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Team Code: TC 31 MAHARASHTRA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, NAGPUR INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETETION, 2022 Before THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA IN SLP NO. ___ OF 20__ UNION OF INDIA …APPELLANT V. SHYAM BODO …RESPONDENT Memorial Submitted to the Registry of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India 1 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDEN

2 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TALE OF

CONTENTS…………………………………………………………………………….

INDEX OF

AUTHORITIES...............................................................................................................

STATEMENT OF

JURISDICTION......................................................................................................

QUESTIONS

PRESENTED...............................................................................................................

STATEMENT OF

FACTS.................................................................................................................

SUMMARY OF

PLEADINGS............................................................................................................

PLEADINGS..................................................................................................................................

I. THE TRANSFER ORDER OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO MR. SHYAM BODO WAS

ULTRA VIRES THE CADRE RULES……………………………………….…………...

….

II. THE ORDER OF THE CHAIRPERSON IS NOT LEGALLY

SUSTAINABLE………………………………………………………………………....

III. MADRAS HIGH COURT HAD THE JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE WRIT PETITION

FILED BY MR. SHYAM

BODO…………………………………………………………………

PRAYER OF

RELIEF…………………………………………………………………………….

3 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

TABLE OF STATUES

Constitution of India The All-India Services Act, 1951 The Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 TABLE OF CASES L. Chandra Kuamar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 Navinchandra N. Majithia vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 647 Nawal Kishore Sharma vs. Union of India & Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 329 S. R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC State of Punjab & Others v. Inder Singh & Others, (1997) 8 SCC 372 State of Rajasthan v. Swastika Properties (1985) AIR 1289 Umapati Choudhary v. State of Bihar and Another (1999) 4 SCC 659 Union of India v. Alapan Bandyopadhyay (2022) 3 SCC 133 4 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Appellants has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution., in SLP No. __ of 20__. The Counsel for the Respondents, Shyam Bodo, hereby humbly submits to this Hon’ble Court’s Jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Indian Constitution India. The parties shall accept any judgement of the court as final and binding for them and shall execute in its entirety and good faith. 5 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. WHETHER THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT’S TRANSFER ORDER WAS ULTRA VIRES

THE CADRE RULES?

II. WHETHER THE CHAIRPERSON’S ORDER WAS LEGALLY SUSTAINABLE?

III. WHETHER THE MADRAS HIGH COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE

WRIT PETITION?

6 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Mr. Shyam Bodo is a member of the Indian Administrative Service who is serving in Tamil Nadu as the Additional Chief Secretary, Finance Department. On January 6, 2022, the Central Government approved an amendment to Rule 6 (1) of the IAS (Cadre) Rules 1954. Accordingly, Mr. Bodo was transferred from Tamil Nadu to Guwahati on January 6, 2022, citing a deficiency in the State Cadre. Mr. Bodo was relieved from his cadre w.e.f. 07.01.2022, and ordered to assume charge before 31.03.2022.
2. On 07.01.2022, Mr. Bodo filed an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, accompanied with an application for a stay on joining, before the Chennai Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Central Government filed an application with the Chairperson on the same day's evening, requesting that the matter be transferred to the principal bench in New Delhi on the grounds that the Contesting-Respondent was the Central Government, but the proceedings were transferred to Guwahati instead of New Delhi without issuing notice.
3. Thereafter, Mr. Bodo filed a Writ Petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution before the Madras High Court on 10.01.2022 challenging the transfer Order. The High Court allowed the Writ Petition, observing that transferring the case to Guwahati would render the Stay Application ineffective, and that none of the parties had requested that the case be shifted to Guwahati.
4. The Centre, aggrieved by the Madras High Court's decision, filed a Special Leave Petition with the Supreme Court on January 20, 2022, claiming that the Madras High Court did not have territorial Jurisdiction to hear the issue. The Centre cited a recent ruling in Alapan Bandopadhyay (2021), which said that "as per the judgment in L. Chandra Kumar (1997), all judgments of these Tribunals shall be subject to examination before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the relevant Tribunal lies." Because the Chairperson was appointed to the Principal Bench in New Delhi, the issue was brought before the Delhi High Court." 7 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

1. THE ORDER OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO TRANSFER MR. SHYAM BODO IS

ULTRA VIRES THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE (CADRE) RULES, 1954.

Mr. Shyam Bodo, as given in the facts, was transferred from Tamil Nadu Cadre to Guwahati under central deputation by the Central Government in retaliation by hurriedly passing Amendment to Rule 6(1) of the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules 1954. Transfer was done without the consent of either the State Government of Tamil Nadu or Mr. Bodo which is against the federal nature of Indian Administrative Service and is arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional. Also, the Amendment is against Section 3 (2) of the All- India Services Act, 1951 which is the parent legislation of Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules 1954. Since the element of consent maintains stable and balanced administrative framework interaction between the Central and the State Governments, it is important that the concurrence of State Government must be taken before transfer of Indian Administrative Service official under central deputation. Therefore, it is clear that transfer order of Mr. Shyam Bodo is ultra vires the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules 1954 since it destroys the purpose of creating this post.

2. THE ORDER OF THE CHAIRPERSON TO TRANSFER THE PROCEEDINGS OF MR. SHYAM BODO’S CASE TO GUWAHATI IS NOT LEGALLY SUSTAINABLE The Chairperson of the Administrative Tribunal transferred the case from Chennai Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal to Guwahati Bench on application filed by Central Government. According to Section 25 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 the Chairperson has the power to transfer the case on the application of any of the parties and suo motu. Given that if transfer is done in accordance to the application filed by any of the parties, it is mandatory to give notice to the other party and hearing such of them. In the present case, since transfer application was filed by central government, it was mandatory to issue notice to Mr. Shyam Bodo and hearing the parties. However, this mandatory step was not followed. Transferring the case either to Guwahati or New Delhi is inconvenient for Mr. Shyam Bodo. Power of Chairperson under Section 25 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is merely to transfer cases from one bench of the Tribunal to another only for the convenience of litigants, to provide an inexpensive redressal mechanism. Therefore, it can be 8 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

concluded that the order of the Chairperson is not legally sustainable according to Section 25 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and also it is inconvenient for Mr. Shyam Bodo.

3. THE MADRAS HIGH COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN THE WRIT PETITION FILES BY MR. SHYAM BODO AGAINST THE ORDER OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL. According to Article 226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution, High Courts of India has the jurisdiction to hear matters in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. The words cause of action was incorporated in Article 226(2) specifically reduce the hardships caused to the litigants in cases where the seat of the authority is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. Also, the case of Union of India v. Alapan Bandyopadhyay must not be relied upon as it is “per incuriam” and must be reconsidered by a larger Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court because in this case the Supreme Court misread “jurisdiction” in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Others as “territory”. The Supreme Court did not realize that “jurisdiction” could not be equated to “territory” in light of Article 226 (2), which specifically provisioned for extra-territorial jurisdiction. The court was wrong in making no inquiry to locate the jurisdiction under Article 226 (2). Therefore, Madras High court rightly exercised its jurisdiction to hear the matter of Mr. Shyam Bodo under Article 226 and 227 because the major part of cause of action happened in the State of Tamil Nadu. 9 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

PLEADINGS

1. THE ORDER OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO TRANSFER MR. SHYAM BODO IS

ULTRA VIRES THE INDIAN ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE (CADRE) RULES, 1954.

The Respondent humbly and respectfully submits before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that transfer of Mr. Shyam Bodo from Tamil Nadu to Guwahati on 6 January, 2022 quoting deficiency in State Cadre in Guwahati is Ultra Vires the Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 because (1.1) the amendment in accordance to which Mr. Bodo was transferred violates Section 3 (2) of the All-India Services Act, 1951 which is the parent legislation of cadre rules; (1.2) transfer through the amendment destroys the purpose with which the post of Indian Administrative Service was created; (1.3) transfer without the consent of the Respondent and/or the State Government of Tamil Nadu is arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional. 1.1 The amendment in accordance to which Mr. Bodo was transferred violates Section 3 (2) of the All-India Services Act, 1951 which is the parent legislation of cadre rules. The All-India Services Act, 1951 – the mother legislation of Indian Administrative Service – empowers the central government to make rules and modifications, “in consultation with the state governments”, regulating the recruitment, and service conditions of AIS officers. Section 3 (2) of All-India Services Act, 1951 states that: Every rule made by the Central Government under this section and every regulation made under or in pursuance of any such rule, shall be laid, as soon as may be after such rule or regulation is made, before each House of Parliament while it is in session for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and if, before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions aforesaid, both Houses agree in making any modification in such rule or regulation or both Houses agree that such rule or regulation should not be made, the rule or regulation shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule or regulation. The current amendment is against the line “any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule or regulation” of 10 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

Section 3(2) All-India Services Act, 1951. The Amendment is prejudice because it defies the core principle of All-India Services which is federal corporativism by taking away the element of concurrence before deputation of officer. It is prejudice to the rights of the state government and will lead to further loss of autonomy on the issue of deputation, when the rules are anyway tilted in favor of the centre. Utilization of the All-India Services deputation reserve by both the centre and states presupposes “consultation” between the two. It is this aspect of consultation that the top-down imposition of rules seems to be doing away with. Therefore, the current amendment by the Central Government is not valid and if the amendment is not valid then transfer of Mr. Bodo is also not valid because it was done without the concurrence of the Tamil Nadu Government. 1.2 Transfer through the amendment destroys the purpose with which the post of Indian Administrative Service was created. The amendment to Rule 6(1) of The Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 aims to give the Union government unilateral powers to choose any Indian Administrative Service officer to be withdrawn from a state and transferred wherever the central government wishes, without the officer's or the state government's consent. In State of Punjab & Others v. Inder Singh & Others^1 ,it was held that a deputation cannot be made without the consent of the officer which would enable him in advance to know his rights and privileges as rules by apex court In Umapati Choudhary v. State of Bihar and Another^2 , another case decided by the Supreme Court, it was held that deputation as a concept in one that is of a consensual nature, which requires a decision of a voluntary nature of the employer to lend the services of the officer working under him, and there must be an acceptance that follows voluntarily by the employer who is borrowing such service. The officer must also have given his consent to proceed with such deputation or not. The constitutional system of Indian federalism will fundamentally alter if Indian Administrative Service Officers are deputed without concurrence of the States. The signatories of the Constitution highlighted that in a federal structure, the Union and the states are separate entities that work to achieve common constitutional aims. The All-India Services which also includes the Indian Administrative Service provides a stable and balanced (^1) 1997 (8) SCC 372 (^2) (1999) 4 SCC 659 11 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

administrative framework for this unique interaction between the two levels of government. If the State as a 'lender' has no authority over what it lends and on what terms and conditions, but the borrower has superior power, the whole idea of the Centre not having its own 'cadre' but having to 'borrow' the services of an officer for specific periods at key senior management levels is destroyed. The Constitution's principal body formed the All-India Services, "making them creations not of the government but of the Constitution itself." Currently there is already a provision where in case of a disagreement the matter shall be decided by the central government. By taking away the element of consent from the states, the service becomes a centralized one instead of an All-India Service which is what it meant to be. Dr. BR Ambedkar said in the constitution that the creation of an All-India Service infringes on the right of state governments to establish their own administration, hence transfers of Indian Administrative Service officials require the agreement of state governments. He saw the All-India Services as critical to tying a broad and varied country's administrative architecture together. The introduction of the element of compulsion in cadre management and doing away with a robust and healthy system of federal consultation, consent/ concurrence and coordination will severely impact the morale of the Indian Administrative Service Officials. Therefore, it can rightly be said that transfer of Mr. Shyam Bodo is against the federal nature of the Indian Administrative Service because it was done against the consent of the State Government of Tamil Nadu. 1.3 Transfer without the consent of the Respondent and/or the State Government of Tamil Nadu is arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional. The amendment to Rule 6 (1) of the IAS (Cadre) Rules 1954 On 6 January, 2022 which takes away the element of consent is an attempt for concentration of power at the Centre. It is clear that the amendment has not been thoroughly considered and are being pushed through without appropriate federal consultation. Three Indian Police Service personnel from the Tamil Nadu cadre were unilaterally "placed at its disposal" by the Centre in July 2001. The Centre did the same for three Indian Police Service officials from the West Bengal cadre in December 2020. Just before the Chief 12 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

Secretary of West Bengal's last day in office, the Centre unilaterally issued directives for his central deputation in May 2021. In all these cases, the States concerned refused to relieve the officers. To eliminate this veto power of states which the central government does not want, it brought amendment to Rule 6(1) of The Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954 in hurry to transfer Mr. Shyam Bodo as a revenge tactic against the state government of Tamil Nadu. The proviso that requires the State government to release such officers whose services may be sought by the Central Government “in specific situations” is worrying based on experiences of the recent past cited above as these situations of requirement of Central deputation would be wholly determined by the Union government which is arbitrary in nature. Therefore, there is a justified apprehension that this proviso may be misused for political considerations. The Centre should be reminded that it has not inherited the Viceroy’s mantle of paramountcy. Without a sense of constitutional morality, particularly a feeling of justice and fairness toward the States, the Centre would lack moral legitimacy to govern. In S.R. Bommai vs Union of India^3 , the Supreme Court held that “States have an independent constitutional existence and they have as important a role to play in the political, social, educational and cultural life of the people as the Union. They are neither satellites nor agents of the Centre”. As a result, removing the element of consent is arbitrary, and therefore, the amendment is unconstitutional since it damages the basic structure of the Constitution of India and should be repealed. Therefore, it is concluded that this amendment is a political move instead of a genuine intention behind transferring Mr. Shyam Bodo citing deficiency in state cadre and thus the transfer order arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional since it was done without the consent of the Respondent and/or the State Government of Tamil Nadu.

2. THE ORDER OF THE CHAIRPERSON TO TRANSFER THE PROCEEDINGS OF MR. SHYAM BODO’S CASE TO GUWAHATI IS NOT LEGALLY SUSTAINABLE The Respondent most humbly and respectfully submits that the Chairperson’s order to transfer the matter to Guwahati is not legally sustainable because (2.1) the Chairperson transferred the case without issuing notice and hearing the other party as required by Section 25 of Administrative Tribunal Act 1985; (2.2) transfer of case from Chennai to either New Delhi or Guwahati is inconvenient to the litigant Mr. Shyam Bodo. (^3) 1994 SCC (3) 13 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

Although the impugned order was passed by the Principal Bench having its seat in New Delhi, the "cause of action" cannot be said to be restricted to the legality of the order alone, but primarily the infringement, by such order, of the fundamental and legal rights of the Respondent to litigate before the Chennai Bench and the alleged recalcitrance of Respondent also took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the Chennai Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal. Also, the respondent was resident and officer of Tamil Nadu Cadre. Therefore, Chennai Bench can hear the matter as major part of “cause of action” happened within its jurisdiction. 2.1 the Chairperson transferred the case without issuing notice and hearing the other party as required by Section 25 of Administrative Tribunal Act 1985 Section 25 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 states that: Power of Chairman to transfer cases from one Bench to another- On the application of any of the parties and after notice to the parties, and after hearing such of them as he may desire to be heard, or on his own motion without such notice, the Chairman may transfer any case pending before one Bench, for disposal, to any other Bench. The Chairman's power to transfer is exercised in two ways under Section 25, on the application of any of the parties and suo motu. The Chairman is exempt from giving notice to the parties if he exercises such power on his own initiative. However, if such authority is exercised on a party's request, an order can only be issued "after notice to the parties" and "after hearing such of them as he may desire to be heard." The term "desire" used in Section 25 cannot confer unfettered authority on the Chairman to exercise such power according to his whims or fancy but has to be read mutatis mutandis with the prior requirement of notice "to the parties". Thus, it is implicit in Section 25 that notice and hearing must mandatorily be given to the parties and the Chairman's "desire to be heard" has to be qualified by reason and application of judicial mind. Moreover, the application under Section 19 of the 1985 Act, filed at the behest of the Respondent, Mr. Shyam Bodo, was at an inchoate stage and could not be said to be "pending" within the purview of Section 25 of the said Act. Section 25 of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 recognizes, the fundamental principles of justice and fair play namely that ‘Justice must not only be done but it must be seen to have been done’. It would enable the Chairman to avert a ‘reasonable suspicion’ of or ‘real 14 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

likelihood’ of bias. It could also be exercised on establishing any other sufficient and sustainable grounds. This power is to be used with great circumspection and sparingly. Therefore, the Principal Bench has no right to finally transfer the matter from Chennai to Guwahati or even to New Delhi since no appropriate notice and/or hearing was given to the Respondent, as mandated under Section 25 Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 since the transfer was not in suo motu exercise of power by the Tribunal but on the application of the Central Government. The entire modus operandi adopted by the Centre reeks of mala fides. It is unfortunate that the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal nurtured such efforts of the Central Government by passing transfer order, which has been repeatedly held by the Supreme Court and various High Courts not to be a favored litigant. Rather, the responsibility of meting out justice and serving the cause of justice is on a much higher pedestal for the Union of India than an ordinary individual litigant. Hence, the transfer order is not legally sustainable. 2.2 Transfer of case from Chennai to either to New Delhi or Guwahati is inconvenient to the litigant Mr. Shyam Bodo The Administrative Tribunals Act establishes only one forum known as the "Central Administrative Tribunal", and several coordinate benches of the Tribunal are established throughout the country solely for convenience of litigants. The Principal Bench in New Delhi does not have appellate or revisional powers over other benches of the Tribunal, and that the power conferred on it, under Section 25 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, is merely to transfer cases from one bench of the Tribunal to another only for the convenience of litigants, to provide an inexpensive redressal mechanism. The impugned order of the Principal Bench not only violates the legal right conferred on the Respondent under Section 25 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 by not giving the notice, as well as the Respondent fundamental right of equality before the law, as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution, which is the grundnorm of the Indian legal fabric, and also poses a threat to the federal structure as envisioned by the makers of the Constitution of India. In the present case, the order of the Chairperson is invalid because it will be inconvenient for the Respondent which is against the very purpose of establishing coordinate benches of the Central Administrative Tribunal. 15 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

3. The Madras High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition files by Mr. Shyam Bodo against the Order of the Chairperson of Administrative Tribunal. The Respondent most humbly and respectfully submits that Madras High Court had the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition filed by Mr. Shyam Bodo because (3.1) Article 226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution; (3.2) The case of Alapan Bandopadhyay on which the Centre relied is per incuriam and must be reconsidered by a larger Bench. 3.1 Madras High Court has the territorial jurisdiction to hear the case under Article 226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution. Article 227 of the Constitution of India reads as follows: “(1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories interrelation to which it exercises jurisdiction.” Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads as follows: "(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories." In Nawal Kishore Sharma vs. Union of India & Ors.^4 The issue concerned was a High Court's jurisdiction over an authority or person located outside of its territorial jurisdiction. Article 226(2) of the Constitution was used to evaluate this issue. Even though the person or authority against whom the writ is sought is located beyond the geographical jurisdiction of the High Court concerned, a writ could be issued if the cause of action arose entirely or substantially within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court concerned. Furthermore, the petitioner had to show that the respondents infringed on his legal rights within the High Court's jurisdiction in order to sustain such a writ petition. In Navinchandra N. Majithia vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.^5 again the jurisdictional issue was considered with reference to Article 226(2) of the Constitution and held that the High Court concerned would have jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition if any part of the cause of (^4) (2014) 9 SCC 329 (^5) (2000) 7 SCC 647 16 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

action arose within its territorial limits even though the seat of government or authority or residence of persons against whom direction, order or writ is sought to be issued is not within its territory. Article 226(2), as it stands now, incorporated the words cause of action to specifically reduce the hardships caused to the litigants in cases where the seat of the authority is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court. In the present case, the case of the Respondent rests upon the hardship that he would have faced, if the proceedings were continued in the Delhi High Court. Thus, the decision of the Madras High Court to hear the case seems to be consistent with the literal and purposive interpretation of Article 226(2). From a bare perusal of the provision, it becomes abundantly clear that the High Courts are at liberty to exercise their jurisdiction in cases where the cause of action partly or wholly’ has arisen in their territorial jurisdiction irrespective of the seat of the authority whose order is under challenge. At this juncture, it is essential to understand the meaning of cause of action as understood by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Swastika Properties^6 : “In other words, it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant.” In the present case, it is submitted that the bundle of facts would never be complete till the proceedings before the Chennai bench are considered. A part of the cause of action will always emerge in Tamil Nadu because of various other factors relating to the Respondent there, such as his home, his place of service, and the location of being aggrieved by the Union order, as well as his legal right to make the application. As a result, it is argued that the Madras High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 (2) and 227 to hear the matter. 3.2 The judgement in Alapan Bandopadhyay should not be relied upon as it is per incuriam and must be reconsidered by a larger Bench. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Alapan Bandyopadhyay^7 relied on its 1997 decision of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India^8 by quoting from it: " All judgments of these tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny by a Division Bench of the high court (^6) 1985 AIR 1289 (^7) (2022) 3 SCC 133 (^8) (1997) 3 SCC 261 17 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

within whose jurisdiction the concerned tribunal lies." The Supreme Court decided that the dispute was under the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court, not the Calcutta High Court, because the Central Administrative Tribunal chairman's ruling was being challenged, and the chairperson was assigned to the tribunal's Principal Bench in Delhi. Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India^9 ruled that the writ jurisdiction of the high courts under Article 226 pertained to the basic structure of the Constitution and could not be short-circuited by way of a statute or constitutional amendment. Given that the high courts’ cumulative jurisdiction under Article 226 had been preserved, it was constitutionally impermissible to restrict the jurisdiction to only Article 226 (1), and jettison Article 226 (2). This was precisely the undoing in Bandyopadhyay, wherein the Supreme Court misread “jurisdiction” in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Others^10 as “territory”. The Supreme Court did not realize that “jurisdiction” could not be equated to “territory” in light of Article 226 (2), which specifically provisioned for extra- territorial jurisdiction. The court was wrong in making no inquiry to locate the jurisdiction under Article 226 (2). In fact, not a single line in any case from L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Others^11 has adverted to washing away the extra-territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 (2), whilst selectively preserving the jurisdiction under Article 226 (1). Moreover, the celebrated judgment of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Others^12 does not involve the question as to whether the High Court could usurp (yoosurp) the jurisdiction of the Tribunals, but raises the question as to whether the Principal Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal, , was justified in law in arrogating the writ petitioner's application under Section 19 of the 1985 Act to itself. Therefore, it is open to invoke the principle of “per incuriam” and contend that the judgement of Union of India v. Alapan Bandyopadhyay^13 be ignored as it does not lay down the correct position in law. Hence, Madras High had the Jurisdiction to entertain the case of Mr. Shyam Bodo under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. (^9) (1997) 3 SCC 261 (^10) (1997) 3 SCC 261 (^11) (1997) 3 SCC 261 (^12) (1997) 3 SCC 261 (^13) (2022) 3 SCC 133 18 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

IN LIGHT OF THE FACTS ABOVEMENTIONED, QUESTONS PRESENT,

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED IN THE PLEADINGS AND AUTHORITIES CITED, THE

COUNCEL FOR THE RESPONDENT MOST RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS THE

HON’BLE SUPREME COURT TO ADJUDGE AND DECLARE THAT:

1. Transfer of Mr. Shyam Bodo is ultra vires The Indian Administrative Service (Cadre) Rules, 1954
2. The order of the Chairperson to transfer the matter from Chennai Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal to Guwahati Bench is not legally sustainable, and
3. The Madras High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition files by Mr. Shyam Bodo against the Order of the Chairperson of Administrative Tribunal. AND PASS ANY OTHER ORDER, DIRECTION, OR RELIEF THAT THIS HON‟BLE COURT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE. All of which is humbly prayed, Counsel for the Respondents. 19 | P a g e M E M O R I A L O N B E H A L F O F