Download Landmark Supreme Court Cases on Freedom of Speech and Press and more Quizzes Mass Communication in PDF only on Docsity! TERM 1 Schenck v. United States DEFINITION 1 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), was a United States Supreme Court decision that upheld the Espionage Act of 1917 and concluded that a defendant did not have a First Amendment right to freedom of speech against the draft during World War I. Ultimately, the case established the "clear and present danger" test. Charles Schenck was the Secretary of the Socialist Party of America and was responsible for printing, distributing, and mailing to prospective military draftees during World War I, including 15,000 leaflets that advocated opposition to the draft. These leaflets contained statements such as; "Do not submit to intimidation", "Assert your rights", "If you do not assert and support your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain," on the grounds that military conscription constituted involuntary servitude, which is prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. For these acts, Schenck was indicted and convicted of violating the Espionage Act of 1917. Schenck appealed to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the court decision violated his First Amendment rights. TERM 2 Gitlow v. New York DEFINITION 2 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution had extended the reach of certain provisions of the First Amendmentspecifically the provisions protecting freedom of speech and freedom of the pressto the governments of the individual states. - This case is important because it changed the relationship between the federal courts and the states - Mr. Gitlow was convicted uner a New York law called the Criminal Anarchy Law. He was circulating a document called "Left Wing Manifesto". He was arrested because this document wanted communist socialism in the U.S. - Main concept is that it nationalizes the first amendment in the sense that the court is now saying that individual state laws CANNOT conflict with the first amendment or any of the rest of the bill or rights TERM 3 Near v. Minnesota DEFINITION 3 In 1927, Jay M. Near, who has been described as "anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic, anti- black and anti-labor"[2] began publishing The Saturday Press in Minneapolis with Howard A. Guilford, a former mayoral candidate who had been convicted of criminal libel. The paper claimed that Jewish gangs were "practically ruling" the city along with the police chief, Frank W. Brunskill, who was accused of participation in graft. Among the paper's other targets were mayor George E. Leach, Hennepin County attorney and future three-term governor Floyd B. Olson, and the members of the grand jury of Hennepin County, who the paper claimed were either incompetent or willfully failing to investigate and prosecute known criminal activity. Shortly after the first issue was distributed, Guilford was gunned down and hospitalized, where a further attempt on his life was made. At least one of the stories printed in The Saturday Press led to a successful prosecution of a gangster called Big Mose Barnett who had intimidated a local dry cleaner by destroying his customers' clothing. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), was a United States Supreme Court decision that recognized the freedom of the press by roundly rejecting prior restraints on publication, a principle that was applied to free speech generally in subsequent jurisprudence. The Court ruled that a Minnesota law that targeted publishers of "malicious" or "scandalous" newspapers violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment). Legal scholar and columnist Anthony Lewis called Near the Court's "first great press case." TERM 4 Grosjean v. American Press Co. DEFINITION 4 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court over a challenge to a separate sales tax on newspapers with circulation of over 20,000. - In 1934, at the request from a man by the name of Huey Long, Lousianna passed a law that imposed a 2% tax on printed material that had a circulation of more than 20,000 copies a week - Bottom line is that this law only affected 9 publishers in Louisiana: Ironically, ALL of these publications were ones that had been accusing Huey Long! -The petitioners went to federal court asking that this tax be overturned. They were successful! The Supreme Court compared this act to the Tax Act. TERM 5 Lovell v. Griffin DEFINITION 5 Lovell v. City of Griffin, GA, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), was a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. This case was remarkable in its discussion of the requirement of persons to seek government sanction to distribute religious material. In this particular case, the Supreme Court ruled it was not constitutional for a city to require such sanction. Appellant, Alma Lovell, had been distributing literature as a Jehovah's Witness. She was arrested for this, pursuant to a city ordinance which read, in part, that the practice of distributing, either by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free, or whether same are being sold, within the limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining written permission from the City Manager of the City of Griffin, such practice shall be deemed a nuisance, and punishable as an offense against the City of Griffin. Alma Lovell did not contest the fact that she was distributing material in violation of this ordinance, but attested that the ordinance itself was unconstitutional, in that it violated her First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. TERM 6 Thornhill v. Alabama DEFINITION 6 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), was a United States Supreme Court case heard in 1940. It reversed the conviction of the president of a local union for violating an Alabama statute that prohibited only labor picketing. Thornhill was peaceably picketing his employer during an authorized strike when he was arrested and charged. In reaching its decision, Associate Justice Frank Murphy wrote for the Supreme Court that the free speech clause protects speech about the facts and circumstances of a labor dispute. The statute in the case prohibited all labor picketing, but Thornhill added peaceful labor picketing to the area protected by free speech Byron Thornhill was convicted of "loitering or picketing" near a place of business, pursuant to 3448 of the 1923 Code of Alabama.[2] Thornhill had been charged with loitering near the Brown Wood Preserving Company with the "intent or purpose of influencing others" to interfere with lawful business. After his conviction in the Inferior Court of Tuscaloosa County, he appealed to the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County. He was originally fined "$100 and costs," but was sentenced to prison for 59 days after not paying. After he failed his appeal, the circuit court increased the prison time to 73 days. Furthermore, the court of appeals affirmed the rulings of the two lower courts. The Alabama Supreme Court denied Thornhill's petition for certiorari, but the U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted the petition TERM 7 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire DEFINITION 7 Chaplinsky v. State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, in which the Court articulated the fighting words doctrine, a limitation of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. In late November 1941, Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, was using the public sidewalk as a pulpit in downtown Rochester, passing out pamphlets and calling organized religion a "racket." After a large crowd had begun blocking the roads and generally causing a scene, a police officer removed Chaplinsky to take him to police headquarters. Along the way he met the town marshal, who had earlier warned Chaplinsky to keep it down and avoid causing a commotion. Upon meeting the marshal for the second time, Chaplinsky attacked him verbally. The complaint against Chaplinsky charged that he had shouted: "You are a God-damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist" and was arrested. Chaplinsky admitted that he said the words charged in the complaint, with the exception of the name of the Deity. For this, he was arrested under a New Hampshire statute preventing intentionally offensive speech being directed at others in a public place. Under NH.'s Offensive Conduct law (chap. 378, para. 2 of the NH. Public Laws) it is illegal for anyone to address another person with "any offensive, derisive or annoying word to anyone who is lawfully in any street or public place...or to call him by an offensive or derisive name." Chaplinsky was fined, but he appealed, claiming the law was "vague" and infringed upon his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech. TERM 8 Dennis v. U.S. DEFINITION 8 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case involving Eugene Dennis, general secretary of the Communist Party USA, which found that Dennis did not have a right under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to exercise free speech, publication and assembly, if that exercise was in furtherance of a conspiracy to overthrow the government. Petitioners were indicted in July 1948 for violating a provision of the Smith Act. Petitioners were found guilty by the trial court and the decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted writ of certiorari, but limited it to whether section two or three of the Smith Act violated the First Amendment and whether the same two sections violated the First and Fifth Amendments because of indefiniteness. TERM 9 Yates v. U.S. DEFINITION 9 - Charged with violating the Smith Act - Mrs. Yates and her co workers were convicted, given 10,000 dollars and sentenced to 5 years in prison - All for being involved in the communist party and building it up - The case went to the Supreme Court - Justice Harlen wrote the opinion, "advocacy unlinked directly with plans for action, is protected speech" -Case was overturned! TERM 10 U.S. v. O'Brien DEFINITION 10 On the morning of March 31, 1966, David Paul O'Brien and three companions burned their Selective Service registration certificates on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse. A sizable crowd, including several agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, witnessed the event.1 Immediately after the burning, members of the crowd began attacking O'Brien and his companions. An FBI agent ushered O'Brien to safety inside the courthouse. After he was advised of his right to counsel and to silence, O'Brien stated to FBI agents that he had burned his registration certificate because of his beliefs, knowing that he was violating federal law. He produced the charred remains of the certificate, which, with his consent, were photographed. For this act, O'Brien was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced in the United States