Docsity
Docsity

Prepara i tuoi esami
Prepara i tuoi esami

Studia grazie alle numerose risorse presenti su Docsity


Ottieni i punti per scaricare
Ottieni i punti per scaricare

Guadagna punti aiutando altri studenti oppure acquistali con un piano Premium


Guide e consigli
Guide e consigli


Structural Realism and the Balance of Power in International Relations, Appunti di Relazioni Internazionali

An in-depth analysis of structural realism, a theoretical perspective in international relations that explains why states compete for power. It discusses the assumptions of this theory, the debate over how much power states should aim to control, and the causes of great power wars. The document also explores the debate over whether bipolar or multipolar systems are more war-prone.

Tipologia: Appunti

2018/2019

Caricato il 08/03/2019

sara_stitch_vitali
sara_stitch_vitali 🇮🇹

4.5

(43)

171 documenti

1 / 2

Toggle sidebar

Questa pagina non è visibile nell’anteprima

Non perderti parti importanti!

bg1
WHY DO STATES WANT POWER?
There is a simple structural realist explanation for why states compete among themeselves for power. It’s
based of five straightforward assumptions about the international system.
The first assumption is that great powers are the main actors in world politics and they operate in an anarchic
system. This is not to say that the system is characterized by chaos or disorder. Anarchy is an ordering
principle, it simply means that there is no centralized authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above states.
The second assumption is that all states possess some offensive military capability, each state has the power
to inflict some harm on its neighbour.
The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. States want to
know whether other states are determined to use force to alter the balance of power or whether they are
satisfied enough with it that they have no interest in using force to change it.
The forth assumption is that the main goal of statesi s survival. States seek to maintain their territorial
integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. They can pursue other goals like prosperity and
protecting human rights.
The fifth assumption is that states are rational actors, which is to say they are capable of coming up with
sound strstegies that maximize their prospects for survival.
None of these assumptions by themselves says that states will or should compete with each other for power.
The greates fear is that another state might have the capability as well as the motive to attack them. The level
of fear between states varies from case to case, buti t can never be reduced to an inconsequential level.
Great powers also understand that they operate in a self-help world; they have to rely on themselves to
ensure their survival, because other states are potential threats and because there is no higher authority they
can turn to if they’re attacked.
HOW MUCH POWER IS ENOUGH?
There is a disagreement among structural realists about how much power state should aim to control.
Offensive realists argue that states should always be looking for opportunities to gain more power and should
do so whenever it seems feasible.
Whilw dwfensive realists recognize that the international system creates strong incentives to gain additional
increments of power, they mantain that it’s strategically foolish to persue hegemony.
Defensive realists emphasize that if any state becomes too powerful, balancing will occur. The other great
powers will build up their militaries and from a balancing coalition that will leave the aspiring hegemon at
least less secure, and maybe even destroy it. Some defensive realists argue that there’s an offence-defence
balance, which indicate show easy or difficult it’s to conquer territory or defeat a defender in battle. Further
they argue that, even when conquest is feasible, it does not pay: the costs outweigh the benefits. In sum, not
only is conquest difficult, but, even in those rare instances where great powers conquer another state, they
get few benefits and lots of trouble.
Offensive realists understand that states usually balance against dangerous foes, but they mantain that
balancing is often inefficent, and this inefficenty provides opportunities for a clever aggressor to take
advantage of its adversaries.
Finally, while offensive realists acknowledge that sometimes conquest does not pay, they also point out that
sometimes it does. They also expect great powers to be constantly looking for opportunities to gain
advantage over each other, with the ultimate prize being hegemony.
WHAT CAUSES GREAT POWER WAR?
Structural realists recognize that states can go to war for any number of reasons, which makes it possible to
come up with a simple theory that points to a single facto ras the main cause of war. Wars motivated largely
pf2

Anteprima parziale del testo

Scarica Structural Realism and the Balance of Power in International Relations e più Appunti in PDF di Relazioni Internazionali solo su Docsity!

WHY DO STATES WANT POWER?

There is a simple structural realist explanation for why states compete among themeselves for power. It’s based of five straightforward assumptions about the international system.

The first assumption is that great powers are the main actors in world politics and they operate in an anarchic system. This is not to say that the system is characterized by chaos or disorder. Anarchy is an ordering principle, it simply means that there is no centralized authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above states.

The second assumption is that all states possess some offensive military capability, each state has the power to inflict some harm on its neighbour.

The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states. States want to know whether other states are determined to use force to alter the balance of power or whether they are satisfied enough with it that they have no interest in using force to change it.

The forth assumption is that the main goal of statesi s survival. States seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. They can pursue other goals like prosperity and protecting human rights.

The fifth assumption is that states are rational actors, which is to say they are capable of coming up with sound strstegies that maximize their prospects for survival.

None of these assumptions by themselves says that states will or should compete with each other for power. The greates fear is that another state might have the capability as well as the motive to attack them. The level of fear between states varies from case to case, buti t can never be reduced to an inconsequential level.

Great powers also understand that they operate in a self-help world; they have to rely on themselves to ensure their survival, because other states are potential threats and because there is no higher authority they can turn to if they’re attacked.

HOW MUCH POWER IS ENOUGH?

There is a disagreement among structural realists about how much power state should aim to control. Offensive realists argue that states should always be looking for opportunities to gain more power and should do so whenever it seems feasible.

Whilw dwfensive realists recognize that the international system creates strong incentives to gain additional increments of power, they mantain that it’s strategically foolish to persue hegemony.

Defensive realists emphasize that if any state becomes too powerful, balancing will occur. The other great powers will build up their militaries and from a balancing coalition that will leave the aspiring hegemon at least less secure, and maybe even destroy it. Some defensive realists argue that there’s an offence-defence balance, which indicate show easy or difficult it’s to conquer territory or defeat a defender in battle. Further they argue that, even when conquest is feasible, it does not pay: the costs outweigh the benefits. In sum, not only is conquest difficult, but, even in those rare instances where great powers conquer another state, they get few benefits and lots of trouble.

Offensive realists understand that states usually balance against dangerous foes, but they mantain that balancing is often inefficent, and this inefficenty provides opportunities for a clever aggressor to take advantage of its adversaries.

Finally, while offensive realists acknowledge that sometimes conquest does not pay, they also point out that sometimes it does. They also expect great powers to be constantly looking for opportunities to gain advantage over each other, with the ultimate prize being hegemony.

WHAT CAUSES GREAT POWER WAR?

Structural realists recognize that states can go to war for any number of reasons, which makes it possible to come up with a simple theory that points to a single facto ras the main cause of war. Wars motivated largely

by non- security considerations are consistent with structural realism as long as the aggressor does not purposely act in ways that would harm its position in the balance of power. Some realists argue that the key variable is the number of great powers or poles in the system, while others focus on the distribution of power among the major states. Another approach looks at how changes in the distribution of power effect the likelihood of war.

THE POLARITY OF THE SYSTEM

A longstanding debate among realists is whether bipolarity (two great powers) is more or less war-prone than multipolarity (three or more great powers). It’s generally agreed that the state system was multipolar from its inception in 1648 until the second world war ended in 1945. It’s tempting to argue that it is clear from 20th century european history that bipolarity is more peaceful than multipolarity.

Realists who think bipolarity is less war prone offer three supporting arguments: first htey mantain that there is more opportunity for great powers to fight each other in multipolarity. There are only two great powers in bipolarity, which means there is only only one great power versus great power dyad.

Second, there tends to be greater equality between the great powers in bipolarity because, the more great powers there are in the system, the more likely it’s tht wealth and population will be distributed unevenly among the great powers. And, when there are powers imbalanced, the strongest often have opportunities to take advantage of the weaker.

Third therer is greater potential for miscalculation in multipolarity, which often contribute to the outbreak of war.

Balancing is also said to be more efficent in bipolar systems, because each great power has no choice but to directly confront the other. In multipolarity, however, threatened states will often be tempted to pass the buck to other threatened states. Although buck-passing is an acctracting strategy, it can lead to circumstances in where aggressors think they can isolate and defeat an adversary.

Not all realists accept the claim that bipolarity facilities peace. Some arggue that multipolarity is less wore- prone. This optimism is based on two considerations: first deterrence it’s easier in multipolarity because there are more states that can join together to confront an especially aggressive state with overwhelming force. Second there is much less hostility among the great powers in multipolarity, because the ammount of attention they pay to each otheris less tha in bipolarity.

With the end of the cold war and the collapse of the soviet union many realists argue that unipolarity has arrived.

POWER SHIFT POWER

Some realists claim that the focus should be on the dynamics of the balance of power, especially on significant changes that take place in the distribution of power. The dominant state has strong incentives to launch a preventive war against the challenger to halt its rise. Some scholars argue that the rising power is likely to initiate the war in this scenario. But this makes little sense, because time is on the side of the scendic power, which does not need a war to catch up with and overtake the leading state.

CONCLUSION

The worls remains a dangerous place, althought the level of threat varies from place to place and time to time. States still worry aout their survival, which means that htey have little choice but to pay attention to the balance o power.