Download McHugh J's Approach to Precedent: Certainty & Integrity in Constitutional Cases and more Study notes Constitutional Law in PDF only on Docsity! Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 163 JUSTICE MCHUGH: A MODERATELY CONSERVATIVE APPROACH TO PRECEDENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW JOHN CARROLL * Abstract This paper analyses McHugh J’s approach to precedent in constitutional law in order to provide an insight into his Honour’s view of the role of the judge in upholding the Constitution. In his time on the High Court McHugh J produced judgments that fiercely advocated both for and against accepting a prior precedent of the Court. However, such judgments should not be seen as at odds with each other, but rather, once contextual factors surrounding the cases are taken into account, if can be seen that his Honour sought to promote similar values in both approaches. In particular, McHugh J’s approach to precedent sought to promote certainty in the law, particularly where governmental reliance was involved, his Honour believed such certainty promoted the values of legitimacy and confidence in the Court. I INTRODUCTION It has been contended by Guilfoyle that the jurisprudence of Justice McHugh is permeated by the balance of two distinct themes – the respect for individual rights, and an adherence to principle, which is motivated by a desire for ‘certainty … in the law’. 1 This paper seeks to examine * BSc (Psych) ANU, JD (Hons) (ANU). This paper is based upon Honours thesis research undertaken at the Australian National University, supervised by Professor Fiona Wheeler. 1 Kate Guilfoyle, ‘McHugh, Michael Hudson’ in Michael Coper, Tony Blackshield and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (Oxford University Press, 2001) 464, 465. 164 Carroll, Justice McHugh 2013 McHugh J’s view as to the role of the judge in upholding the Constitution by examining his Honour’s approach to precedent in constitutional cases. Of particular interest is to test how McHugh J balanced the two themes of his Honour’s jurisprudence in the constitutional arena. Precedent has been described as the ‘hallmark of the common law’. 2 However, the High Court, as a final court of appeal, and also as a constitutional court, has never been strictly bound by its decisions. 3 There are a number of competing values involved when considering precedent, including stability, consistency and predictability from following precedent, versus the need for justice, flexibility and rationality that departing from precedent may bring. 4 Precedent also has a special significance in constitutional law, where a tension can be set up between adhering to the law as articulated by precedent, and adhering to the law of the Constitution itself. 5 Accordingly, in considering precedent in constitutional law, a judge must weigh up the importance of a significant range of values in light of their own view of the role of the judge in upholding the Constitution. 6 It is this balancing process that will be used to identify the values that were most significant for McHugh J when interpreting the Constitution. The particular interest in McHugh J is that first, his Honour was a member of the High Court from 1989 until 2005 – a significant period for 2 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘The Use and Abuse of Precedent’ (1988) 4 Australian Bar Review 93, 93. 3 Michael Kirby, ‘Precedent Law, Practice and Trends in Australia’ (2007) 28 Australian Bar Review 243, 246. 4 Mason, ‘The Use and Abuse of Precedent’, above n 2, 93–5. 5 Tony Blackshield, ‘Precedent’ in Michael Coper, Tony Blackshield and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (Oxford University Press, 2001) 550, 553. 6 See Michael Gerhardt, ‘The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory’ (1991–1992) 60 George Washington Law Review 68, 74. Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 167 considerations to take into account in the judging process, rather than mechanically applying previous decisions. It is this ‘value judgment’ that is of particular interest in examining McHugh J’s approach, and accordingly, precedent will be referred to in the sense of stare decisis in this paper. The doctrine of precedent does not require that the whole of a previous decision be applied; rather, only the ratio decidendi (ratio) of the decision must be followed. 20 The ratio comprises that part of the judicial reasoning that is essential for deciding the case, 21 and not any additional remarks that were not essential to the decision. 22 This chapter first considers the approach that the High Court has taken to constitutional precedent, followed by an examination of the values at stake when considering approaches to precedent. Finally, there is a brief discussion as to how approaches to precedent in constitutional law have a complex relationship with the approach to constitutional interpretation that a judge prefers. A The Approach of the High Court It has long been established that the High Court can overrule its own decisions, 23 and, particularly in constitutional law, the Court has adopted 20 Kirby, ‘Precedent Law, Practice and Trends in Australia’, above n 3, 245. 21 Peter Butt (ed), Butterworths Concise Australian Legal Dictionary (LexisNexis Butterworths, 3 rd ed, 2004) 363. 22 Kirby, ‘Precedent Law, Practice and Trends in Australia’, above n 3, 245. 23 See, eg, Australian Agricultural Co v Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen’s Association of Australasia (1913) 17 CLR 261, 278–9 (Isaacs J); David Bennett, ‘Overruling’ in Michael Coper, Tony Blackshield and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia (Oxford University Press, 2001) 516, 516. 168 Carroll, Justice McHugh 2013 a flexible approach to precedent. 24 However, no settled principles as to when it may be appropriate to overrule have been developed, particularly in constitutional cases. 25 The case law does, however, provide a framework to the approach taken by the Court when overruling previous constitutional decisions. 1 Framework for Overruling First, a cautionary approach is taken when considering overruling. Gibbs J summed up this position; that ‘[i]t is only after the most careful and respectful consideration of the earlier decision ... that a Justice may give effect to his own opinions in preference to an earlier decision’. 26 Next, a judge considers whether the previous decision is ‘wrong’. 27 Phrases such as ‘manifestly wrong’ 28 or ‘fundamentally wrong’ 29 have been used to demonstrate that it is appropriate to overrule. 30 Horrigan suggests, however, that such terms merely give ‘emphatic force’ to a judge’s opinion, and are simply a conclusion that the judge has already made in regards to overruling. 31 If the previous decision is thought to be ‘wrong’ then the judge considers whether it is appropriate to overrule. In determining this, consideration is 24 Leslie Zines, The High Court and the Constitution (Butterworths, 4 th ed, 1997) 433. The fourth edition is being utilised here as Zines omitted the section on precedent in constitutional law in the fifth edition. 25 Bryan Horrigan, ‘Towards a Jurisprudence of High Court Overruling’ (1992) 66 Australian Law Journal 199, 199. 26 Queensland v Commonwealth (1977) 139 CLR 585, 599 (‘Second Territories Senators Case’). 27 See, eg, Horrigan, above n 25, 205. 28 See, eg, Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 554 (‘Lange’). 29 See, eg, McGinty (1996) 186 CLR 140, 235 (McHugh J). 30 Kirby, ‘Precedent Law, Practice and Trends in Australia’, above n 3, 245. 31 Horrigan, above n 25, 205. Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 169 given to a range of factors, identified in the case law, to provide an indication as to whether the circumstances are appropriate to overrule. 2 Factors Involved in Considering Precedent 32 Four matters that may justify a departure from an earlier decision were affirmed in John v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (‘John v FCT’), 33 and were applied in the constitutional context in Street. 34 These matters include, if the ‘earlier decision [does] not rest on a principle carefully worked out in a significant succession of cases’; if there are differences in the reasoning of the majority in the previous case; if the prior decision has ‘achieved no useful result’ or ‘led to considerable inconvenience’; and if the previous decision has ‘not been independently acted upon in a manner which [militates] against reconsideration’. 35 These factors demonstrate that more is involved than simply the ‘correctness’ of a past decision – with reference being made to the practical consequences of a decision, the level of reliance that has been placed on it, and also the degree to which a decision has been accepted by members of the Court. Another argument favouring overruling is, if the constitutional issue is of ‘fundamental’ importance, 36 or relates to individual rights, 37 then a judge should uphold the ‘correct’ interpretation, even if it is contrary to precedent. Judges are likely to differ considerably in their interpretation 32 For a comprehensive discussion see Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 24, 433–44. 33 (1989) 166 CLR 409. 34 Ibid 489 (Mason CJ), 549 (Dawson J), 560 (Toohey J), 569 (Gaudron J), 586 (McHugh J). 35 Ibid 438 (Mason CJ, Wilson, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ). 36 See, eg, Second Territories Senators Case (1977) 139 CLR 585, 630 (Aickin J). 37 Street (1989) 168 CLR 461, 489 (Mason CJ), 518–9 (Brennan J), 588 (McHugh J). Street considered the Constitution s 117, an ‘individual right’ preventing a state from discriminating against residents of other states by reason of their inter-state residence. 172 Carroll, Justice McHugh 2013 overruling. 44 By assessing which factors a judge considers most important, an insight can be gained as to the values informing that judge’s approach. Specifically in constitutional law, the identification of such values provides information as to the role that the judge believes they have to play in interpreting the Constitution. This section provides a discussion of the basic arguments for and against accepting precedent, followed by a discussion of the specific values underlying approaches to precedent. Chapters Two and Three will then seek to identify which values were most important for McHugh J in his approach to precedent in constitutional law. 1 Arguments for and against Precedent Overwhelmingly, precedent is used to promote consistency and predictability in the law. 45 However, if precedent is applied too strictly it can ‘[destroy] or at least ... [delay] the development ... of principles’, 46 meaning that the law may lose its ability to account for changing social conditions. 47 In constitutional law, precedent carries a special significance, due to considerations respecting the Constitution. First, due to the entrenched nature of the Constitution, the High Court is more willing to reconsider past constitutional cases rather than non-constitutional cases, since the Parliament is unable to ‘correct’ a decision that is thought to be erroneous. 48 Second, in constitutional law, judges have two loyalties – loyalty to existing precedent, and loyalty to the Constitution itself. Some argue that the reasoning of the Court in past decisions is only persuasive, 44 See Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 24, 443. 45 Kirby, ‘Precedent law, Practice and Trends in Australia’, above n 3, 243. 46 Lockhart, above n 18, 5. 47 Mason, ‘The Use and Abuse of Precedent’, above n 2, 94. 48 See Second Territories Senators Case (1977) 139 CLR 585, 599 (Gibbs J). Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 173 and ‘may not be used as a substitute for the Constitution’. 49 However, if each judge only followed their own opinion there would be an unacceptable amount of instability within the law. 50 Third, since the Constitution is designed to endure over time, previous decisions may need to be reconsidered to take account of changing circumstances, 51 thus, decreasing the strength of a precedent. Consequently, in constitutional law an even more complex array of factors confront a High Court judge when deciding whether to apply precedent. 2 Underlying Values (a) Certainty and Reliance Promoting consistency and predictability through adhering to precedent can relate to the need to be able to rely on decisions of the court, which requires certainty in the law. 52 This has been heralded as a ‘principal’ purpose of stare decisis. 53 In constitutional law, a particular emphasis may be placed on governmental reliance, 54 since constitutional decisions ‘directly affect the institutional shape and powers of ... government’. 55 Reliance of citizens can also be important when considering precedent; however, in relation to citizens, reliance is more often referred to in the 49 Damjanovic & Sons Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1968) 117 CLR 390, 396 (Barwick CJ). 50 Zines, The High Court and the Constitution, above n 24, 433. 51 Ibid. This may be linked to whether the judge prefers ‘originalist’ or ‘progressive’ modes of interpretation – discussed further below. 52 Saul Brenner and Harold Spaeth, Stare Indecisis: The Alteration of Precedent on the Supreme Court, 1946–1992 (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 2. 53 Itel Containers International Co v Huddleston, 507 US 60, [43] (1993) (Scalia J). 54 Edmund Thomas, The Judicial Process: Realism, Pragmatism, Practical Reasoning and Principles (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 145. 55 Brian Galligan, ‘The Australian High Court’s Role in Institutional Maintenance and Development’ in Charles Sampford and Kim Preston (eds), Interpreting Constitutions: Theories, Principles and Institutions (Federation Press, 1996) 184, 185. 174 Carroll, Justice McHugh 2013 context of promoting security of commercial transactions. 56 Accordingly, reliance of citizens does not carry the same importance in constitutional law. (b) Fairness and Equality before the Law Following precedent may also be used to promote equality before the law. This may be due to the ‘rule of law’ ideal that like cases should be treated alike, 57 promoting fairness and justice. Counter to this view is that if the earlier decision was itself unjust, then by following precedent the court is simply promulgating unjust outcomes. 58 (c) Legitimising Judicial Review A common theme in the American literature is that adherence to precedent is one method of legitimising judicial review. 59 Judicial review needs legitimising because it is argued that it is undemocratic for a court, comprised of non-elected judges, to strike down legislation and actions of elected officials. 60 Consequently, by following precedent the court demonstrates that it is bound by the rule of law, rather than by political motivations, when reviewing governmental action, providing legitimacy to the ‘anti-democratic’ task. 61 56 See Thomas, above n 54, 148; Brenner and Spaeth, above n 52, 3–4. 57 Brenner and Spaeth, above n 52, 5. 58 Ibid. 59 See, eg, Henry Monaghan, ‘Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication’ (1988) 88 Columbia Law Review 723, 752; James Rehnquist, ‘The Power that shall be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court’ (1986) 66 Boston University Law Review 345, 354. 60 Rehnquist, above n 59, 353–4. 61 Monaghan, above n 59, 753. Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 177 that it prevents the Constitution developing with changing conditions that were not envisaged when the Constitution was adopted. However, one method to respond to this criticism is construing constitutional powers broadly, so that the Constitution can apply to circumstances that were not foreseen when it was framed. 72 Alternatively, a basic description of a ‘progressive’ 73 approach is that by recognising that the Constitution is designed to be capable of adjusting to ‘changing conditions’, 74 the Constitution must be interpreted by determining its contemporary meaning. 75 The main originalist criticism to this approach is that it allows the meaning of the Constitution to change over time. 76 A modern example of a progressive approach can be seen in Kirby J’s judgment in Al-Kateb v Godwin (‘Al-Kateb’). 77 Kirby J argued that the Constitution must be interpreted ‘in a way that is generally harmonious with the basic principles of international law’ 78 so that the Constitution can be adapted to ‘changing times’. 79 McHugh J rejected Kirby J’s approach in Al-Kateb, claiming it allows the meaning of the Constitution to change whenever rules of international law change, amounting to unauthorised amendments of the Constitution. 80 72 Ibid 15. 73 See Ibid 16. ‘Progressivism’ is also a broad label under which a number of interpretive methods may be classified. 74 Ibid 17. 75 Graeme Hill, ‘“Originalist” vs “Progressive” Interpretations of the Constitution – Does it Matter?’ (2000) 11 Public Law Review 159, 159. 76 Mason, ‘The Interpretation of a Constitution in a Modern Liberal Democracy’, above n 68, 18. 77 (2004) 219 CLR 562. 78 Ibid 624. 79 Ibid 625. 80 Ibid 592. Note, however, that different methods of interpretation do not, as a matter of course, lead to different results on constitutional issues – see generally Hill, above n 75. 178 Carroll, Justice McHugh 2013 McHugh J was one of the few judges to explicitly explain his interpretive approach whilst on the Court. 81 McHugh J’s approach has been described as a ‘version of moderate originalism’, 82 where his Honour’s starting point was to discern the objective intentions of the makers of the Constitution. 83 This basic understanding of McHugh J’s interpretative approach as a form of ‘originalism’ is useful for understanding his Honour’s reasons for rejecting precedent in the cases discussed in Chapter Three. Prior to this, however, Chapter Two will consider the values underlying McHugh J’s approach in constitutional cases where his Honour deferred to precedent. III CHAPTER TWO: DEFERRING TO PRECEDENT This chapter analyses constitutional cases where McHugh J deferred to precedent and identifies the values informing this approach, providing an insight as to McHugh J’s view of the proper role of the judge in interpreting the Constitution. These cases demonstrate that, in comparison to other judges on the bench in the same period, McHugh J particularly valued the certainty that precedent provides. Additionally, his Honour’s approach necessarily recognises that there are occasions when an individual judge’s opinion must give way to that of the court in order to promote the institutional values of legitimacy and confidence in the court. The ‘centre piece’ for analysis of McHugh J deference to precedent is his Honour’s remarkable judgment in Tyler in relation to the jurisdiction of 81 See Bradley Selway, ‘Methodologies of Constitutional Interpretation in the High Court of Australia’ (2003) 14 Public Law Review 234, 244. 82 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Interpreting the Constitution in its Second Century’ (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 677, 706. 83 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 551 (McHugh J) (‘Re Wakim’); for an analysis of McHugh J’s approach see Selway, above n 81, 244–6. Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 179 service tribunals. In Tyler, his Honour held that the previous cases were ‘binding’ on him in a limited way, despite there being no test previously accepted by a majority. The later decisions of Mewett and Austin are useful as further examples of McHugh J promoting the values that his Honour upheld in Tyler. A Service Tribunal Cases – Setting the Scene 1 Background To fully appreciate McHugh J’s approach in Tyler, an understanding of the significance of the issues is required. The service tribunal cases involved constitutional challenges to the jurisdiction of a military tribunal to hear service offences. If a wide jurisdiction was granted to the tribunals then a wider exception would be created to the protections offered by Constitution ch III. A narrow jurisdiction, however, could potentially undermine the ability of the military to enforce service discipline. 84 The first case, Re Tracey; Ex parte Ryan (‘Tracey’), 85 decided in 1989, before McHugh J’s appointment to the Court, set the scene for sharp divisions in the Court. In Tracey the Court split, providing three lines of reasoning as to the scope of service tribunal jurisdiction, with no line of reasoning attracting majority support. 86 The divisions in the Court continued two years later in Nolan, where all members of the Court that decided Tracey retained their views from that case. 87 In Nolan, McHugh J, the only new member of the Court, 84 See Richard Tracey, ‘The Constitution and Military Justice’ (2005) 28 University of New South Wales Law Journal 426, 426–7. 85 (1989) 166 CLR 518. 86 See Re Nolan; Ex parte Young (1991) 172 CLR 460, 471 (Mason CJ and Dawson J) (‘Nolan’). 87 Ibid 474 (Mason CJ and Dawson J), 484 (Brennan and Toohey JJ), 490 (Deane J), 494 (Gaudron J). 182 Carroll, Justice McHugh 2013 Thus, for McHugh J, precedent went beyond the ratio of a case, extending to requiring similar outcomes for indistinguishable cases. B Valuing Certainty McHugh J’s reasons for being bound by precedent in Tyler indicate that in the circumstances of the case, his Honour was compelled towards the theme of adhering to principle. 97 It is contended, from Tyler, that the ‘principle’ which McHugh J was adhering to was the promotion of certainty in the law, so that government could rely on decisions of the Court. Importantly, for McHugh J, promoting certainty in Tyler outweighed the desire to maintain an interpretation of the Constitution that had a greater protection for individual rights. 1 Governmental Reliance Critical for McHugh J in Tyler was that Parliament had formed expectations from past decisions. Similar concerns were displayed by his Honour in Re Aird; Ex parte Alpert (‘Aird’), 98 where the issue of service tribunal jurisdiction was again raised ten years later. This case demonstrates the consistency of McHugh J’s desire to promote certainty, at least in the circumstances of the service tribunal cases. In Aird, McHugh J argued that Brennan and Toohey JJ’s ‘service connection’ test had gained general acceptance since the previous cases. 99 This was a reference to general acceptance by the government and, in particular, the Judge Advocate in trying the case, rather than referring to acceptance by a majority of the Court. Thus, McHugh J perceived the reliance of the 97 See Guilfoyle, above n 1, 465. 98 (2004) 220 CLR 308. Note that Aird was not a good vehicle to analyse precedent since neither party sought to re-open the earlier decisions. 99 Ibid 322. Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 183 government, and the Judge Advocate, as significant factors when considering precedent. It is uncontroversial that constitutional decisions have a key role to play in developing and maintaining governmental institutions. 100 Justice McHugh has argued that this role of shaping the ‘social, economic and political fabric of the country’ forms part of the constitutional strength of the Court. 101 Arguably, McHugh J’s recognition, in Tyler and Aird, of the level of reliance taken by the government, demonstrates that his Honour believes that the Court’s strength must be exercised with care. McHugh J considered that if the earlier decisions were to be reversed, then the detrimental effect to the government would be significant, and it was a lesser evil to adopt an interpretation that his Honour considered erroneous. Accordingly, at least in the circumstances of enforcing military discipline effectively, McHugh J considered that Parliament must be able to rely on past decisions of the Court. Thus, given the power that Justice McHugh recognises the Court to have, it must be exercised with an appreciation of the practical effects that will flow from the decision. In the circumstances of the severe uncertainty pervading the service tribunal cases, McHugh J felt bound to adhere to the ‘principle’ to provide certainty to the issue. Support for McHugh J consistently valuing reliance in relation to governmental interests is found in Austin. Austin was decided late in McHugh J’s time on the Court, and concerned the doctrine of state immunity from Commonwealth laws. Significantly, McHugh J criticised the joint judgment for not following precedent. The joint judgment, with 100 See Galligan, above n 55, 201; Rehnquist, above n 59, 368. 101 Michael McHugh, ‘The Strengths of the Weakest Arm’ (2004) 25 Australian Bar Review 181, 181–2. 184 Carroll, Justice McHugh 2013 Kirby J concurring on this point, 102 held that the previous decisions on state immunity were consistent with a one limb test, and, rather than overruling precedent, argued that judgments promoting a two limb test were an erroneous interpretation of earlier decisions on state immunity. 103 McHugh J, however, held that a ‘long line’ of decisions that accepted the two limb test, prevented him from agreeing with the joint judgment that the test comprised only one limb. 104 In responding to the joint judgment, McHugh J argued that while there may not be a difference between the two tests, if there was a substantive difference, the single limb test ‘may lead to unforeseen problems in an area that is vague and difficult to apply’. 105 Significantly, the doctrine of state immunity provides an area of protection for the states from Commonwealth interference. Thus, McHugh J’s desire for certainty again related to governmental interests. This reiterates that in certain circumstances McHugh J values adhering to principle to promote certainty in constitutional law, particularly to account for governmental reliance. C Value of the Court It has been noted by Thomas that a strict approach to precedent necessarily hampers judicial autonomy. 106 Accordingly, in the cases where McHugh J has deferred to precedent, his Honour has favoured 102 Austin (2003) 215 CLR 185, 301. 103 Ibid 258 (Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). 104 Ibid 281; the ‘long line’ includes acceptance of the two limb test by Mason J in Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, subsequently accepted by a majority in both Queensland Electricity Commission v Commonwealth (1985) 159 CLR 192 and Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416. 105 Austin (2003) 215 CLR 185, 282. 106 Thomas, above n 54, 141. Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 187 Arguably, for McHugh J, the value of overtly accepting past decisions is in paying due respect to the Court as an institution – and such respect fosters public perceptions of the Court’s integrity. 2 Critique of McHugh J in Tyler McHugh J’s unique judgment in Tyler may be open to criticism. First, McHugh J’s judgment in Tyler was not pleasing for a ‘student of the law’, since no test was accepted by his Honour as determinative of the issue. It must be remembered, however, that if his Honour had maintained his position from Nolan there also would have been no authoritative test accepted by a majority. Second, Gaudron and Deane JJ may criticise his Honour for abandoning the ‘rights protectionist’ view before a clear majority had accepted another position. Contrary to this criticism, given the stalemate that had occurred within the Court, McHugh J should be heralded at least for attempting to provide certainty to the issue. Given the clear refusal of the other justices to alter their view, McHugh J should be recognised for being the only Justice to overtly consider the potential ramifications for the Court as an institution if it was unable to resolve its internal divisions. For McHugh J, rather than simply focussing on the doctrine involved in the service tribunal cases, his Honour appealed to what, for him, was a higher ‘principle’ of creating certainty in the law, and protecting the legitimacy of the Court. 3 Supporting Evidence – Mewett The above discussion in relation to the institutional values that McHugh J was promoting in Tyler is supported by the more ‘classical’ application of precedent by McHugh J in Mewett. This demonstrates a consistent approach by McHugh J in promoting such values, rather than Tyler being a deviation from his Honour’s usual approach. 188 Carroll, Justice McHugh 2013 In Mewett, McHugh J departed from his own view to follow the precedent set by a majority of the Court in Georgiadis. In Georgiadis, the majority found that a provision purporting to extinguish an accrued right to sue for common law damages was invalid as being an ‘acquisition of property’ other than on ‘just terms’. 115 McHugh J dissented in Georgiadis, holding that the plaintiff’s cause of action only had an existence due to federal law, and that it was ‘liable to be revoked by federal law’, thus, there was no ‘acquisition of property’. 116 There were also two other dissenting judgments, on different grounds to McHugh J, in Georgiadis. 117 By accepting Georgiadis as precedent in Mewett, McHugh J accepted the majority reasoning despite there being three dissenting judges in Georgiadis. Consequenlty, by holding that he was bound by the slim majority of the Court in Mewett, McHugh J was promoting the values of certainty, legitimacy and public confidence in the Court. A final point on Mewett is that McHugh J did not articulate the values that led his Honour to follow precedent to the same extent as his Honour did in Tyler. It appears that, for McHugh J, accepting precedent in Mewett was a simple and uncontroversial step – which supports the proposition that such an approach is consistent for his Honour. 118 115 (1994) 179 CLR 297, 308 (Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ), 312 (Brennan J). 116 Ibid 325. 117 Ibid 315 (Dawson J), 320–1 (Toohey J). 118 Note that in Smith (2000) 204 CLR 493, McHugh J dissented, concurring with Hayne J, that the provision in question was not an ‘acquisition of property’ as it could be distinguished from the provisions considered in Georgiadis and Mewett. The author agrees with Lynch that the provisions could be legitimately distinguished so as to not constitute an attempt to ‘attack Georgiadis through the back door’: Andrew Lynch, The Impact of Dissenting Opinions Upon the Development of Australian Constitutional Law (PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, 2005) Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 189 D The Significance of Individual Rights for McHugh J The analysis of Tyler has demonstrated that the theme of adherence to principle is evident in McHugh J’s approach to precedent; the question is, what role does the second theme of his Honour’s jurisprudence, the respect for individual rights, have to play for his Honour? 119 In Tyler, even though McHugh J described the protection that Constitution ch III provides as a ‘fundamental guarantee’, this possibility of protecting individual rights was outweighed by the need to promote certainty. Thus, while McHugh J recognised that a guarantee of rights was involved, that was only one interest to be balanced as part of the decision-making process. In particular, McHugh J’s approach can be contrasted to that of Deane and Gaudron JJ, who each retained their own view from the earlier cases in Tyler, due to the fundamental nature of the issue. This contrast highlights the different weightings given to competing values by the judges: while Deane and Gaudron JJ preferred protecting individual rights, McHugh J, clearly valued certainty over protecting individual rights in the circumstances of Tyler. Consequently, Tyler does not demonstrate that individual rights had no role to play in considering constitutional precedent for McHugh J, but rather, in certain circumstances other values must prevail. 1 Inconsistent Approach? One example where the value of individual rights prevailed for McHugh J, when considering precedent in constitutional law, is found in Street. In Street each member of the Court, in separate judgments, overruled Henry 249. As such, Smith is not an attempt by McHugh J to get around precedent by ‘stealth’. 119 These themes were referred to in the introduction: see Guilfoyle, above n 1, 465. 192 Carroll, Justice McHugh 2013 number of factors favouring overruling Henry, Street did not require the judges to ‘balance’ competing interests in a manner which would demonstrate which factors were most important. In particular, McHugh J noted that the past decision had not been independently acted upon, thus, the issue of reliance did not arise, which was the critical factor for his Honour in Tyler. Finally, the context of Tyler was extremely different to Street. Whereas Street was the first decision on Constitution s 117 in 16 years, Tyler was the third time the Court had considered the question of service tribunal jurisdiction in recent years, and there was clearly a stalemate amongst the justices. This was certainly a factor influencing McHugh J to prefer certainty over individual rights in Tyler. This point is critical for demonstrating the existence of both themes of adhering to principle, and valuing individual rights, in McHugh J’s approach. 134 Since reliance was not in issue for McHugh J, in Street, no tension arose between protecting individual rights and promoting certainty. However, in Tyler, such a tension did arise, and due to the circumstances, his Honour was compelled to promote certainty over individual rights. Consequently, McHugh J’s judgment in Street should not be seen as inconsistent with Tyler, but rather, demonstrates that different circumstances will call for a different balancing of values. (c) McHugh’s J Respect for Civil Liberties Extra-judicially, Justice McHugh has made it clear that he holds the protection of human rights in high regard. 135 The question is whether this position can sit comfortably with his Honour’s approach to the 134 See Guilfoyle, above n 1, 465. 135 See generally Michael McHugh, ‘The Need for Agitators – The Risk of Stagnation’ (2007) 9 Constitutional Law and Policy Review 46. Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 193 Constitution. Arguably, the tension between the themes that Guilfoyle 136 contends permeate McHugh J’s jurisprudence came to the fore in McHugh J’s judgments in the service tribunal cases. McHugh J’s adoption of the interpretation providing greatest protection for individual rights in Nolan demonstrated that his Honour values protecting civil liberties. However, in Tyler, the balance of the competing interests weighed in favour of adhering to principle to promote certainty. Extra-judicially Justice McHugh has noted that constitutional decisions of the High Court have highlighted that gaps exist in the protection of human rights, and that there is an ‘inability [for] Australian judges to prevent unjust human rights outcomes’. 137 This was not an accusation of a failing of the judiciary, but rather an acknowledgment that ‘the High Court ... is not empowered to be as active as the Supreme Court of the United States ... in the defence of ... human rights.’ 138 This understanding was clearly highlighted for McHugh J in the unfortunate case of Al- Kateb. While McHugh J recognised the ‘tragic ... position of the appellant’, his Honour held that there was nothing in the Constitution to prevent the Commonwealth Parliament authorising ‘indefinite detention of an unlawful non-citizen in circumstances where there is no real prospect’ of their removal. 139 In particular, McHugh J noted that ‘[i]t is not for the courts ... to determine whether the course taken by Parliament is ... contrary to basic human rights’. 140 Instead, his Honour held that if such rights are to be protected through the Constitution it must be done 136 Guilfoyle, above n 1, 465. 137 McHugh, ‘The Need for Agitators – The Risk of Stagnation’, above n 135, 53. 138 Ibid 48 (emphasis added). 139 Al-Kateb (2004) 219 CLR 562, 580–1. 140 Ibid 595. 194 Carroll, Justice McHugh 2013 by inserting a Bill of Rights into the Constitution using the s 128 amendment process. 141 Consequently, while McHugh J values protecting human rights, his Honour believes the Court has limited power to undertake an activist role in protecting such rights under the Constitution. In light of this understanding, it is not surprising that, in Tyler, the value of adhering to principle to promote certainty outweighed protecting individual rights. E Choices in Interpretation The cases where McHugh J has deferred to precedent also demonstrate that his Honour accepts that there is no single correct answer to constitutional issues, but rather, that choices must be made. Justice McHugh has recognised this, noting that ‘justices in constitutional cases often reach diametrically opposed views on the meaning of constitutional provisions even though they all use the same method of ... interpretation.’ 142 A more complex understanding of McHugh J’s view as to the scope for such choice emerges in the next chapter. As will be seen, for McHugh J, the ability for judges to make choices is not unbounded – and in certain circumstances his Honour has vigorously attacked methods of interpretation of the Constitution that he considers to fall outside such boundaries. This analysis of McHugh J’s deferral to precedent in constitutional cases is consistent with Guilfoyle’s claim that a balance between the themes of adhering to principle and protecting individual rights permeate his Honour’s jurisprudence. Due to his Honour’s view that the Court has a 141 Ibid. 142 Michael McHugh, ‘The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the High Court: 1989–2004’ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 5, 10. Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 197 In this ‘new constitutional law’, Leeth v Commonwealth (‘Leeth’), 149 decided in the same year as ACTV, is significant. In Leeth, Deane and Toohey JJ, in dissent, held that there is implied in the Constitution a general guarantee of legal equality. 150 In devising this implication their Honours relied on the common law doctrine of ‘legal equality’ being incorporated in ‘the very structure of the Constitution’. 151 This method of deriving the implication opened an ‘interpretive door’ that was ‘very wide’, 152 and it was this process which Detmold was heralding as the ‘new constitutional law’. Critics, however, argued that such developments may result in governmental power being limited through principles that have only a ‘tenuous link with anything in the Constitution’. 153 This then had the potential to ‘open up a Pandora’s box of implied rights and freedoms.’ 154 It is in this context that McHugh J’s judgments are best understood. 2 ACTV In ACTV there were differences amongst the judges as to the source of the implied freedom of political communication. For McHugh J, the words ‘directly chosen by the people’ in Constitution ss 7 and 24, interpreted against a background of representative and responsible government, refer to a process surrounding elections. 155 In this process, according to 149 (1992) 174 CLR 455. 150 Ibid 486. 151 Ibid 485. 152 Jeremy Kirk, ‘Constitutional Implications (II): Doctrines of Equality and Democracy’ (2001) 25 Melbourne Law Review 24, 32. 153 Zines, ‘A Judicially Created Bill of Rights?’ (1994) 16 Sydney Law Review 166, 183. 154 Ibid 177. 155 ACTV (1992) 177 CLR 106, 232. 198 Carroll, Justice McHugh 2013 McHugh J, the people have a right to ‘participation, association and communication identifiable [from] ss 7 and 24’. 156 B Rejecting the ‘New Constitutional Law’ Following ACTV, over a series of cases, including Theophanous and McGinty, McHugh J criticised the majority approach to deriving the implication. Through these criticisms an understanding as to the factors that persuaded McHugh J to reject precedent can develop. 1 Rejecting Precedent (a) Theophanous 157 In Theophanous, the question was whether the ACTV implication could provide either a constitutional defence for defamation on ‘political matters’, or whether the common law defences to defamation could be altered to be consistent with the implication. In their joint judgment, Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ held that the source of the implication was the need to ‘ensure the efficacious working of representative democracy’, 158 which their Honours held to be a concept ‘enshrined in the Constitution’. 159 On the question at issue, their Honours formulated a constitutional defence to actions in defamation. 160 Deane J, in the majority, agreed that the source of the implication was ‘the doctrine of representative government which forms part of the fabric of the 156 Ibid 231–2. 157 Note that Theophanous was heard successively with Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 211 (‘Stephens’), where the Court was similarly divided as to the source of the implication. 158 Theophanous (1994) 183 CLR 104, 123. 159 Ibid 121–1. 160 Ibid 140. Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 199 Constitution’, and his Honour held that this was established in ACTV. 161 Deane J, however, held that the Constitution provided a complete defence in relation to publications ‘about the official conduct or suitability of a member of the Parliament or other holder of high Commonwealth office.’ 162 This was a wider view than that expressed in the joint judgment, however, Deane J added that while he was ‘unable to accept’ the position of the joint judgment, he would agree with them in order to gain majority support. 163 In Theophanous, McHugh J rejected the majority approach to the source of the implication, authoring a forceful dissent. McHugh J could not agree with ‘the proposition that the institution of representative government [was] a part of the Constitution, independently of its text and structure’. 164 His Honour held that any implication from the concept of ‘representative government’ can only be to the extent that the concept is apparent in the ‘text and structure of the Constitution’. 165 Interestingly, it could have been legitimately argued that due to the novel nature of the implication, and the differences between the judgments in ACTV, that no approach to deriving the implication had been accepted by a majority there. However, McHugh J held that a majority in ACTV had accepted a wider view of the implication, 166 and, consequently, his Honour considered whether he should follow precedent. 167 In taking the significant step to depart from precedent, his Honour criticised the majority for not following the ‘theory of constitutional 161 Ibid 163. 162 Ibid 185. 163 Ibid 188. 164 Ibid 195 (emphasis added). 165 Ibid 196. 166 Ibid. 167 See ibid 205–6. 202 Carroll, Justice McHugh 2013 2 Protection from Fundamental Errors of Interpretation It was noted in Chapter One that Horrigan suggests that terms such as ‘fundamentally’ wrong merely give force to the judge’s conclusion. 175 However, it is contended that, for McHugh J in McGinty, the ‘fundamental’ nature of the error did carry substantive meaning. The error was ‘fundamental’ for McHugh J because the majority failed to follow the fundamental method of constitutional interpretation outlined in the Engineers’ Case. It has been argued that the majority approach in ACTV impliedly overruled the Engineers’ Case. 176 Thus, in McGinty, McHugh J was confronted with two conflicting precedents – the precedent of a settled interpretation method from the Engineers’ Case versus the precedent set by ACTV and Theophanous. By rejecting the precedent of ACTV and Theophanous, his Honour accepted that the Engineers’ Case was of a more ‘fundamental’ nature. Judges are often confronted with a ‘choice’ between precedents carrying different levels of importance. 177 The choice that is made provides an insight as to which values are of greater importance for that judge. McHugh J considered that a departure from the Engineers’ Case fundamentally changed the limits of authority that judges have in interpreting the Constitution. 178 This fits with arguments that the constitutional developments by the Court in the early 1990s had the potential to ‘[open] up a vast and uncertain area of constitutional 175 See Horrigan, above n 25, 205. 176 See George Williams, ‘Engineers is Dead, Long Live the Engineers!’ (1995) 17 Sydney Law Review 62. 177 See Henry Abraham, The Judicial Process (Oxford University Press, 6 th ed, 1993) 325. 178 Such an approach is not surprising given the Engineers’ Case has been referred to as the ‘cornerstone of Australian constitutional jurisprudence’: See Williams, above n 176, 63. Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 203 limitations ... [increasing] the discretionary power of the judiciary.’ 179 Arguably, McHugh J’s desire to firmly link the implication of freedom of political discussion back to the text of the Constitution was to reign in this increasing area of discretionary power. This goal is linked to philosophical underpinnings of the judicial process concerning the level of ‘restraint’ or ‘activism’ that a judge is empowered to employ in interpreting the Constitution. 180 By attempting to narrow the scope of the implication, perhaps McHugh J was trying to narrow the scope for judicial activism in the future. This is not an argument that McHugh J was extremely conservative. Rather, on a spectrum, his Honour had a greater concern than most other members on the bench, during the same period, of the limits of the authority of the Court being breached. To link this back to the themes that pervade McHugh J’s jurisprudence, 181 the interpretive method enunciated in the Engineers’ Case can be seen as the ‘principle’ that his Honour was attempting to adhere to. The approach of McHugh J in preferring the precedent of the Engineers’ Case is perhaps one manifestation of a consistent approach taken by his Honour in rejecting certain forms of ‘progressive’ methods of constitutional interpretation. McHugh J’s accusation in McGinty, that the majority approach amounted to an unauthorised alteration of the Constitution, is echoed in other judicial statements of his Honour. In Al- Kateb, McHugh J charges Kirby J with ‘amending the Constitution ... in disregard of s 128’ when interpreting the Constitution by reference to contemporary rules of international law. 182 Also, in Re Wakim, McHugh 179 Zines, ‘A Judicially Created Bill of Rights?’, above n 153, 181. 180 See Williams, above n 176, 1–2. Williams notes that underlying the issues involved in the political communication cases was the ‘issue of judicial activism versus judicial restraint’. 181 Guilfoyle, above n 1, 465. 182 (2004) 219 CLR 562, 592. 204 Carroll, Justice McHugh 2013 J remarked that ‘the judiciary has no power to amend or modernise the Constitution’ in response to an argument that the cross-vesting legislation should be validated because it would be a convenient result. 183 Both methods of interpretation that McHugh J is condemning here can be seen to have ‘progressive’ elements. In light of McHugh J’s similar criticisms in these cases, arguably, in McGinty, his Honour was similarly concerned with a ‘progressive’ method of interpretation, which was forming part of the ‘new constitutional law’. Whether or not the majority’s method could be classed as progressive, 184 McHugh J certainly thought it was. In McGinty, his Honour held that the majority approach required cases to be decided ‘by reference to what the principles of representative democracy currently require’, 185 which fits within the scope of ‘progressive’ interpretive methods. 186 Thus, recalling from Chapter One, that McHugh J’s approach to interpretation can be classed as a version of ‘originalism’, his Honour sought to protect the Constitution from unauthorised amendment through certain ‘progressive’ methods of interpretation. 187 It would be too sweeping to argue that McHugh J wished to reject any progressive method of interpretation. 188 Rather, it is the context of the 183 (1999) 198 CLR 511, 549. 184 Although, see Adrienne Stone, ‘Australia’s Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Interpretive Disagreement’ (2005) 27 Sydney Law Review 29, 42. Stone notes the implication was controversial because it was ‘contrary to originalist arguments ... and because of doubts as to its textual foundation.’ 185 (1996) 186 CLR 140, 236 (emphasis added). 186 See Hill, above n 75, 159. 187 Goldsworthy notes that the concern of originalism is to ensure that the authority of the people is not ‘usurped by a small group of unelected judges’ – this accords with McHugh J’s criticisms regarding illegitimately amending the Constitution: Goldsworthy, above n 82, 683. 188 Note that McHugh J’s own interpretation method is a complex and nuanced method that recognises that the Constitution was intended to endure over time, and as such, his Honour recognises the ability for ‘current understanding[s] of ... concepts Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 207 interpretative method that the Court uses when construing the Constitution. McHugh J’s vision as to the limits of the Court’s authority in interpreting the Constitution required his Honour to reject precedent in order to promote the institutional values of legitimacy and confidence in Theophanous and McGinty. C Contribution to ‘Ideas’ on the Constitution McHugh J’s rejection of precedent in McGinty and Theophanous may also be linked to the goal of challenging the majority to refine their reasoning as to the source of the implication. In McGinty, McHugh J considered that ultimately the majority approach to the implication may prevail – however, until that time his Honour refused to accept their reasoning. 197 Thus, despite the fact that McHugh J did not believe that his own approach would prevail, his Honour continued to reject precedent. It has been suggested that dissent not only provides an opposing view which may be accepted in the future but can also be used to ‘stimulate more thorough reasoning across the Court’. 198 If this was a goal of McHugh J, then it is likely that his Honour considers one role of the individual judge is to ‘contribute to the storehouse of ideas about a constitution ... to deepen [our] understanding of it’. 199 Especially in the underdeveloped area of law that was the doctrine of freedom of political communication, 200 at the very least, his Honour may have been able to 197 (1996) 186 CLR 140, 236. 198 Lynch, above n 118, 2. 199 See Cheryl Saunders, ‘Interpreting the Constitution’ (2004) 15 Public Law Review 289, 295. 200 See Williams, above n 176, 65–66: Williams notes that at the time of Theophanous the implication of freedom of political communication remained ‘vague and imprecise’. 208 Carroll, Justice McHugh 2013 challenge the majority to answer his criticisms with more thorough and precise reasoning. 201 V CONCLUSION: A MODERATELY CONSERVATIVE APPROACH It is first important to recognise that the current analysis is not definitive, as the examination of the values influencing McHugh J’s jurisprudence have only been considered through the very limited lens of his Honour’s approach to constitutional precedent. The central point for the analysis of McHugh J’s approach was the two judgments handed down in 1994, Tyler and Theophanous. This analysis has attempted to resolve the prima facie inconsistency between these judgments, in order to tease out the values that were important for McHugh J in constitutional law. The cases where McHugh J deferred to precedent demonstrate that a critical value for McHugh J in constitutional jurisprudence was certainty in the law, particularly so that the government could rely on decisions of the Court. McHugh J also sought to protect values inherent in the Court, so as to allow the Court to effectively perform its role as a constitutional court; these were, in particular, the values of legitimacy and confidence in the Court. Thus, by deferring to precedent, McHugh J demonstrated one theme of his jurisprudence, adherence to principle to promote certainty. 202 However, the second theme of his Honour’s jurisprudence, respecting individual rights, 203 was not entirely absent. Prior to Tyler, in Nolan, McHugh J demonstrated a respect for individual rights by adopting the view on service tribunal jurisdiction that provided the greatest protection for individual rights. Also, in Street, his Honour was willing to overrule 201 See, eg, Rehnquist, above n 59, 374. 202 Guilfoyle, above n 1, 465. 203 Ibid. Vol 4 The Western Australian Jurist 209 precedent and advocate for an interpretation providing a wider protection of individual rights. What is clear, however, is that when the circumstances of a case brought the two themes of McHugh J’s jurisprudence into conflict, his Honour’s view of the limited role of the judge in protecting individual rights under the Constitution meant that the theme of adherence to principle prevailed. In rejecting precedent, once the contextual factors are taken into account, it can be seen that McHugh J was not adopting an inconsistent approach to that taken in deferring to precedent, but rather, his Honour was attempting to promote the same values of certainty, legitimacy and confidence. The reason that McHugh J had to reject precedent in order to promote the same values was due to his Honour’s view of the limits of legitimate authority that judges have in upholding the Constitution. McHugh J believed that the judge has a less activist role to play in interpreting the Constitution than most other judges on the bench in the same period. Thus, his Honour was compelled to reject certain methods of constitutional interpretation that had the potential to increase the discretionary power of a judge in interpreting the Constitution. McHugh J’s goal in rejecting precedent was to bring back a level of certainty into the methods of constitutional interpretation that could be used, and also to promote the legitimacy and confidence in the Court by keeping constitutional interpretation within certain limits. This again demonstrated the theme of McHugh J’s jurisprudence involving adherence to principle, where the ‘principle’ was what his Honour regarded as the legitimate methods of constitutional interpretation. This strong desire to adhere to principle in order to promote certainty in the law, balanced by a respect for individual rights where, according to his Honour, they can be legitimately protected under the Constitution, can be