Within a multinational context, establishing coordinating boards or centers assists unity of effort among the stakeholders. (3) Provide Effective Leadership. SFA seeks to provide and instill leadership at all appropriate levels of the FSF. Both MNF and HN leadership must fully comprehend the OE and be prepared and supportive for the SFA effort to succeed. (4) Build Legitimacy. The ultimate objective of SFA is to develop security forces that are competent, capable, committed, and confident to contribute to the legitimate governance of the HN population. (5) Manage Information. This encompasses the collection, preparation, analysis, management, application, and dissemination of information. (6) Sustainability. This includes two major efforts: the ability of the US/MNF to sustain the SFA effort throughout the operation or campaign, and the ability of the PN security forces to ultimately sustain their operations independently. (7) Do No Harm. SFA is often undertaken in support of complex operations and US/MNF actions can become part of the conflict dynamic that either increases or reduces tensions. SFA planners and practitioners must be sensitive to and maintain awareness for adverse impacts in the security sector and on the HN population. For additional discussion of SFA, see JP 3-20, Security Cooperation. Chapter I I-10 JP 3-16 establish commonality in procedures and equipment. The ABCANZ Standards are another type of ISA. The existence of these ISAs does not mean they will be automatically used during an alliance’s multinational operation. Their use should be clearly specified in the OPLAN or operation order. In addition, these ISAs cannot be used as vehicles for obligating financial resources or transferring resources. (4) Multinational publications (MPs) are a series of unclassified ISAs specifically developed by NATO. MPs provide signatory nations with common doctrine, TTP, and information for planning and conducting operations. These publications are available to all nations through a NATO sponsor. (5) Standardization agreements like AJPs, MPs, STANAGs, and ABCANZ standards provide a baseline for cooperation within a coalition. In many parts of the world, these multilateral and other bilateral agreements for standardization between potential coalition members may be in place prior to the formation of the coalition. However, participants may not be immediately familiar with such agreements. The MNFC disseminates ISAs among the MNF or relies on existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) and clearly written, uncomplicated orders. MNFCs should identify where they can best standardize the force and achieve interoperability within the force. This is more difficult to accomplish in coalition operations since participants have not normally been associated prior to the particular contingency. The same considerations apply when non- alliance members participate in an alliance operation. However, ISAs should be used where possible to standardize procedures and processes. (6) MNF SOPs provide for standardization of processes and procedures for multinational operations. For example, the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program developed an MNF SOP with the 31 MPAT nations, has used it within real-world contingencies, and routinely uses it in exercises and training throughout the Asia-Pacific region. e. Interoperability. Interoperability greatly enhances multinational operations through the ability to operate in the execution of assigned tasks. Nations whose forces are interoperable across materiel and nonmateriel capabilities can operate together effectively in numerous ways. For example, as part of developing PN security forces, the extent of interoperability can be used to gauge the effectiveness of SC/SFA activities. Although frequently identified with technology, important areas of interoperability may include doctrine, procedures, communications, and training. (1) Factors that enhance interoperability start with understanding the nature of multinational operations as described in paragraph 3, “Nature of Multinational Operations.” Additional factors include planning for interoperability and sharing information, the personalities of the commander and staff, visits to assess multinational capabilities, a command atmosphere permitting positive criticism and rewarding the sharing of information, liaison teams, multinational training exercises, and a constant effort to eliminate sources of confusion and misunderstanding. The establishment of standards for assessing the logistic capability of expected participants in a multinational operation should be the first step in achieving logistic interoperability among participants. Such Fundamentals of Multinational Operations I-11 standards should already be established for alliance members when the preponderance of NATO nations are representative of a particular alliance. (2) Factors that inhibit interoperability include restricted access to national proprietary defense information; time available; any refusal to cooperate with partners; differences in military organization, security, language, doctrine, and equipment; level of experience; and conflicting personalities. Chapter I I-12 JP 3-16 Intentionally Blank Command and Coordination Relationships II-3 b. Nations do not relinquish their national interests by participating in multinational operations. This is one of the major characteristics of operating in the multinational environment. Commanders should be prepared to address issues related to legality, mission mandate, and prudence early in the planning process. In multinational operations, consensus often stems from compromise. Somalian Piracy Threat Map (2005-2010) COMBINED TASK FORCE 151 Combined Task Force (CTF) 151, a multinational task force established to conduct counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and Somali Basin, operates under a mission-based United Nations Security Council Resolution mandate throughout the Combined Maritime Forces area of operations to actively deter, disrupt, and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security and secure freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations. Contributing nations have included ships from Australia, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Thailand, Turkey, and the US. In conjunction with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Union Naval Force, ships from CTF 151 patrol in the Somali Basin and the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor in the Gulf of Aden. CTF 151 also coordinates anti-piracy operations with naval forces from China, Russia, and India. Various Sources Chapter II II-4 JP 3-16 3. Multinational Force Commander a. MNFC is a generic term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the MNFC’s command authority is determined by the participating nations or elements. This authority can vary widely and may be limited by national caveats of those nations participating in the operation. The MNFC’s primary duty is to unify the efforts of the MNF toward common objectives. An operation could have numerous MNFCs. (1) MNFCs at the strategic level are analogous to GCC level. (2) MNFCs at the operational level may be referred to as subordinate MNFCs or a multinational task force (MNTF). This level of command is roughly equivalent to the US commander of a subordinate unified command or joint task force (JTF) and is the operational-level portion of the respective MNF. Integrated MNTFs, such as the NATO- led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), will have embedded MNTF personnel throughout the HQ. A lead nation (LN) MNTF HQ, like Multinational Force-Iraq, will be staffed primarily by LN personnel and augmented by personnel from other MNTF countries. Some integration in staff functions is possible, but the bulk of the work will be handled within the LN structure. The LN provides the commander and the majority of staff with the MNF HQ. Moreover, it is likely to dictate the language and command and staff procedures utilized. Ultimately, the LN assumes responsibility for all aspects of planning; execution; assessment; command, control, communications, and information structure; doctrine; and logistic coordination that supports it. Other nations assign contributions to the force and fulfill some positions within the LN’s staff. Figure II-2 illustrates an example of the various command levels. b. MNFCs should integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in the OA. All MNTF commanders plan, conduct, and assess the effectiveness of unified action IAW the guidance and direction received from the national commands, alliance or coalition leadership, and superior commanders. c. The MNF will attempt to align its operations, actions, and activities with NGOs operating in a country or region. NGOs may be precluded from coordinating and integrating their activities with those of an MNF to maintain their neutrality. d. Training of forces within the MNTF command for specific mission standards enhances unified action. The MNFC should establish common training modules or certification training for assigned forces. Such training and certification of forces should occur prior to entering the MNTF OA. Certification of forces should be accomplished by a team composed of subject matter experts from all nations providing military forces to the MNFC. 4. Overview of Multinational Command Structures No single command structure meets the needs of every multinational command, but national considerations will heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure. Command and Coordination Relationships II-5 However, participating nations should strive to achieve unity of command for the operation to the maximum extent possible, with missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities clearly defined and understood by all participants. While command relationships are fairly well defined in US doctrine, they are not necessarily part of the doctrinal lexicon of nations with which the US may operate in multinational operations. a. Organizational Structure. The basic structures for multinational operations fall into one of three types: integrated, LN, or parallel command. (1) Integrated Command Structure. A good example of this command structure (see Figure II-3) is in NATO, where a strategic commander is designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational makeup. The key factors in an integrated command are: (a) A designated single commander. (b) A staff composed of representatives from all member nations. (c) Subordinate commands and staffs integrated into the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the mission. Figure II-2. Notional Coalition Command and Control Structure Notional Coalition Command and Control Structure Legend strategic guidance and support national command collaboration consultation Operational Level Theater Strategic National Strategic Government and Military National Component Commander National Component Commander Commander Multinational Task Force National Strategic Commander Multinational Force Commander National Strategic Commander Nation #2 National Authorities Nation #1 National Authorities (Lead Nation) Nation #3 National Authorities Chapter II II-8 JP 3-16 element, to effectively administer its forces. The national component provides a means to administer and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations directly to the multinational commander, and facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations. In an administrative role, these national components are similar to a Service component command at the unified command level in a US joint organization. The logistic support element of this component is also referred to as the national support element (NSE). An NSE may provide common-user logistics (CUL) support to MNFs as well as national forces. It is also possible that in some operations, selected CUL would be arranged by the multinational joint logistics center (MJLC) (or equivalent), thereby reducing the role of the NSE in providing such logistics. 5. Multinational Command Structures a. In multinational commands, national objectives are addressed and generally subsumed within MNF objectives at the alliance treaty level. Typically, alliance command structures have been carefully developed over extended periods of time and have a high degree of stability and consensus, doctrine, and standardization. Established command structures may be modified or tailored for particular operations, especially during multinational operations that include non-allied members. b. Multinational command relationships often reflect either an integrated command structure or an LN command structure. Alliances typically have established command structures, support systems, and standardized procedures. In combined operations, such structures should be used to the maximum practical extent. Combined command and force structures often mirror the degree of allied member participation. Subordinate commands are often led by senior military officers from member nations. Effective operations within an alliance require the senior national and military authorities be in agreement on the type of command relationships that will govern the operations of the forces. Notwithstanding peacetime command relationships, the national sensitivities associated with actual operations will impact command relationships and operating procedures. c. Coalitions often form in response to crises that occur outside the area or scope of an established alliance or when the response requires more than an alliance can handle. Coalition command relationships, which evolve as a coalition develops, are most often characterized by one of two basic structures: LN or parallel. In coalition operations, member nations may initially desire to retain even more control of their own national forces than is generally associated with combined operations. At the outset of a coalition, nations are often reluctant to grant extensive control over their forces to one LN. Coalition counterparts are also sensitive to actions that might be construed as preferential to the LN’s interests. d. One means of ensuring the HQ is representative of the entire coalition is to augment the HQ staff with representatives from the participating coalition members, such as designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This provides Command and Coordination Relationships II-9 the coalition commander with representative leadership and a ready source of expertise on the capabilities of the respective coalition members and facilitates the planning process. e. During formation of the coalition, the early integration of the multinational national command elements into the coalition planning process can greatly accelerate building of unity of effort and reinforce the tenets of multinational operations. National command elements represent the national command channels from each individual nation within the multinational command. Meetings with the MNFC provide the setting for open, candid input from participating nations. f. LN and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This situation occurs when two or more nations or organizations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces. The command arrangement used by the Gulf War coalition (see Figure II-6) provides a good example of the intricate web of command structures possible. In that case, the US performed as the LN for a coalition of non-Arab countries while Saudi Arabia functioned as the LN for the Arab coalition members. A friendly forces coordinating council (since renamed to coalition coordination center [CCC]) provided the coordination conduit between the non-Arab (US-led) forces and the Arab/Islamic (Saudi-led) command structures. Terms in the figure reflect the terminology used in the operation. g. Figures II-7 through II-10 show examples of coalition command structures from Afghanistan ISAF (Figure II-8), the NATO Balkans Stabilization Force (Figure II-9), and the Balkans European Force Command (Figure II-10). In the Balkans, when the EU assumed the mission from NATO, NATO continued to maintain a military HQ and a place in the command chain as well, with a continued US presence in the country. These diagrams highlight the evolution of multinational command structures, especially those involving international organizations such as NATO, the EU, or the UN. These organizations add a layer of complexity to the command structure as nations have to answer to both the international organization chain of command, as well as their national leadership. 6. Multinational Force Coordination There are two key structural enhancements that should improve the coordination of MNFs—a liaison network and coordination centers. a. Liaison Network. Effective liaison is vital in any MNF. Differences in doctrine, organization, equipment, training, and national law demand a robust liaison structure to facilitate operations. Not only is the use of liaison an invaluable confidence-building tool, but it is also a significant source of information for the MNFC. During multinational operations, US forces should establish liaison early with forces of each nation, by fostering a better understanding of mission and tactics, facilitating the ability to integrate and synchronize operations, assisting in the transfer of vital information, enhancing mutual trust, gaining awareness and understanding of national caveats, and developing an increased level of teamwork. Chapter II II-10 JP 3-16 (1) Liaison is often accomplished through the use of liaison teams. These teams should be knowledgeable about the structure, capabilities, weapons systems, logistics, communication systems, and planning methods that are employed within their commands. Liaison requirements for US forces participating in multinational operations are usually greater than anticipated or staffed. Personnel liaison requirements should be identified Figure II-6. Coalition Command Relationships for Operation DESERT STORM (Land Forces) 1 Egyptian Corps 1 Syrian Division 2 Saudi and Kuwaiti Task Forces Bahrain, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, and United Arab Emirates Forces National Leaders of the United Kingdom National Leaders of Saudi Arabia Coalition, Coordination, Communication and Integration Center National Leaders of Arab/ Islamic Nations National Leaders of France National Command Authority British Force Commander 1st Armoured Division Joint Forces Command [Saudi] Joint Forces Command- East Joint Forces Command- North French Force Commander United States Force Commander VIII Corps XVIII Airborne Corps MARCENT 4x Army Divisions 3x Army Divisions Daguet Division I Marine Expeditionary Force 2nd Brigade, 82nd Division 18th Field Artillery Brigade 2x Marine Divisions ARCENT Coalition Command Relationships for Operation DESERT STORM (Land Forces) Legend national operational command operational command coordination ARCENT United States Army Central Command MARCENT Marine Corps Forces Central Command Command and Coordination Relationships II-13 Figure II-7. Order of Battle 2 319 Group West Group East Daguet Headquarters/ Reserves Logistics Plus several other company units Plus several other company units Command Post Red Command Post Green 2nd Brigade 18 82 1 1 FL 6 FL 1 4 D 1 6 2 3 3 4 6 FL 5 B 18 2 2 FL 54 27 1 6 2 82 325 10 39 27 325 9 8 325 6 8 503 16 96 6 3 3 4 1 11 6 Spahis 6 6 1st Parachute Hussards 1st Parachute Hussards Logistics Support Group 201 9 101 24 Order of Battle Legend D dragoons FL Foreign Legion MP military police PSYOP psychological operations SF special forces Black = American Blue = French NOTE: All cannon artillery is 155 millimeter except for 2/319th which is 105 millimeter. Chapter II II-14 JP 3-16 Figure II-8. International Security Assistance Force Coalition Command Relationships Legend International Security Assistance Force Coalition Command Relationships 2010 - 20xx United States United States United States United States Odin (ISR) Cyclone (Engineer) JFEC 30 Medical RC East RC Southwest NATO NATO NATO NATO United States United States RC West CTAG-A RC Capitol CTAG-P RC South Italy United Kingdom France Italy United Kingdom JIOC-A Paladin (C-IED) RST-East RST-Capitol CJIATF-North RST-South RST-West NATO NATO NATO NATO NATO United States United States United States United States United States United States United States RC North CAPTF BiometricsRST-North Germany United States United StatesUnited States NATO NATO NATOUnited States United States United States United Kingdom United StatesUnited States United States COMISAF/ USFOR-A NATO United States ISAF Joint Command ISAF SOF NTM-A/ CSTC-A CFSOCC CJTF 435 CAPTF combined air power transition force CFSOCC combined force special operations component command C-IED counter-improvised explosive device CJIATF combined interagency task force CJTF combined joint task force COMISAF commander, CTAG-A combined training advisory group-Army CTAG-P combined training advisory group-police International Security Assistance Force CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan ISAF International Security Assistance Force North Atlantic Treaty Organization ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance JFEC joint fires and effects cell JIOC-A Joint Information Operations Center-Afghanistan NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NTM-A Training Mission- Afghanistan RC regional command RST regional security transition SOF special operations forces USFOR-A United States Forces-Afghanistan Command and Coordination Relationships II-15 (e) Advise foreign military forces and governmental agencies on how to employ air/land/sea forces in specific operation situations. (f) Facilitate force integration for multinational operations. (g) Provide direct support to HNs by using air/land/sea resources to provide intelligence, communications capability, and air or aviation support. b. Coordination Centers. Another means of increasing MNF coordination is the use of a multinational coordination center (MNCC). US commanders should routinely advocate creation of such a center in the early stages of any multinational effort, especially one that is operating under a parallel command structure. It is a proven means of integrating the participating nations’ military forces into the multinational planning, operations, and assessment processes, enhancing coordination and cooperation and supporting an open and full interaction within the MNF structure. Normally, the MNCC Figure II-9. Stabilization Force Coalition Command Relationships Stabilization Force Coalition Command Relationships Legend (Netherlands)(Italy) (United States) (United States) (France) (United Kingdom) COMSFOR Chief of Staff DCOMSFOR DCOMOPS (United States) (Germany) (France) (United Kingdom) ACOS Support ACOS JMA ACOS Operations HQ CMDT CJ5 PIO Support Staff JMA Staff Operations Staff Canada Czech Republic Hungary Netherlands Spain France Germany Germany United States Czech Republic Denmark Netherlands Spain Turkey United Kingdom United States Germany COMSFOR Political Advisor DCOMSFOR Political Advisor DCOMOPS Political Advisor ACOS assistant to the chief of staff CJ5 plans branch CMDT commandant COMSFOR commander, stabilization force DCOMOPS deputy commander, operations DCOMSFOR deputy commander, stabilization force HQ headquarters JMA joint military affairs PIO public information officer Chapter II II-18 JP 3-16 8. Interorganizational Cooperation a. In many OEs, the MNF interacts with a variety of stakeholders requiring unified action by the MNFC, including nonmilitary governmental departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. Interorganizational cooperation includes the coordination between the Armed Forces of the United States; USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; NGOs; and the private sector. Interagency coordination is a subset of interorganizational cooperation. These groups play an important role in providing support to HNs. Additionally, the MNF should be aware of private-sector firms (e.g., businesses, contractors working for the military) operating in the OA. Though differences may exist between military forces and civilian agencies, short-term objectives are frequently very similar. CA or NATO civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) forces enhance interorganizational coordination through the establishment of a CMOC. b. Relationships. The MNFC’s relationship with these organizations will vary depending on the nature of the contingency and the particular type of organization involved. (1) Relationships with other governmental agencies (US and multinational partners) and international organizations should be clearly defined to coordinate required military support before commencement of operations, if possible. In some cases, other agencies may be lead agent for operations with military forces providing support. In other cases, the lead agency is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between allied and coalition forces and the agencies involved. The President, normally through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), should provide clear guidance regarding the relationships between US military commanders and USG departments and agencies. (2) To achieve the greatest unity of effort, the roles, missions, efforts, and activities of the international humanitarian community within the MNF OA should be factored into the commander’s mission analysis. Every effort should be made to formally include interorganizational coordination factors and requirements in MNF OPLANs. (3) In addition, the OPLAN should provide guidance to the MNFC regarding relationships with and support to NGOs and international organizations operating within the OA. A transition plan is essential when relieving, replacing, or relinquishing control to NGOs and international organizations. This must begin as early as possible in the planning cycle for such operations. Civil-military operations (CMO) planners should include international organization/NGO capabilities, limitations, and operations within the MNF’s plan whenever possible. c. Coordination Centers. One means of enhancing the working relationship between NGOs/international organizations when there is no command relationship is through their integration with existing coordination centers, as described in subparagraph 6.b., “Coordination Centers.” For additional information, see JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. Command and Coordination Relationships II-19 d. Agreements. The US DOS leads USG negotiations with international organizations and other nations’ agencies. Although Congress has tightly restricted the delegation of authority to negotiate and sign agreements with foreign nations, forces, and agencies to DOS, formal agreements between the US military and US civilian government agencies may be established. Such agreements can take the form of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) or terms of reference. Concluding these negotiations prior to the commencement of operations offers the best chance for success. There are regulatory and statutory fiscal constraints involving agreements between the Armed Forces of the United States and other US governmental departments and agencies. A staff judge advocate (SJA) should be consulted before negotiating or entering into any agreements outside DOD. For more detailed information on interagency coordination and on agencies expected to be involved, see JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation. Chapter II II-20 JP 3-16 Intentionally Blank General Planning Considerations III-3 (c) Conduct military-to-military senior leader and staff talks and exchanges; (d) Promote regional cooperation to meet shared challenges, as well as decrease tension and rivalries; (e) Conduct bilateral and multilateral exercises; and (f) Conclude formal arrangements for the use of facilities, basing, or transit of military forces. e. Employment. In most multinational operations, the differing degrees of national interest result in varying levels of commitment by PNs. While some countries might authorize the full range of employment, other countries may limit their forces to strictly defensive or combat service support roles. Some examples of PN contributions can be seen in Figure III-2. However, offers of national support should not be declined outright. Instead, every offer should be vetted through the MNFC and multinational partners and recognized as support to the operation or campaign. This process helps maintain the support of allies, friends, and partners and enhances the relationship. Additionally, multinational support will help increase the perceived legitimacy of operations domestically as well as internationally. For additional information regarding legitimacy, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations. For NATO operations, see AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations. 2. Building and Maintaining a Multinational Force a. Building an MNF starts with the national decisions and diplomatic efforts to create a coalition or spur an alliance into action. Discussion and coordination between potential participants will initially seek to sort out basic questions at the national strategic level. These senior-level discussions could include organizations like the African Union, UN, or NATO, existing coalitions or alliances, or individual nations. The result of these discussions should determine: (1) The nature and limits of the response. (2) The command structure of the response force. (3) The essential strategic guidance for the response force to include military objectives and the desired end states. b. Command Issues. When the response force is resident within an alliance, the procedures and structure of the alliance will normally determine operational-level leadership for the response force. When the response force is based in a coalition (or an LN structure in an alliance), the designated LN will normally select the operational-level leadership. The Multinational Interoperability Council’s Coalition Building Guide, describes the LN construct and could be used by an LN and potential partners as a starting point to address the coalition building process as it applies to multinational military operations, particularly at the strategic level. Chapter III III-4 JP 3-16 c. These designated military leaders will coordinate military requirements and actions between participating nations. In an alliance such as NATO, this would normally be the alliance’s military commander. The MNFC promulgates essential guidance to all members that should contain the following information: (1) Purpose of the multinational operation. (2) Mission statement for the MNTF. (3) Strategic end state and military end state for the MNTF. (4) Strategic objectives and broad tasks for the MNTF with guidance for termination or transition. (5) Participating nations and expected initial contributions. Figure III-2. Partner Nation Contributions Partner Nation Contributions Noncombat Forces Combat Forces Diplomatic Support Financial Support Logistics, Lift, and Sustainment OCS Basing, Access, and Overflight Support Stabilization and Reconstruction Support Governance and Ministerial Support Troops Ships Aircraft Staff Officers Trainers Diplomatic recognition Opening embassy or mission Supporting United Nations security resolution Debt forgiveness Unfreezing assets Direct financial assistance Logistic infrastructure Strategic air and sea lift Intratheater lift Operational contract support (OCS) Basing rights Access to facilities Overflight rights Humanitarian assistance Public infrastructure Constitutional support Ministerial mentoring Civil service training support General Planning Considerations III-5 (6) Designated LN and supporting guidance. (7) Common security interests. (8) Multinational communications strategy. (9) Specific diplomatic, economic, and informational guidance and national limitations, concerns, or sensitivities. d. When dealing with PNs, sensitivities and cultural differences must be recognized and acknowledged and procedures developed to mitigate or minimize additional conflict between nations. Some planning considerations for multinational operations may include language, culture and religion, diet, alcohol and tobacco consumption policies, male/female contact/cohabitation policies, openness to biometrics, work hours, leave, perspectives on ethics and corruption, working animals, ROE/rules for the use of force caveats, and other duty limitations. e. Maintaining a cohesive MNF may require the MNFC’s continual attention, as nearly every action or event may impact national and military interests and may compete for primacy with the MNF’s objective and end state. In some cases, national restrictions may seem wholly out of line with national contributions. This tension between national elements is not new, and commanders at all levels should be prepared to deal with it. As discussed earlier, nations join multinational efforts for a variety of reasons, both known and unknown. National will, popular support, and the perceived achievement of stated objectives are just some of the factors that might influence continued national participation. However, thorough pre-mission preparation and planning can pay significant dividends later as the MNFC faces the challenge of maintaining a stable MNF. 3. Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks a. The MNFC’s staff should conduct a detailed mission analysis. This is one of the most important tasks in planning multinational operations and should result in a revised mission statement, commander’s intent, and the MNFC’s planning guidance. As part of the mission analysis, force requirements should be identified; standards for participation published (e.g., training-level competence and logistics, including deployment, sustainment, and redeployment capabilities); and funding requests, certification procedures, and force commitments solicited from an alliance or likely coalition partners. b. Before the MNTF staff can develop proposed courses of action, the MNFC must conduct an estimate of the situation. This enables the MNFC to analyze, in an organized manner, the many factors that will affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission(s). This estimate should address the respective capabilities, national will, and national interests of the MNTF components. Additionally, expected interagency contributions and involvement of each nation should be addressed. This is a critical step as each nation determines its contribution to the operation. National force commitments, even in an established alliance, are not automatic. For example, a NATO non-Article 5 crisis response operation is one such case where nations can opt in or out based on their national interests. Based upon these national contributions, and after determining the tasks Chapter III III-8 JP 3-16 overflight rights, aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, railheads, border crossings, frequency management, and operations in the territorial sea. (a) Normally, such issues will be formally resolved with HNs through the development of appropriate technical agreements to augment existing or recently developed status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), status-of-mission agreements, or defense cooperation agreements (DCAs). These agreements, negotiated between the HN and the sponsoring organization on behalf of the participating countries, establish the detailed legal status of MNFs. (b) Authority to negotiate a SOFA or DCA is held at the national level. For US forces, some specified portions of that authority have been delegated to the Joint Staff and CCDRs. Neither the MNFC nor the staff has such authority without specific approval or delegation from higher authority. Before any negotiations or agreement with another nation, the SJA or appropriate legal authorities should be consulted. US forces remain subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which will be administered by the appropriate US commander. (2) The commander may also create structures such as committees to address sovereignty issues. These committees may be chaired by military or nonmilitary representatives of the HN to facilitate cooperation and build trust. These organizations could facilitate operations by reducing sensitivities and misunderstandings and removing impediments. In many cases, SC organizations, NGOs, and international organizations present in the HN can help establish good will with the HN. In some cases, these organizations may also be called upon to assist in the conduct of operations or in establishing a congenial relationship in the HN. 5. Legal a. Commanders must ensure the MNTF complies with applicable national and international laws during the conduct of all military operations. Participating nations should provide commanders with access to legal advice throughout the operation to facilitate a comprehensive understanding of any national differences. In operations under the authority of NATO, relevant alliance documents will be applicable. b. US forces will comply with the law of war (also referred to by other nations as the law of armed conflict) during all armed conflicts however characterized and in all other military operations. Additionally, US forces will be trained in the law of war IAW DODD 2311.01, DOD Law of War Program. US forces will report alleged violations of the law of war (for which there is credible information or conduct during military operations that would constitute a violation of the law of war if it occurred during an armed conflict) through command channels. Refer to DODD 2311.01, DOD Law of War Program, and CJCSI 5810.01, Implementation of the DOD Law of War Program. c. International Agreements. International agreements are the primary source of rules of international law applicable to US, multinational, and HN forces. SOFAs are one General Planning Considerations III-9 type of international agreement. SOFAs are normally comprehensive; however, these may be modified or become inapplicable in time of armed conflict. They prescribe most of the reciprocal rights, powers, duties, privileges, and immunities of the US forces, to include DOD civilians and contractor personnel stationed abroad and of the governments of the HN and PNs and their respective armed forces. Other important types of international agreements concern security assistance and HNS agreements. For specific information on HNS agreements (e.g., acquisition and cross-servicing agreements [ACSAs]) and international agreements (e.g., defense cooperation agreements), contact the US embassy military senior defense official or GCC’s legal advisor. d. Treatment of Detainees. During the conduct of military operations, MNF personnel must be prepared to detain a wide variety of individuals who fall into different categories under the law of war. Regardless of the category or status of a detainee, MNFs are required to properly control, maintain, protect, and account for all detainees IAW applicable domestic law, international law, and policy. Additionally, US forces should be aware that other participating nations may categorize detainees differently. For this reason, and because the excessive use of force or the perceived mistreatment of detainees can also seriously undermine public confidence in MNF operations, it is imperative commanders provide clear guidance for detainee operations in a multinational environment. For additional information, see JP 3-63, Detainee Operations. e. The DOD Detainee Program establishes overarching DOD detainee policy. The directive requires humane treatment of all detainees, however characterized, during all armed conflicts and in all other military operations. The standards of treatment set forth in the directive apply to all DOD components and contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF), when assigned to or supporting the DOD components conducting, participating in, or supporting detainee operations. These standards also apply to all non- DOD personnel as a condition of permitting access to internment facilities or to detainees under DOD control. For additional information, see DODD 2310.01E, DOD Detainee Program. f. Military Justice (1) Jurisdiction over US forces suspected of committing a criminal offense will be decided on a case-by-case basis, IAW applicable international agreements with HN civil authorities. It is US policy to retain jurisdiction in all criminal cases to the fullest extent possible. Foreign military commanders exercising operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) over US forces will not administer discipline. (2) Jurisdiction over non-US members of the MNTF in such circumstances will also be decided IAW applicable international agreements with HN civil authorities. Since national procedures with regard to jurisdiction will determine how each case will be handled, US commanders should defer such matters to the participating nation’s authorities. Chapter III III-10 JP 3-16 g. Commanders should coordinate with the joint force SJA to assist in resolving potential legal conflicts that arise during multinational operations, such as jurisdictional issues related to HN law and military justice, questions regarding compliance with international law, and issues related to the treatment of detainees. However, this does not relieve the commander of the responsibility to understand and apply pertinent directives related to the law of war and ROE. 6. Doctrine and Training a. Doctrine. Some nations, and international organizations, possess doctrine and training programs with a full treatment of strategic, operational, and tactical issues. Other nations have doctrine and training programs smaller in both scope and capability to match their national goals and objectives. When the Armed Forces of the United States participate in multinational operations, US commanders should follow multinational doctrine and procedures that have been ratified by the US. For multinational doctrine and procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures where applicable and consistent with US law, policy, and guidance. An example is the MNF SOP developed by 31 nations within the MPAT in the Asia-Pacific region. It seeks to identify common starting points for the rapid activation and forming of an MNTF for crisis response situations (see Appendix B, “Multinational Planning Augmentation Team”). b. Training and Resources. When the situation permits, MNFCs at all levels should seek opportunities to improve the contributions of member nation forces through training assistance and resource sharing consistent with agreements between MNF members. This could include development of interoperable C2 and joint fires capabilities and procedures; the sale or loan of equipment; consistent and shared doctrine; common TTP; and participation in multinational exercises, including training at US national training centers when appropriate. GCCs should include this information in the SC portion of their campaign plan. 7. Funding and Resources Financial and resource considerations may vary greatly with each multinational operation. Responsible parties need to become familiar with the added legal complexities and ramifications when operating with MNFs. Reimbursement and other funding issues are often complex. Many arrangements will be similar to those for UN operations while other financial arrangements will be based on specific coalition agreements, MOUs, or technical agreements. It is important to begin coordination of financial arrangements with prospective multinational partners as early in the planning process as possible. Often, financial arrangements may be supported by special US logistic and funding authorities (the US’s Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid provisions, for example). Examples of unique authorities include the provision of supplies, services, transportation, and logistic support to coalition forces supporting military and stability activities in Iraq and Afghanistan and authorities to use ACSAs to lend certain military equipment to foreign forces in Iraq and Afghanistan for personnel protection and survivability. Additional examples of authorities are: establish an OCS coordination framework to preclude MNF General Planning Considerations III-13 For additional information on standing rules of engagement, see CJCSI 3121.01, (U) Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces. 10. Combat Identification and Friendly Fire Prevention Tragically, “fog-of-war” situations can lead to friendly fire incidents. Rapid, reliable identification of friends, foes, and neutrals, also known as combat identification (CID) is a key survivability enabler that mitigates friendly fire incidents. a. Effective CID enhances joint force capabilities by providing confidence in the accuracy of engagement decisions throughout the force. The MNFC’s CID procedures should serve to optimize mission effectiveness by maximizing enemy engagements while minimizing friendly fire and collateral damage. These measures are particularly important in PO and traditional noncombat operations. Therefore, CID measures should be established early in the planning cycle. b. CID considerations play an important role in FP. The MNFC’s CID procedures must be consistent with ROE and not interfere with a unit’s or an individual’s ability to engage enemy forces and conduct actions appropriate for self-defense. CID characterizations, when applied with ROE, enable engagement decisions and the subsequent use, or prohibition of use, of weapons and capabilities that create lethal and/or nonlethal effects. When developing the MNF CID procedures, important considerations include the missions, capabilities, and limitations of all participants. For additional guidance on CID, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. c. MNFCs must make every effort to reduce the potential for the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel (to include civilians) by friendly fire. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, the fluid nature of the nonlinear OA, the changing disposition of attacking and defending forces, and the presence of civilians in the OA, increase the potential for friendly fire. For additional information on protection of civilians, refer to Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute’s Protection of Civilians Military Reference Guide (Second Edition) at http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/PoC_MilRefGd_2nd_ed_Web_reduced .pdf. d. Commanders must identify and assess situations that increase the risk of friendly fire in the OE and institute appropriate preventive measures. The primary preventive measures for limiting and reducing friendly fire are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component commands and multinational partners, exercises, reliable and timely CID, effective SOPs, technology solutions (e.g., identification, friend or foe; friendly force tracking), and enhanced situational awareness (SA) of the OE. Commanders should seek to minimize friendly fire while not limiting boldness and initiative. Chapter III III-14 JP 3-16 Intentionally Blank IV-1 CHAPTER IV OPERATIONS 1. Land Operations In most multinational operations, land forces are an integral and central part of the military effort. The level and extent of land operations in a multinational environment is largely a function of the overall military objectives, any national caveats to employment, and the forces available within the MNF. a. National doctrine and training will normally dictate employment options within the MNF. Nations with common TTP will also experience far greater interoperability. Effective use of SC activities may significantly reduce interoperability problems even for countries with widely disparate weapons systems. b. The MNFC may assign the responsibility for land operations to an overall multinational force land component commander (MNFLCC) or a task force (TF) within the MNF command structure (for example: TF South, TF North). Such TFs may include elements from a single nation or multiple nations, depending on the situation and the interoperability factors of the nations involved. In addition, the MNFC may also assign an area of operations (AO) to the MNFLCC or TF based upon the concept of operations (CONOPS). Figure IV-1 contains a representative sample of MNFLCC responsibilities. c. The MNFC will also establish supported and supporting relationships between the land component command or TF and other MNTF components (maritime, air, and special operations), based upon mission requirements, to assist in prioritizing actions; establishing the main effort; and establishing formal command/coordination channels between the components for a specific operation, mission, or phase. d. A fundamental consideration for planning and executing land operations is sustainability. The following factors impact the sustainability of land operations: (1) Personnel staffing requirements. (2) Medical requirements and capabilities. (3) Maintenance. (4) Supply. (5) Storage facilities. (6) Transportation. (7) Technical support and requirements. (8) Common sourcing of support. Chapter IV IV-4 JP 3-16 infrastructure ashore and facilitates the protection of supplies and logistics support. Maritime forces expand access options, reduce dependence on land bases, and create uncertainty for adversaries. e. Maritime transport vessels provide the bulk of heavy lift in support of multinational operations. See JP 3-32, Joint Maritime Operations, for details on maritime operations 3. Air Operations a. Air operations provide the MNFC with a responsive, agile, and flexible means of operational reach. The MNFC can execute deep operations rapidly, striking at decisive points and attacking centers of gravity. Further, transportation and support requirements can be greatly extended in response to emerging crisis and operational needs. Multinational air operations are focused on supporting the MNFC’s intent and guidance in accomplishing the Figure IV-2. Multinational Force Maritime Component Commander Notional Responsibilities Multinational Force Maritime Component Commander Notional Responsibilities Recommend to the multinational force commander (MNFC) the apportionment of the joint maritime effort (after consultation with other component commanders). Provide maritime forces to other component commanders in accordance with MNFC apportionment decisions. Control the execution of joint maritime operations, as specified by the MNFC, to include adjusting targets and tasks for available joint capabilities/forces. The MNFC and affected component commanders will be notified, as appropriate, if the multinational force maritime component commander changes the planned joint maritime operations during execution. Assign and coordinate target priorities within the maritime area of operations (AO) and integrate maneuver and movement, fires, and interdiction. The multinational force maritime component commander nominates targets located within the maritime AO to the joint targeting process that may potentially require action by another component commander’s assigned forces. Contribute to maritime domain awareness. In order to allow decision makers to understand complex security environments, maritime components must: Persistently monitor the maritime domain to identify potential and actual maritime threats; Fuse and analyze intelligence and information when possible; and Disseminate intelligence and information in near real-time to the MNFC and other component commanders. Function as the supported/supporting commander, as directed by the MNFC. Provide centralized direction for the allocation and tasking of forces/capabilities made available. Establish a personnel recovery coordination center in the same manner as the land component commander. Operations IV-5 MNTF mission and, at the same time, ensuring air operations are integrated with the other major MNF operational functions (land, maritime, and special operations forces). b. Overall MNF air operations will normally be assigned to a multinational force air component commander (MNFACC) (the designation will be based on the type of multinational configuration used in the operation). MNFACC plans, coordinates, allocates, and tasks air capabilities/force made available based on the MNFC’s air apportionment decision (see Figure IV-3). The MNFC will also establish support relationships between the MNFACC or TF and other MNF components based on MNF mission requirements, to assist in prioritizing actions and establish formal command/coordination channels between the components for a specific operation/mission or phase. c. Air Operations Planning. An integral part of the MNFC’s planning efforts is the concept of air operations. The MNFACC conducts air operations planning and develops the concept for air operations, describing how the multinational assets made available are envisioned to be employed in support of the MNFC’s overall objectives. Both US component commanders and MNFCs should provide highly trained liaison staffs to facilitate integration, coordination, and synchronization of their operations. Air planning should also include the use of logistic air assets and airfields. This is especially important for the coordination of tactical air operations with logistic operations, especially the air movement of supplies, their unloading, and rapid clearance from aerial ports. In the event that no established multinational guidance is available, planning considerations for multinational air operations should resemble those for joint air operations. Figure IV-3. Multinational Force Air Component Commander Notional Responsibilities Multinational Force Air Component Commander Notional Responsibilities Develop a multinational air operations plan to support the multinational force commander’s (MNFC’s) objectives. Recommend to the MNFC apportionment of the joint air effort, after consulting with other component commanders. Allocate and task air capabilities/forces made available based on the MNFC’s air apportionment decision. Provide oversight and guidance during execution of multinational air operations. Coordinate multinational air operations with other component commanders and forces assigned to or supporting the MNFC. Assess the results of multinational air operations. Support MNFC information operations with assigned assets, when directed. Function as the supported/supporting commander, as directed by the MNFC. Perform the duties of the airspace control authority, the area air defense commander, and/or the space coordinating authority as designated. Implement a personnel recovery plan for their own forces. Chapter IV IV-6 JP 3-16 See JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations, for details on the air planning process. d. Airspace Control. The primary purpose of airspace control is to increase combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, effective, and flexible use of airspace with minimal restraint imposed on the users. International agreements; enemy and friendly force structures; deployments and resupply operations; commanders’ concepts and operations; and operating environments such as foreign countries, the high seas, and amphibious objective areas will necessitate different specific arrangements for airspace control. Since participating nations’ policies and doctrines may vary in this regard, the MNFC should ensure early, common understanding of the boundaries and limits of all operational areas. (1) Responsibility. The responsibility for airspace control rests with the MNFC, who normally designates an airspace control authority (ACA) to coordinate the airspace control activities for multinational operations. In broad terms, the ACA establishes, coordinates, and integrates the use of the airspace control area. Subject to the authority and approval of the MNFC, the ACA develops broad policies and procedures for airspace control and for the coordination required among nations’ forces. (2) When operating outside of a combat environment and within the borders of another sovereign nation, the ACA may perform coordination rather than control over the airspace. In those situations, the ACA needs to establish an effective relationship with the HN airspace authority. In addition to increasing effectiveness, the HN interests are likely to include safe domestic civil aviation, efficient commercial aviation, and international overflight rights. Integrating airspace control efforts will have a positive impact on the overall relationship between the HN and the MNF. (3) The ACA establishes an airspace control system that is responsive to the needs of the MNFC, integrates the MNF airspace control system with that of the HN, and coordinates and deconflicts user requirements. Centralized direction by the ACA does not imply command authority over any assets. Matters on which the ACA is unable to obtain agreement are referred to the MNFC for resolution. The responsibilities of ACA and MNFACC are interrelated and should normally be assigned to one individual. If this is not possible, the ACA staff should be collocated with the MNFACC staff. See JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, for specific information on US joint operations and AJP-3.3.5, Airspace Control, for specific information on NATO operations. e. Air Defense. Air and missile defense operations must be coordinated with other operations, both on and over land and sea. The MNFC normally designates an area air defense commander (AADC) to integrate the MNF’s defensive effort. The responsibilities of the MNFACC, AADC, and ACA are interrelated and are normally assigned to one individual. When the situation dictates, the MNFC may designate a separate AADC and/or ACA. In those joint operations where separate commanders are required and designated, close coordination is essential for unity of effort, prevention of friendly fire, and deconflicting joint air operations. Operations IV-9 multinational plan for operations in the information environment is coordinated with all other aspects of the multinational operation. Toward that end, it is essential that from the initiation of planning those activities, and the structures, systems, and facilities that support them, be classified at the lowest level possible. (a) Each nation has various resources to provide both classified and unclassified information to a particular information activity. To maximize the benefits of information activities, all nations must be willing to share appropriate information to accomplish the assigned mission. However, all MNF members should understand each nation is obliged to protect information that it cannot share with other MNF nations. (b) Information sharing arrangements in formal alliances, to include US participation in UN missions, are worked out as part of alliance protocols. Information sharing arrangements in ad hoc multinational operations where coalitions are working together on a short-notice mission must be created during the establishment of the coalition. For more information, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-13, Information Operations. For NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations. (2) When the JFC is not the MNFC, it may be necessary for the JFC to brief the MNFC and staff on the advantages of operations in the information environment to achieve US and MNF objectives. The JFC should propose organizing a multinational IO cell. If this is not acceptable to the MNFC, the JFC should assume responsibility for using operations in the information environment to support US and MNF objectives. c. Multinational Planning for Operations in the Information Environment. Planning operations in the information environment to support multinational operations is more difficult because of complex approval and security issues, differences in the level of training of involved forces, interoperability of equipment, and language barriers. (1) How to plan multinational operations is the prerogative of the MNFC. The size, composition, and mission of the MNF, as well as diplomatic considerations, may influence how multinational IO is planned. Coordination at the IO cell level, with detailed planning at the individual element level, would give multinational planning for operations in the information environment the most consistency with US planning procedures. (2) The use of information should directly and demonstrably support the objectives of the MNFC. This is particularly important when joint force planners are attempting to acquaint a non-US MNFC with the advantages of operations in the information environment. (3) The subordinate JFC may undertake planning and execution of independent operations in the information environment in support of multinational objectives. See CJCSI 6510.01, Information Assurance (IA) and Support to Computer Network Defense (CND). Chapter IV IV-10 JP 3-16 d. Military information support operations (MISO) provide the commander with the ability to develop and convey messages and devise actions to influence select foreign groups and promote themes to change those groups’ attitudes and behaviors. MISO can also degrade the enemy’s combat power, reduce civilian interference, minimize collateral damage, and increase the population’s support for operations. MISO provide JFCs with ways and means to influence political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure aspects of the OE that may be as critical to operational success as actions against enemy and adversary military capabilities. Target audiences are individuals or groups selected for influence and may include enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral groups or populations. MISO should be incorporated into all multinational operations. (1) The MNFC should ensure all MISO, regardless of national origin, are coordinated. MISO planning must begin early, preferably before deployment, to prepare a population for the arrival of MNFs and develop communication channels that can be used from day one of the operation. A detailed analysis of a country’s culture, political climate, and military organization can help the MNFC to effectively apply MISO to communicate policy, provide information, and persuade groups to cooperate with friendly forces. US MISO require US granted authorities/permissions and are approved in US channels regardless of the composition of the MNF chain of command. (2) Many NATO and Partnership for Peace nations still use the term psychological operations in place of MISO. In the US, military information support forces are trained personnel who primarily conduct MISO. It is important not to confuse the psychological impact of other military operations with MISO. Many actions of the joint force, such as air strikes, have psychological impact, but they are not MISO unless their primary purpose is to influence the attitudes, rules, norms, beliefs, and subsequent behavior of a target audience. However, the psychological impact of such events can significantly enhance or undermine program effectiveness and is considered during planning, execution, and assessment. Regardless of the circumstances, all MISO are conducted within carefully reviewed and approved programs and under mission-tailored product approval guidelines that flow from national-level authorities. MISO officers advise the commander and operations officer on the possible psychological impacts of all actions and ongoing operations. See JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations, and CJCSI 3110.05, Military Information Support Operations Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, for additional information. 6. Cyberspace Operations a. Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, space-based resources, and embedded processors and controllers. Cyberspace uses electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) to create, store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems. Cyberspace operations seek to ensure freedom of action throughout the OE for US forces and our allies, while denying the same to our adversaries. Cyberspace operations Operations IV-11 overcome the limitations of distance, time, and physical barriers present in the physical domains. Cyberspace links actions in the physical domains, enabling mutually dependent operations to achieve an operational advantage. b. Nations’ understanding of the role of cyberspace in military operations continues to evolve. Operating capabilities, philosophies, and national limitations on cyberspace activities in support of military operations are changing at a tempo that affects ongoing MNF operations, as well as the planning of potential future ones. Mutually beneficial national interests usually govern a contributing nation’s involvement in MNF cyberspace operations. Cyberspace operations planning, coordination, and execution items that must be considered when an MNF campaign plan or OPLAN is developed can include the national agendas for each country of the MNF, which may differ significantly from those of the US, creating potential difficulties in determining cyberspace operations objectives. The level of multinational network and other cyberspace operations integration is directly influenced by differing national standards and laws, which may affect employment of PN cyberspace capabilities or willingness to participate in certain cyberspace operations. c. Multinational operations are becoming the norm for military operations, making intelligence and information sharing with PNs increasingly important. Cyberspace connectivity, security, and assurance are essential for the multinational and HN forces’ effective mutual support during operations. Cyberspace interoperability issues should also be considered in light of cybersecurity policy requirements. Security restrictions may prevent full disclosure of individual cyberspace operations plans and orders with multinational partners; this may severely hamper cyberspace synchronization efforts. While it may not be possible to share specific cyberspace plans, resources, and techniques with all partners due to restrictions, appropriate information on the broader intent, objectives, and messaging should be provided, enabling PNs to conduct effective, if unsynchronized, independent activities. d. The threat may use cyberspace operations to penetrate US, MNF, and HN networks to collect data on forces and systems or to create denial or manipulation effects. States are the principal actors on the global stage, but non-state actors also threaten the security environment with increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, cyberspace hackers, and other malicious non-state actors have transformed global affairs with increased capabilities of mass disruption. Our partners and allies in cyberspace go beyond just nation-states; multilateral organizations, NGOs, corporations, and other strategic influencers all provide opportunities for collaboration and partnership. For further information, read JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations. Chapter V V-2 JP 3-16 (7) Secure key infrastructure nodes and facilitate HN law enforcement and first responder services. (8) Develop and disseminate multinational communication-related themes to suppress potential new enemies and promote new governmental authority. (9) Coordinate OCS to preclude destabilization of market wage and vendor rates; monopolization of vendor capability, goods, and services; and competition among individual MNF members for resources. For specific details on stability activities, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 3-07, Stability; DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations; JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency; and JP 4-02, Joint Health Services. For NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.4.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction. 2. Special Operations a. SOF can provide the MNTF with a wide range of specialized military capabilities and responses. SOF can provide specific assistance in the areas of assessment, liaison, and training of HN forces within the MNTF OA. Special operations responsibility will normally be assigned to a multinational force special operations component commander (MNFSOCC) or to a TF within the MNF command structure. The TF may be made up of SOF from one nation or multiple nations depending on the situation and the interoperability factors of the nations involved. Figure V-1 contains a representative sample of MNFSOCC responsibilities. b. SOF may deploy ahead of the multinational operations to evaluate capability of foreign units and identify training necessary to integrate them into the overall plan. This capability is enhanced by routine interaction of SOF with foreign military units including, for example, combat aviation advisory support. SOF can make use of their language and cultural capabilities to liaise with multinational units as needed. SOF can train, advise, assist, and, in some cases, accompany HN or multinational forces to overcome existing shortfalls identified during the assessment. For specific details on special operations, see JP 3-05, Special Operations, and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense. For NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations. 3. Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations a. The MNF is critically dependent on the EMS. To prevail in the next conflict, an MNF must win the fight for EMS superiority. Devices whose functions depend on the EMS are used by both civilian and military organizations and individuals for intelligence; communications; positioning, navigation, and timing; sensing; C2; attack; ranging; and data transmission and information storage and processing. The military requirement for unimpeded access to, and use of, EMS is a key focus for joint electromagnetic spectrum operations (JEMSO), both in support of military operations and as a focus of operations themselves. Other Multinational Operations V-3 b. JEMSO are military actions undertaken by two or more Services operating in concert to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the electromagnetic operational environment (EMOE). These actions include all joint force transmissions and receptions of electromagnetic (EM) energy. The EMS is the range of all frequencies of EM radiation. EMS superiority is that degree of dominance in the EMS that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference, while affecting an adversary’s ability to do the same. c. JEMSO actions to exploit, attack, protect, and manage the EMOE rely on personnel and systems from the legacy EMS-related mission areas (e.g., signals intelligence, EMS management, electronic warfare [EW]). Instead of these mission areas being planned and executed in a minimally coordinated, stove-piped fashion, JEMSO guidance and processes prioritize, integrate, synchronize, and deconflict all joint force actions in the EMOE, enhancing unity of effort. d. Operations within the air, maritime, and land domains are similar in their EMS dependence through the execution of the joint functions. Since the EMS overlaps all the physical domains and the information environment simultaneously, JEMSO provides the processes to effectively prioritize, integrate, synchronize, and deconflict the EMS aspects of operations throughout the OE. Many space and cyberspace operations occur through Figure V-1. Multinational Force Special Operations Component Commander Notional Responsibilities Multinational Force Special Operations Component Commander Notional Responsibilities Advise the multinational force commander (MNFC) on the proper employment of special operations forces (SOF) and assets. Plan and coordinate special operations and employ designated SOF in support of the MNFC’s concept of operations. Issue planning guidance. Analyze various courses of action. Coordinate the conduct of special operations with other component commanders and forces assigned to or supporting the MNFC. Evaluate the results of . Synchronize sustainment for SOF. Establish a combat identification standing operating procedure and other directives based on MNFC guidance. Function as a supported/supporting commander, as directed by the MNFC. Focus operational-level functions and their span of control. Develop and support selected information operations efforts. Responsible for a personnel recovery plan covering their forces and should establish a personnel recovery coordination center. special operations Chapter V V-4 JP 3-16 the EMS, especially at the tactical level, and require close coordination with other JEMSO through EM battle management processes. e. Effective EMS management is essential to integrate and deconflict MNF use of the EMS for communications, C2, sensor operations, information activities, EW, directed energy capabilities, signals intelligence, and FP. The number, sophistication, and variety of systems operated by PNs make EMS management far more demanding in multinational operations than in joint operations. f. The MNFC provides guidance for planning and JEMSO to the MNF through the operations directorate of a joint staff’s combined electronic warfare coordination cell (CEWCC). Note: NATO/multinational terminology still references the CEWCC. Therefore, the CEWCC, not joint EMS operations cell, will be used when discussing NATO/multinational operations. For more information on spectrum management, refer to JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management Operations; JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare; and Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 3-16, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations. 4. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations a. The President of the United States is the approval authority for noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs), which will be conducted under the lead of the chief of diplomatic mission, the President’s personal representative to the HN. A NEO is conducted to relocate designated noncombatants threatened in a foreign country to a place of safety. NEOs are principally conducted by US forces to evacuate US citizens but may be expanded to include citizens from the HN, as well as citizens from other countries. b. NEOs are often characterized by uncertainty. They may be directed without warning because of sudden changes in a country’s government, reoriented diplomatic or military relations with the US, a sudden hostile threat to US citizens from elements within or external to a foreign country, or in response to a natural disaster. c. NEO methods and timing are significantly influenced by diplomatic considerations. Under ideal circumstances, there may be little or no opposition; however, commanders should anticipate opposition and plan the operation like any combat operation. d. NEOs are similar to a raid in that the operation involves swift insertion of a force, temporary occupation of physical objectives, and ends with a planned withdrawal. It differs from a raid in that force used is normally limited to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. Forces operating in foreign territory to conduct a NEO should be kept to the minimum consistent with mission accomplishment, the security of the force, and the extraction and protection of evacuees. e. In planning for a NEO, the chief of mission, GCC, and JFC may consider the possibility of operating with MNFs. When the NEO is to evacuate US citizens and Other Multinational Operations V-7 6. Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction a. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons or devices capable of a high order of destruction and/or causing mass casualties. The UN and the ICRC, as well as other NGOs, utilized the cluster coordination mechanism and organized the response in 11 thematic areas. The UN established a joint operations and tasking center at the tactical level which prioritized requests for all the military forces. President Barack Obama designated USAID as the lead federal agency, with the Department of Defense and 10 other departments and agencies supporting it. United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), the supported combatant commander, established Joint Task Force (JTF)- Haiti, which dwarfed USAID. USAID sent hundreds of people, while JTF- Haiti was in charge of over 22,000 servicemen. One USAID worker asked “How do we lead with such a small agency? We are smaller than a military band.” JTF-Haiti exchanged liaison officers with MINUSTAH and received liaison officers from Canada, France, and South Korea. The JTF commander appointed a Canadian exchange officer assigned to the US Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps to lead the JTF’s Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Cell, which was the focal point between US efforts and the cluster groups. The 2,000 person Canadian contingent JTF-Haiti collaborated with many other agencies, organizations, and nations. The relationship between the various militaries and the NGOs worked very well because it was based on commitment to the objectives, transparency between the participants, and open communication and coordination. USSOUTHCOM established the All Partners Access Network (APAN), an unclassified, nonmilitary computer network for use by all US Government agencies, international organizations, the UN, and NGOs. Through APAN, which JTF-Haiti treated as a core rather than adjunct tool to operationalize the “born unclassified” principle, US Government organizations posted imagery (satellite, unmanned aerial vehicles, and over 4,000 photographs from helicopter overflights) to better assist in identifying needs and also received imagery requests. Additionally, a UN civil-military coordination officer temporarily relocated to USSOUTHCOM headquarters where the higher-level military- civilian coordination was conducted. The United States Naval Ship Comfort allowed NGO medical staff on board and use of their facilities. The UN relied heavily on joint task force’s planning capabilities, and JTF- Haiti provided much logistic support, especially transportation, to the NGOs for distribution of supplies. With roads blocked by debris, the military transported NGOs and other military contingents and their supplies to isolated regions by aircraft and amphibious landing craft. Various Sources Chapter V V-8 JP 3-16 b. Countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) planning includes the development of global and regional multinational campaign plans to shape the environment to prevent the US and multinational partners from being attacked or coerced with WMD. The existence of CBRN materials, significant quantities of toxic industrial material, or the presence of pandemic influenza or infectious disease and the potential for use precipitates the need to plan, prepare for, and counter their use. c. CWMD is a continuous campaign that requires a coordinated multinational and whole-of-government effort to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD-related expertise, materials, and technologies. See JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, for CWMD planning considerations; JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, for CBRN planning considerations; and, for NATO-specific doctrine, see AJP-3.8, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defence. 7. Counterdrug Operations a. Counterdrug (CD) operations are inherently interagency and/or multinational in nature. DOD supports the USG lead agencies for both domestic and international CD operations, so military planning requires coordination and collaboration with relevant agencies and multinational partners. This helps ensure the effective integration of supporting military forces and equipment. Military planners must understand some of the agencies and multinational organizations that lead or might become involved in CD operations will have different goals, capabilities, limitations (such as policy and resource constraints), standards, and operational philosophies. b. Coordination and collaboration can be accomplished by integrating the efforts of military, civilian agency, and multinational planners early in the planning process. Military commanders who support CD operations must ensure interagency and multinational planners clearly understand military capabilities, requirements, operational limitations, liaison, and legal considerations and military planners understand the nature of the relationship and the types of support they can provide. Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment. See JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations, for more information. Also, refer to JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation, for interagency and multinational considerations. 8. Countering Threat Networks Countering threat networks through network engagement involves developing and partnering with friendly networks, which frequently, if not practically always, involve allied, coalition, or HN military forces. Under network engagement, the MNF would be a key element of the friendly network. The MNFC needs to understand the MNFs’ role in the friendly network and how to best enable other friendly partners to reach mission objectives, as well how to leverage PN authorities and capabilities. As with friendly partners in general, individual members of the MNF may have differing authorities and Other Multinational Operations V-9 capabilities that can affect how and in what ways they can partner with friendly, engage neutral, and counter threat networks. For more information on network engagement and countering threat networks, refer to JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks. 9. Personnel Recovery a. Personnel recovery (PR) is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. IAW DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of Defense, PR is applicable to all DOD personnel, including the military, DOD civilians, and CAAF. PR may occur through three options (diplomatic, civil, or military) or through any combination of these options. In multinational operations, PR may be a secondary task during NEOs and salvage operations. In addition, planning for peacetime search and rescue (SAR) operations must be considered. b. The MNFC must make a careful assessment of each MNF nation’s PR capability, restrictions, and procedures. Normally, each nation and/or component is responsible for conducting its own PR missions. However, participants may possess a variety of PR methods ranging from civil SAR to dedicated combat SAR. Therefore, the MNFC may designate an individual or establish an organization and procedures to coordinate this mission among all participants. c. Personnel Recovery Coordination Center (PRCC). The MNFC should create a PRCC to act as the MNF focal point for all personnel and equipment ready to perform PR within the AO. The actual name of the PRCC will be based on the arrangement of the participating nations and could be joint or multinational. PRCCs coordinate with all component PR activities, including coordination with the joint personnel recovery center (JPRC), if one has been established, and other component PRCCs. The MNFC should be prepared to establish a JPRC if directed or if designated as the joint force supported commander for PR. Further, the PRCC should be prepared to implement a PR plan and conduct PR for assigned forces. Functions of the PRCC include: (1) Coordinate PR operations, both within the MNF and with external organizations. (2) Advise the MNFC or designated component commander on PR incidents and requests. (3) Coordinate requests for augmentation to support recovery operations as required. d. PR operations may extend across national lines of responsibility. Operational flexibility, interoperability, and multisystem redundancy are the primary factors in successful PR operations. Commanders should know the PR capabilities available to maximize unified action, achieve economy of force, and enhance SA to enable those most Chapter VI VI-2 JP 3-16 from foreign military forces whenever possible within security guidelines. In some circumstances, the JFC will need to seek authority to go outside the usual political-military channels to provide information to NGOs. Unique intelligence policy and dissemination criteria may have to be tailored to each multinational operation. b. A multinational intelligence center is necessary for merging and prioritizing the intelligence requirements from each participating nation and for acquiring and fusing all the nations’ intelligence contributions. Likewise, the center should coordinate the intelligence collection planning and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations of each nation. Designating a single director of intelligence for the multinational command may assist in resolving potential disagreements among the multinational members. c. Every interrelated intelligence operation of the intelligence process—planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback—is substantively affected in multinational operations. In some international operations or campaigns, JFCs will be able to use ISAs (e.g., NATO STANAG) as a basis for establishing rules and policies for conducting joint intelligence operations. Since each multinational operation will be unique, such agreements may have to be modified or amended based on the situation. The following general principles provide a starting point for creating the necessary policy and procedures (see Figure VI-1). (1) Maintain Unity of Effort. Each nation’s intelligence personnel need to view the threat from multinational, as well as national, perspectives. A threat to one element of an MNF must be considered a threat to all MNF elements. (2) Make Adjustments. There will be differences in intelligence doctrine and procedures among the coalition partners. A key to effective multinational intelligence is the willingness to make the adjustments required to resolve significant differences such as: (a) How intelligence is provided to the commander, the commander’s staff, and forces. (b) Procedures for sharing information among intelligence agencies. Figure VI-1. Multinational Intelligence Principles Multinational Intelligence Principles Maintain unity of effort. Make adjustments. Plan early and plan concurrently. Share all necessary information. Conduct complementary operations. Other Considerations VI-3 (c) The degree of security afforded by different communications systems and procedures. (d) Administrative requirements. (3) Plan Early and Plan Concurrently. National command channels determine what intelligence may be shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning process. NATO and the Republic of Korea, via the Combined Forces Command, have developed and exercised intelligence policies and procedures with the US that provide examples of how multinational planning can be done in advance. (4) Share All Necessary Information (a) MNF members should share all relevant and pertinent information and intelligence about the situation and threat without violating national disclosure policy (NDP). They should also write and/or classify material for release to as many of our multinational partners as possible. However, avoid sharing information about intelligence sources and methods with multinational members unless approved by the appropriate authority. (b) FP is a mission inherent to any commander, and intelligence support to that mission is critical. Every effort must be made to share any data that could impact the commander’s FP mission. (c) The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) should establish procedures for separating intelligence from sources and methods. To the greatest extent possible, this information should be disseminated using a tear line to keep information above the tear line (compartmented data) and disseminate the intelligence below to facilitate intelligence sharing. Such considerations warrant increased emphasis for forces operating at the tactical level, where timely information is especially critical to mission success, as well as prevention of friendly fire and undesired collateral damage. When feasible, intelligence production organizations operating in a multinational environment should use the principle of “write for release” to facilitate timely dissemination of information to interagency, international, nongovernmental, or multinational partners. (d) The joint force J-2 should obtain the necessary authorizations from the foreign disclosure officers (FDOs) and designated intelligence disclosure officials from the CCMD J-2 or FDO as soon as possible. (5) Conduct Complementary Operations (a) Intelligence efforts of the nations should be complementary. HN security services’ capabilities, for example, may contribute significantly to FP. Regional partners will likely have unique cultural adeptness that make them more effective in disciplines, such as human intelligence, open-source intelligence, and counterintelligence, and some military partners may have more open intelligence exchanges with their respective law- enforcement counterparts. Furthermore, planning with friendly nations to fill shortfalls, especially linguist requirements, may help overcome such limitations. Chapter VI VI-4 JP 3-16 (b) All intelligence resources and capabilities should be made available for application to the whole of the intelligence problem. Establishing a multinational collection management element is essential for planning and coordinating multinational collection operations. See JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, for further details. d. Geospatial Intelligence Geodetic Datums. Multinational operations require interoperable geodetic data, applications, and data exchange capabilities. Whenever possible, participants should agree to work on standard vertical and horizontal datums that allow products to have common datum reference points. A multinational geodetic reference plan should be developed and used to coordinate all products for use by member forces, including access approval procedures and blending assets into a cohesive production program. See JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations, for further details. e. Biometrics. Biometrics—the process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, and behavioral characteristics—is an enabling technology used across multiple joint functions; applicable in movement and maneuver, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND COALITION INTELLIGENCE CENTER “We were established in 2001 at the beginning of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Under J-2 [intelligence directorate of a joint staff], we were established for the purpose of facilitating and sharing of intelligence. In the beginning, there was some operational tactical intelligence that we shared with our coalition members and that information was limited to just Afghanistan. But as the mission expanded into Iraq, we also had to expand our purpose of sharing and discussing information while establishing analytical teams to address specific questions from both the Coalition and the US. Our Center is the forum where most of those discussions take place. The Coalition countries are all invited to have membership in the Intelligence Center. We put in perspective the nation’s involvement with operations. Not every country has an intelligence interest and not every country has an intelligence officer assigned to United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). Those that do have an intelligence officer assigned at USCENTCOM will participate with us on a daily basis. Those that do not have an intelligence officer, but do have intelligence interests, usually go through their country’s senior national representative or through the operations officer to consult with us and discuss with us issues of common interest.” Colonel Evilio Otero, Jr. Chief, Coalition Intelligence Center US Central Command Coalition Village Other Considerations VI-7 information is shared by all the forces involved. The ability to exchange tactical information is especially critical for forces during execution. Information must flow quickly from sensors to fusion processes to analysts and decision makers and ultimately to those who execute actions. Some specific insights and recommendations from these operational lessons learned include: (1) Develop categories/groups in which information can be released or disclosed. Release is the physical transfer to another nation. With disclosure, the owning or originating nation maintains control, but the information may be visually or orally displayed to another nation. (2) Address information disclosure restrictions before major planning efforts and especially before execution. (3) Identify, delegate, and announce release authority early and to all concerned. (4) Identify and pre-stage classified documents (e.g., Adaptive Planning and Execution System plans and orders) to be made releasable and distributed to multinational partners at the right time. g. Communications and Processing Architectures. Due to the perishable nature of pertinent, releasable intelligence, it is imperative that a system be devised for and by the MNF members that is capable of transmitting the most important intelligence rapidly to units. Frequently, this system relies on the distribution of standardized equipment by one country’s forces to ensure commonality. The system must also be firmly rooted in a network of coalition LNOs at major intelligence production or communication centers, to provide redundant intelligence communications channels to their parent nation and to determine and obtain intelligence uniquely suited for that nation’s mission in time to exploit it. (1) Several nations maintain and utilize separate classified Internet and communications systems. For US forces, the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) is the primary classified architecture solely for US-specific communication and tasks not suitable for execution in a multination information-sharing environment. The same can be expected of US partners and allies utilizing their respective national classified systems for internal use. (2) Unclassified networks are an operational imperative. In addition to classified networks, an unclassified network using the Internet (commercially encrypted if available) is a communications backbone for multinational operations. To enable timely and efficient information sharing with nonmilitary organizations, the MNF should provide these organizations with access to current information on unclassified networks. MNFs should be aware that many NGOs/international organizations are hesitant to use DOD-sponsored information exchange Websites to avoid the appearance of close association with USG entities. In such situations, MNFs should first coordinate regarding these concerns and then be prepared to “push” information to specified organizational Websites. (3) MNF networks such as the BICES [battlefield information collection and exploitation system], if established, are able to provide responsive information sharing Chapter VI VI-8 JP 3-16 between the MNFs, but care must be taken to avoid the inadvertent sharing of classified information that has not been sanitized for release to other nations. Detailed planning for information sharing should be accomplished well in advance of operations with MNFs. This may be very complicated based on the multiple classification levels allowed and by the nature of PNs involved in the operation. Some PN countries have established intelligence-sharing agreements with the US STONEGHOST network. It is an encrypted communications network designed to support collaboration and intelligence sharing between the US defense intelligence community and its Commonwealth allies during combat operations. Other MNFs have long-standing relationships with US Services and intelligence agencies, but release of US-produced intelligence is subject to review by the FDO. The United States Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System (US BICES) and United States Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation System Extended (US BICES-X) are capabilities that provide the US intelligence community a mechanism for sharing intelligence with PNs who have the appropriate agreements with the US. By mutual agreement, US BICES also allows nations to use the system for bi- lateral or multilateral intelligence sharing by implementing additional security measures. US BICES-X services in support of United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) are known as the Asia-Pacific Intelligence Information Network. Within United States Central Command’s (USCENTCOM’s) area of responsibility, the system is referred to as the USCENTCOM Partner Network. US BICES-X is implemented with PNs or a grouping of nations in alignment with CCMD requirements and the appropriate policy, security, and technical agreements with the PN(s). The use of cross- network information security solutions should be used whenever possible to avoid the inadvertent sharing of information with networks external to those accessible by the collective membership of a specific MNF. Often, LNOs can bridge the culture gap between what multinational commanders/staffs say and what they mean. (4) The MNF networks will provide responsive information sharing between the MNF at both the unclassified level and the classified level. Mission partner information sharing provides an operational framework for planning, preparation, and execution of operations with mission partners supported by effective information sharing and data exchange. The mission partner information sharing framework integrates varied partner doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities and policy approaches to enable mission partners to rapidly establish an information sharing and data exchange network at an agreed security classification level and in a common language. For more information on mission partner information sharing, see DODI 8110.01, Mission Partner Environment (MPE) Information Sharing Capability Implementation for the DOD. h. Coordination. Within alliances, it is common for intelligence procedures, practices, and standardized agreements to be established and tested prior to actual use. Coalitions, however, are frequently created and disbanded relatively quickly. Coalition participants typically compensate for the lack of standardization through coordination between national leadership and prospective forces. As mentioned above, coordinating the elements of communications architectures is essential. Additional areas requiring extensive coordination include the friendly use of the EMS, use of space and/or space Other Considerations VI-9 assets, geographical location of intelligence collection assets, and targets of intelligence collection. Intelligence processing centers should be multinational in character, serving the MNFC but also recognizing intelligence that has value in support of national missions. However, establishment of these multinational processing centers, particularly in the case of ad hoc coalitions, will require extensive personal involvement and support from the MNFC and the corresponding nation to make this a functioning reality. The MNFC priority intelligence requirements should serve as the milestones to fully focus the intelligence effort. The answers can only be gained through effective coordination at all levels. i. Additional national and DOD-level references on information sharing useful to enhancing the information environment in support of joint and/or multinational operations include the National Strategy for Information Sharing, United States Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy, DOD Information Sharing Strategy, and DOD Information Sharing Implementation Plan. Additionally, the Defense Information Systems Agency has a Multinational Information Sharing Program Office with a mission to manage current multinational information sharing efforts, provide the standard multinational information sharing services and applications for future DOD information networks, and facilitate information sharing among DOD components and eligible foreign nations in support of planning and execution of military operations. 4. Communications a. Communications are fundamental to successful multinational operations. Planning considerations include frequency management; equipment compatibility; procedural compatibility; cryptographic and information security; identification, friend or foe; and data-link protocols. MNFCs should anticipate that some forces from MNF will have direct and near-immediate communications capability from the OA to their respective national leadership. This capability can facilitate coordination of issues, but it can also be a source of frustration, as leaders external to the OA may be issuing guidance directly to their deployed national forces. Many communications issues can be resolved through equipment exchange and liaison teams. When exchanging equipment, special consideration must be paid to the release of communications security (COMSEC) devices, as well as the level and nature of classified information (material) released to individual countries per NDP and any applicable exceptions. The ability of the MNF to exchange information at all levels (i.e., strategic, operational, and tactical) should be a consideration during planning and throughout execution. As difficult as communications are among all partners in the force during the operation, the problem is compounded when communications are degraded or denied and limited compatible resources are stretched even further. b. Communications requirements vary with the mission, size, composition, geography, and location of the MNF. It is critical that operations and communications planners begin the coordination process early to ensure both US and MNF communication requirements are identified and sourced prior to operations. Interoperability is often constrained by the least technologically capable participant. Effective communications support enables control over diverse, widely dispersed air, maritime, land, and space elements. Access to both military and commercial satellites should be an early planning