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Comparative Law: Contractual and Tort Liability, Sintesi del corso di Diritto Privato Comparato

A comparative analysis of contractual and tort liability across different legal systems, focusing on civil and common law approaches. It covers key concepts such as mistake in contract law, specific performance, breach of contract, strict liability, and the role of fault in tort law. The document also explores the law of unjustified enrichment and systems of property law, offering insights into real rights versus personal rights and the feudal system roots in common law. It is useful for students studying comparative law, contract law, and tort law.

Tipologia: Sintesi del corso

2022/2023

Caricato il 06/09/2025

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Lecture 17-19
COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW
A. Illegality of a legal act: when it violates or circumvents a mandatory prohibi<on, or the
agreement contravenes public policy, including morality (ex. illicit contracts).
B. Invalidity of a legal act: when it is affected by a legal pathology.
1. Voidness (or nullity): en<rely or par<ally ineffec<ve right from the beginning,
regardless of whether or not any of the par<es has disaffirmed it.
- Example: absence of essen<al element of the contract etc.
- Nullity is designed to safeguard public interests.
2. Avoidance (or annulment): capable of producing its legal effects un<l the aggrieved
party has the possibility to disaffirm it (via a court claim).
- Example: contract concluded by a minor (legal incapacity), mistake etc.
- Avoidance is designed to safeguard individual interests.
o Affirma<on (or confirma<on): of an avoidable legal act is generally allowed,
but with the condi<on that the reason for annulment has ceased to exist.
Unfairness
For some <me it was believed that it was a sin for a party to pay less than a ‘iustum
pre*um, and Natural lawyers developed the idea that a party should be allowed to resile
from a contract on the ground of ‘laesio enormis’ if, for example, the value of its
performance exceeded that of the other’s by more than a half.
In the 19th century such rules were considered rather out of place in an economy
increasingly dominated by liberalism (people should look aOer themselves).
However, § 138 (2) BGB states that a contract is void if:
a) performance and counterperformance are ‘clearly dispropor<onate’
b) one of the par<es exacted the contract ‘through exploi<ng the predicament,
inexperience, lack of judgment or significant indecisiveness’ of the other party.
English law has no general principle which would allow a party to escape from an
obviously disadvantageous contract, despite Lord Denning’s proposal.
OOen standard terms are used to save the par<es the cost of nego<a<ng the terms of
each contract individually. On the other hand, firms will oOen draO their terms so as to
shiO as many risks as possible to the other side, thus making them unbalanced and
unfairly favour the party who draOed them. The customer habitually accepts unfavorable
standard terms because of ‘unequal bargaining power’.
Courts have always protected par<es against unfair standard terms. One example of it is
the contra proferentem rule. This principle means that if there is uncertainty in a wriVen
contract, it must be interpreted against the person who draOed it.
The 1993 EU Direc<ve on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts allowed the courts to treat
contract terms as invalid if they were ‘unfair’, ‘unreasonable’, or ‘contrary to good faith’.
1. Mistake
A. Civil law jurisdic<ons: tend to lean towards an 'inten<on-based' approach to contracts,
which allows more flexibility for contract avoidance due to factors that affect it.
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Lecture 17 - 19

COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW

A. Illegality of a legal act: when it violates or circumvents a mandatory prohibi<on, or the agreement contravenes public policy, including morality (ex. illicit contracts). B. Invalidity of a legal act: when it is affected by a legal pathology.

  1. Voidness (or nullity): en<rely or par<ally ineffec<ve right from the beginning, regardless of whether or not any of the par<es has disaffirmed it.
    • Example: absence of essen<al element of the contract etc.
    • Nullity is designed to safeguard public interests.
  2. Avoidance (or annulment): capable of producing its legal effects un<l the aggrieved party has the possibility to disaffirm it (via a court claim).
    • Example: contract concluded by a minor (legal incapacity), mistake etc.
    • Avoidance is designed to safeguard individual interests. o Affirma<on (or confirma<on): of an avoidable legal act is generally allowed, but with the condi<on that the reason for annulment has ceased to exist. Unfairness
  • For some <me it was believed that it was a sin for a party to pay less than a ‘ iustum pre*um ’, and Natural lawyers developed the idea that a party should be allowed to resile from a contract on the ground of ‘ laesio enormis ’ if, for example, the value of its performance exceeded that of the other’s by more than a half.
  • In the 19th^ century such rules were considered rather out of place in an economy increasingly dominated by liberalism (people should look aOer themselves).
  • However, § 138 (2) BGB states that a contract is void if: a) performance and counterperformance are ‘clearly dispropor<onate’ b) one of the par<es exacted the contract ‘through exploi<ng the predicament, inexperience, lack of judgment or significant indecisiveness’ of the other party.
  • English law has no general principle which would allow a party to escape from an obviously disadvantageous contract, despite Lord Denning’s proposal.
  • OOen standard terms are used to save the par<es the cost of nego<a<ng the terms of each contract individually. On the other hand, firms will oOen draO their terms so as to shiO as many risks as possible to the other side, thus making them unbalanced and unfairly favour the party who draOed them. The customer habitually accepts unfavorable standard terms because of ‘unequal bargaining power’.
  • Courts have always protected par<es against unfair standard terms. One example of it is the contra proferentem rule. This principle means that if there is uncertainty in a wriVen contract, it must be interpreted against the person who draOed it.
  • The 1993 EU Direc<ve on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts allowed the courts to treat contract terms as invalid if they were ‘unfair’, ‘unreasonable’, or ‘contrary to good faith’. 1. Mistake A. Civil law jurisdic<ons: tend to lean towards an 'inten<on-based' approach to contracts, which allows more flexibility for contract avoidance due to factors that affect it.
  • In the civil law the par<es' inten<on is the most essen<al element in the forma<on of a contract, and a party should be allowed to escape it whenever their inten<on suffers from a 'defect' ( vizi del consenso ) , such as mistake, fraud, and threat (or duress).
  • There is general agreement, however, that the mistake must be ‘essen<al’ in the sense that the party affected by it would not have concluded the contract at all or would have concluded it on substan<ally different terms, had it known what the real situa<on was.
  • It is equally clear that a contract cannot be avoided just because a party made a mistake as to the value of its subject maVer, if not somehow obscured by the other party. B. Common law jurisdic<ons: tend to adhere to an 'expression-based' approach to contracts, which shields it from 'one-sided' mistakes made by each party unless these mistakes result from misrepresenta<on.
  • In the common law contracts may be void or voidable if a party has been induced to enter it by the other party’s fraud, or its use of improper pressure (duress).
  • Damages may be claimed not only where the other party knew that his statement was untrue (fraudulent misrepresenta<on), but also where he was merely negligent. 2. Fraud (or deceit)
  • A fraud (or deceit) occurs when one of the contrac<ng par<es is inten<onally induced into a mistake as to the prospec<ve contract.
    • Fraudulent misrepresenta;ons : both in civil and common law jurisdic<ons.
    • Silence (non-disclosure of an informa<on): only in most civil law jurisdic<ons. A. Dolus causam dans : if correctly informed, the mistaken party would not have concluded the contract. B. Dolus incidens : if correctly informed, the mistaken party would have concluded the contract, although on beVer terms. A. Claim for avoidance: contract is not avoidable in case of laudatory puffery (exaggera<on) that no reasonable man would have taken literally ( dolus bonus = dolo consen*to ). B. Claim for damages: damages are to be assessed along the beVer terms which the mistaken party would have bargained, if correctly informed (expecta<on damages). Avoidance for fraud (or deceit)
  • Avoidance is granted when the fraud is commiVed by the other contrac<ng party.
  • If it is commiVed by a third party, avoidance is granted when the other contrac<ng party knew or must have known it (cannot claim ignorance as a defense). 3. Duress (or threat)
  • Duress involves using threats that endanger a poten<al party's life or family, honour or property, or economic interests to force them into a contract to avoid the harm posed by these threats.
  • A threat of legal ac<on does not cons<tute duress, except where the legal process is deflected from its own purpose or where it is invoked or exercised in order to obtain manifestly excessive advantage.
  • In most civil law jurisdic<ons, avoidance is granted not only when the threats are made by the other contrac<ng party, but also when they are made by a third party, even if the other contrac<ng party was in good faith.
  1. Condi<ons are major terms of the contract: if violated, the innocent party has the right to seek damages and as well terminate the contract.
  2. Innominate (intermediate) terms are neither minor nor major: if the breach of those terms results in the other party being completely deprived of the contract's benefits, termina<on is permiVed; otherwise, only damages can be sought.
  • German law does not require a ‘fundamental’ or ‘material’ breach. You can terminate a contract if the other party doesn't meet their obliga<ons, but you must first offer them an extra period of <me to do so ( Nachfrist model). Similar in US law (offer/<mewise). Agreed rights of termina;on
  • Termina<on can happen regardless of a significant breach in certain situa<ons, related to a specific agreement made by the par<es (explicit dissolu<on clause).

Lecture 21

Claim for damage

  • In case of non-performance, defec<ve performance, or delay in performance, the creditor might be able to seek compensa<on for damages. The injured party should be restored to a financial posi<on as close as possible to what it would have been if the contract had been executed correctly (posi<ve interest). A. Civil law approach:
  • If the debtor is capable and willing to rec<fy the breach, there should be no contract termina<on or a demand for damages instead of performance.
  • Typically, the standard procedure involves the injured party sedng a reasonable <meframe for the debtor to either fulfil the contract or rec<fy a defec<ve performance.
  • A debtor will incur liability for damages resul<ng from a breach of contract only if it is ‘aVributable’ or ‘imputable’ to him (fault principle). B. Common law approach:
  • The mere occurrence of non-performance or breach is enough on its own to ini<ate a claim for compensa<on. The debtor will be held responsible without excep<on if the promised outcome is not achieved.
  • The only way of escaping liability is to invoke the doctrine of ‘frustra;on’ , under which the performance of a contract becomes ‘impossible’ for reasons beyond control. A. Obliga5ons de moyens
  • The debtor merely promised to take all necessary steps that a reasonable person in the same circumstances would take to achieve his purpose. In this case the aggrieved party must prove that the other party failed to do so. B. Obliga5ons de résultat
  • In such cases, the debtor can't escape by claiming he did his best. Instead he will be held strictly liable to pay damages unless he is able to prove that execu<on was prevented by a 'force majeure' (unpredictable/unavoidable event). Foreseeability
  • When gran<ng damages, the courts provide compensa<on to the injured party solely for the losses that were (i) foreseeable or (ii) within the contempla<on of the par<es when the contract was concluded.
  • Foreseeability does not necessitate actual foresight but only a reasonable expecta<on of the event or outcome. Types of injuries deemed to be foreseeable
  1. Injuries which will flow naturally from the breach in the ordinary course of events.
  2. Injuries which arise from the aggrieved party special needs or circumstances of which the other contrac<ng party has knowledge or reason to know. For example, the foreseeable injury resulng from the breach would not just be the cost of the pastries but also potenal damages to my business reputaon and potenal loss of clients due to the substandard pastries. Duty to mi;gate damages
  • A cardinal rule of contract damages is that the aggrieved party cannot recover those losses which could have been avoided by reasonable effort and without undue expense by virtue of opportuni<es that would not exist if not for the breach.
  • Only a reasonable effort to mi<gate damages is required. The doctrine does not require that his efforts be successful. If Party B fails to fulfil the payment agreement, Party A, facing potenal losses, is obligated to minimize damages by selling the goods to another party or taking reasonable steps to migate the impact. Consequences of failure to comply with the duty
  • The gains that the aggrieved party could have made by reasonable effort are deducted from the amount that it could otherwise recover as compensa<on.
  • The idea is to prevent the injured party from claiming excessive damages that could have been reasonably avoided. Liquidated damages clauses
  • Par<es to a contract agree, as one of the terms of their agreement, that, in the event of breach, the culpable party should pay a specified amount to the injured party. Func;ons
  1. Convenient method of determining the amount to be paid in the event of breach (good faith pre-es<mate of probable actual damages).
  2. Coercing a party to perform its obliga<on (liquidated sum in excess of probable actual damages).
  3. Diminish the amount of loss to be borne by a party in breach (liquidated sum lower than probable actual damages). A. Civil law approach:
  • Clauses that do involve pre-es<ma<on of damages are enforceable.
  • There is oOen no clear dis<nc<on between ‘penalty’ and ‘liquidated damages’ clauses (= clausola penale ).
  • Tort law (or law of delict) has always been one of the major areas of compara<ve law.
  • In recent decades, comparing different systems of delict or torts furthermore received a boost from the objec<ve of harmonizing European private law.
    • A group of scholars from across Europe, led by Chris<an von Bar, compiled a draO European Civil Code under the name of a ‘Common Frame of Reference’.
    • Another example is the crea<on of the ‘Principles of European Tort Law’ prepared by the compe<ng Group of European Tort Law. Ends and methods of tort law A. Common law approach:
  • The purpose of tort law extends beyond merely compensa<ng for losses; it is also, and perhaps primarily, intended to avoid harm in the first place. This is done by means of threatening to impose liability as a sanc<on.
  • Remedies that go beyond mere compensa<on, such as exemplary or puni<ve damages, can be considered, but only if it is deemed necessary for deterrence.
  • Legal sources : variety of causes of ac<on, each tailored to specific factual situa<ons of wrongdoing, accompanied by dis<nct legal criteria for establishing liability.
  • History : in England, the writ of trespass, ini<ally designed to safeguard the King’s peace, evolved with the addi<on of the ac<on of trespass on the case. While trespass dealt with direct viola<ons of legal rights, the broader ac<on on the case covered both direct and indirect viola<ons. This development laid the founda<on for the gradual emergence of general negligence liability. Percy H. Winfield was able to remark that negligence was no longer ‘simply a way of commiUng a tort; it was the tort’. B. Civil law approach:
  • Compensa;on-theory : the main objec<ve is to provide compensa<on to individuals who have suffered due to wrongful ac<ons. Compensa<on is only applicable when harm has been experienced, and the awarded damages should be confined strictly to the amount necessary to address the suffered harm.
  • Legal sources : empha<cally formulated general clauses. a. Correc<ve jus<ce approach: favour fault-based liability as fault is thought to provide the necessary jus<fica<on for shiOing losses from the vic<m to the torieasor. b. Social jus<ce approach: provides compensa<on to the vic<ms, whether or not the behaviour that caused the harm was wrongful (favours strict liability).
  • Calabesi’s ‘Costs of Accidents’ : the reduc<on of primary accident costs occurs when an individual increases his precau<ons up to the point where the cost of an addi<onal unit of care is equal to the cost of harm that could be avoided by such unit.
  • Learned Hand formula : it is the reformula<on of the previous theory, and it defines negligence as the failure to take precau<ons that would have cost less than the harm caused, mul<plied by the probability of such harm actually occurring. “...if the probability be called P; the injury L; and the burden B; liability depends upon whether B is less likely than L mul*plied by P: i.e. whether B is less than PL”

Lecture 23- 24

Scope of protec;on

  • The ques<on is whether any kind of interest is worthy of protec<on by the law of torts. o Pure economic loss: ‘pure’ in the sense that it is not the consequence of personal injury or property damage, but solely economic in nature. o Intangible personality rights: non-physical (ex. image, privacy, iden<ty…). Protected interests vs General clause A. French law: the general clause requires dommage (harm), but not the infringement of a protected interest and thus seems to provide no basis at all for dis<nguishing between economic loss consequen<al upon the infringement of bodily integrity and tangible property on one side, and pure economic loss on the other. B. German law: the liability for negligence is confined to the viola<on of protected interests explicitly listed in the BGB. This includes the protec<on of purely financial interests and intangible personality interests, such as honour, dignity, and privacy. C. English common law: an individual actor is not required to prevent every form of loss experienced by third par<es. Instead, the obliga<on is to refrain from causing specific types of harm (personal integrity and tangible property), thereby incorpora<ng the extent of protec<on within the concept of the duty to take care.

Lecture 25

Concept of fault

  • The concept of fault in tort law is a conten<ous issue, with differing views on whether it involves determining personal blameworthiness or merely the breach of a legal standard.
  • In common law jurisdic<ons, the deterrent purpose of tort law is emphasized, but it is clarified that tort liability is not a criminal convic<on or a badge of infamy. Standard of care a. Roman Law: negligen*a was seen as the opposite of diligen*a , assessed through the standard of the diligens paterfamilias. German pandec<sts before codifica<on held this view, and it influenced the code draOers with current formula<ons of the BGB. b. French law: the standard for the general duty of care is based on the ac<ons of a fic<onal reference person, the bon père de famille , rather than the actual individual being evaluated. c. English common law: the con<nental diligens paterfamilias becomes the English reasonable man/person. d. American law: negligence is oOen seen as economically unsound behavior, where the wrongdoer fails to take precau<ons that would have cost less than the resul<ng injuries. e. Austrian Law: tort liability is determined by personal culpability following subjec<vist principles. The standard of care is based on the individual torieasor's reasonable behavior, not the typical conduct of a reasonable person. f. The Principles of European Tort Law: seek to balance the objec<ve (“reasonable person”) and subjec<ve approaches (due to age, physical or mental disabili<es, and extraordinary circumstances).

Lecture 26

  • Condi5o indebi5 : legal ac<on whereby a plain<ff may recover what he has paid the defendant by mistake; such mistaken payment is known as solu5o indebi.
  • Nego5orum ges5o : voluntary management of someone else's affairs in a state of emergency and without a formal agreement.
  • Rei vindica5o : legal ac<on by which the plain<ff demands (owner) that the defendant return (possessor) a thing that belongs to the plain<ff. Enrichment by transfer (or in another manner) A. Civil law:
  • The res<tutory remedy is awarded to restore benefits given without any legal ground. B. Common law:
  • The res<tutory remedy is awarded upon establishing that the transfer was influenced by unjust factors (mistake, threat, duress etc.).
  • Enrichment liability : only valid when the defendant's gain corresponds to the claimant's loss.

Lecture 2 8 - 29

Res;tu;onary remedies A. Personal remedies: monetary compensa<on (enrichment claim) B. Proprietary remedies: return of specific property or assets (not an enrichment claim).

  • Advantages: bankruptcy situa<ons and insolvency proceedings, property apprecia<on, protec<on against third par<es. Remedies A. Civil law:
  • Enrichment remedies (whether or not they have a proprietary focus) are consistently personal claims.
  • Where ownership has not passed, rei vindica*o (or its equivalent) provides the appropriate remedy.
  • Where ownership has passed, the remedy is a personal claim. B. Common law:
  • Enrichment remedies can take on either a personal or a proprietary nature.
  • Where ownership has not passed, the equivalent of a rei vindica*o (“pure proprietary claim”) provides the appropriate remedy.
  • Where ownership has passed, the remedy can also be of a proprietary nature. Remedies under equity
  • Court remedies, guided by discre<onary remedialism, are determined by the judge's discre<on, focusing on the "appropriate" remedy for each unique case, rather than being confined to predefined remedies for specific events. Remedies in German law
  • The assessment of enrichment follows a three-step approach: the principle is to return what had been transferred, and if that is not feasible, the value must be repaid. If the value has diminished, only the remaining value needs to be repaid.

Remedies in English law

  • The basic measure is the value received, but the defense of change of posi<on ensures that, in many situa<ons, the appropriate measure is the value remaining (unless there are circumstance that exclude the defense).
  • For example, in certain cases of failed reciprocal contracts it would be unfair if one of the contrac<ng par<es could rely on change of posi<on due to an inability to return what he had received (the same case applies to Civil law).

Lecture 30.

COMPARATIVE PROPERTY LAW

Property law

  • Despite acknowledging a common market and private ownership, compara<ve lawyers typically avoided exploring property law, considering it to have a dis<nct na<onal or local nature in both civilian and common law systems (unlike the law of obliga<ons).
  • Nevertheless, compara<ve property law studies have increased, driven by the push for harmoniza<on essen<al for interna<onal business transac<ons.
  • The cons<tu<onaliza<on of private law has in the field of property law resulted in a new area called ‘cons<tu<onal property law’ (ex. human rights - protec<on of ownership). Civil law A. Real rights (absolute rights): against the world or erga omnes (ex. property law). B. Personal rights (rela<ve rights): that a specific person has against one or more specific other persons bound by a corresponding obliga<on (ex. contracts and torts). Real rights vs Personal rights
  • The fundamental dis<nc<on between real rights and personal rights is not absolute, which is exemplified in the law of lease. a. Civil law: a lease is a contract that entails mutual obliga<ons: the lessor provides object use, and the lessee pays the agreed price. However, the lessee is granted special protec<on if the lessor sells the object to a third party, with the principle ' sale does not break lease ,' allowing the lessee to assert same rights against the new owner. b. Common law: the lessee is granted a legal status, enabling the transfer of rights. This transforms a lease into an ' estate ,' a right that is not personal but valid erga omnes. Despite this, the idea of an absolute right, in the civilian sense of the term, does not exist in the common law.
  • In Civil law, a further example are ‘qualita;ve’ rights and du;es , which are linked to the status of being the owner of an object. They cons<tute a par<cular type of legal rela<onship that has effect against specific, but not necessarily all, third par<es. An example of a qualita*ve right is a guarantee (of reimbursement); an example of a qualita*ve duty is the duty not to build a brick wall to enclose one’s land. Numerus clausus of Absolute rights

b. Personal property: includes movable objects (chaVels). Protected by means of ac*ones in personam (personal ac<ons), which generally only allowed damages. a) Choses or things in possession (tangible or physical like cars and jewerly) b) Choses or things in ac<on (intangible like credit and intellectual property rights)

  • In personal property law, the primary right is called “;tle” (short for “en<tlement”), which is the right of exclusive possession to a chaVel.
  • Rela;vity of ;tle : it is possible that more than one person is en<tled to the same chaVel, but the person with the stronger en<tlement is allowed to receive possession. Feudal system roots in Common law a. Tenure: originally the term expressed that a person holds (French: ‘tenir’ ) rights granted by the Crown or a lord (i.e. condi<ons for holding land or property). In reality, concerning most land, the Crown nowadays only maintains a nominal or symbolic right. b. Estate: denotes the length of <me of a par<cular en<tlement with regard to land. a) Freehold estate: unlimited dura<on b) Leasehold estate: limited dura<on Scots law
  1. Dominium directum : the property right of the lord (superior) who granted feudal rights to someone.
  2. Dominium u*le : the property right of the person (vassal) to whom these rights were granted.
  3. Duplex dominium : aVempts to bridge the gap between Roman legal principles and the feudal system, acknowledging the coexistence of superior and subordinate property rights in a unitary concept of ownership ( dominium ). Common law and Equity
  • A consequence of the coexistence of these two subsystems is that a person can have a property en<tlement according to one of them, but not according to the other.
  • A prime example is the trust : the trustee (manager of a fund) has a property en<tlement at common law; the beneficiary has a property en<tlement in Equity.

Lecture 31 - 32

Hierarchy

  • In the law of obliga<ons all creditors are equal (principle of paritas creditorum ), but in the law of property a strict hierarchy exists in order to protect the erga omnes effect of property rights:
    • An older property right has priority over a younger right.
    • A limited right overrides the property right which is burdened by it.
    • In case of mul<ple mortgages, the first holder of a right of mortgage takes precedence, ac<ng as if no other mortgages existed. Transfer systems A. Causal: require a transfer to be based on a valid legal ground, such as a contract of sale (ex. Netherlands, Austria, DCFR).

B. Abstract: a transfer is valid even without a valid legal ground, as long as a mutual agreement exists (ex. Germany, South Africa, Scotland). A. Consensual: involves a valid transfer of ownership without the need for physical possession transfer (in common law called “delivery”). B. Tradi<on: a contract establishes an obliga<on to transfer, but ownership is transferred only aOer the legal act of transfer and tradi<on (“delivery”) have taken place. Transparency

  • First, establish clarity with regard to which object a property right is being claimed and, second, that right must be visible and recognizable to third par<es.
  • Visibility can result either from the exercise of factual power, such as possession ( principle of specificity ), or from registra<on ( principle of publicity ). I. Land register - German legal system a) Posi<ve func<on: assures third par<es of registered rights (“posi<ve publicity”). b) Nega<ve func<on: assures third par<es that non-registered rights do not exist (completeness of the register).
  • Ideally, a land register should mirror the legal status of each parcel of land. However, excep<ons exist, as some legal systems permit the establishment of certain unregistered rights against unsuspec<ng third par<es ac<ng in good faith (ex. contract of lease). II. Land register - French legal system
  • As of 2010, the French Cour de Cassa*on protects a second buyer, even if aware of an earlier unregistered sale, as long as his acquisi<on is registered first. III. Land register - English common law
  • To transfer a legal estate such as freehold, a deed of transfer must be registered at the Land Registry. The buyer becomes the new owner only aOer successful registra<on.
  • In cases where the registered owner A sells land to B under fraud, misrepresenta<on, or undue influence, A can request the court to avoid the sale. If B then sells the land to C before A's sale is avoided, the court may be hesitant to avoid the transfer if it would harm an innocent purchaser.

Lecture 33 - 34

DELAYED EXERCISE OF RIGHTS

Prescrip;on and Statutes of limita;ons A. Civil law: most patrimonial (economic) rights have to be enforced within certain <me periods, which are set out by the law: when those <me periods run out, the rights that have not been pursued become ex<nct ( prescrip;on ). B. Common law: such <me-based limita<ons of enforcement of rights set out through apposite statutory provisions ( statutes of limita;ons ); they do not affect substan<al rights as such, but the ac<ons to enforce them (procedural mechanism). Prescrip;on defense