Interest Representation in the EU: Responsiveness of Actors in Formative Stage | Schemi e mappe concettuali di Diritto dell'Unione Europea

The responsiveness Judge e Thompson

The procedural legitimacy of democracy rests partly on the idea that policymakers consider

the range of interests that are affected by policy proposals before reaching final decisions.

Although there is no consensus about what an ‘unbiased interest system’ looks like, most

scholars agree that a broad range of interests should be represented, none should be

systematically excluded, and none should determine the contents of legislative outputs to the

exclusion of others.

This paper examines the extent to which actors involved in the European Union's legislative

process – the Commission, member states in the Council and the European Parliament –

respond to a broad range of interests when they discuss legislative proposals.

We conceptualise the formative stage as a stage between the ‘agenda-setting’ and ‘decision’

stages of the legislative process, in line with previous research on interest representation in

the EU.

The formative stage occurs before the Commission issues a legislative proposal, but is

distinct from the agenda-setting stage in that the issues and at least some policy alternatives

for discussion have already been identified in the Commission's consultation call.

Stakeholders are actively consulted during the formative stage and can introduce new issues

or policy alternatives in their submissions that respond to the Commission's consultation call.

Of the EU actors, the Commission is generally the most responsive to stakeholder's

demands. This accords with the view that the Commission is the main lobbying venue for

interest groups, and that the Commission has a particular need for information on how

policies work and the levels of support for different policies.

the Commission's legitimacy and influence in the decision stage is strengthened when it

consults widely before introducing legislative proposals.

the Commission is the most responsive of the EU actors by attending to the distinction

between responsiveness and congruence referred to earlier. Alternative operationalisations of

responsiveness could focus on the extent to which EU actors further the general interests of

various stakeholders, as distinct from reflecting their positions in the decision-making stage.

Furthermore, alternative research designs could examine whether the stakeholders that

participate in consultations reflect the full range of interests affected by a proposal.

the EU gives a greater weight to stakeholders that provide information on the opinions of

individual citizens.

the Commission's mandate to represent the broad European interest could lead it to attend

more closely to associations than other stakeholders. Future research could expand further

upon this implication of resource exchange theory. It is also worth examining to the impact of

different types of stakeholders at different stages of the legislative process. This study

focused on the formative stage, which leaves open the possibility that biases may exist in

earlier or later stages of the policy process.

The Commission is surprisingly more responsive to non-EU stakeholders than to EU or

member state-based stakeholders.

National governments define state interests in terms of domestic groups’ demands.

In the case of the Parliament, the present study focused on the EP's common positions in the

first reading of the legislative proposal. These policy positions are aggregations of distinct

positions taken within the EP, by the EP party groupings and sometimes also by groups of

national MEPs.

The policy positions of party groups and national factions in the EP on the same specific

issues that were debated by the member states in the Council.

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The responsiveness Judge e Thompson The procedural legitimacy of democracy rests partly on the idea that policymakers consider the range of interests that are affected by policy proposals before reaching final decisions. Although there is no consensus about what an ‘unbiased interest system’ looks like, most scholars agree that a broad range of interests should be represented, none should be systematically excluded, and none should determine the contents of legislative outputs to the exclusion of others. This paper examines the extent to which actors involved in the European Union's legislative process – the Commission, member states in the Council and the European Parliament – respond to a broad range of interests when they discuss legislative proposals. We conceptualise the formative stage as a stage between the ‘agenda-setting’ and ‘decision’ stages of the legislative process, in line with previous research on interest representation in the EU. The formative stage occurs before the Commission issues a legislative proposal, but is distinct from the agenda-setting stage in that the issues and at least some policy alternatives for discussion have already been identified in the Commission's consultation call. Stakeholders are actively consulted during the formative stage and can introduce new issues or policy alternatives in their submissions that respond to the Commission's consultation call. Of the EU actors, the Commission is generally the most responsive to stakeholder's demands. This accords with the view that the Commission is the main lobbying venue for interest groups, and that the Commission has a particular need for information on how policies work and the levels of support for different policies. the Commission's legitimacy and influence in the decision stage is strengthened when it consults widely before introducing legislative proposals. the Commission is the most responsive of the EU actors by attending to the distinction between responsiveness and congruence referred to earlier. Alternative operationalisations of responsiveness could focus on the extent to which EU actors further the general interests of various stakeholders, as distinct from reflecting their positions in the decision-making stage. Furthermore, alternative research designs could examine whether the stakeholders that participate in consultations reflect the full range of interests affected by a proposal. the EU gives a greater weight to stakeholders that provide information on the opinions of individual citizens. the Commission's mandate to represent the broad European interest could lead it to attend more closely to associations than other stakeholders. Future research could expand further upon this implication of resource exchange theory. It is also worth examining to the impact of different types of stakeholders at different stages of the legislative process. This study focused on the formative stage, which leaves open the possibility that biases may exist in earlier or later stages of the policy process. The Commission is surprisingly more responsive to non-EU stakeholders than to EU or member state-based stakeholders. National governments define state interests in terms of domestic groups’ demands. In the case of the Parliament, the present study focused on the EP's common positions in the first reading of the legislative proposal. These policy positions are aggregations of distinct positions taken within the EP, by the EP party groupings and sometimes also by groups of national MEPs. The policy positions of party groups and national factions in the EP on the same specific issues that were debated by the member states in the Council.

Dur Marshall Business lobbying is widespread in the European Union. Business actors are, overall, less successful than citizen groups in the European policy process. However, they can protect their interests if interest group conflict is low or the role of the European Parliament is restricted. Business interests’ attempts at influencing public policy are ubiquitous in the European Union (EU). The EU is sufficiently important to attract lobbying from a large number of business interests: Its institutions legislate on the terms under which goods and services can be produced and traded in what, if considered a single unit, is the largest economy in the world. To illustrate, in late 2012 and early 2013, the EU institutions were the target of a massive lobbying campaign by Internet companies, including Facebook and Google, asking for changes to a proposed data protection directive. More than 3,000 proposals for amendments were forwarded to the European Parliament alone. But lobbying frequently takes place in contested environments, so that not all lobbyists can expect to be equally successful. In the EU, business actors are more often than not unsuccessful in achieving their desired policy outcomes. Most legislative proposals in the EU concern market regulation, which is frequently opposed by a large majority of business actors. Therefore, business routinely faces a defensive battle from the moment the European Commission puts forward a proposal for new legislation. As most Commission proposals eventually lead to legislation, we argue that business frequently loses compared with the status quo and at best manages to limit the size of its losses. Citizen groups, by contrast, frequently support new regulation. Once the Commission fields a legislative proposal, these groups can expect considerable gains compared with the status quo. In these situations, business actors may still be able to defend their interests as long as policy is agreed upon in relatively closed elite circles involving few interest representatives and executive officials. In the context of the EU, this is the case when a policy episode is marked by low levels of controversy or when the role of the European Parliament is limited. On much of EU legislation the Commission, in alliance with citizen groups and the European Parliament, wants to change the status quo while business interests seek to defend it. The legislative outcomes tend to shift policy closer to the preferences of citizen groups and further away from the preferences of business interests. This tendency is amplified by increased levels of conflict and enhanced institutional powers of the European Parliament. Business success is conditional on the level of conflict. Additional strengths of our approach focus is on the time between the formulation of a new regulation or directive by the agenda setter (the European Commission) and the final decision on this proposal by the European legislative institutions. Hence, our study does not capture the “second-dimensional” power relations that may prevent some interests from successfully defining issues and placing them on the public agenda. Business actors may be quite successful in keeping certain issues off the legislative agenda. However, because the actual legislative activity of the EU has important consequences for firms within and outside the EU, the analysis of the decision-making stage yields important insights. The considerable amount of lobbying taking place during that stage supports this assumption. Influential actors are able to obtain policies they prefer while averting policies they dislike, where these outcomes depend on the actions or some properties of the influential actor.^2 In our study, we cannot rule out that actors attain their policy goals due to “luck” rather than influence. inter-institutional bargaining could produce the same policy outcomes as those that we observe in the absence of any lobbying. Although individual policy actors might occasionally be lucky, if luck was all that matters, we should not observe a statistically significant association between lobbying success and the identity or characteristics of actors or types of actors. Two opposing views characterize the literature on lobbying in the EU. Some studies conclude that in the EU, business actors are both successful at promoting their own agendas and manage to

Interest Representation in the EU: Responsiveness of Actors in Formative Stage, Schemi e mappe concettuali di Diritto dell'Unione Europea

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