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NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

Syllabus

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

No. 83-712. Argued March 28, 1984-Reargued October 2, 1984- Decided January 15, 1985

A teacher at a New Jersey (^) high school, upon discovering respondent, then a 14-year-old freshman, and her companion smoking cigarettes in a school lavatory in violation of a school rule, took them to the Principal's office, where they met with the Assistant Vice Principal. When respondent, in response to the Assistant Vice Principal's questioning, denied that she had been smoking and (^) claimed that she did not smoke at all, the Assistant Vice Principal demanded to see her purse. Upon opening the purse, he found a pack of cigarettes and also noticed a pack- age of cigarette rolling papers that are commonly associated with the use of marihuana. He then proceeded to search the purse thoroughly and found some marihuana, a pipe, plastic bags, a fairly substantial amount of money, an index card containing a list of students who owed respond- ent money, and two letters that implicated her in marihuana dealing. Thereafter, the State brought delinquency charges against respondent in the Juvenile (^) Court, which, after denying respondent's motion to sup- press the evidence found in her purse, held that the Fourth Amendment applied to searches by school officials but that the search in question was a reasonable one, and adjudged respondent to be a delinquent. The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the trial court's finding that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation but vacated the (^) adjudication of delinquency and remanded on other grounds. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and ordered the suppression of the evidence found in respondent's purse, holding that the search of the purse was unreasonable.

Held:

1. The Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to (^) searches conducted by public school officials and is not limited to searches carried out by law enforcement officers. Nor are school officials exempt from the Amendment's dictates by virtue (^) of the special nature of their authority over schoolchildren. (^) In carrying out searches and other functions pursuant (^) to disciplinary policies mandated by state statutes, school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents of students, and they cannot claim the parents' immunity from the Fourth Amendment's strictures. Pp. 333-337.

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

Syllabus 469 U. S.

2. Schoolchildren have legitimate expectations of privacy. They may find it necessary to carry with them a variety of legitimate, non- contraband items, and there is no reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items by bringing them onto school grounds. But striking the balance between schoolchildren's legitimate expectations of privacy and the school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place re- quires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public au- thorities are ordinarily subject. Thus, school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority. More- over, school officials need not be held subject to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search. Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a determination of whether the search was justified at its inception and whether, as conducted, it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. Under ordinary circumstances the search of a student by a school official will be justified at its inception where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. And such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the student's age and sex and the nature of the infraction. Pp. 337-343.
3. Under the above standard, the search in this case was not unrea- sonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. First, the initial search for cigarettes was (^) reasonable. The report to the Assistant Vice Principal that respondent had been smoking warranted a reasonable suspicion that she had cigarettes in her purse, and thus the search was justified despite the fact that the cigarettes, if found, would constitute "mere evidence" of a violation of the no-smoking rule. Second, the discovery of the rolling papers then gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that respondent was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her purse, and this suspicion justified the further exploration that turned up more evidence of drug- related activities. Pp. 343-347.

94 N. J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934, reversed.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J.,

and POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and in Part II of

which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 348.

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

325 Opinion of the Court

BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 351. BRENNAN, J.,^ filed^ an^ opinion^ concurring^ in^ part^ and^ dissenting^ in^ part,^ in

which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 353. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion

concurring in part and dissenting^ in^ part,^ in^ which^ MARSHALL,^ J.,^ joined,

and in Part I of which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 370.

Allan J. Nodes, Deputy Attorney General of New Jersey,

reargued the^ cause^ for^ petitioner.^ With^ him^ on^ the^ brief

on reargument were Irwin J. Kimmelman, Attorney^ Gen-

eral, and Victoria Curtis Bramson, Linda L. Yoder,^ and

Gilbert G. Miller, Deputy Attorneys General. With him on

the briefs on the original^ argument^ were^ Mr.^ Kimmelman

and Ms. Bramson.

Lois De Julio reargued the cause for respondent. With

her on the briefs were Joseph H. Rodriguez and Andrew

Dillmann. *

JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari in this case to examine the appro-

priateness of the exclusionary rule^ as^ a^ remedy^ for^ searches

carried out in violation of the Fourth Amendment by public

school authorities. Our consideration of the proper applica-

tion of the Fourth Amendment to the public schools, how-

ever, has led us to conclude that the search that gave rise to

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Frey, and Kathryn A. Oberly; for the National Association of Secondary School Principals^ et^ al. by Ivan B. Gluckman; for the National School Boards Association by Gwendolyn H. Gregory, August W.^ Steinhilber,^ and^ Thomas^ A.^ Shannon; for the Washington Legal Foundation by^ Daniel^ J.^ Popeo^ and^ Paul^ D. Kamenar; and for the New Jersey School Boards^ Association^ by^ Paula A. Mullaly and Thomas F. Scully. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Mary L. Heen, Burt Neuborne, E. Richard Larson, Barry S. Goodman, and Charles S. Sims; and for the Legal Aid Society of the City of New York et al. by Janet Fink and Henry Weintraub. Julia Penny Clark and Robert Chanin filed a brief for the National Education Association as amicus curiae.

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

Opinion of the Court 469 U. S.

the case now before us did not violate the Fourth Amend-

ment. Accordingly, we here address only the questions of

the proper standard for assessing the legality of searches

conducted by public school officials and the application of that

standard to the facts of this case.

I

On March 7, 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in

Middlesex County, N. J., discovered two girls smoking in a

lavatory. One of the two girls was the respondent T. L. 0.,

who at that time was a 14-year-old high school freshman.

Because smoking in the lavatory was a violation of a school

rule, the teacher took the two girls to the Principal's office,

where they met with Assistant Vice Principal Theodore

Choplick. In response to questioning by Mr. Choplick,

T. L. O.'s companion admitted that she had violated the rule.

T. L. 0., however, denied that she had been smoking in the

lavatory and claimed that she did not smoke at all.

Mr. Choplick asked T. L. 0. to come into his private office

and demanded to see her purse. Opening the purse, he

found a pack of cigarettes, which he removed from the purse

and held before T. L. 0. as he accused her of having lied to

him. As he reached into the purse for the cigarettes, Mr.

Choplick also noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers.

In his experience, possession of rolling papers by high school

students was closely associated with the use of marihuana.

Suspecting that a closer examination of the purse might yield

further evidence of drug use, Mr. Choplick proceeded to

search the purse thoroughly. The search revealed a small

amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags,

a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills, an index

card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T. L. 0.

money, and two letters that implicated T. L. 0. in marihuana

dealing.

Mr. Choplick notified T. L. O.'s mother and the police, and

turned the evidence of drug dealing over to the police. At

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

325 Opinion^ of^ the^ Court

the request of the police, T. L. O.'s mother took her daugh-

ter to police headquarters, where T. L. 0. confessed that she

had been selling marihuana at^ the^ high^ school.^ On^ the^ basis

of the confession and the evidence seized by Mr. Choplick,

the State brought delinquency charges against T. L. 0. in

the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex

County.^1 Contending that Mr. Choplick's search of her

purse violated the Fourth Amendment, T. L. 0. moved to

suppress the evidence found in her purse as well as her

confession, which, she argued, was tainted by the allegedly

unlawful search. The Juvenile Court denied the motion to

suppress. State ex rel. T. L. 0., 178 N. J. Super. 329,

428 A. 2d 1327 (1980). Although the court concluded that

the Fourth Amendment did apply to searches carried out by

school officials, it held that

"a school official may properly conduct a search of a

student's person if the official has a reasonable suspicion

that a crime has been or is in the process of being com-

mitted, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is

necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce school

policies." Id., at 341, 428 A. 2d, at 1333 (emphasis in

original).

Applying this standard, the court concluded that the

search conducted by Mr. Choplick was a reasonable one.

The initial decision to open the purse was justified by Mr.

Choplick's well-founded suspicion that T. L. 0. had violated

the rule forbidding smoking in the lavatory. Once^ the^ purse

'T. L. 0. also received a 3-day suspension from school for smoking cigarettes in a nonsmoking area and a 7-day suspension for possession of marihuana. On T. L. O.'s motion, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, set aside the 7-day suspension on the ground that it was based on evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (T. L. 0.) v. PiscatawayBd. of Ed., No. C.2865-79 (Super. Ct. N. J., Ch. Div., Mar. 31, 1980). The Board of Education apparently did not appeal the decision of the Chancery Division.

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

Opinion of the^ Court^469 U.^ S.

was open, evidence of marihuana violations was in plain view,

and Mr. Choplick was entitled to conduct^ a^ thorough^ search

to determine the nature and extent of T. L. O.'s drug-

related activities. Id., at 343, 428 A. 2d, at 1334. Having

denied the motion to suppress, the court on March 23, 1981,

found T. L. 0. to be a delinquent and on January 8, 1982,

sentenced her to a year's probation.

On appeal from the final judgment of the Juvenile Court, a

divided Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's finding

that there had been no Fourth Amendment violation, but

vacated the adjudication of delinquency and remanded for

a determination whether T. L. 0. had knowingly and volun-

tarily waived her Fifth Amendment rights before confessing.

State ex rel. T. L. 0., 185 N. J. Super. 279, 448 A. 2d 493

(1982). T. L. 0. appealed the Fourth Amendment ruling,

and the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the judg-

ment of the Appellate Division and ordered the suppression

of the evidence found in T. L. O.'s purse. State ex rel.

T. L. 0., 94 N. J. 331, 463 A. 2d 934 (1983).

The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed with the lower

courts that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches con-

ducted by school officials. The court also rejected the State

of New Jersey's argument that the exclusionary rule should

not be employed to prevent the use in juvenile proceedings of

evidence unlawfully seized by school officials. Declining to

consider whether applying the rule to the fruits of searches

by school officials would have any deterrent value, the court

held simply that the precedents of this Court establish that

"if an official search violates constitutional rights, the evi-

dence is not admissible in criminal proceedings." Id., at

341, 463 A. 2d, at 939 (footnote omitted).

With respect to the question of the legality of the search

before it, the court agreed with the Juvenile Court that a

warrantless search by a school official does not violate the

Fourth Amendment so long as the official "has reasonable

grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

325 Opinion of the Court

activity or activity that would interfere with school discipline

and order." Id., at 346, 463 A. (^) 2d, at 941-942. However,

the court, with two justices dissenting, sharply disagreed

with the Juvenile Court's conclusion that the search of the

purse was reasonable. According to the majority, the con-

tents of T. L. O.'s purse had no bearing on the accusation

against T. L. 0., for possession of cigarettes (as opposed to

smoking them in the lavatory) did not violate school rules,

and a mere desire for evidence that would impeach T. L. O.'s

claim that she did not smoke cigarettes could not justify the search. Moreover, even if a reasonable suspicion that T. L. 0. had cigarettes in her purse would justify a search, Mr. Choplick had no such suspicion, as no one had furnished

him with any specific information that there were cigarettes

in the purse. Finally, leaving aside the question whether Mr. Choplick was justified in opening the purse, the court held that the evidence of drug use that he saw inside did not

justify the extensive "rummaging" through T. L. O.'s papers

and effects that followed. Id., at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942-943. We granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certio- rari. 464 U. S. 991 (1983). Although the State had argued in the Supreme Court of New Jersey that the search of T. L. O.'s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the petition for certiorari raised only the question whether the exclusionary rule should operate to bar consideration in

juvenile delinquency proceedings of evidence unlawfully

seized by a school official without the involvement of law enforcement officers. When this case was first argued last Term, the State conceded for the purpose of argument that the standard devised by the New Jersey Supreme Court for determining the legality of school searches was appropriate and that the court had correctly applied that standard; the State contended only that the remedial purposes of the exclu- sionary rule (^) were not well served by applying it to searches conducted by public authorities not primarily engaged in law enforcement.

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

Opinion of the Court 469 U. S.

Although we originally granted certiorari to decide the

issue of the appropriate remedy in juvenile court proceedings

for unlawful school searches, our doubts regarding the wis-

dom of deciding that question in isolation from the broader

question of what limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places

on the activities of school authorities prompted us to order

reargument on that question. 2 Having heard argument on

(^2) State and federal courts considering these questions have struggled to

accommodate the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment and (^) the interest of the States in providing a safe environment conducive to (^) educa- tion in the public schools. Some courts have resolved the tension (^) between these interests by giving full force to one or the other side (^) of the balance. Thus, in a number of cases courts have held that school officials (^) conducting in-school searches of students are private parties acting (^) in loco parentis and are therefore not subject (^) to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment. See, e. g., D. R. C. (^) v. State, 646 P. 2d 252 (Alaska App. 1982); In re G., 11 Cal. App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983); (^) Mercer v. State, 450 S. W. 2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). At least one court has held, on the (^) other hand, that the Fourth Amendment applies (^) in full to in-school searches by school officials and that a search conducted without probable cause is unreasonable, see State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La.), vacated, 423 U. S. 809 (1975), on remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976); others have held or suggested (^) that the probable-cause standard is applicable at least where the (^) police are involved in a search, see M. v. Board of Ed. Ball-Chatham (^) Community Unit School Dist. No. 5, 429 F. Supp. 288, 292 (SD Ill. (^) 1977); Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976); State v. Young, (^234) Ga. 488, 498, 216 S. E. 2d 586, 594 (1975); (^) or where the search is highly intrusive, see M. M. v. Anker, 607 F. 2d 588, 589 (CA2 1979). The majority (^) of courts that have addressed the issue of the Fourth Amendment (^) in the schools have, like the Supreme Court of New Jersey in this case, reached a middle position: the Fourth Amendment (^) applies to searches conducted by school authorities, but the special (^) needs of the school environment require assessment (^) of the legality of such searches against a standard less exacting (^) than that of probable cause. These courts have, by and large, upheld warrantless searches (^) by school authorities pro- vided that they are supported by a reasonable (^) suspicion that the search will uncover evidence of an infraction of school (^) disciplinary rules or a violation of the law. See, e. g., Tarter v. Raybuck, (^) No. 83-3174 (CA6, Aug. 31, 1984); Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F. 2d 1462 (CA9 1984); Horton (^) v. Goose Creek

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

325 Opinion of the Court

the legality of the search of T. L. O.'s purse, we are satisfied that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.'

II

In determining whether the search at issue in this case vio- lated the Fourth Amendment, we are faced initially with the question whether that Amendment's prohibition on unrea- sonable searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school officials. We hold that it does.

Independent School Dist., 690 F. 2d 470 (CA5 1982); Bellnier v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (NDNY 1977); M. v. Board of Ed. Ball-ChathamCommunity Unit School Dist. No. 5, supra; In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); State v. Baccino, 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); State v. D. T. W., 425 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. App. 1983); State v. Young, supra; In re J. A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 406 N. E. 2d 958 (1980); People v. Ward, 62 Mich. App. 46, 233 N. W. 2d 180 (1975); Doe v. State, 88 N. M. 347, 540 P. 2d 827 (App. 1975); People v. D., 34 N. Y. 2d 483, 315 N. E. 2d 466 (1974); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P. 2d 781 (1977); In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N. W. 2d 343 (App. 1979). Although few have considered the matter, courts have also split over whether the exclusionary rule is an appropriate remedy for Fourth Amendment violations committed by school authorities. The Georgia courts have held that although the Fourth Amendment applies to the schools, the exclusionary rule does not. See, e. g., State v. Young, supra; State v. Lamb, 137 Ga. App. 437, 224 S. E. 2d 51 (1976). Other jurisdic- tions have applied the rule to exclude the fruits of unlawful school searches from criminal trials and delinquency proceedings. See State v. Mora, supra; People v. D., supra. IIn holding that the search of T. L. O.'s purse did not violate the Fourth Amendment, we do not implicitly determine that the exclusionary rule applies to the fruits of unlawful searches conducted by school authori- ties.. The question whether evidence should be excluded from a criminal proceeding involves two discrete inquiries: whether the evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and whether the exclusion- ary rule is the appropriate remedy for the violation. Neither question is logically antecedent to the other, for a negative answer to either question is sufficient to dispose of the case. Thus, our determination that the search at issue in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment implies no particular resolution of the question of the applicability of the exclusion- ary rule.

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

Opinion of the Court 469 U. S.

It is now beyond dispute that "the Federal Constitution,

by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreason-

able searches and seizures by state officers." Elkins v.

United States, 364 U. S. 206, 213 (1960); accord, Mapp v.

Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25

(1949). Equally indisputable is the proposition that the

Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of students

against encroachment by public school officials:

"The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate, and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not per- form within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes." West Virginia State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 637 (1943).

These two propositions-that the Fourth Amendment ap-

plies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, and

that the actions of public school officials are subject to the limits placed on state action by the Fourteenth Amend-

ment-might appear sufficient to answer the suggestion that

the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe unreasonable searches by school officials. On reargument, however, the State of New Jersey has argued that the history of the Fourth Amendment indicates that the Amendment was intended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out

by law enforcement officers; accordingly, although public

school officials are concededly state agents for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment creates no rights enforceable against them.

(^4) Cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977) (holding that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment applies only to

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

325 Opinion of the Court

It may well be true that the evil toward which the Fourth

Amendment was primarily directed was the resurrection of

the pre-Revolutionary practice of using general warrants or

"writs of assistance" to authorize searches for contraband

by officers of the Crown. See United States v. Chadwick,

433 U. S. 1, 7-8 (1977); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S.

616, 624-629 (1886). But this Court has never limited

the Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and

seizures to operations conducted by the police. Rather, the

Court has long spoken of the Fourth Amendment's strictures

as restraints imposed upon "governmental action"--that is,

"upon the activities of sovereign authority." Burdeau v.

McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 475 (1921). Accordingly, we have

held the Fourth Amendment applicable to the activities of

civil as well as criminal authorities: building inspectors,

see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523, 528 (1967),

Occupational Safety and Health Act inspectors, see Marshall

v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U. S. 307, 312-313 (1978), and even

firemen entering privately owned premises to battle a fire,

see Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U. S. 499, 506 (1978), are all

subject to the restraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment.

As we observed in Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, "[t]he

basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless

decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and

security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by gov-

ernmental officials." 387 U. S., at 528. Because the indi-

vidual's interest in privacy and personal security "suffers

whether the government's motivation is to investigate vio-

lations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or

regulatory standards," Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, at

312-313, it would be "anomalous to say that the individual

and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth

Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal

behavior." Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 530.

punishments imposed after criminal convictions and hence does (^) not apply to the punishment (^) of schoolchildren by public school officials).

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

Opinion of the Court 469 U. S.

Notwithstanding the general applicability of the Fourth

Amendment to the activities of civil authorities, a few courts

have concluded that school officials are exempt from the

dictates of the Fourth Amendment by virtue of the special

nature of their authority over schoolchildren. See, e. g.,

R. C. M. v. State, 660 S. W. 2d 552 (Tex. App. 1983).

Teachers and school administrators, it is said, act in loco

parentis in their dealings with students: their authority is

that of the parent, not the State, and is therefore not subject

to the limits of the Fourth Amendment. Ibid.

Such reasoning is in tension with contemporary reality and

the teachings of this Court. We have held school officials

subject to the commands of the First Amendment, see Tin-

ker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,

393 U. S. 503 (1969), and the Due Process Clause of the Four-

teenth Amendment, see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975).

If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the

constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and due

process, it is difficult to understand why they should be

deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority

when conducting searches of their students. More gener-

ally, the Court has recognized that "the concept of parental

delegation" as a source of school authority is not entirely

"consonant with compulsory education laws." Ingraham v.

Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 662 (1977). Today's public school offi-

cials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred

on them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance

of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies.

See, e. g., the opinion in State ex rel. T. L. 0., 94 N. J.,

at 343, 463 A. 2d, at 934, 940, describing the New Jersey

statutes regulating school disciplinary policies and establish-

ing the authority of school officials over their students. In

carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions pursu-

ant to such policies, school officials act as representatives of

the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and they

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

325 Opinion of the Court

cannot claim the^ parents'^ immunity^ from^ the^ strictures^ of^ the Fourth Amendment. III

To hold^ that^ the^ Fourth^ Amendment^ applies^ to searches

conducted by^ school^ authorities^ is^ only^ to^ begin^ the^ inquiry into the standards governing such searches. Although the

underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always

that searches and^ seizures^ be^ reasonable,^ what^ is^ reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place.

The determination of the standard of reasonableness govern-

ing any specific class of searches requires^ "balancing^ the^ need to search against the invasion which the search entails." Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 536-537. On one side of the balance are arrayed the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; on the other, the government's need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public order. We have recognized that even a limited search of the person is a substantial invasion of privacy. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S.^ 1,^ 24-25^ (1967).^ We^ have^ also^ recognized^ that searches of^ closed^ items^ of^ personal^ luggage^ are intrusions^ on protected privacy interests, for "the Fourth Amendment pro- vides protection to the owner of every container that conceals' its contents from plain view." United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 822-823 (1982). A search of a child's person or of a closed purse or other bag carried on her person,' no less

'We do^ not^ address^ the^ question, not^ presented^ by^ this^ case,^ whether^ a schoolchild has a legitimate expectation of privacy in lockers,^ desks,^ or other school property provided for^ the^ storage^ of^ school^ supplies.^ Nor^ do we express any opinion on the standards (if any) governing searches of such areas by school officials or^ by^ other^ public^ authorities^ acting^ at^ the request of school officials. Compare Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F. 2d 662, 670 (CA10^ 1981)^ ("Inasmuch^ as^ the^ school^ had^ assumed^ joint^ control^ of^ the locker it cannot^ be^ successfully^ maintained^ that^ the^ school^ did^ not^ have^ a right to inspect it"), and People v. Overton, 24 N. Y. 2d 522, 249 N. E. 2d 366 (1969) (school administrators^ have^ power to^ consent^ to^ search^ of^ a

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

Opinion of the Court 469 U.^ S.

than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a

severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy.

Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not protect sub-

jective expectations of^ privacy^ that^ are^ unreasonable^ or

otherwise "illegitimate." See, e. g., Hudson v. Palmer,

468 U. S. 517 (1984); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 98

(1980). To receive the protection of the Fourth Amendment,

an expectation of privacy must be one that society is

"prepared to recognize as legitimate." Hudson v. Palmer,

supra, at 526. The State of New Jersey has argued that

because of the pervasive supervision to which children in

the schools are necessarily subject, a child has virtually no

legitimate expectation of privacy in articles of^ personal prop-

erty "unnecessarily" carried into a school. This argument

has two factual premises: (1) the fundamental incompatibility

of expectations of privacy with the maintenance of a sound

educational environment; and (2) the minimal interest of the

child in bringing any items of personal property into the

school. Both premises are severely flawed.

Although this^ Court^ may^ take^ notice^ of^ the^ difficulty^ of

maintaining discipline in the public schools today, the situa-

tion is not so dire that students^ in^ the^ schools^ may^ claim^ no

legitimate expectations of privacy. We have recently recog-

nized that the need to maintain order in a prison is^ such^ that

prisoners retain no legitimate expectations of privacy in their

cells, but it goes almost without saying that "[t]he prisoner

and the schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances,

separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction and incar-

ceration." Ingraham v. Wright, supra, at 669. We are not

student's locker), with State v. Engerud, 94 N. J. 331, 348, 463 A. 2d 934,

943 (1983) ("We are satisfied that in the context of this case the student had

an expectation of privacy in the contents of his^ locker^ ....^ For^ the^ four

years of high school, the school locker is a home away from home. In it the

student stores the kind of personal 'effects' protected by the Fourth

Amendment").

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

325 Opinion^ of^ the^ Court

yet ready to hold that the schools and the prisons need be

equated for purposes of the^ Fourth^ Amendment.

Nor does the State's suggestion that children have^ no

legitimate need to bring^ personal^ property^ into^ the^ schools

seem well anchored in reality. Students at a minimum must

bring to school not^ only^ the^ supplies^ needed^ for^ their^ studies,

but also^ keys,^ money,^ and^ the^ necessaries^ of^ personal^ hy- giene and grooming. In^ addition,^ students^ may^ carry^ on their persons or^ in^ purses^ or^ wallets^ such^ nondisruptive^ yet highly personal items as photographs, letters,^ and^ diaries. Finally, students may have perfectly legitimate reasons to carry with them articles of property needed in connection with extracurricular or^ recreational^ activities.^ In^ short, schoolchildren may^ find^ it^ necessary^ to^ carry^ with^ them^ a variety of legitimate, noncontraband^ items,^ and^ there^ is no reason to conclude that^ they^ have^ necessarily^ waived^ all rights to privacy in such items merely by bringing them^ onto school grounds. Against the child's interest in privacy must be^ set the^ sub- stantial interest of teachers and^ administrators^ in^ maintain- ing discipline in the classroom and^ on^ school^ grounds.^ Main- taining order in the classroom has never been easy, but^ in recent years, school disorder has often^ taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems. See generally 1 NIE, U. S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Violent^ Schools- Safe Schools: The Safe School Study Report to^ the^ Congress (1978). Even in schools that have been spared the most se- vere disciplinary problems, the preservation of order and a proper educational environment^ requires^ close^ supervision^ of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of^ rules^ against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult. "Events calling for discipline are frequent occur- rences and sometimes require immediate, effective^ action." Goss v. Lopez,^419 U.^ S.,^ at^ 580.^ Accordingly,^ we^ have rec-

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

Opinion of the Court 469 U. S.

ognized that maintaining security and order in the schools

requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary

procedures, and we have respected the value of preserving

the informality of the student-teacher relationship. See id.,

at 582-583; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S., at 680-682.

How, then, should we strike the balance between the

schoolchild's legitimate expectations of privacy and the

school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment

in which learning can take place? It is evident that the

school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to

which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. The warrant requirement, in particular, is unsuited to the

school environment: requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant

before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the

maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures

needed in the schools. Just as we have in other cases dis-

pensed with the warrant requirement when "the burden of

obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental

purpose behind the search," Camara v. Municipal Court,

387 U. S., at 532-533, we hold today that school officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority. The school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search. Ordinarily, a search-even one that may permissibly be car- ried out without a warrant-must be based upon "probable cause" to believe that a violation of the law has occurred. See, e. g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U. S. 266, 273 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 62-66 (1968). However, "probable cause" is not an irreducible requirement of a valid search. The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and although "both the concept of probable cause and the require- ment of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, ... in certain limited circumstances neither is required."

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, supra, at 277 (POWELL,

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

325 Opinion of the Court

J., concurring). Thus, we have in a number of cases recog-

nized the legality of searches and seizures based on suspi-

cions that, although "reasonable," do not rise to the level of

probable cause. See, e. g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968);

United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881 (1975);

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979); United

States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543 (1976); cf. Camara

v. Municipal Court, supra, at 534-539. Where a careful

balancing of governmental and private interests suggests

that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amend-

ment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable

cause, we have not hesitated to adopt such a standard.

We join the majority of courts that have examined this

issue 6 in concluding that the accommodation of the privacy

interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teach-

ers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the

schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement

that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the

subject of the search has violated or is violating the law.

Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend

simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of

the search. Determining the reasonableness of any search

involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider "whether

the ... action was justified at its inception," Terry v. Ohio,

392 U. S., at 20; second, one must determine whether the

search as actually conducted "was reasonably related in scope

to the circumstances which justified the interference in the

first place," ibid. Under ordinary circumstances, a search

of a student by a teacher or other school official 7 will be

ISee cases cited in n. 2, supra.

(^7) We here consider only searches carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own authority. This case does not present the question of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies, and we express no opinion on that question. Cf. Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219-1221 (ND Ill. 1976) (holding probable- cause standard applicable to searches involving the police).

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

Opinion of the Court 469 U. S.

"justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds

for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the

student has violated or is violating either the law or the

rules of the school.^8 Such a search will be permissible in its

scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to

the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive

in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of

the infraction.'

This standard will, we trust, neither unduly burden the

efforts of school authorities to maintain order in their schools

'We do not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential

element of the reasonableness standard we adopt for searches by (^) school

authorities. In other contexts, however, we have held that although

''some quantum (^) of individualized (^) suspicion is usually (^) a prerequisite to (^) a

constitutional search or seizure[,] ... the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." United States v. Martinez- Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 560-561 (1976). See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. (^523) (1967). Exceptions to the requirement of individual- ized suspicion (^) are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by a search are minimal and where "other safeguards" are avail- able (^) "to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the official in the field.'" Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648, 654-655 (1979) (citation omitted). Because the search of T. L. O.'s purse was based upon an individualized suspicion that she had violated school rules, see infra, at 343-347, we need not consider the circumstances that might justify school authorities in conducting searches unsupported by individualized suspicion. I Our reference to the nature of the infraction is not intended as an endorsement of (^) JUSTICE STEVENS' suggestion that some rules regarding student conduct are by nature too "trivial" to justify a (^) search based upon reasonable suspicion. See post, at 377-382. We are unwilling to adopt a standard under which the legality of a search is dependent upon a judge's evaluation of the relative importance of various school rules. The mainte- nance of discipline (^) in the schools requires not only that students be restrained from (^) assaulting one another, abusing drugs and alcohol, and committing other crimes, but also that students conform themselves to the standards of conduct prescribed by school authorities. (^) We have "repeat- edly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent (^) with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe (^) and control conduct in the schools." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U. (^) S. 503, 507

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

325 Opinion of the Court

nor authorize unrestrained^ intrusions^ upon^ the^ privacy^ of

schoolchildren. By focusing attention on the question of

reasonableness, the standard will spare teachers^ and^ school

administrators the necessity^ of^ schooling^ themselves^ in^ the

niceties of probable cause and permit them to regulate their

conduct according to^ the^ dictates^ of^ reason^ and^ common

sense. At the same time, the reasonableness standard

should ensure that the interests of students will be invaded

no more than is necessary to^ achieve^ the^ legitimate^ end^ of

preserving order in the schools.

IV

There remains the question of the legality of the^ search^ in

this case. We recognize that the "reasonable grounds"

standard applied by the New Jersey Supreme Court in^ its

consideration of this question is not substantially different

from the standard that we have adopted today. Nonethe-

less, we believe that the New Jersey court's application of

that standard to strike down the search of T. L. O.'s purse

reflects a somewhat crabbed notion of^ reasonableness.^ Our

review of the facts surrounding the search^ leads^ us^ to

conclude that the search was in no sense unreasonable for

Fourth Amendment purposes.

The incident that^ gave^ rise^ to^ this^ case^ actually^ involved

two separate searches, with the first-the search for ciga-

rettes-providing the suspicion that gave rise to the sec-

(1969). The promulgation of a rule forbidding specified conduct presum- ably reflects a judgment on the part^ of^ school^ officials^ that^ such^ conduct is destructive of school order or of a proper educational environment. Ab- sent any^ suggestion^ that^ the^ rule^ violates^ some^ substantive^ constitutional guarantee, the^ courts^ should,^ as^ a^ general^ matter,^ defer^ to^ that^ judgment and refrain from attempting^ to^ distinguish^ between rules^ that^ are^ impor- tant to the preservation of^ order^ in^ the^ schools^ and^ rules^ that^ are^ not. 1°Of course, New Jersey may insist^ on^ a^ more^ demanding^ standard under its own Constitution or statutes. In^ that^ case,^ its^ courts^ would^ not purport to be applying the Fourth Amendment when they invalidate a search.

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

Opinion of the Court 469 U. S.

ond-the search for marihuana. Although it is the fruits of

the second search that are at issue here, the validity of the

search for marihuana must depend on the reasonableness of

the initial search for cigarettes, as there would have been no

reason to suspect that T. L. 0. possessed marihuana had the

first search not taken place. Accordingly, it is to the search

for cigarettes that we first turn our attention.

The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed to two grounds

for its holding that the search for cigarettes was unreason-

able. First, the court observed that possession of cigarettes

was not in itself illegal or a violation of school rules. Because

the contents of T. L. O.'s purse would therefore have "no

direct bearing on the infraction" of which she was accused

(smoking in a lavatory where smoking was prohibited), there

was no reason to search her purse.^1 " Second, even assuming

that a search of T. L. O.'s purse might under some circum-

stances be reasonable in light of the accusation made against

T. L. 0., the New Jersey court concluded that Mr. Choplick

in this particular case had no reasonable grounds to suspect

that T. L. 0. had cigarettes in her purse. At best, accord-

"JUSTICE STEVENS interprets these statements as a holding that

enforcement of the school's smoking regulations was not sufficiently related to the goal of maintaining discipline or order in the school to justify a search under the standard adopted by the New Jersey court. See post, at 382-384. We do not agree that this is an accurate characterization of the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion. The New Jersey court did not hold that the school's smoking rules were unrelated to the goal of maintain- ing discipline or order, nor did it suggest that a search that would produce evidence bearing directly on an accusation (^) that a student had violated the smoking rules would be (^) impermissible under the court's reasonable- suspicion standard; rather, the court concluded that any evidence a search of T. L. O.'s purse was likely to produce would not have a sufficiently direct bearing on the infraction to justify a search-a conclusion with which we cannot agree for the reasons set forth infra, at 345. JUSTICE STE- VENS' suggestion that the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision rested on the perceived triviality of the smoking infraction appears to be a reflection of his own views rather than those of the New Jersey court.

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

325 Opinion of the Court

ing to the court, Mr. Choplick had "a good hunch." 94 N. J.,

at 347, 463 A. 2d, at 942. Both these conclusions are implausible. T. L. 0. had been accused of^ smoking, and had denied^ the^ accusation^ in^ the strongest possible^ terms^ when^ she^ stated^ that^ she^ did^ not smoke at all.^ Surely^ it^ cannot^ be^ said^ that^ under^ these circumstances, T. L. O.'s possession of^ cigarettes^ would^ be irrelevant to the charges^ against^ her^ or^ to^ her^ response^ to those charges. T. L. O.'s possession of cigarettes, once it was discovered, would both corroborate^ the^ report^ that she had been smoking and undermine the^ credibility^ of^ her defense to the charge of smoking. To be sure, the discovery of the cigarettes would not prove that T. L. 0. had been smoking in the lavatory; nor would it, strictly speaking, necessarily be inconsistent with her claim that she did not smoke at all. But it is universally recognized that evidence, to be relevant to an inquiry, need not conclusively prove the ultimate fact in issue, but only have "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deter- mination of the action more probable^ or^ less^ probable^ than^ it would be without the evidence." Fed. Rule Evid. 401. The relevance of T. L. O.'s possession of^ cigarettes^ to^ the^ ques- tion whether she had been smoking and to the credibility of her denial that she smoked supplied the necessary "nexus" between the item searched for and the infraction under inves- tigation. See^ Warden^ v.^ Hayden,^^387 U.^ S.^ 294,^ 306-307 (1967). Thus,^ if^ Mr.^ Choplick in^ fact^ had^ a^ reasonable^ suspi- cion that T. L. 0. had cigarettes in her purse, the search was

justified despite the^ fact^ that^ the^ cigarettes,^ if^ found, would

constitute "mere evidence" of a violation. Ibid. Of course, the New Jersey Supreme Court also held that Mr. Choplick had no reasonable suspicion that the purse would contain cigarettes. This conclusion is puzzling. A teacher had reported that T. L. 0. was smoking in the lava- tory. Certainly this report gave Mr. Choplick reason to suspect that T. L. 0. was carrying cigarettes with her; and

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

Opinion of the Court 469 U. S.

if she did have cigarettes, her purse was the obvious place

in which to find them. Mr. Choplick's suspicion that there

were cigarettes in the purse was not an "inchoate and un-

particularized suspicion or 'hunch,"' Terry v. Ohio, 392

U. S., at 27; rather, it was the sort of "common-sense

conclusio[n] about human behavior" upon which "practical

people"-including government officials-are entitled to rely.

United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981). Of

course, even if the teacher's report were true, T. L. 0. might

not have had a pack of cigarettes with her; she might have

borrowed a cigarette from someone else or have been sharing

a cigarette with another student. But the requirement of

reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute cer-

tainty: "sufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone

of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. .. ." Hill

v. California, 401 U. S. 797, 804 (1971). Because the

hypothesis that T. L. 0. was carrying cigarettes in her

purse was itself not unreasonable, it is irrelevant that other

hypotheses were also consistent with the teacher's accusa-

tion. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Mr. Choplick acted

unreasonably when he examined T. L. O.'s purse to see if

it contained cigarettes. 12

'^2 T. L. 0. contends that even if it was reasonable (^) for Mr. Choplick to

open her purse to look for cigarettes, it was (^) not reasonable for him to reach in and take the cigarettes out of her purse once he found (^) them. Had he not removed the cigarettes from the purse, she asserts, (^) he would not have observed the rolling papers that suggested the presence (^) of marihuana, and the search for marihuana could (^) not have taken place. T. L. O.'s argument is based on the fact that the cigarettes were (^) not "contraband," as no school rule forbade her (^) to have them. Thus, according to T. L. O., the cigarettes were not subject to seizure or confiscation (^) by school authorities, and Mr. Choplick was not entitled to take (^) them out of T. L. O.'s purse regard- less of whether he was entitled (^) to peer into the purse to see if they were there. Such hairsplitting argumentation (^) has no place in an inquiry ad- dressed to the issue of reasonableness. (^) If Mr. Choplick could permissibly search T. L. O.'s purse (^) for cigarettes, it hardly seems reasonable to suggest that his natural (^) reaction to finding them-picking them up-could

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

325 Opinion of the Court

Our conclusion that Mr. Choplick's decision to open

T. L. O.'s purse was reasonable brings us to the question of

the further search for marihuana once the pack of cigarettes

was located. The suspicion upon which the search for

marihuana was founded was provided when Mr. Choplick ob-

served a package of rolling papers in the purse as he removed

the pack^ of^ cigarettes.^ Although^ T.^ L.^ 0.^ does^ not^ dispute

the reasonableness of Mr. Choplick's belief that the rolling

papers indicated the presence of marihuana, she does contend

that the scope of the search Mr. Choplick conducted^ exceeded

permissible bounds when he seized and read certain letters

that implicated T. L. 0. in drug dealing. This argument,

too, is unpersuasive. The discovery of the rolling papers

concededly gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that T. L. 0.

was carrying marihuana as well as cigarettes in her purse.

This suspicion^ justified^ further^ exploration^ of^ T.^ L.^ O.'s

purse, which turned^ up more evidence^ of^ drug-related^ activi-

ties: a pipe, a number of plastic bags of the type commonly

used to store marihuana, a^ small^ quantity^ of^ marihuana,^ and

a fairly substantial amount of money. Under these circum-

stances, it was not unreasonable to extend^ the^ search^ to

a separate zippered compartment of the purse; and when a

search of that compartment revealed an index card contain-

ing a list of "people who owe me money" as well as two let-

ters, the inference that T. L. 0. was involved in marihuana

trafficking was substantial enough to justify Mr. Choplick in

examining the letters to determine whether they contained

any further evidence. In short, we cannot conclude that the

search for marihuana was unreasonable in any respect.

Because the search resulting in the discovery of the evi-

dence of marihuana dealing by T. L. 0. was reasonable, the

New Jersey Supreme Court's decision to exclude that evi-

be a constitutional violation. We find that neither in opening the purse nor in reaching into it to remove the cigarettes did Mr. Choplick violate the Fourth Amendment.

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

POWELL, J., concurring 469 U. S.

dence from T. L. O.'s juvenile delinquency (^) proceedings on

Fourth Amendment grounds was erroneous. Accordingly,

the judgment of the Supreme Court of New Jersey is

Reversed.

JUSTICE (^) POWELL, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins,

concurring.

I agree with the Court's decision, (^) and generally with its

opinion. (^) I would place greater emphasis, however, on the

special characteristics of elementary and secondary schools

that make it unnecessary to afford students the same

constitutional protections granted adults and juveniles in

a nonschool setting.

In any realistic sense, students within the school environ-

ment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of

the population generally. They spend the school hours in close association with each other, both in the classroom and

during recreation periods. The students in a particular class

often know each other and their teachers quite well. Of

necessity, teachers have a degree of familiarity with, and

authority over, their students that is unparalleled except

perhaps in the relationship between parent and child. It

is simply unrealistic to think that students have the same

subjective expectation of privacy as the population gener-

ally. But for purposes of deciding this case, I can assume

that children in school-no less than adults-have privacy

interests that society is prepared to recognize as legitimate.

However one may characterize their privacy expectations,

students properly are afforded some constitutional protec-

tions. In an often quoted statement, the Court said (^) that

students do not "shed their constitutional rights (^)... at

the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent

Community School District, 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969). The Court (^) also has "emphasized the need for affirming the com-

prehensive authority of the states and of school officials ...

NEW JERSEY v. T. L. 0.

325 POWELL, J., concurring

to prescribe and control^ conduct^ in^ the^ schools."^ Id.,^ at^ 507.

See also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U. S.^ 97,^104 (1968).

The Court has balanced the interests of the student^ against

the school officials' need to maintain discipline by recognizing

qualitative differences between the constitutional remedies

to which^ students^ and^ adults are^ entitled.

In Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975), the Court rec-

ognized a constitutional right to due process, and yet was

careful to^ limit^ the^ exercise^ of^ this^ right^ by^ a^ student^ who

challenged a disciplinary suspension. The only process

found to be "due" was notice and a hearing described as

"rudimentary"; it amounted to no more than "the discipli-

narian... informally discuss[ing] the alleged misconduct

with the student minutes after it has occurred." Id.,^ at

581-582. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651 (1977), we

declined to extend the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the use

of corporal punishment of schoolchildren as authorized by

Florida law. We emphasized in that opinion that familiar

constraints in the school, and also in the community, provide

substantial protection against the violation of constitutional

rights by school authorities. "[A]t the end of the school day,

the child is invariably free to return home. Even while at

school, the child brings with him the support of family and

friends and^ is^ rarely^ apart^ from^ teachers^ and^ other^ pupils

who may witness^ and^ protest^ any^ instances^ of^ mistreatment."

Id., at 670. The^ Ingraham^ Court^ further^ pointed out^ that

the "openness of^ the^ public^ school^ and^ its^ supervision^ by

the community afford^ significant^ safeguards"^ against^ the

violation of constitutional rights. Ibid.

The special relationship between teacher and student also

distinguishes the setting within^ which^ schoolchildren^ oper-

ate. Law^ enforcement^ officers^ function^ as^ adversaries^ of

criminal suspects. These officers have^ the^ responsibility^ to

investigate criminal activity, to locate and arrest those who

violate our laws, and to facilitate^ the^ charging^ and^ bringing^ of

such persons to trial. Rarely does this type of^ adversarial