JP 5-0, Joint Planning, 01 December 2020, Lecture notes of Design and Analysis of Algorithms

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D E P A O T M ENT F THE A R M Y E U N I T E D S TAT S O A F A M E R I C R Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Planning 01 December 2020 iii JP 5-0 SUMMARY OF CHANGES REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 5-0 DATED 16 JUNE 2017 • Reorganizes to clarify the joint planning process and operational design: • Separates the planning process (Chapter III, “Joint Planning Process”) from operational design (Chapter IV, “Operational Design”). • Adds updated global integration processes and terms (global integration framework [GIF] and GIF development and review process). • Changes the definition of decisive point to “key terrain” vice “geographic place” to account for operations in cyberspace. • Expands discussion on global campaigning and campaign planning. • Updates and edits Chapters I, “Joint Planning,” and Chapter II, “Strategic Guidance and Coordination.” • Removes redundancies. • Eliminates references to Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and GEF-directed objectives. • Edits Appendix K, “Operation Assessment Plan.” Summary of Changes iv JP 5-0 Intentionally Blank v TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................... xi CHAPTER I JOINT PLANNING  Overview ............................................................................................................................. I-1  Strategy, Plans, Operations, and Assessments Cycle ....................................................... I-2  Planning............................................................................................................................... I-3  Principles of Planning ......................................................................................................... I-5  Planning Products ............................................................................................................... I-7  Shared Understanding ...................................................................................................... I-18  Risk Identification and Mitigation ................................................................................... I-20  Assessment ........................................................................................................................ I-23  Interorganizational Planning and Coordination .............................................................. I-24  Multinational Planning and Coordination ....................................................................... I-26  Strategic Guidance for Multinational Operations ........................................................... I-28  Review of Multinational Plans ......................................................................................... I-29 CHAPTER II STRATEGIC GUIDANCE AND COORDINATION  Overview ........................................................................................................................... II-1 SECTION A. NATIONAL AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE GUIDANCE  Introduction ....................................................................................................................... II-1  Strategic Guidance and Direction .................................................................................... II-1  National Security Council System ................................................................................... II-3  National Security Strategy ............................................................................................... II-3  Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development ..................................................................................................................... II-3  Department of Defense ..................................................................................................... II-4  Joint Strategic Planning System ....................................................................................... II-5  Combatant Commanders .................................................................................................. II-8  Commander’s Communication Synchronization .......................................................... II-10 SECTION B. APPLICATION OF GUIDANCE  Joint Planning and Execution Community .................................................................... II-10  Adaptive Planning .......................................................................................................... II-12  Operational Activities ..................................................................................................... II-13 Table of Contents viii JP 5-0 II-3 Key Planning Times .................................................................................II-15 III-1 Planning Functions, Process, and Operational Design Methodology ............................................................................................ III-4 III-2 Joint Planning Overview .......................................................................... III-5 III-3 Developing the Operational Approach ................................................... III-10 III-4 Joint Planning Process Steps .................................................................. III-11 III-5 Joint Planning Process: Mission Analysis ............................................. III-14 III-6 Mission Analysis Activities ................................................................... III-15 III-7 Potential Course of Action Evaluation Criteria ...................................... III-23 III-8 Probability of Event ............................................................................... III-24 III-9 Consequence Levels ............................................................................... III-24 III-10 Generic Risk Contour Graph .................................................................. III-25 III-11 Commander’s Critical Information Requirements ................................. III-26 III-12 Example Mission Analysis Briefing ...................................................... III-30 III-13 Joint Planning Process Step 3: Course of Action Development ........... III-33 III-14 Step-by-Step Approach to Course of Action Development ................... III-36 III-15 Example Course of Action Development Briefing ................................ III-43 III-16 Joint Planning Process Step 4: Course of Action Analysis ................... III-46 III-17 Sample Wargaming Steps ...................................................................... III-51 III-18 Joint Planning Process Step 5: Course of Action Comparison ............. III-56 III-19 Example of Staff Estimate Matrix (Intelligence Estimate) .................... III-57 III-20 Joint Planning Process Step 6: Course of Action Approval .................. III-59 III-21 Sample Course of Action Decision Briefing Guide ............................... III-60 III-22 Plan Development Activities .................................................................. III-65 III-23 Elements of Operational Design ............................................................ III-75 III-24 Joint Functions ....................................................................................... III-76 IV-1 Operational Design: Understanding the Operational Environment ........ IV-7 IV-2 Holistic View of the Operational Environment ........................................ IV-8 IV-3 Problem Identification ............................................................................ IV-12 IV-4 Operational Design: Defining the Problem ........................................... IV-13 IV-5 Operational Design: Developing the Operational Approach ................ IV-15 IV-6 Notional factors of Operational Design ................................................. IV-20 IV-7 Characteristics of a Center of Gravity .................................................... IV-23 IV-8 Center of Gravity Analysis ..................................................................... IV-25 IV-9 End State, Objectives, Effects, Tasks ..................................................... IV-27 IV-10 Sample Line of Operation ...................................................................... IV-30 IV-11 Sample Lines of Effort ........................................................................... IV-31 IV-12 Direct and Indirect Approach ................................................................. IV-34 V-1 The Campaign ........................................................................................... V-2 V-2 Campaign Planning and Execution ......................................................... V-11 V-3 Plan Relationships ................................................................................... V-13 VI-1 Campaign Plan Assessments .................................................................... VI-5 VI-2 Notional Assessment Working Group ...................................................... VI-6 VII-1 Operation Plan or Concept Plan Hand-Off (Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff to Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff ....................... VII-4 Table of Contents ix VII-2 Hand-Off Briefing (Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff to Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff) ..................................................................... VII-5 D-1 Department of Defense Force Structure and Global Force Management .................................................................................... D-2 E-1 Examples of Requested Diplomatic Flexible Deterrent Options ............... E-2 E-2 Examples of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Options ........... E-3 E-3 Examples of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options ................. E-4 E-4 Examples of Requested Military Flexible Deterrent Options .................... E-4 E-5 Flexible Response Option Content Guidelines .......................................... E-5 E-6 Flexible Response Option Scalability ........................................................ E-7 F-1 Example Numerical Comparison ............................................................... F-2 F-2 Example #2 Course of Action Comparison Matrix Format ....................... F-3 F-3 Criteria for Strengths and Weaknesses Example ....................................... F-4 F-4 Descriptive Comparison Example .............................................................. F-4 F-5 Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison Example ................................................. F-5 H-1 United States Transportation Command’s Functional Campaign Plan for Global Deployment and Distribution 9033 ......................................... H-2 H-2 Theater Distribution Plan Structural Format ............................................. H-3 K-1 Operation Assessment Steps ..................................................................... K-2 K-2 Step 1—Develop Operation Assessment Approach .................................. K-4 K-3 Information Collection Considerations ..................................................... K-7 K-4 Step 2—Develop Assessment Plan ........................................................... K-9 K-5 Step 3—Collect Information and Intelligence ........................................ K-10 K-6 Step 4—Analyze Information and Intelligence ....................................... K-11 K-7 Notional Battle Rhythm Integration ........................................................ K-14 K-8 Step 5—Communicate Feedback and Recommendations ...................... K-15 K-9 Step 6—Adapt Plans for Operations, Campaigns, and Assessment ....................................................................................... K-15 K-10 Linking End State, Objectives, Effects, Tasks, Conditions, and Mission to Tasks ............................................................................... K-18 K-11 Information Category Example ............................................................... K-21 K-12 Linking End State, Objectives, Tasks, Conditions, and Mission to Indicators ............................................................................... K-23 K-13 Comparison and Use of Information and Intelligence ............................ K-24 K-14 Data Collection Methods ......................................................................... K-29 Table of Contents x JP 5-0 Intentionally Blank Executive Summary xiii Principles of Planning Focused on the Objective. Joint planning is oriented on achieving an objective: plans and actions should contribute to achieving national objectives. Globally Integrated and Coordinated. Integrated planning synchronizes resources and integrates timelines, decision points, and authorities across CCMDs to enable the achievement of strategic and operational objectives. Resource Informed. Joint planning is resource informed and time constrained. Risk Informed. Planners assess and articulate risks and identify potential mitigation. Framed within the Strategic Environment and Operational Environment (OE). Planning requires an understanding of the OE as it exists and as it changes. Informs Decision Making. Joint planning must be agile and flexible enough to provide senior leadership with information to make critical decisions. Adaptive and Flexible. Planning is an adaptive process that occurs in a networked, collaborative environment. Planning Products While the planning process is generally the same for campaign, contingency, or crisis planning, the output or products may differ. Campaign and contingency planning encompasses the preparation of plans that occur in non-crisis situations with a timeline generally not driven by external events. Crisis planning uses the same process but is typically driven by external events and is almost always time constrained. Combatant command campaign plans (CCPs) provide the means to translate strategic guidance into activities executable by CCMDs. The two basic types of plans are campaign and contingency plans. Executive Summary xiv JP 5-0 Shared Understanding Civilian-Military Dialogue. Strategy is developed and joint planning is conducted at the United States Government (USG) department level. Joint planning supports the interaction between senior DOD civilian leadership, combatant commanders (CCDRs), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to help the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how to employ US military forces and resources. Adaptive planning provides a range of options at the operational and strategic levels. The complexity, rate of change, and inherent political nature of the strategic environment often drive policy makers to seek maximum strategic and operational flexibility. Providing Options and Aligning Resources. CCDRs provide options for the use of the military in conjunction with other instruments of national power. Further planning enables CCDRs to develop courses of action (COAs) that identify costs (including casualties) and risks associated with the options, a timeline, required resources and capabilities, and probability of success or failure of the military objectives in contributing to the desired national strategic objectives. Risk Identification and Mitigation Identifying Risk. Risk is the probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something valued. Commanders and senior leaders should account for risk when evaluating the likelihood of mission success. Risk can be assessed through the cost imposed by, or the impact on, achievement of the objective. Military risk is the estimated probability and consequence of the joint force’s projected inability to achieve current or future military objectives (risk-to-mission), while providing and sustaining sufficient military resources (risk-to- force). Mitigating Risk. Planners and CCDRs identify methods to mitigate risk as part of the plan. Assessment Commanders continually assess plans. At the CCMD-level, the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) and senior DOD leadership share Executive Summary xv this task. Assessments continuously measure the effectiveness of military operations and project the expected effectiveness of plans against contingencies as the OE changes. Assessments support decision making by measuring the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, achieving an objective, or attaining a military end state. Interorganizational Planning and Coordination Interorganizational planning and coordination is the interaction among elements of DOD; participating USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government departments and agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector to achieve an objective. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Coordination of interorganizational and multinational plans facilitates unity of effort among multiple organizations by promoting common understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and nonmilitary actions. Multinational Planning and Coordination Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations. Such operations are usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance, although other possible arrangements include supervision by an international organization (e.g., the United Nations or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe). Key to any multinational operation is unity of effort among national and military leaders of participating nations emphasizing common objectives and shared interests as well as mutual support and respect. Strategic Guidance and Coordination Strategic direction is contained in key documents, generally referred to as strategic guidance. Strategic direction may change rapidly in response to changing situations, whereas strategic guidance documents are typically updated cyclically and may not reflect the most current strategic direction. Executive Summary xviii JP 5-0 to the lowest tactical level across all relevant communication activities. Application of Guidance Joint Planning and Execution Community The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in joint planning or committed to a joint operation are collectively termed the JPEC.  The supported CCDR has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the CPG; CJCS Instruction 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) [short title: JSCP]; or other joint planning directives.  Supporting commanders provide forces, assistance, or other resources to a supported commander in accordance with the principles set forth in global force management policies and procedures. Supporting commanders prepare supporting plans as required.  Coordinating Authority. Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service (e.g., joint security coordinator exercises coordinating authority for joint security area operations among the component commanders) and may include USG departments and agencies and partner nations (e.g., as part of security cooperation planning). Adaptive Planning The intent of adaptive planning is to develop plans that contain military options for the President and SecDef as they seek to shape the environment and respond to contingencies. This facilitates responsive plan development that provides up-to-date planning and plans for civilian leaders. Operational Activities Operational activities comprise a sustained cycle of situational awareness, planning, execution, and Executive Summary xix assessment that occur continuously to support leader decision-making cycles at all levels of command. Joint Planning Process Planning is Commander’s Business Commanders own the planning process and must continuously participate in planning to provide guidance and expertise. The planner develops possible solutions to a problem presented in strategic or commander’s guidance. Planning Teams Planners should establish a team of experts to support the planning process. These are often called joint planning groups, operational planning teams, operational planning groups, or cross-functional teams and are normally led by either the plans directorate of a joint staff or the operations directorate of a joint staff. Transregional, All-Domain Planning When the scope of contemplated military operations exceeds the authority or capabilities of a single CCDR to plan and execute, the President, SecDef, or CJCS, when designated by the President or SecDef, identify a CCDR to lead the planning for the designated strategic challenge or threat. The commander’s assessment supporting this decision could be either the assessments of multiple CCDRs addressing a similar threat in their areas of responsibility (AORs) or a single threat assessment from a CCDR addressing the threat from a global, cross-AOR, or functional perspective. Situations that may trigger this assessment range from combat operations that span UCP-designated boundaries to the threat of asymmetric attack that overlaps CCMD boundaries and functions, thereby requiring strategic integration of two or more CCDRs’ campaigns and operations. Overview of Planning and the Planning Functions Although planning has an input (guidance) and an output (the plan or order), the planning process is a recursive, assessment-informed process and not linear. Issues discovered in later steps of the planning process can require adjustments to earlier steps. Planning consists of four functions, the planning process, and an operational design methodology. Executive Summary xx JP 5-0 The four planning functions of strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan assessment are generally sequential, although often run simultaneously to deepen the dialogue between civilian and military leaders and accelerate the overall planning process. SecDef, the CJCS, or CCDR may direct the planning staff to refine or adapt a plan by reentering the planning process at any of the earlier functions. The relationship between the application of operational art, operational design, and the joint planning process (JPP) continues throughout the planning and execution of the plan or order. By applying the operational design methodology in combination with the procedural rigor of the JPP, the command can monitor the dynamics of the mission and OE while executing operations in accordance with the current approach and revising plans as needed. The Joint Planning Process Through the use of operational design and the application of operational art, commanders develop innovative, adaptive alternatives to solve complex challenges. These broad alternatives are the operational approach. The JPP is an orderly, analytical set of logical steps to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order:  Planning Initiation (Step 1)  Mission Analysis (Step 2)  COA Development (Step 3)  COA Analysis and Wargaming (Step 4)  COA Comparison (Step 5)  COA Approval (Step 6)  Plan or Order Development (Step 7) Executive Summary xxiii  Force requires planners to know the science of warfare, the capabilities and limitations of blue force weapon systems and tactics, and the capabilities and limitations of the enemy’s weapon systems and tactics. Objective. The objective is the single most important element of operational design. The objective is why the mission is being conducted and should be determined first. Objectives may be broad or defined by a military end state as directed or informed by policy and strategy. Operational Environment The OE includes tangible and intangible factors that affect combat and support operations. Tangible factors include, but are not limited to, physical size, weather/climate, and geography (including lines of communication, distances, interior/exterior lines). Intangible factors include culture (including gender considerations), the information environment (including cyberspace), and population. Time Arranging Operations. Commanders must determine the best arrangement of joint force and component operations to conduct the assigned tasks and joint force mission. This arrangement will often be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to attain the end state conditions with the least cost in personnel and other resources. Anticipation. Anticipation is key to effective planning. Joint force commanders (JFCs) must consider what might happen and look for indicators of forecasted events. During execution, JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and be prepared to exploit opportunities. Executive Summary xxiv JP 5-0 Forces and Functions Commanders and planners can plan campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either enemy or adversary forces, functions, or a combination of both. Typically, JFCs structure operations to attack both forces and functions concurrently to create the greatest possible impact on the enemy and chance for success. JFCs can focus on destroying and disrupting critical enemy or adversary functions such as C2, sustainment, and protection. Attacking an enemy’s or adversary’s functions normally intends to destroy their balance, thereby creating vulnerabilities for exploitation. Defeat Mechanisms. Defeat mechanisms are the methods used by friendly forces in combat operations against an enemy force. Defeating an enemy means creating the conditions necessary to impose the desired strategic outcome on the enemy against the enemy’s will to oppose or resist that outcome. These aim at defeating armed enemies through the organized application of force to kill, destroy, or capture. The three basic defeat mechanisms are: destruction, attrition, and exhaustion. Balancing Commanders will rarely have all the resources or time desired for an operation. By understanding the relationship between the elements of operational design, commanders and planners can balance different factors to maximize the likelihood of success in the most efficient manner. The operational commander must decide which tradeoffs will produce the best balance. For example, commanders may decide to use an indirect approach and several phases, due to insufficient forces, or a direct assault on a center of gravity. Similarly, a commander may plan for an operational pause to use additional time to mobilize, deploy, or reconstitute forces. Check the Plan During all steps of planning, and again on completion of the plan, commanders and planners should review the plan to ensure: Executive Summary xxv  The plan does not violate any principles of joint operations.  The joint functions are addressed, interlaced, and reinforcing.  The plan achieves the objective or attains the military end state within an acceptable level of risk.  The plan does not foreclose future options. Campaigning DOD is tasked to conduct operations in support of achieving national objectives. To support the national strategy (as identified in the NSS and NDS), the CJCS oversees the development of the national military strategy, JSCP, global campaign plans, and global integration frameworks. In turn, CCDRs develop campaigns to support the global campaign and shape the OE in a manner that supports those strategic objectives. They conduct their campaigns primarily through military engagement, operations, posture, and other activities that seek to achieve US national objectives, protect US national interests, and prevent the need to resort to armed conflict while setting conditions to transition to contingency operations when required. Campaign Planning Campaigns and campaign planning follow the principles of joint operations while synchronizing efforts throughout the OE with all participants. Examples include:  Objective. Clear campaign objectives must be articulated and understood across the joint force.  Unity of Command. Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Executive Summary xxviii JP 5-0  Commander Centricity. The commander’s involvement in operation assessment is essential.  Subordinate Commander Involvement. Assessments are more effective when used to support conversations between commanders at different echelons.  Integration. Staff integration is crucial to planning and executing effective assessments.  Integration into the Planning Process and Battle Rhythm. To deliver information at the right time, the operation assessment should be synchronized with the commander’s decision cycle.  Integration of External Sources of Information. Operation assessment should allow the commander and staff to integrate information that updates the understanding of the OE to plan more effective operations.  Credibility and Transparency. Assessment reports should cite all sources of information used to build the report.  Continuous Operation Assessment. While an operation assessment product may be developed on a specific schedule, assessment is continuous in any operation. Staff Organization for Operation Assessment Cross-functional staff representation is required to effectively analyze progress toward achieving objectives. This provides the assessment activity with varied perspectives and broad expertise that are necessary for the assessment’s credibility and rigor. Conducting Operation Assessment The assessment process is continuous. Throughout the JPP, assessment provides support to and is supported by operational design and operational art. The assessment process complements and is concurrent with the JPP in developing specific and measurable task-based end states, objectives, and effects during operational design. Executive Summary xxix Transition to Execution Effective planning enables transition. Integrated staff effort during planning ensures the plan is a team effort and the knowledge gained across the staff in the planning process is shared and retained. This staff work assists in identifying changes in the OE and guidance, speeding transition to execution. The decision to execute will often be presented as an examination of options in response to a developing crisis or action by a competitor state or threat (state or non-state) rather than a specific directive to execute a specific concept plan or operation plan. Types of Transition There are three possible conditions for transitioning planning to execution.  Contingency Plan Execution. Contingency plans are planned in advance to typically address an anticipated crisis.  Crisis Planning to Execution. Crisis planning is conducted when an emergent situation arises.  Campaign Plan Execution. Activities within CCPs are in constant execution. Transition Process The transition process to contingency plan execution originates in the planning section with significant support from the intelligence staff. Planners synthesize strategic guidance from intelligence and existing plans. The output of this synthesis is a hand- off briefing to the crisis planning lead for the command. For crisis planning execution, plan transition follows similar steps but within the staff section responsible for crisis planning. Tools to Aid Transition Rehearsals, Exercises, and Staff Walks. For most likely contingencies, the commander may hold rehearsals to ensure transition activities are understood and the staff assessed. Transition Book. Commands may develop a condensed primer for the commander and staff that Executive Summary xxx JP 5-0 provides a rapid overview of options and requirements for a response. Staff Checklists. Staff section should develop detailed checklists by both functional areas and timeline on actions required to support crisis execution. Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs). Which of the CCIRs fall within the staff’s responsibilities? What else does the commander need to know within the staff’s responsibilities? Points of Contact (POCs) Lists. Although not specifically part of the plan, planners should have available a list of key POCs. Conclusion This publication is the keystone document for joint planning. It provides the doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles that guide the Armed Forces of the United States in planning joint campaigns and operations. Joint Planning I-3 3. Planning a. Joint planning is the art and science of interpreting direction and guidance, translating them into executable activities within imposed limitations, and assessing the environment to place the joint force in the best position to achieve objectives. Planning enables leaders to identify cost-benefit relationships, risks, and tradeoffs to determine the preferred COA. b. The four planning functions of strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan assessment are generally sequential, but they often run simultaneously to accelerate the process. Leaders may direct staffs to refine or adapt a plan by entering the planning process through any of the functions. Planners adapt to changes in guidance and the OE during each planning function. The joint planning and execution community (JPEC) synchronizes plans in the USG through ongoing civil-military dialogue. For the discussion on planning functions, see Chapter III, “Joint Planning Process,” paragraph 5, “Planning Functions.” c. Strategy, Strategic Art, Operational Art, and Operational Planning (1) Strategy is a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and multinational objectives. Strategy is also the art and science of determining a future state or condition (ends), conveying this to an audience, determining the possible approaches (ways), and identifying the authorities and resources (e.g., time, forces, equipment, and money–means) to achieve the intended objective, all while managing the associated risk. (2) Strategic art is the formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to implement policy and promote national interests. Practitioners evaluate the competing interests and objectives of state and non-state actors in the OE, organize joint forces to implement policy, and sense when revision is prudent. Strategies should provide a coherent narrative to bridge the present to the future. Enduring, effective strategy provides the conceptual basis for an integrated military operation or campaign. Visualization and conceptualization of strategic success achieved or supported by military means is the foundation of operational art and operational design. The essence of strategic art is distillation—organizing and articulating the complex interrelationship between national interests, policy, strategic ends, and practice, in clear terms. (3) Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs— supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and evaluating risks. In planning, many activities are done through a scientific methodology. These include identifying strengths and weaknesses of the opponent, validating requirements through checklists, and comparing the outcomes of analysis. However, planning for conflict and war is best based on operational art and the broad knowledge of commanders and planners that are not easily categorized. Chapter I I-4 JP 5-0 (4) Strategic art and operational art are mutually supporting. Strategic art provides policy context to objectives, while operational art demonstrates the feasibility and efficacy of a strategy. Operational planning translates strategy into executable activities, operations, and campaigns, within resource and policy limitations to achieve objectives. d. Understanding Problems (1) To provide definitive focus for the development of a strategy or plan, a clear, concise, and precise problem statement is essential. At its most basic, the problem statement answers the question “what is the nature of our problem?” While the problem statement should be as factual as possible, it is fundamentally a contextual hypothesis regarding the underlying causes of situations in complex and ambiguous environments. Even relatively minor differences in the hypothesis can drive substantial differences in the resultant strategy and plan. Problem statements may need to be refined, revisited, or validated as operations unfold and the OE becomes better understood or changes. (2) The second question commanders and staffs need to ask themselves before beginning work is, “Who is best suited to lead and/or resolve the problem?” In many cases along the competition continuum, it may be a non-DOD lead or require extensive efforts from non-DOD assets or organizations. After this analysis, the requisite interorganizational entity can be brought into the beginning of the planning process. Assessment of the OE, including contributing CCMDs and other organizations, keeps the commander’s strategic estimate current, increases its influence, strengthens planning, and improves execution. (3) Planners distinguish symptoms from root causes when defining problems and developing strategies and plans. Before planning, commanders and staffs should ask, “What problem are we really being asked to solve?” The root cause may not be articulated in strategic guidance. Identifying root causes should begin the civilian-military dialogue at the national level, as well as dialogue between the CCDR and JPEC stakeholders at the theater and functional level. For instance, killing or detaining insurgents seldom addresses the underlying causes of an insurgency. In fact, military action may exacerbate problems rather than solve them. Identifying the underlying problems informs commanders so they can develop operation or campaign plans to prevent, prepare for, or mitigate contingencies. (4) Understanding the problem enables planners to define desired objectives early in the planning process. By correctly identifying and understanding objectives and military end states, the planner should be able to articulate whether proposed planning tasks address only symptoms of the problem, rather than providing a solution. If strategic guidance appears to address only symptoms, other options for using the military instrument of national power should be raised through civil-military discussions. See Chapter IV, “Operational Design,” for more detailed discussion of identifying and understanding problems. Joint Planning I-5 4. Principles of Planning a. Focused on the Objective. Joint planning is oriented on achieving an objective: plans and actions should contribute to achieving national objectives. Planning begins by identifying the associated national objectives. The commander and staff evaluate strategic guidance, analyze the OE, and coordinate with senior leadership to identify national objectives. Joint planners align plans with national priorities and direct them to achieve national objectives. Planning also identifies and articulates the problem set against which military effort might be applied. The Joint Staff (JS), CCDR, Service, and National Guard Bureau (NGB) staffs work with DOD leadership in this effort. The CCDR, staff, Services, NGB, and SecDef (or designated representative) view problems from different perspectives. Examining and discussing the different perspectives is essential, because a directed military end state or objective may not necessarily result in the strategic objective envisioned by policymakers. Commanders, with their staffs, identify gaps between the directed military end states, the capabilities and limitations of employing the military, and the desired national objectives and then discuss such gaps with DOD leaders. b. Globally Integrated and Coordinated. Integrated planning synchronizes resources and integrates timelines, decision points, and authorities across CCMDs to enable the achievement of strategic and operational objectives. It should produce a shared understanding across the joint force of the threat environment, required decisions, resource prioritization, and risk. Integrated planning increases collaboration through robust JPEC coordination and across the whole-of-government to address the challenges facing the United States. Integrated planning recognizes the necessity to inform strategy that spans the competition continuum, requiring alignment of campaign and contingency planning. (1) Integrated planning addresses complex strategic challenges that span multiple CCMD AORs and functional responsibilities. Integrated planning synchronizes resources and integrates timelines, decision matrices, and authorities across CCMDs, the JS, NGB, DOD agencies, interagency partners, and multinational partners. Integrating plan development, in-progress reviews (IPRs), and assessment provides national leadership a holistic understanding of how a conflict could realistically develop, options for response, and how operations by one CCMD could affect the broader global OE. (2) Military forces alone cannot achieve national objectives. Joint forces must coordinate with USG departments and agencies (e.g., Department of State [DOS] for foreign operations and Department of Homeland Security for domestic efforts), allied and partner nations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, commercial entities (e.g., contractors), and local and regional stakeholders. Within an operational area (OA), the commander will also utilize network engagement, seeking to partner with friendly networks, engage neutral networks, and counter threat networks. In most cases, these networks will have ties with diasporas or links with international elements of a particular network. Networks that will form, evolve, dissolve, and reform in different arrangements. Individuals will often belong to several types of networks at the same time. Joint force commanders (JFCs) and staffs consider how to interact with friendly and neutral networks and how to counter threat networks. Planners coordinate and Chapter I I-8 JP 5-0 a. Campaign Plans. Campaign plans organize the day-to-day operations of the joint force to shape the OE and achieve national objectives. They establish objectives, conditions, and tasks under which the CCMD and Service components build operations, activities, and investments to achieve objectives (set conditions) in support of national policy. CCMD campaigns are proactive and rarely feature a single measure of military success implying victory in the traditional sense. (1) A campaign is a series of related military operations to achieve strategic and operational objectives in a given time and space. Campaigns are planned when contemplated objectives exceed the scope of a single operation. Thus, campaigns are often the most extensive joint operations in terms of time and other resources. CCDRs document the full scope of their campaigns in plans that include the campaign plan and all of its subordinate and supporting plans. (a) CCDRs plan and conduct campaigns and operations, while Service and functional components conduct operations, activities, battles, and engagements but not independent campaigns. CCDRs can plan and conduct subordinate campaigns or operations in support of another CCDR’s campaign. While intended primarily to guide the use of military power, discussions and decisions at the national level provide guidance for employing the different instruments of national power and should be included in the campaign plan, as should the efforts of various interorganizational partners, to achieve national objectives. (b) Campaign plans implement a CCDR’s strategy by integrating all CCMD current activities and establishing the conditions for contingency (potential) operations. A CCDR’s strategy and resultant campaign plan should be designed to achieve prioritized campaign objectives and integrate and synchronize all subordinate and supporting planning and operations. Campaign plans also help the CCDR identify resources required to achieve objectives and tasks directed in the CPG and JSCP for input into budget and force allocation requests. (c) Daily operations and activities should be designed to achieve national strategic objectives; to compete, deter, and prepare for crises identified in the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge [short title: (U) National Defense Strategy (NDS)], NMS, CPG, JSCP, and other strategic guidance; and to facilitate transition into a contingency operation. The campaign plan is the primary vehicle to organize, integrate, and execute security cooperation activities. Country-specific security cooperation plans are codified within the country-specific security cooperation section (CSCS) of the campaign plan. (d) Under this construct, plans developed to respond to contingencies are best understood as branches to the overarching campaign plan (global, functional, CCMD, or regional). They address scenarios that put one or more US strategic objectives in jeopardy and leave the United States no recourse other than to address the problem through military actions, not as part of an ongoing campaign or operation. Military actions can be in response to many scenarios, including armed aggression, regional instability, a Joint Planning I-9 humanitarian crisis, or a natural disaster. Contingency plans should provide a range of military options, to include flexible deterrent options (FDOs) or flexible response options (FROs), and should be coordinated with the total USG response. (e) United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) leads collaborative planning efforts to align and harmonize logistics functions and recommend sequencing of logistics actions primarily by guiding the development of theater distribution plans (TDPs) that support the CCP and other OPLANs. (2) Types of Campaign Plans (a) Global Campaign Plans (GCPs). GCPs address threats and challenges that significantly affect US interests across the globe and require coordinated planning across all, or nearly all, CCMDs. GCPs are identified in the JSCP based on guidance in the NDS and NMS and are managed by the CJCS in the role as global integrator on behalf of SecDef. GCPs form the base of the JSCP. (b) Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs). Regional planning guidance addresses regional threats or challenges that require coordination across multiple CCMDs. Generally, issues that require RCPs are not as significant a threat to US interests as GCPs but require attention to ensure they do not devolve into a more significant crisis. If necessary, SecDef, through the CJCS, could direct an RCP with a designated coordinating authority. (c) Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs). FCPs address functional threats or challenges that are not geographically constrained and require coordination across multiple CCMDs. (d) CCPs. CCPs are the centerpiece of the CCMDs’ planning construct and operationalize CCMD strategies. CCPs incorporate intermediate objectives and tasks assigned to the CCMD from the GCPs, RCPs, and FCPs within their geographic AOR or functional area. They link support and contingency plans, set priorities, and identify risks in requirements placed on the CCMD. CCPs focus the command’s day-to-day activities, which include ongoing operations and military engagement, including security cooperation, exercises, deterrence, and other shaping or preventive activities. CCPs organize and align operations, activities, and investments with resources to achieve the CCMD’s objectives and complement related USG efforts in the theater or functional areas. CCDRs identify the resources assigned and allocated to the CCMDs, prioritize objectives, and commit those resources to shape the OE and support the national strategic objectives. CCDRs evaluate the commitment of resources and make recommendations to civilian leadership on future resources and national efforts associated with executing the command’s missions. b. Contingency plans are typically prepared in advance to address an anticipated crisis and must be modified during execution to respond to conditions at the time of Chapter I I-10 JP 5-0 execution. If there is an approved contingency plan that closely resembles the emergent scenario, that plan can be refined or adapted as necessary and executed. (1) Contingency plans are branches of GCPs, FCPs, or RCPs that are planned for designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions without a crisis at-hand, pursuant to the strategic guidance in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), CPG, and JSCP and guidance given by the CCDR. The UCP, CPG, and JSCP guide the development of contingency plans, which address potential threats that put one or more national interest at risk in ways that warrant military operations. Contingency plans are built to account for the possibility that campaign activities could fail to prevent aggression, preclude large- scale instability in a key state or region, or respond to a natural disaster. An integrated contingency plan coordinates the activities of multiple CCMDs in time and space to respond to a single contingency that spans CCMD geographic boundaries or functional responsibilities. Designated coordinating authorities lead planning and assessments across CCMDs and provide recommendations to the CJCS for specific problem sets or missions. (2) Global integration frameworks (GIFs) are strategic frameworks for decision making and integrating joint force activities across the competition and conflict continuum. The JS develops GIFs to facilitate CJCS advice to SecDef and the President on global risks, trade-offs, and opportunity costs across and within campaigns during a global crisis or conflict. GIFs are informed by existing campaign and contingency plans, including GCPs and integrated contingency plans. A GIF identifies tasks, priorities, considerations, and decisions associated with the joint force’s ability to meet global requirements during a crisis or conflict. GIFs also identify potential President or SecDef decisions required to execute the global response to a priority challenge. These decisions may include risk mitigation options, reallocation and escalation management decisions, or early actions to preserve optionality. (3) Planners use the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP), existing contracts, and task orders to identify forces available for campaign and contingency plans. Planning for contingencies is based on hypothetical situations and therefore relies heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when a crisis arises. Planning for a contingency encompasses the activities associated with the development of plans for the deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces and resources in response to potential crises identified in joint strategic planning documents. An existing plan with a similar scenario may be used to initiate planning in an emergent crisis situation. To accomplish this, planners develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) that details the assumptions; adversary forces; operation phases; prioritized missions; and force requirements, deployment, and positioning. Detailed, wargamed planning identifies force requirements and training in preparation for the most likely operational requirements. It also enables rapid comparison of the hypothetical conditions, operation phases, missions, and force requirements of existing contingency plans to the actual requirements of an emergent crisis. Contingency planning allows the JPEC to deepen its understanding of the OE and sharpen its analytical and planning expertise. Joint Planning I-13 transregional implications that simultaneously threaten two or more CCDRs. In these situations, supported and supporting command relationships may be fluid. Forces and capabilities committed to mitigate emergent threats will likely require dynamic reallocation or reprioritization. These situations, increasingly the norm, highlight the importance of integrated planning and making force management decisions from a risk-informed, global perspective. Planning in response to a crisis generally results in the publication of an order and the execution of an operation. Crisis planning should help senior leaders determine if a military response can help achieve the desired objective at acceptable cost and risk levels. (b) Planning initiated in response to an emergent event or crisis uses the same construct as all other planning but is compressed to the time available. When possible, planners leverage previously prepared plans as a starting point in a crisis, modifying as required to meet the operational circumstances. If no previously developed plan is suitable, then planning begins from scratch. Regardless of whether a plan exists, a similar plan will be modified, or planning begins from scratch; the basic tenets of integrated planning always apply. In some cases, commanders and staffs may need to develop and approve a feasible COA with a notional TPFDD and assess possible contested environments, publish the plan or order, prepare forces, verify high-demand forces or capabilities (e.g., communications systems; lift; precision munitions; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR]) are sufficient, develop and execute an integrated intelligence plan [annex B (Intelligence)], and arrange sustainment for the employment of US military forces. Figure I-1 provides a comparison of planning for a contingency and planning in a crisis. (c) In crises, planners’ situational awareness is updated by continuous all- source intelligence and operations reports and assessment of operational activities. Identifying suitable and feasible military options in a crisis requires flexible procedures that evaluate time available, utilize rapid and effective internal and external communications, and consider previous planning products. (d) In a crisis or time-sensitive situation, the CCDR reviews previously prepared plans for suitability. The CCDR may refine or adapt these plans into an executable OPORD or develop an OPORD from scratch when no useful contingency plan exists. (e) Planning, whether performed as part of the command’s daily operations or in response to a crisis, uses the same construct to facilitate unity of effort and the transition from planning to execution. These planning functions can be compressed or truncated in time sensitive conditions. Planning activities may be performed sequentially or concurrently, with supporting and subordinate plans or OPORDs being developed concurrently. The exact flow of activities is largely determined by the time available and by the significance of the crisis. The following paragraphs summarize a compressed planning process. 1. When the President, SecDef, or CJCS decides to develop military options, the CJCS issues a planning directive to the JPEC initiating the development of COAs. This planning directive may request that the supported commander submit a commander’s estimate of the situation with a recommended COA. Normally, the directive Chapter I I-14 JP 5-0 will be a warning order (WARNORD), but a planning order (PLANORD) or alert order (ALERTORD) may be used if the crisis warrants accelerated planning. In a quickly Figure I-1. Planning Comparison Time Available Environment Facts and Assumptions JPEC Involvement Operational Activities Planning Functions Document Assigning Planning Task Forces for Planning Planning Guidance COA Selection CONOPS Approval Final Planning Product Final Planning Product Approval Execution Document Output As defined in authoritative directives (normally 6+ months) Distributed, collaborative planning Full JPEC participation (Note: JPEC participation may be limited for security reasons.) Situational awareness Planning Assessment Strategic guidance Concept development Plan development Plan assessment 1. JSCP (CJCS)/CPG (SecDef) 2. Planning directive 3. WARNORD (for short suspense planning) Apportionment tables in GFMAP CJCS issues JSCP or WARNORD. CCDR issues PLANDIR and TPFDD LOI. CCDR prepares COAs and submits to CJCS and SecDef for review. Specific COA may or may not be selected. SecDef approves planning or directs additional planning or changes. Campaign plan. Level 1–4 contingency plan. CCDR submits final plan to CJCS for review and SecDef for approval. Not applicable. Plan Significant use of assumptions Situation dependent (hours, days, up to 12 months) Distributed, collaborative planning and execution Rely on facts and minimal use of assumption Full JPEC participation (Note: JPEC participation may be limited for security reasons.) Situational awareness Planning Execution Assessment Strategic guidance Concept development Plan development Plan assessment CJCS issues: 1. WARNORD 2. PLANORD 3. SecDef-approved ALERTORD Allocated in WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD. CJCS issues WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD. CCDR issues WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD and TPFDD LOI to subordinates, supporting commands, and supporting agencies. CCDR develops commander’s estimate with recommended COA, and, as appropritate, alternative COAs to achieve different end states. President/SecDef approve COA, disapproves or approves further planning. OPORD CCDR submits final plan to President/SecDef for approval. CJCS issues SecDef-approved EXORD. CCDR issues EXORD. Order/Execution Planning for a Contingency Planning in a Crisis Planning Comparison Legend ALERTORD alert order CCDR combatant commander CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff COA course of action CONOPS concept of operations CPG Contingency Planning Guidance EXORD execute order JPEC joint planning and execution community JSCP Joint Strategic Campaign Plan LOI letter of instruction OPORD operations order PLANDIR planning directive PLANORD planning order SecDef Secretary of Defense TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data WARNORD warning order community Joint Planning I-15 developing crisis, the initial WARNORD may be communicated verbally with follow-on documentation to inform the JPEC. If the directive contains a force deployment preparation order or deployment order (DEPORD), SecDef approval is required. 2. The WARNORD should describe the situation, establish command relationships, and identify the mission and any planning constraints. It may identify forces and strategic mobility resources, or it may request that the supported commander develop these factors. It may establish tentative dates and times to commence mobilization, deployment, or employment, or it may solicit the recommendations of the supported commander regarding these dates and times. The WARNORD should also identify any planning assumptions, restraints, or constraints the President or SecDef have identified to shape the response. If the President, SecDef, or CJCS directs development of a specific option or especially a COA, the WARNORD will describe the COA and request the supported commander’s assessment. The amount of detail in the WARNORD depends on the known facts and time available. A WARNORD sample is in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance. 3. In response to the WARNORD, the supported commander, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting commanders and the rest of the JPEC, reviews existing joint contingency plans for applicability; accounts for contested environments; then develops, analyzes, and compares COAs and prepares a commander’s estimate. The commander’s estimate provides recommendations and advice to the President, SecDef, or higher headquarters for COA selection. Based on the supported commander’s guidance, supporting commanders begin their planning activities. 4. Although an existing plan almost never completely aligns with an emerging crisis, it can be used to facilitate rapid COA development and be modified to fit the specific situation. TPFDDs developed for specific plans are stored in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) database and are made available to the JPEC for review. 5. The CJCS, in consultation with other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and JPEC, reviews and evaluates the supported CCDR’s estimate and provides recommendations and advice to the President and SecDef for COA selection. The supported CCDR’s COAs may be accepted, refined, or revised, or a new COA(s) may have to be developed. The President or SecDef selects a COA and directs that detailed planning be initiated. 6. Upon receiving directions from the President or SecDef, the CJCS issues a SecDef-approved ALERTORD to the JPEC. The order is a record communication stating the President or SecDef has approved the detailed development of a military plan to help resolve the crisis. The contents of an ALERTORD may vary depending upon the crisis and amount of prior planning accomplished, but it should always describe the selected COA in sufficient detail to allow the supported commander, in collaboration with Chapter I I-18 JP 5-0 (C2) of the FP. CJCSM 3130.06, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures, and the GFMIG discuss the PTDOs in more detail. (e) DEPORD. A DEPORD, a planning directive from SecDef, issued by the CJCS, authorizes the transfer and allocation of forces among CCMDs, Services, and DOD agencies. It specifies the authorities the gaining CCDR will exercise over specified forces to be transferred. The GFMAP is a global DEPORD for all allocated forces. FPs deploy or prepare forces to deploy on a time frame as directed in the GFMAP. CJCSM 3130.06, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures, and the GFMIG discuss the DEPORD in more detail. (f) Execute Order (EXORD). An EXORD is a directive to implement an approved CONOPS. Only the President and SecDef have the authority to approve and direct the initiation of military operations. The CJCS, by the authority of and at the direction of the President or SecDef, may subsequently issue an EXORD to initiate military operations. Supported and supporting commanders and subordinate JFCs use an EXORD to implement the approved CONOPS. (g) OPORD. An OPORD is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders to coordinate execution of an operation. Joint OPORDs are prepared under joint procedures in prescribed formats during a crisis. (h) Fragmentary Order (FRAGORD). A FRAGORD is a modification to any previously issued order. It is issued to change an existing order or to execute a branch or sequel of an existing OPORD. It provides brief and specific directions that address only those parts of the original order that have changed. For more information on plan and orders formats, see CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance, and Appendix A, “Joint Operation Plan Example.” 6. Shared Understanding a. Civilian-Military Dialogue. Strategy is developed and joint planning is conducted at the USG department level. Joint planning supports the interaction between senior DOD civilian leadership, CCDRs, and CJCS to help the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how to employ US military forces and resources. This interaction is iterative and collaborative and includes close coordination with the chief of mission, DOS, Department of Justice, and other USG interagency partners, depending on the mission. b. Bridging Perspectives (1) Adaptive planning provides a range of options at the operational and strategic levels. The complexity, rate of change, and inherent political nature of the strategic environment often drive policy makers to seek maximum strategic and operational flexibility. Consequently, policy guidance may lack sufficient specificity to guide joint planning. This lack of specificity may be driven by insufficient information, uncertainty Joint Planning I-19 about available options or resources or evolving political considerations. SecDef, the CJCS, and the CCDRs may be able to provide information to help clarify policy guidance, but joint planners will continue planning with even only the broadest of policy aims. (2) CCDRs identify how planned campaign activities and events achieve national security objectives. When objectives are poorly defined, military leaders should seek clarification. Dialogue between civilian policymakers and military leaders informs national policy. SecDef, the CJCS, and the CCDRs provide policy makers assessment of the impact of the campaign’s activities and the opportunities and risks associated with execution, delay, or cancellation of those activities. The dialogue should also evaluate how the campaign could establish conditions to prevent, prepare for, or mitigate contingencies. Planning should not halt due to unclear objectives; in these cases, commanders make assumptions necessary to continue planning. c. Identifying Purpose, Objectives, and Desired Military End States (1) Purpose. The purpose explains why the military action is being conducted. The purpose can help the force pursue the mission in the absence of further orders, even when actions do not unfold as planned. Thus, if an unanticipated situation arises, commanders understand the purpose of the action and can act decisively and within the higher commander’s intent. (2) Objectives. Objectives and attainable goals are clearly defined, toward which operations are directed. They are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound. Objectives are markers used to assess the strategy and develop decision points. (a) At the operational level, CCDRs identify, prioritize, and sequence intermediate objectives that support the achievement of the national-level objectives and associated conditions to support attainment of military end states. Intermediate objectives help assess progress toward the longer-range objectives established by the NDS, NMS, or JSCP. As intermediate objectives are achieved, commanders and their staffs reassess their vision of the military end state (for contingencies), their progress toward the longer-range objectives, and the need to change or alter the objectives or methods. Intermediate objectives also represent multiple actions that occur between initiation of a CCP and the achievement of campaign objectives. Intermediate objectives should identify discrete, identifiable, and measurable conditions or effects. (b) At the tactical level, forces are arranged and employed to execute specific immediate tasks or missions. Although tactical tasks may not directly achieve operational or strategic objectives, the cumulative effects of the tactical events, coupled with operational and strategic events, should achieve those objectives. Both desired and undesired effects should be evaluated. (3) Military End State. A military end state describes conditions that define mission success. It also describes how reaching the JFC’s military end state supports Chapter I I-20 JP 5-0 higher headquarters’ national objectives. The military end state normally represents a period in time or set of conditions beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power to achieve remaining national objectives. Commanders and planners constantly assess the stated military end state against the OE, resources, or policy. d. Providing Options and Aligning Resources (1) CCDRs provide options for the use of the military in conjunction with other instruments of national power. Further planning enables CCDRs to develop COAs that identify costs (including casualties) and risks associated with the options, a timeline, required resources and capabilities, and probability of success or failure of the military objectives in contributing to the desired national strategic objectives. (2) DOD seeks input from other USG departments and agencies to develop a shared understanding. Civilian and military leaders use shared understanding to identify and synchronize all instruments of national power to achieve strategic success. (3) Partner-nation contributions can vary significantly based upon their capacity and current geopolitical situations and can dramatically alter the options and COAs available to a CCDR. Civilian and military leaders should identify partner-nations’ contributions early in the planning process to best integrate partner-nation contributions and capabilities and mitigate limitations. DOD and DOS leadership should identify who opens discussions with partner nations and when. (4) The joint planning process (JPP) is a problem-solving technique designed for military planning. The planning staff typically uses the JPP to conduct detailed planning to fully develop options, identify resources, and identify and mitigate risk. Planners develop the CONOPS, force plans, deployment plans, and supporting plans that contain multiple COAs. Multiple COAs can provide joint forces options to adapt to a changing OE, while remaining consistent with the JFC’s intent. Such action should create acceptable options for military and civilian decision makers. Chapter III, “Joint Planning Process,” discusses the JPP in more detail. 7. Risk Identification and Mitigation a. Identifying Risk (1) Risk is the probability and consequence of an event causing harm to something valued. Commanders and senior leaders should account for risk when evaluating the likelihood of mission success. Risk can be assessed through the cost imposed by, or the impact on, achievement of the objective. Military risk is the estimated probability and consequence of the joint force’s projected inability to achieve current or future military objectives (risk-to-mission), while providing and sustaining sufficient military resources (risk-to-force). Risks may result from enemy action, incorrect assumptions, limited resources, lack of preparation, friendly force activities, environment and terrain, and public opinion, among others. The most serious risks are the ones that Joint Planning I-23 8. Assessment a. Commanders continually assess plans. At the CCMD-level, the JPEC and senior DOD leadership share this task. Assessments continuously measure the effectiveness of military operations and project the expected effectiveness of plans against contingencies as the OE changes. Assessments support decision making by measuring the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, achieving an objective, or attaining a military end state. b. Assessments monitor and analyze changes in the OE, determine the most likely potential causes for those changes, identify opportunities and risks, and provide recommendations to improve operation or campaign performance. Integrating assessment throughout plan development and post-approval refinement and adaptation keeps the plan relevant and ready for transition to execution. c. Commanders drive assessment. They are assisted by their staffs, supporting commanders, and subordinate commanders, along with interagency and multinational partners and other stakeholders. Operation assessment applies during all military activities and operations, providing the opportunity for correction and adaptation. Assessment mechanisms and the assessment processes may differ at the tactical, operational, theater, global, and strategic levels, depending upon the commander’s pace of decision making and the OE analysis capabilities. Some assessments may be qualitative vice quantitative, making evaluation more challenging. (1) Operation assessments link the employment of forces and resources to intelligence analysis of the OE. An operation assessment framework helps organize and analyze data and communicate recommendations to the commander. This enables the commander to build processes that optimize the command’s capacity to monitor progress or regression and implement corrective changes during execution. (2) Assessments help commands analyze changes in the OE, changes in strategic guidance, and other challenges facing the joint force throughout planning and execution. They can enable commanders to adapt and update plans and orders to achieve objectives. The OE changes because of constant interaction between enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral elements. This interaction includes seemingly random and unpredictable events or friction, which further complicates and challenges execution. (3) CCDRs with coordinating authority provide input to coordinate assessment requirements for integrated contingency plans. In execution, coordinating authority assessments evaluate global progress against the problem set or functional objectives to align execution with the achievement of national objectives. See Chapter VI, “Operation Assessment,” for additional information on planning and conducting operation assessment. Chapter I I-24 JP 5-0 9. Interorganizational Planning and Coordination Interorganizational planning and coordination is the interaction among elements of DOD; participating USG departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government departments and agencies; international organizations; NGOs; and the private sector to achieve an objective. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Coordination of interorganizational and multinational plans facilitates unity of effort among multiple organizations by promoting common understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and nonmilitary actions. It also identifies common objectives and how military and civilian capabilities best complement each other to achieve these objectives. a. Interagency Coordination. Interagency coordination is interaction among USG departments and agencies, including DOD, to achieve an objective. Interagency coordination links the US military and the other instruments of national power. b. Strategic objectives are achieved through unified action built on unity of effort. This is accomplished by collaboration, synchronization, and coordination of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. Military power is most effectively used in conjunction with the other instruments of national power to advance and defend US values, interests, and objectives. To accomplish this integration, the CCMDs, Services, and DOD agencies interact with non-DOD agencies and organizations to build mutual understanding of the OE, requirements, capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and nonmilitary actions, as well as the understanding of the desired objectives and, if applicable, military end state. They also identify how military and civilian capabilities best complement each other. The National Security Council (NSC) integrates the instruments of national power by facilitating mutual understanding and cooperation and overseeing interagency planning efforts. Further, military and civilian organizations share information, cooperate, and strive together to make unity of effort possible. JFCs seek cooperation and build consensus to achieve unity of effort. Interagency and multinational consensus building is a key element to unity of effort. c. CCDRs seek to involve relevant USG departments and agencies in all stages of planning, as directed in strategic guidance. CCDRs through the JS and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD[P]) to identify supporting and supported USG departments and agencies. d. Collaboration and coordination with interagency partners is critical to successful operation and campaign activities, as well as transitions when JFCs may operate in support of other USG departments and agencies. JFCs and their staffs must evaluate how DOD capabilities can be synchronized with other USG departments and agencies’ capabilities to most effectively achieve broader national strategic objectives. CCMDs should coordinate directly with interagency representatives in their own command and with those in the Joint Planning I-25 National Capital Region. This cooperation addresses key issues such as overflight rights and access agreements. Coordination with NGOs should normally be done through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) senior development advisor assigned to each geographic CCMD, the field-level civil-military coordinator assigned to the USAID mission, or the lead federal agency for contingencies in the United States. e. The JPP allows for interagency review of plans or annexes when approved by the OUSD(P). Interagency plan reviews differ from DOD JPEC plan reviews in that inputs from non-DOD agencies are requested but not required. Additionally, non-DOD agency inputs are advisory and, while a valued part of the process, do not carry veto authority. Nevertheless, participating agencies can follow up on issues identified in the review, in accordance with guidance from the OUSD(P). Interagency plan-reviews issues may be raised with the NSC, if warranted. f. Planning and Coordination with Other Agencies. Commanders integrate interagency inputs and concerns into joint plans. Annex V (Interagency- Interorganizational Coordination) of an OPLAN or OPORD is one tool that can be used to collaborate with interagency partners. CCMDs should seek approval from OSD to release this annex to relevant USG departments and agencies during development to gather their input at the earliest stage practicable. Annex V (Interagency-Interorganizational Coordination) should identify the anticipated capabilities required to accomplish tasks. Common understanding enables interagency planners to suggest other activities or partners that could contribute to the operation and to better determine support requirements. The staff considers interagency participation for each phase of the operation (see Chapter IV, “Operational Design,” for a discussion of phases). g. Interagency Considerations (1) Interagency coordination is complex. USG departments or agencies sometimes embrace differing and even conflicting policies, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, procedures, decision-making processes, security classification constraints, communications and planning systems, and culture. Operations may be executed by nonmilitary organizations or NGOs with the military in support. In such instances, the understanding of military authorities, objectives, and, if appropriate, military end states may vary among the participants. The JFC must clearly articulate military capabilities, requirements, operational limitations, liaison, and legal considerations to interagency partners. Military planners must understand the relationships and the types of support they can provide interagency partners. Planners must also learn the supported organization’s processes, policies, and operational limitations to identify areas where they can assist. The joint force planner should also understand the supported organization’s planning process and products (such as federal interagency operational plans, or incident command systems for crisis planning) and how those processes align with the JPP. When other USG departments and agencies have provided institutional points of contact (POCs) for defense planning, planners should coordinate directly with these individuals. The JFC’s civil- military operations center, with oversight by the civil-military operations directorate of the command’s staff, can facilitate these relationships. Annex G (Civil-Military Operations) Chapter I I-28 JP 5-0 11. Strategic Guidance for Multinational Operations a. Multinational operations start with diplomatic efforts to create a coalition or justify action of an alliance. Discussion and coordination between potential participants initially addresses basic questions at the national strategic level. These senior-level discussions could involve international organizations such as the UN or NATO, existing MNFs, or individual nations. The result of these discussions should: (1) Determine the nature and limits of the response. (2) Determine the command structure of the response force. (3) Determine the essential strategic guidance, to include military objectives and the desired strategic and military end states, for the response force. b. A hierarchy of bilateral or multilateral bodies are established to support each MNF. The bodies define strategic and military objectives and end states, develop strategies, and coordinate strategic guidance for planning and executing multinational operations. Through dual involvement in national and multinational security processes, US national leaders integrate national and theater strategic planning with the MNF. Within the multinational structure, US participants develop objectives and strategies that are compatible with US capabilities and complement US interests, assigned missions, and tasks for participating US forces. Within the US national structure, international commitments impact the development of the NMS and CCDRs should adequately address relevant concerns in strategic guidance for joint planning. c. Much of the information and guidance provided for unified action and joint operations remains applicable to multinational operations. However, commanders and staffs consider differences, including, but not limited to, partners’ laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion, language, and caveats on authorized military action throughout the entire operation. CCDRs and JFCs develop plans to align US forces, actions, and resources in support of the multinational plan. d. When directed, designated US commanders participate directly with the armed forces of other nations in preparing bilateral contingency plans. Commanders and their staff assess the potential constraints, opportunities, security risks, and any additional vulnerabilities resulting from bilateral planning and how these plans impact the ability of the United States to achieve its objectives. Bilateral planning involves the preparation of combined, mutually developed, and approved plans governing the employment of the forces of two nations for a common contingency. Bilateral planning may be accomplished within the framework of a treaty or alliance but may be accomplished in the absence of such arrangements. Bilateral planning is accomplished in accordance with specific guidance provided by the President, SecDef, or CJCS and captured in bilateral strategic guidance signed by the leadership of both countries. Joint Planning I-29 12. Review of Multinational Plans US joint strategic plans or contingency plans prepared in support of multinational plans are developed, reviewed, and approved exclusively within US channels. Selected portions and/or applicable planning and deployment data may be released in accordance with CJCSI 5714.01, Policy for the Release of Joint Information. USG representatives and commanders within each multinational organization participate in multinational planning and exchange information in mutually devised forums, documents, and plans. The formal review and approval of multinational plans is accomplished in accordance with specific procedures adopted by each multinational organization and may or may not include separate US review or approval. Multilateral contingency plans routinely require national- level US approval. For more details, see JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures, available at https://community.apan.org/wg/mpat, provides commonly agreed upon formats and procedures that may assist with planning efforts in a multinational environment. Chapter I I-30 JP 5-0 Intentionally Blank Strategic Guidance and Coordination II-3 aggregates, analyzes, and balances competing risk perspectives of the CCDRs and Services across command and Service seams to provide SecDef and the President a holistic, global perspective. See CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System, for additional information. 4. National Security Council System a. The President uses the NSC system for national security policy development and decision making. In addition to NSC meetings chaired by the President, the NSC system includes the Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, policy coordination committees, and a dedicated NSC staff. Along with the NSC staff, issue-specific interagency working groups support these higher-level committees. b. The NSC is the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with senior national security advisors and cabinet officials, including SecDef and the CJCS. NSC decisions may be directed to any department or agency. For additional information, see National Security Presidential Memorandum-4, Organization of the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and Subcommittees, and CJCSI 5715.01, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs. 5. National Security Strategy a. The NSS is required annually by Title 50, USC, Section 3043. It is prepared by the Executive Branch of the USG for Congress and outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and how the administration plans to address them using all instruments of national power. The document is often purposely general in content, and its implementation by DOD relies on elaborating direction provided in supporting documents (e.g., the NDS and NMS). b. JFCs and their staffs can derive the broad, overarching policy of the United States from the NSS but must check other DOD and military sources for refined guidance, as the NSS is too broad for detailed planning. 6. Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development DOS is the lead US foreign affairs agency within the Executive Branch and the lead institution for the conduct of American diplomacy. The Secretary of State is the President’s principal foreign policy advisor. The Secretary of State implements the President’s foreign policies worldwide through DOS and its employees. USAID is an independent federal agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. USAID serves as the USG lead for international development and foreign disaster assistance. a. DOS conducts planning at the department, bureau, and country levels. The following are key DOS/USAID planning documents that commanders and planners consult when developing their campaign plans. Chapter II II-4 JP 5-0 (1) DOS and USAID develop the four-year joint strategic plan (e.g., Joint Strategic Plan FY [2018-2022]) as their primary strategy, to set forth the direction and priorities to implement US foreign policy and development assistance for the coming years. (2) Joint Regional Strategies. A joint regional strategy is a four-year regional strategy developed jointly by the regional bureaus of DOS and USAID. It articulates the priorities, goals, and areas of strategic focus within the region. Joint regional strategies also provide a flexible framework within which regional bureaus and missions prioritize desired objectives and military end states, identify supporting resources, and respond to unanticipated events. Where an end state is not feasible or attainable, for example when conducting long-term counter weapons of mass destruction or combating terrorism activities and operations, intermediate objectives may be used instead. (3) Integrated Country Strategies. An integrated country strategy is a four- year, whole-of-government strategy developed by a US country team for a particular country. It articulates a common set of USG priorities and goals by setting the mission goals and objectives through a coordinated and collaborative planning effort. It provides the basis for the development of annual mission resource requests for DOS and USAID, as well as all USG security sector assistance. The chief of mission leads the development process and has final approval authority. (4) Country Development Cooperation Strategy. A country development cooperation strategy, typically a five-year strategy, defines a mission's chosen approach in a country, articulates the self-reliance trajectory, and details expected results. The country development cooperation strategy provides a road map for how USAID will design and implement projects and activities. It is used to inform dialogue with Congress and engage host nation (HN) partners and other stakeholders, including the private sector and civil society. b. Establishing and maintaining unity of effort requires commanders and planners to stay abreast of these planning products, develop mutually supporting theater and FCPs, and develop applicable country-specific security cooperation plans. 7. Department of Defense a. NDS. The NDS, required by Title 10, USC, Section 113(g), is signed by SecDef and outlines DOD’s approach to implementing the President’s NSS. The NDS supports the NSS by establishing a set of overarching defense objectives that guide DOD’s security activities and provide direction for the NMS. The NDS objectives serve as links between military activities and those of other DOD agencies in pursuit of national goals. b. UCP. The UCP, signed by the President, establishes CCMDs and responsibilities and missions of the CCDRs. The unified command structure identified in the UCP is flexible and changes as required to accommodate evolving US national security needs. Title 10, USC, Section 161, tasks the CJCS to conduct a review of the UCP “not less often than every two years” and submit recommended changes to the President through SecDef. Strategic Guidance and Coordination II-5 This document provides broad guidance from which CCDRs and planners can derive tasks and missions during CCMD plan development and modification. c. CPG. The CPG, signed by the President, fulfills the statutory requirement in Title 10, USC, Section 113. SecDef, with the approval from the President, and with advice from the CJCS, provides written policy guidance on the preparation and review of campaign and contingency plans. 8. Joint Strategic Planning System a. The JSPS is the primary system the CJCS uses to execute statutory responsibilities assigned by Title 10, USC, Section 153. The JSPS enables the CJCS to conduct assessments; provide military advice to the President, SecDef, NSC, and Homeland Security Council; and assist the President and SecDef in providing strategic direction to the Armed Forces of the United States. The NMS and JSCP are core strategic guidance documents the CJCS uses to augment and amplify other strategic documents (e.g., UCP, CPG, GFMIG) and provide direction and policy essential to implementation of the NSS. Other elements of JSPS, such as the CJCS risk assessment, the Joint Force Readiness Review, and the annual joint assessment (AJA), inform decision making and identify new contingencies that may warrant planning and the commitment of resources. Figure II-1 illustrates these relationships. The JSPS is described in detail in CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System. b. Strategic Direction. The President, SecDef, and CJCS provide strategic direction by communicating broad objectives and issue-specific guidance to DOD. It provides the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the planning activities and operations of the JS, CCMDs, Services, joint forces, combat support agencies (CSAs), and other DOD agencies. It provides purpose and focus to the planning for employment of military force. Strategic direction identifies a desired military objective or end state, national-level planning assumptions, and national-level limitations. In addition to previously mentioned documents, additional strategic direction will emerge as orders or as part of the iterative plans dialogue. (1) Policy and Strategic Assumptions. Strategic guidance and specific strategic direction should include specific assumptions US leadership is willing to make for each planning effort. These assumptions should cover both domestic and international unknowns to better define the OE in which the commander is expected to operate. Similarly, the commander should identify and question strategic assumptions to determine if they are reasonable and offer suggestions for improvements and clarification. (2) Policy and Political Limitations. The President and SecDef (or representatives) provide the commander and the command planning team any limitations (constraints or restraints) they expect will be imposed on the planning problem. These could be mandates for partner participation, restrictions on military personnel levels, or expected basing limitations. Chapter II II-8 JP 5-0 that facilitate synchronization of resources, authorities, processes, and timelines to favorably affect conditions within the CCDRs’ AORs. Global distribution establishes the requirement for geographic CCDRs to submit TDPs annually to support campaign and contingency plans. Distribution plans support GCPs by interfacing with the relevant posture plans to support strategic lift, infrastructure, distribution enablers, agreements, policies, processes, and information systems. For additional information on the JSCP, see CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP). e. GFMIG. The GFMIG integrates complementary policy and guidance on directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment, and assessment into a single authoritative GFM document in support of DOD strategic guidance. It provides required procedures prescribed by SecDef in accordance with Title 10, USC, Section 162, to assign and allocate forces. These processes are applied within the force management and force planning constructs to better support resource-informed planning and enable the force to be dynamically employed, while allowing senior decision makers to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed changes in force assignment, apportionment, and allocation. For detailed strategic guidance see the current GFMIG. See Appendix D, “Global Force Management,” for additional information and descriptions. 9. Combatant Commanders a. CCDRs use strategic guidance and direction to prepare command strategies focused on their command’s specific capabilities and missions to link national strategic guidance to theater or functional strategies and joint operations. The command strategy, like national strategy, identifies the command’s broad, long-range objectives that contribute to national security. The command strategy provides the link between national strategic guidance and joint planning. b. Global and Transregional Missions (1) Since threats and/or opportunities presented by allies, partners, competitors, enemies, adversaries, and natural disasters do not restrict their operations by boundaries, CCDRs and their planners must integrate their plans with other CCDRs to ensure unified actions in support of strategic and operational objectives. Integrated planning also synchronizes resources and integrates timelines, decision points, and authorities across multiple CCMDs to achieve directed campaign objectives and attain contingency end states. (2) CCDRs can be tasked to address missions that cross geographic CCMD boundaries. CCDRs tasked with global missions provide planning and assessment expertise to identify tasks and missions other CCMDs (supporting commands) must perform to ensure success of global missions. Commands include supporting tasks as part of their campaign and contingency planning and coordinate to ensure assessments are Strategic Guidance and Coordination II-9 complete. CCDRs with global responsibilities use the planning process to provide an assessment of risk from the global, cross-AOR perspective to ensure the military advice provided to the President and SecDef includes these considerations. Chapter II, “Strategic Guidance and Coordination,” and Chapter V, “Campaigning,” discuss this in more detail. c. Planning Organization. CCMDs use joint planning groups (JPGs), operational planning groups, or operational planning teams (OPTs) to direct planning efforts across the command, including implementation of plans and orders. d. Strategic Estimate. The CCDR and staff, with input from subordinate commands and supporting commands and agencies, prepare a strategic estimate by analyzing and describing the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) factors and trends; key relationships and links between relevant actors or networks; and the threats and opportunities that facilitate or hinder achievement of the objectives over the time frame of the strategy. (1) The strategic estimate is a tool available to commanders as they develop plans. CCDRs use strategic estimates to facilitate the employment of military forces. The strategic estimate is more comprehensive than estimates of subordinate commanders, encompasses all aspects of the CCDR’s OE, and is the basis for the development of the theater strategies. (2) The CCDR, the CCDR’s staff, and supporting commands and agencies evaluate the broad, strategic-level factors that influence the theater strategy. (3) The estimate should include an analysis of strategic direction received from the President, SecDef, or the authoritative body of an MNF; an analysis of all states, groups, or organizations in the OE that may threaten or challenge the CCMD’s ability to advance and defend US interests in the region; visualization of the relevant geopolitical, geoeconomic, and cultural factors in the region; an evaluation of major strategic and operational challenges facing the CCMD; an analysis of known or anticipated opportunities the CCMD can leverage; and an assessment of risks inherent in the OE. (4) The result of the strategic estimate is a visualization and better understanding of the OE, to include allies, other partners, neutrals, adversaries, and enemy combatants. The strategic estimate process is continuous and provides input used to develop strategies and implement plans. The broad strategic estimate is also the starting point for conducting the commander’s estimate of the situation for a specific operation. (5) Supported and supporting CCDRs and subordinate commanders all prepare strategic estimates based on assigned tasks. CCDRs who support multiple JFCs prepare estimates for each supporting operation. See Appendix B, “Strategic Estimate,” for a notional strategic estimate format. Chapter II II-10 JP 5-0 10. Commander’s Communication Synchronization a. Commander’s communication synchronization is the DOD process to coordinate and synchronize narratives, themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to ensure their integrity and consistency down to the lowest tactical level across all relevant communication activities. b. Within the USG, DOS has primary responsibility for strategic communication abroad. DOS describes strategic communication as the focused USG efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, and preserve conditions for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. It is led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and is the overall mechanism by which the USG coordinates public diplomacy among interagency participants. c. The US military plays an important supporting role in communication efforts, primarily through commander’s communication synchronization, public affairs, operations in the information environment, and defense support to public diplomacy. Communication synchronization considerations should be integrated in all joint planning for military operations from routine, recurring, military activities during periods of cooperation through armed conflict. d. To support the CJCS’s responsibility as the global integrator, the joint force synchronizes operations in the information environment to shape the perceptions, decisions, and actions of relevant actors, which includes strategic messaging. Strategic messaging is coordinated and deliberate communication activities to influence the OE in support of US strategic objectives. Strategic messaging is developed in concert with other USG departments and agencies, partner nations, and NGOs, as appropriate. CCDRs should develop staff procedures for implementing communication synchronization guidance into all joint planning and targeting processes, as well as collaborative processes for integrating communication synchronization activities with nonmilitary partners and subject matter experts. See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-61, Public Affairs, for additional information. SECTION B. APPLICATION OF GUIDANCE 11. Joint Planning and Execution Community a. The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in joint planning or committed to a joint operation are collectively termed the JPEC. Although not a standing or regularly meeting entity, the JPEC consists of the stakeholders shown in Figure II-2. (1) The supported CCDR has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the CPG, JSCP, or other joint planning directives. In the context of joint Strategic Guidance and Coordination II-13 13. Operational Activities a. Operational activities comprise a sustained cycle of situational awareness, planning, execution, and assessment that occur continuously to support leader decision- making cycles at all levels of command. b. Situational Awareness (1) Situational awareness addresses procedures for understanding the OE, including threats to national security. This occurs during continuous monitoring of the national and international political and military situations so CCDRs, JFCs, and their staffs can determine and analyze emerging crises, notify decision makers, and determine the specific nature of the threat. Persistent or recurring theater military engagement activities contribute to maintaining situational awareness. (2) Situational awareness encompasses activities such as monitoring the global situation, identifying that an event has occurred, recognizing the event is a problem or a potential problem, reporting the event, and reviewing enduring and emerging warning concerns and the CCMD’s running intelligence estimate (based on continuous joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment [JIPOE]). An event is a national or international occurrence assessed as unusual and viewed as potentially having an adverse impact on US national interests and national security. The recognition of the event as a problem or potential problem follows from the observation. c. Planning (1) Planning translates strategic guidance and direction into campaign plans, contingency plans, and OPORDs. Joint planning is usually based on defined tasks identified in the UCP, CPG, and JSCP. Alternatively, joint planning may be based on the need for a military response to an unforeseen current event, emergency, or time-sensitive crisis. (2) CCMD planning for contingencies is normally tasked in the JSCP based on the CPG or other directive. Planners derive assumptions needed to continue planning and reference the force apportionment and force assignment tables to provide the number of forces reasonably expected to be available. (3) Planning for crises is initiated to respond to an unforeseen current event, emergency, or time-sensitive crisis. It is based on planning guidance, typically communicated in orders: WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD. Commanders evaluate the availability of assigned and currently allocated forces to respond to the event. They also determine what other force requirements are needed and begin putting together a rough order-of-magnitude force list. d. Execution Chapter II II-14 JP 5-0 (1) Execution begins when the President or SecDef authorizes the initiation of a military operation or other activity. The CJCS, at the direction of the President or SecDef, issues an EXORD or other authorizing directive to initiate or conduct military operations. Depending upon time constraints, an EXORD may be the only order a CCDR or subordinate commander receives. The EXORD defines the time to initiate operations and may convey guidance not provided earlier. (2) The CJCS monitors the deployment and employment of forces, makes recommendations to SecDef to resolve shortfalls, and transmits presidential- and SecDef- directed orders to support the successful execution of military operations. Execution continues until the mission is accomplished and a new order transitions operations. In execution, based on continuous assessment activities, the planning process is repeated as circumstances and missions change. (3) The CCDR monitors the deployment, distribution, and employment of forces; measures task performance and progress toward mission accomplishment; and adapts and adjusts operations as required to achieve the objectives and attain the military end state. This continual assessment and adjustment of operations creates an organizational environment of learning and adaptation. This adaptation can range from minor operational adjustments to a radical change of approach. When fundamental changes have occurred that challenge existing understanding or indicate a shift in the OE/problem, commanders and staffs may develop a new operational approach that recognizes that the initial problem has changed, thus requiring a different approach to solving the problem. The change to the OE could be so significant that it requires a review of the strategic objectives and military end states and necessitates discussions with higher authority to determine whether the objectives and/or military end states are still viable. (4) Changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical, intelligence, or environmental considerations; force and non-unit cargo availability; availability of strategic transportation; and port capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules and close coordination and monitoring of deployment activities are required. (5) The CJCS-issued EXORD defines D-day (the unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduled to commence) and H-hour (the specific time an operation begins) and directs execution of the OPORD. Date-time groups are expressed in universal time. While OPORD operations commence on the specified D-day and H-hour, deployments providing supporting forces, equipment, and sustainment are defined by C- day (an unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins) and L-hour (a specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence). The CJCS’s EXORD is a record communication that authorizes execution of the COA approved by the President or SecDef and detailed in the supported commander’s OPORD. It may include further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. In a fast-developing crisis, the EXORD may be the first record communication generated by the CJCS. The record communication may be preceded by a voice authorization. The issuance of the EXORD is time-sensitive. The format may differ depending on the amount of previous Strategic Guidance and Coordination II-15 correspondence and the applicability of prior guidance. CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance, contains the format for the EXORD. Information already communicated in previous orders should not be repeated unless previous orders were not made available to all concerned. The EXORD need only contain the authority to execute the operation and any additional essential guidance, such as D-day and H-hour (see Figure II-3). (6) Throughout execution, the JS, JFPs, Services, CCDRs, and CSAs monitor movements, assess accomplishment of tasks, and resolve shortfalls as necessary. This allows guidance to be changed and the plan to be modified, if necessary. (7) The supported commander issues an OPORD to subordinate and supporting commanders prior to or upon receipt of an EXORD issued by the CJCS at the direction of the President or SecDef. The OPORD may provide detailed planning guidance resulting from updated or amplifying orders, instructions, or guidance the EXORD does not cover. Supporting commanders may develop OPORDs in support of the supported commander’s OPORD. The supported commander also implements an operation assessment, which evaluates the progress toward or achievement of military objectives. This assessment informs the commanders’ recommendations to the President and SecDef. If significant changes in the OE or the problem are identified which call into question viability of the current operational approach or objectives, the supported commander should consult with subordinate and supporting commanders and higher authority. (8) Following the GFM allocation process as detailed in CJCSM 3130.06, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures, the supported CCDR’s approved and validated force requests that have been allocated by SecDef’s decision are entered in the GFMAP annexes. The JFPs subsequently release GFMAP annex schedules reflecting specific deployment directions. (9) CCMDs coordinate with USTRANSCOM, other supporting CCMDs, JFPs, the JS, and FPs to provide an integrated transportation plan from origin to destination. CCMDs control the flow of requirements into and out of their theater, using the validation Figure II-3. Key Planning Times C-Day The day deployment begins D-Day The day operations began or are scheduled to begin H-Hour The time (on D-Day) the operation is scheduled to begin L-Hour The time (on C-Day) deployment operations begin M-Day The day mobilization (partial or full) begins N-Day The day a unit (active duty) is notified for deployment or redeployment Key Planning Times Chapter III III-2 JP 5-0 assistance operations, medical planners, the civil-military J-3, and other joint enablers may be critical. Staff judge advocate, chaplains, cyberspace operations planners, space operations planners, public affairs officers, fires, the commander’s gender adviser, and other joint enablers should also be considered based on the mission. Initial consultation with these additional planners at the beginning of mission analyses allows the additional planners to assist the lead planner in determining whether their further involvement is warranted. (3) Service Component and Component Command Representation. The CCMD Service representatives and component commands are essential in developing supporting plans, as well as identifying required capabilities and probable availability. Additionally, component representatives are usually responsible for developing a TPFDL in appendix 1 (Time-Phased Force Deployment List) to annex A (Task Organization) of the OPLAN and building a TPFDD in the JOPES database. In time-sensitive planning situations, component headquarters can conduct simultaneous planning better if involved in the decision and analysis process early. 3. Transregional, All-Domain Planning a. When the scope of contemplated military operations exceeds the authority or capabilities of a single CCDR to plan and execute, the President, SecDef, or CJCS, when designated by the President or SecDef, identify a CCDR to lead the planning for the designated strategic challenge or threat. The commander’s assessment supporting this decision could be either the assessments of multiple CCDRs addressing a similar threat in their AORs or a single threat assessment from a CCDR addressing the threat from a global, cross-AOR, or functional perspective. Situations that may trigger this assessment range from combat operations that span UCP-designated boundaries to the threat of asymmetric attack that overlaps CCMD boundaries and functions, thereby requiring strategic integration of two or more CCDRs’ campaigns and operations. b. Per Title 10, USC, SecDef may direct the CJCS to perform responsibilities as the global integrator for overseeing the activities of the CCMDs. Such assignment by SecDef does not confer any command authority on the CJCS and does not alter CCDRs’ responsibilities prescribed in Title 10, USC, Section 164. c. When designated by SecDef, the CJCS or CCDR with coordinating authority issues a planning directive and may be tasked to lead the planning effort. The CJCS or CCDR performs a mission analysis; issues initial global planning guidance based on national strategic objectives and priorities; and develops COAs in coordination with the affected CCMDs, Services, and CSAs. These COAs should mitigate operational gaps, seams, and vulnerabilities from a global perspective and provide an improved understanding of how actions in one AOR impact ongoing or potential plans and operations in other AORs. This will be achieved through a recommendation for the optimal allocation, prioritization, or reallocation of forces and capabilities required to develop a cohesive global CONOPS. These planning procedures detail how CCDRs will employ forces and capabilities in support of another CCDR. COAs are based largely on recommendations of Joint Planning Process III-3 the affected CCDRs. However, they should also take a global perspective when framing cumulative risk beyond a limited time horizon. These COAs may require refinement as initial planning apportionments are adjusted across the global CONOPS. Planners must be aware of competing requirements for limited resources such as ISR, cyberspace, space, and transportation capabilities. GFM policies and procedures inform global planning activities. d. All planning should be collaborative and integrated. Integrated planning addresses complex threats that span multiple AORs and functional responsibilities and provides the President and SecDef a clear understanding of how the entire military, not just a portion, responds to those threats. The CJCS or delegated CCDR is required to mitigate operational gaps, seams, and vulnerabilities and resolve the conflict over forces, resources, capabilities, or priorities from a global perspective. Risks, benefits, and trade-offs must inform employment of all joint force capabilities. Early identification and submission of requests for forces and authorities along with clear articulation of intent and risk can expedite decision making associated with employment of these capabilities. e. When directing the execution of a contingency plan or OPORD, the President or SecDef also selects a CCDR as the supported commander for implementation of the plan. This commander is responsible for all aspects of a mission, to include the integration of plans or orders of supporting CCDRs in response to higher headquarters requirements. f. Supporting Plans. Supporting CCDRs, subordinate JFCs, component commanders, and CSAs prepare supporting plans as tasked by the JSCP or other planning guidance. Supporting commanders and staffs prepare plans in the tasked format, describing how they intend to achieve their assigned objectives and/or tasks. Supporting commanders and staffs develop these plans in collaboration with the supported commander’s planners. CJCSI 3141.01, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans, governs the formal review and approval process for plans. SECTION A. OVERVIEW OF PLANNING AND THE PLANNING FUNCTIONS 4. Overview a. Although planning has an input (guidance) and an output (the plan or order), the planning process is a recursive, assessment-informed process and not linear. Issues discovered in later steps of the planning process can require adjustments to earlier steps. For example, COA wargaming may identify additional assumptions that could affect viability of options or COAs within an option. b. Planning is commander-led but informed by staff analysis and expertise. c. Planning consists of four functions, the planning process, and an operational design methodology as depicted in Figure III-1. For additional information, see Chapter IV, “Operational Design.” Chapter III III-4 JP 5-0 d. Operational design and the JPP are complementary tools of the overall planning process. Operational design provides an iterative process that enables the commander’s vision and mastery of operational art to help planners answer ends―ways―means―risk questions and appropriately structure campaigns and operations in a dynamic OE. The commander, supported by the staff, gains an understanding of the OE, defines the problem, and develops an operational approach for the campaign or operation through the application of operational design during the initiation step of the JPP. Commanders communicate their operational approach to their staff, subordinates, supporting commands, agencies, and multinational/nongovernmental entities as required in their initial planning guidance so that their approach can be translated into executable plans. As the JPP is applied, commanders may receive updated guidance, learn more about the OE and the problem, and refine their operational approach. Commanders provide their updated approach to the staff to guide detailed planning. This iterative process facilitates the continuing development and refinement of possible COAs into a selected COA with an associated initial CONOPS and eventually into a resource-informed executable plan or order. e. The relationship between the application of operational art, operational design, and the JPP continues throughout the planning and execution of the plan or order. By applying the operational design methodology, in combination with the procedural rigor of the JPP, Figure III-1. Planning Functions, Process, and Operational Design Methodology Joint Planning Process (seven steps) Planning Functions, Process, and Operational Design Methodology Planning Functions (four) Planning Initiation Mission Analysis COA Development COA Comparison COA Approval COA Analysis and Wargaming Plan or Order Development Understand Strategic Direction Understand Operational Environment Identify Decisions and Decision Points Understand Strategic Environment Develop Options Define the Problem Refine the Operational Approach Identify Assumptions Develop Planning Guidance Operational Design Methodology Assessment   Plan Assessment Operational Assessment Plan Development    COA Selection Plan or Order Development In-Progress Reviews and Approval Strategic Guidance     Initiate Planing Basis for Mission Analysis Develop Shared Understanding Understand Operational Environment Concept Development    Shared Understanding Develop Options Develop Operational Approach Course of Action (COA) development COA wargaming COA comparison    Joint Planning Process III-7 (a) The commander recommends a COA that is most appropriate for the situation. (b) Concept development should consider a range of COAs that integrate robust options to provide greater flexibility and to expedite transition during a crisis. CCDRs should be prepared to continue to develop multiple COAs to provide options to national-level leadership should the crisis develop. (c) For CCPs, CCDRs should address resource requirements, expected changes in the strategic environment and OEs, and how each COA supports achieving national objectives. (d) The commander also requests SecDef guidance on interorganizational planning and coordination and makes appropriate recommendations, based on the interorganizational requirements identified during assessments, mission analysis, and COA development. (2) One of the main products from the concept development planning function is approval for continued development of one or more COAs. Detailed planning begins upon COA approval in the concept development function. c. Plan Development. This function is used to develop a feasible plan or order that is ready to transition into execution. This function fully integrates mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, transition, redeployment, and demobilization activities. When the CCDR believes the plan is sufficiently developed to become a plan of record, the CCDR briefs the final plan to SecDef (or a designated representative) for approval. d. Assessment (1) Assessment is a continuous operation activity in both planning and execution functions and informs the commander’s decision making. It determines whether current actions and conditions are creating the desired effects and changes in the OE toward the desired objectives and ensures that plans remain appropriate for the changing conditions in the OE and resources. (2) Operation Assessment (a) Assessment reveals the progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. Assessment involves comparing desired conditions of the OE with actual conditions to determine the overall effectiveness of the campaign or operation. More specifically, assessment helps the JFC measure task performance; determine progress toward or regression from accomplishing a task, creating an effect, achieving an objective, or attaining an end state; and issue the necessary guidance for change to guide forward momentum. As follow-on assessments occur, they are compared to the initial (ideally pre- Chapter III III-8 JP 5-0 execution) baseline and previous follow-on assessments; historical trends can aid the analysis and provide more definitive and reliable measures and indicators of change. (b) During execution, assessment helps the command adapt and adjust operations as required to attain the desired end state (or achieve strategic objectives). This analysis and adjustment of operations creates an organizational environment of learning and adaptation. Adaptation can range from minor operational adjustments to a radical change of approach, including termination of the operation. When fundamental changes have occurred that challenge existing understanding or indicate a shift in the OE, commanders and staffs may develop a new operational approach that recognizes that the initial problem has changed, thus requiring a different approach toward the solution. The change to the OE could be so significant that it may require a review of the national strategic, theater strategic, and military objectives and discussions with higher authority to determine whether the military objectives or national strategic end states are still viable. (c) Operation assessment identifies when changes to the current plan are required. (3) Plan Assessment. (Refine, Adapt, Terminate Planning, Execute). Commanders continually review and evaluate the plan to determine one of four possible outcomes—refine, adapt, terminate planning or cancel the plan, or execute—and then act accordingly. Commanders and the JPEC continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that would require changes in the plan. The CCDR briefs SecDef during plan update IPRs on modifications and updates to the plan, based on the CCDR’s assessment of the situation, changes in resources or guidance, and the plan’s feasibility and suitability. (a) Refine. During all planning efforts, plan refinement is typically an orderly process that follows plan development and is part of the assessment function. Refinement is facilitated by continuous operation assessment to confirm changing OE conditions related to the plan or potential contingency. In a crisis, continuous operation assessment accommodates the fluidity of the crisis and facilitates continuous refinement throughout plans or OPORD development. Planners frequently adjust the plan or order based on evolving commander’s guidance; results of force planning, support planning, or deployment planning; shortfall identification; adversary or MNF actions; changes to the OE; or changes to strategic guidance. Based on continuous operation assessment, refinement continues throughout execution, with changes typically transmitted in the form of FRAGORDs rather than revised copies of the plan or order. (b) Adapt. Planners adapt plans when major modifications are required, which may be driven by one or more changes in the following: strategic direction, OE, or the problem facing the JFC. Planners continually monitor the situation for changes that necessitate adapting the plan, to include modifying the commander’s operational approach and revising the CONOPS. When this occurs, commanders may need to initiate a plan revision. (c) Terminate. Commanders recommend termination of a plan when they determine that the plan is no longer required. For CPG- or JSCP-tasked plans, the CCDR Joint Planning Process III-9 requests permission to archive the plan through the Joint Staff J-5 [Strategic Plans and Policy], who will staff the request through the JPEC. Recommendations on CPG-tasked plans are sent through the appropriate OSD staff for approval by SecDef (with a CJCS recommendation attached). For plans tasked in the JSCP, transition recommendations will be sent to the CJCS for approval. (d) Execute. When ordered, commanders review the plan, validate assumptions and previously issued guidance, issue orders, and conduct operations as directed. ALERTORDs, WARNORDs, and EXORDs will identify any changes to plans and specific forces allocated for the operation. Additional information on transitioning to execution is in Chapter VII, “Transition to Execution.” SECTION B. THE JOINT PLANNING PROCESS Joint Planning Overview Commander’s Role. The commander is the central figure in planning due to knowledge, experience, and because the commander’s judgment and decisions are required to guide the staff through the process. Generally, the more complex a situation, the more critical the role of the commander early in planning by leveraging their knowledge, experience, judgment, intuition, responsibility, and authority to generate a clearer understanding of the conditions needed to focus effort and achieve success. a. Commanders distinguish the unique features of their current situations to enable development of innovative or adaptive solutions. They understand that each situation requires a solution tailored to the context of the problem. Through the use of operational design and the application of operational art, commanders develop innovative, adaptive alternatives to solve complex challenges. These broad alternatives are the operational approach (Figure III-3). b. Commanders use the knowledge and understanding gained from operational design, along with any additional guidance from higher headquarters, to provide guidance that directs and guides the staff through the JPP. Developing meaningful touch-points throughout the planning process with the supported and supporting commanders and other stakeholders enables a shared understanding of the OE. c. Operational design requires the commander to encourage discourse and leverage dialogue and collaboration to identify complex, ill-defined problems. To that end, the commander must empower organizational learning and develop methods to determine whether modifying the operational approach is necessary during the course of an operation or campaign. This requires assessment and reflection that challenge understanding of the existing problem and the relevance of actions addressing that problem. Partners can be sources of additional information on the problem or OE, and can provide differing perspectives, which can broaden understanding and challenge institutional biases. Red teaming can also be a means to improve understanding by challenging assumptions. Due to complexity and constant change, commanders should be comfortable in the recognition that they will never know everything about the given OE and will never be able to fully Chapter III III-12 JP 5-0 higher authority. Additionally, analyses of the OE or developing or immediate crises may result in the President, SecDef, or CJCS directing military planning through a planning directive. CCDRs normally develop military options in combination with other nonmilitary options so the President can direct a whole-of-government approach that involves all the appropriate instruments of national power. Whether or not planning begins as described here, the commander may act within approved authorities and rules of engagement (ROE)/rules for the use of force (RUF) in an immediate crisis. (3) The commander and staff will receive and analyze the planning guidance to determine the time available until mission execution; current status of strategic and staff estimates; and intelligence products, to include JIPOE, and other factors relevant to the specific planning situation. The staff gathers and analyzes relevant information about friendly, neutral, and threat networks. This information can be obtained by both military and nonmilitary elements. The commander will typically provide initial planning guidance based upon current understanding of the OE, the problem, and the initial operational approach for the campaign or operation. It could specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, or authorize movement of key capabilities within the JFC’s authority. (4) While planning is continuous once execution begins, it is particularly relevant when there is new strategic direction, significant changes to the current mission or planning assumptions, or the commander receives a mission for follow-on operations. (5) Planning for campaign plans is different from contingency plans in that contingency planning focuses on the anticipation of future events, while campaign planning assesses the current state of the OE and identifies how the command can shape the OE to deter crisis and support strategic objectives. (6) Operational design supports this step in the planning process by building understanding of strategic direction, the strategic environment, and the OE. This helps the commander and staff define the problem as they begin mission analysis. For more information, see Chapter IV, “Operational Design.” c. Mission Analysis (Step 2) (1) The CCDR and staff develop a restated mission statement that allows subordinate and supporting commanders to begin their own estimates and planning efforts for higher headquarters’ concurrence. The joint force’s mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned tasks and to identify all other tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. Mission analysis focuses the commander and the staff on the problem at hand and lays a foundation for effective planning. When the commander receives a mission tasking, analysis begins with the following questions: Joint Planning Process III-13 (a) What is the purpose of the mission? (What problem is the commander being asked to solve or what change to the OE is desired?) (b) What tasks will accomplish the mission? (c) Will the mission achieve the desired objectives? (d) What limitations have been placed on my own forces’ actions? (e) What forces are needed to support my operation? (f) How will I know when the mission is accomplished successfully? (g) How will friendly, neutral, and threat networks affect the accomplishment of the mission? (2) The primary inputs to mission analysis are strategic guidance; the higher headquarters’ planning directive; and the commander’s initial planning guidance, which may include a description of the OE, a definition of the problem, the operational approach, initial intent, and the JIPOE (see Figure III-5). The primary outputs of mission analysis are the identified essential, specified, and implied tasks; friendly and threat centers of gravity (COGs) and their critical vulnerabilities; staff estimates; the mission statement; a refined operational approach; the commander’s intent statement; updated planning guidance; and initial commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs). (3) Mission analysis helps the JFC understand the problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process. The JFC and staff can accomplish mission analysis through a number of logical activities, such as those shown in Figure III-6. Liaison officers from adjacent, supporting, and subordinate organizations should be included in the planning process as soon as possible to ensure coherent planning across the command and with higher and adjacent units. (a) Although some activities occur before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial concurrent processing of information by the commander and staff, particularly in a crisis situation. (b) During mission analysis, the tasks (specified and implied) and their purposes must be clearly stated to ensure planning encompasses all requirements, including any limitations on actions that the commander or subordinate forces may take. Mission analysis should also ensure the correlation between the commander’s mission and intent and those of higher and other commanders is understood. Resources and authorities must also be evaluated to ensure there is not a mission-resource-authority mismatch and to enable the commander to prioritize missions and tasks against limited resources. (c) Specific information may need to be captured and tracked to improve the end products. This includes requests for information regarding forces, capabilities, and other resources; questions for the commander or special assistant (e.g., legal); and proposed Chapter III III-14 JP 5-0 battle rhythm for planning and execution. Recording this information during the mission analysis process will enable a more complete product and smoother mission analysis brief. (4) Analyze Higher Headquarters’ Planning Directives and Strategic Guidance (a) Strategic guidance is essential to joint planning and operational design. The President, SecDef, and CJCS promulgate strategic guidance documents that cover a broad range of situations, and CCDRs provide guidance that covers a narrower range of theater or functional situations. Documents such as the UCP, NMS, CPG, and JSCP provide near-term (0-2 years) strategic guidance, and the CCDR’s theater or functional Figure III-5. Joint Planning Process: Mission Analysis Joint Planning Process: Mission Analysis Higher headquarters’ planning directive Strategic direction Commander’s planning guidance Description of the operational environment Definition of the problem Commander’s operational approach Commander’s initial intent Strategic estimate and intelligence products to include JIPOE Network analysis     Staff estimates Mission statement Commander’s refined operational approach including: JFC’s intent statement JFC’s updated planning guidance Problem framing, initial force identification, mission success criteria, initial risk assessment, mission analysis briefing, and planning directive (as necessary) Initial commander’s critical information requirements Course of action evaluation criteria Identified essential, specified, and implied tasks Friendly and threat centers of gravity   Key Inputs Key Outputs Mission Analysis Legend JFC joint force commander JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment Joint Planning Process III-17 provides a basis for continued detailed analysis of the OE and of the tasks that may describe the mission and its parameters. (6) Determine Known Facts and Develop Planning Assumptions. The staff assembles both facts and assumptions to support the planning process and planning guidance. (a) A fact is a statement of information known to be true (such as verified locations of friendly and adversary force dispositions). Planners must acknowledge higher headquarters assumptions and assess the impact (risk) should they prove to be incorrect. If subordinate headquarters have information that may invalidate a higher headquarters’ assumption, that should be raised; however, it does not relieve subordinate headquarters from planning within the confines of the given assumption. (b) An assumption provides a supposition about the current situation or future course of events, presumed to be true based on an assessment of available facts. Valid assumptions have three characteristics: logical, realistic, and essential for planning to continue. Commanders and staffs should never assume away adversary capabilities or assume unrealistic friendly capabilities will be available. Assumptions address gaps in knowledge critical for the planning process to continue. All assumptions are continually reviewed to ensure their validity and challenged if unrealistic, including those provided in strategic guidance or from higher headquarters. Subordinate commanders do not develop assumptions that contradict valid higher headquarters assumptions. 1. Commanders and staffs should anticipate changes to the plan if an assumption proves to be incorrect. Because of assumptions’ influence on planning, planners must either validate the assumptions (treat as facts) or invalidate the assumptions (alter the plan accordingly) as quickly as possible. 2. During wargaming or red teaming, planners should review both the positive and negative aspect of all assumptions. They should review the plan from both the perspective that the assumption will prove true and from the perspective that the assumption will prove false. This can aid in preventing biases or tunnel vision in a crisis. For more discussion on red teams, see Appendix J, “Red Teams.” 3. Commanders should assess the impact higher headquarters assumptions have on the plan during wargaming. Although higher headquarters assumptions are followed in framing planning, they are treated as assumptions and validated for execution. Commanders and planners must use caution in characterizing information as facts, as some items of information thought to be facts may be open to interpretation, based on the observer’s perspective or incomplete information. Chapter III III-18 JP 5-0 4. Assumptions made in contingency planning should be addressed in the plan. Activities and operations in the plan can be used to validate, refute, or render unnecessary contingency plan assumptions. 5. Plans may contain assumptions that cannot be resolved until a crisis develops. As a crisis develops, assumptions should be replaced with facts as soon as possible. The staff accomplishes this by identifying the information needed to validate assumptions and submitting an information request to an appropriate agency as an information requirement. If the commander needs the information to make a key decision, the information requirement can be designated a CCIR. Although there will be exceptions, the staff should strive to resolve all assumptions before issuing the order. 6. Planners work to limit assumptions to only those necessary for continued planning. By definition, assumptions introduce possibility for error. If the assumption is not necessary to continue planning, its only effect is to introduce error and add the likelihood of creating a bias in the commander’s and planner’s perspective. Since most plans require refinement, a plan with fewer assumptions allows the commander and staff to act and react with other elements of the OE (including enemies, adversaries, allies, and the physical element). However, assumptions are useful to identify those issues the commander and planners must validate on execution, and strategic plans are heavily reliant on assumptions due to the ambiguity inherent in the strategic environment. 7. All assumptions should be identified in the plan or decision matrix to ensure they are reviewed and validated prior to execution. (7) Determine and Analyze Operational Limitations. Operational limitations are actions required or prohibited by higher authority and other restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and partner nation and HN issues. (a) A constraint is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that dictates an action (“must do”), thus restricting freedom of action. For example, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was required to enter the continent of Europe instead of relying upon strategic bombing to defeat Germany. (b) A restraint is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that prohibits an action (“cannot do”), thus restricting freedom of action. For example, General Douglas MacArthur was prohibited from striking Chinese targets north of the Yalu River during the Korean War. (c) Many operational limitations transition to ROE/RUF. Operational limitations may restrict or bind COA selection or may even impede implementation of the chosen COA. Commanders must examine the operational limitations imposed on them, understand their impacts (including risk posed by limitations), and develop options within these limitations to promote maximum freedom of action during execution. Joint Planning Process III-19 (d) Some operational limitations may arise due to the inherent informational aspect of military activities, the effects of which are not geographically constrained or limited to a joint force’s intended audiences. The joint force cannot control the spread of information or its impact on audiences, within or beyond an OA. This may restrict a commander's freedom of action if the informational aspect of a COA undermines higher priority national objectives. Based upon their understanding of the information impact on the OE, joint force planners need to determine limitations related to relevant actors, the use of certain capabilities, and the use of specific themes or messages. (e) Other operational limitations may arise from laws or authorities, such as the use of specific types of funds or training events. Commanders are responsible for ensuring they have the authority to execute operations and activities. (8) Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks. The commander and staff will typically review the planning directive’s specified tasks and discuss implied tasks during planning initiation to resolve unclear or incorrectly assigned tasks with higher headquarters. If there are no issues, the commander and staff will confirm the tasks in mission analysis and then develop the initial mission statement. (a) Specified tasks are those that have been assigned to a commander in a planning directive. These are tasks the commander wants the subordinate commander to accomplish, usually because they are important to the higher command’s mission and/or objectives. One or more specified tasks often become essential tasks for the subordinate commander. (b) Implied tasks are additional tasks the commander must accomplish, typically to accomplish the specified tasks, support another command, or otherwise accomplish activities relevant to the operation or achieving the objective. In addition to the higher headquarters’ planning directive, the commander and staff will review other sources of guidance for implied tasks, such as multinational planning documents and the CCP, enemy and friendly COG analysis products, JIPOE products, relevant doctrinal publications, interviews with subject matter experts, and the commander’s operational approach. The commander can also deduce implied tasks from knowledge of the OE, such as the enemy situation and political conditions in the assigned OA. However, implied tasks do not include routine tasks or standard operating procedures inherent for most operations, such as conducting reconnaissance and protecting a flank. EXAMPLES OF SPECIFIED TASKS Ensure freedom of navigation for United States forces through the Strait of Gibraltar. Defend Country Green against attack from Country Red.