Scarica SECURITY STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION e più Dispense in PDF di Terrorismo solo su Docsity!
SECURITY STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION
PART 1 - THEORETICAL APPROACHES
CHAPTER 1 - REALISM
How the world works in terms of security (for us). Here there are different realist approaches, but they share the view that the character of rela@ons Amons state has not altered. Realists schools/ theories
- classical realism
- Strategic realism
- Neo-realism (or structural realism) There are 6 variants of liberalism:
- Classical realism ( is held to be the first of the 20th realist research programmes _)
- Neorealism
- defensive structural realism —> 6) neoclassical realism Realist assump<on 4) offensive structural realism
- rise and fall realism
- CLASSICAL REALISM_ Dated from 1939 with the publica@on of Edward Hallet Carr’s “ the twenty year’s crisis”. Usually they are characterised as responding to then-dominant liberal approaches to interna@onal poli@cal, although scholars disagree on how widespread liberalism was during interwar years. According to classical realism, because the desire for more power is rooted in the flawed nature of humanity, states are con;nuously engaged in a struggle to increase their capabili;es. It explains armed conflict with reference to human failings. Wars are explained by par@cular aggressive poli@cian, or by domes@c poli@cal systems that give greedy/selfish narrow-minded groups the opportunity to pursue self-serving expansionist foreign policies. For classical realists, interna@onal poli@cal is evil: bad things happen because the people making foreign policy are some@mes bad. State behaviour can be understood as having ra@onal micrcofounda@ons, aXer having taken costs and benefits of different ac@on into account. Is P. Donal J. Trump a realist? On 27 April 2016, he gave his first foreign policy speech as candidate for president. He said that he would lead in an era of “American first” foreign policies to improve the US global posi@on by renego@a@ng unfavourable trade agreement, withdrawing from binding int trea@es and taking steps to curb/limit the growth of China. At first glance, Trump’s foreign policy appears to be an offensive structural realism. The US primary interest should be preven@ng the rise of a peer compe@tor, not trying to achieve an una^ainable (irraggiungibile) global hegemony. Thus, it should only act as a balancer of last resort. However, with the US involvement in Iraq and Syria, Trump’s administra@on appears to be viola@ng the principle of sophis@cated power maximisa@on that drives offensive structural realism. Neoclassical realism’s focus on the domes@c “transmission belt”, suggest that some aspects of American social, economic and poli@cal experience are likely to block the project of “American First”. If the US cannot decide its goals or select appropriate strategies, good result are unlikely to follow. Neorealism suggests that systemic pressures will push states to behave in certain ways, but they are free to ignore the signals and behave as they wish. The theory does not suggest that states will always behave wisely, only that they will pay a big price if they do not.
NEOREALISM
In 1979, Kenneth Waltz argued that systems are composed of a structure and their interac@ng units. Poli@cal structures have 3 elements: an ordering principle (anarchic or hierarchical), the character of the units/states (func@onally alike or differen@ated) and the distribu@on of capabili@es (mul@polar or bipolar systems). Two elements of the structure of the int systems are said to be constant: the lack of an overarching authority means that its ordering principle is anarchy, and the principle of self-help means that all of the states remain func@onally alike. Contrary to neoclassical realism, neorealism excludes the internal make-up of different states when thinking about their foreign policy choices, and Waltz’s theory is not based on leaders’ mo@va@on and state characteris@c as causal variables for interna@onal outcomes. In addi@on, classical realism suggested that the state strategies are selected ra@onally, while neorealism states that state behaviour can be a product of compe@@on among them or the can be the product of socialisa@on: states can decide to follow forms because they calculate it is to their advantage or because the norm become internalised. Waltz’s purpose is to explain why similarly structured interna@onal systems all seems to be characterised by similar outcomes, even though their units have different domes@c poli@cal arrangements. A system can be said to exist when:
- a set of units is interconnected so that changes in some elements or their rela@ons produce changes in
other parts of the system, and
- The en@re system exhibits proper@es and behaviours that are different from those parts
Because systems are genera@ve, the interna@onal system is characterised by complex nonlinear rela@onship and unintended consequences. Neorealists see interna@onal poli@cal as tragic, rather that as being driven by the aggressive behaviour of revisionist states. Waltz states that:
- mul@polar systems will be less stable that bipolar outcomes; - that the interdependence will be lower in bipolarity that mul@polarity; - Hegemony by any single state is unlikely or even impossible Neorealism’s decline in the 1990s was amplified by interna@onal events such as the USSR’s voluntary retrenchment/cost-cueng and its subsequent end, the con@nua@on of Western European integra@on in the absent of US-USSR compe@@on, the wave of democra@sa@on and economic liberalisa@on, all made realism seem outdated, un@l 9/11 a^acks, when poli@cal realism enjoyed a resurgence. There are 4 more contemporary stands of poli@cal realism: rise and fall realism, neoclassical realism, defensive structural realism and offensive structural realism. All 4 take the view that IR are characterised by an endless succession of wars. They are differen@ated on the sources of state preferences. DEFENSIVE STRUCTURAL REALISM It developed out of neorealism but is dis@nct from it. It shares neorealism’s minimal assump@ons about state mo@va@ons, sugges@ng that state seek security in an anarchic int system and the main threat of their well-being comes from other states. 3 differences between Neorealism (NR) and Defensive Structural Realism (DSR):
- NR allowed for micrcofounda@ons to explain state behaviour, while DSR relies on ra@onal choice
- DSR adds the offence-defence balance as a variable, arguing that prevailing technologies or geographical circumstances oXer favour defence and power is hard to project at a distance.
- Combining ra@onality and an offence-defence balance that favours defence, DSR predict that states should support the status quo. A variant of DSR is Stephen Walt’s “balance of threat” theory. According to him “in anarchy, states form alliances to protect themselves”. He suggests that states es@mates threats posed by other states by their rela@ve power, proximity and inten@on and offence-defence balance. Because balancing is pervasive, he concludes that revisionist and aggressive behaviour is self defea@ng. DSR, to explain how armed conflict arises in the fist place, must either appeal to domes@c-level factors or argue that extreme security dilemma dynamic make states behave as if they were revisions.
[unbalanced mul@polarity’s war-proneness -> balanced mul@polarity -> bipolarity’s peacefulness] RISE AND FALL REALISM (R&F) It is an alterna@ve to the balance of power theories that dominated IR during the 1950s. AFK Organski’s “World Poli@cs” of 1958, challenged the popular belief that power parity is a virtue in IR by insis@ng that throughout history “world pease has coincided with period of unchallenged supremacy of power, whereas the period of approximate balance have been the periods of war”. He claims that hegemony is the founda@on of peace , while balance is associated with war. War between major powers is least likely when the int system is dominate by a single state and when there is an absence of rising challengers figh@ng for system leadership. The dominant state is able to shape the rules of int system in order to sa@sfy its selfish interests. Stability is a product of this hegemonic order, as states that are dissa@sfied with the status quo lack the capabili@es to change it. When 2 or more states approach power parity, the declining hegemony may calculate the need for preven@ve war in order to preserve its status as the world’s top power. Rise and fall realism represents the course of human history as the successive rise and fall of great powers. What did cause the states to grow at different rates and at different @mes? In contrast to neorealism, R&F realists contend that differen@al growth rates are caused by internal processes such as @ming of industrialisa@on, type of economic system, military innova@on… Since these dynamics are different among states, they tend to rise and fall in rela@on to one another. NEOCLASSICAL REALISM What states do depends on influences located at the domes@c level of analysis. It employs a “transmission belt” approach to foreign policy illustra@ng how systemic pressures are filtered through variables at the unit level to produce specific foreign policy decisions. Distribu@on of capabili@es is a good star@ng point for the analysis of state behaviour, but they contend that the int system rarely provides states with clear informa@on on which to base foreign policy decision. Threats are not easily iden@fiable and there are numerous policy op@ons available. Given these challenges, variables at the unit level oXen intervene between systemic threats and state behaviour to determine the direc@on of a state’s foreign economic and military policy. How a state reacts is shaped by the percep@ons of its leaders, bureaucracy and society. Randall Schneller ’s theory of “under-balancing” explains how neoclassical realists incorporate unit-level variables into theories of foreing policy. He starts from the structural realist posi@on that the state behaviour is driven by the rela@ve distribu@on of material power in the int system. How states choose to read to threats depends on the degree to which they embody structural realism’s unitary actor assump@on.
- when systemic pressures are transmi^ed through societal unified states, decision makers find it more
easier to recognise threats
- When states are fragmented, leader find it difficult to come to an agreement to deal with the threat (i.e.
France and UK were fragmented before IIWW, and that’s why they both under-reacted to the threat posed by a rising Germany) REALISMS AND THE RISE OF CHINA
- Offensive Structural and R&F realists share a pessimis@c view of the consequences of China’s rise for
global security
- OSR predicts a future of intense security compe@@on. If China’s economy and power con@nues to grow it is likely to assert greater control in Asia and will invest more in military capabili@es in order to become the predominant power in the region. Nevertheless, China’s neighbours and the US will not sit and watch, but fearing for their security they will join in a balancing coali@on to counter China’s rise. A compe@@on between China and the America-led coali@on is likely to result, with the US pursuing aggressive policies in an a^empt to remain the world0s only regional hegemon.
- R&F realists suggest that when a rising challenger and a declining hegemony approach power parity, a war is likely to occur. US is unlikely to peacefully cede to China its posi@on atop the int system, but US is
ready to fight to maintain its hegemony. likewise, as China’s power increase, it’s likely to demand greater share of interna@onal spoils. A catastrophic war depend on numerous factors: china must rise in rela@on to the US and china’s growth can end before become as powerful as the US. American and Chinese status quo may change. American may be open to taking preven@ve ac@on to stop the rise of China if they believe in a big decline. Similarly, Chinese leaders are likely to evaluate the status quo unfavourable if they deem that the policies and ac@ons of the US limit their ability to achieve benefit in line with their growth. In addi@on, some factors can moderate security compe@@on providing a peaceful transi@on. I.e. transi@on is likely to be peaceful when both side posses nuclear weapons
- Defensive S tructural realists are op@mis@c about peaceful rela@ons between China and USA
- DSR predicts that as China con@nue to rise, it will devote more of its resources to military technology and capabili@es. Although these developments could spark a security dilemma leading to arms racing and war, defensive realists stress that measures can be take by China to other states that these investments are meant for security purposes alone. DSR have argued that the US should accommodate China’s rise in order to promote peaceful rela@ons between the two. They are not saying that a war is impossible!
- Neoclassical realists believe in any poten@al outcome, from mutual accommoda@on to war.
- NC realists agree that China, its neighbours and the US act in the future will be determined by the domes@c-level factor that shape how states interpret systemic constraints. If American and Asian official perceive China’s growth to be threatening, they are more likely to adopt aggressive containment strategies than they are if they view China to have benign inten@ons. Percep@ons are based on factors, such as past behaviours. CHAPTER 2 - LIBERALISM CHAPTER 3 - CONSTRUCTIVISM
PART 2 - KEY CONCEPTS
CHAPTER 17 - DEVELOPMENT
Development, poverty and security are connected. The majority of armed conflict today occurs in developing countries, and when interna@onal organisa@ons seek to reduce poverty they rely on indicators related to human security, such as health care, educa@on and employment. The rela@onship between development and security has reached the status of “common sense” that goes beyond the individual level, with “underdevelopment” described as a threat to the security of states and interna@onal order. WHAT IS DEVELOPMENT? In its broadest sense consist of 2 main elements.
- First, it is associated with change from one form to another.
- Second, view development in term of improvement.
The process of change is considered part of a trajectory towards a posi@ve end goal. Development is a universal process of change, and all socie;es are in a constant state of development. Development in interna@onal rela@ons focuses on a^empts to improve the lives of people living in poor countries. Development success is therefore associated with economic growth, measured in GDP per capita. However, economic growth alone does not guarantee improvements across health, educa@on or inequality. Since the 1990s the emphasis has shiXed from economic growth to “poverty reduc@on”. The people living below the extreme poverty threshold reduced from 2012 to 2013, especially in India and China, but poor people s@ll remain in sub-Saharan Africa.
The terms was coined in 1989 but the principles had underpinned structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) since the early 1980s. During the 1980s and 90s, most low-income states did not experience significant economic growth (even la@n America). In states with low income per capita and poor human development outcomes, the nega@ve impacts of priva@sa@on, liberalisa@on and deregula@on were oXen leX by the poorest in society. Cueng food subsidies led to higher prices and fuelled malnutri@on. Pressure to reduce government spending oXen led to cuts in welfare and the public services. Debt con@nued to account for a high propor@on of state expenditure. However, there were some beneficiaries from structural adjustment and the WC policies. Elites able to influence the course of priva@sa@on, liberalisa@on and deregula@on were in a posi@on to offer benefits and minimise danger. Priva;sa;on saw sta@oned enterprises sold to cronies, family member and important supporters of the poli@cal regime, failing to deliver on the promise of more effec@ve and efficient industry and services. There was also a failure of the benefits of liberalisa;on to “trickle down” through society, leading to greater inequality. By the way, during this period, some states were able to develop: the “Asian Tiger” economies of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea. This did rest upon a degree of state control in economic reforms that was incompa@ble with the WC. WHY DOES DEVELOPMENT MATTER FOR SECURITY? The UN Human Development Index (HDI) placed 44 countries in the “low income development” category, 36 of these were in Africa and 6 were experiencing or emerging from period of civil wars or armed conflicts (2015). Many of these least developed countries have become a source of security threats to their ci@zens and neighbours. In terms of interna@onal security, this is because countries with low levels of development lack capacity to control their border and to govern and secure their territory. This can be exacerbate by difficult terrain (deserts, mountains) or by lack of infrastructures. Poor territorial control can provide opportuni@es for trafficking drugs, weapons and people. An exploita@on of these opportuni@es allows armed groups to support their ac@vi@es within and outside their home state. Since the 1990s, civil society organisa@ons have reached and documented the links between natural resources, violent conflict and corrup@on. An example is the “ Blood diamonds ” campaign: valuable resources that played in armed conflict and HR abuses from Sierra Leone and Cote D’Ivore in West Africa to Angola and Zimbabwe in southern Africa. Other commodi@es present different security challenges. For example, efforts to reduce poppy growth and opium produc@on in Afghanistan since the US interven@on in 2001 have been unsuccessful. Poppy growing , which provides raw material for produc@on of opium and heroin, tends to be produced in areas where security deteriorates, such as the case of Taliban in Afghanistan. The trafficking of Afghan opiates is harmful in the des@na@on country but also in those of origin and transit. There is a strong link between drug trafficking and the spread of crime, corrup@on, HIV infec@on and drug abuse, which in turn has serious implica@ons for the legal and economic stability. These issues have a devasta@ng security impact on individuals, on health security, personal security (crime) and compromising state security by strengthening armed groups. This may include corrupt state officials, security force members and money laundering networks. Frustra@on can make ci@zens more recep@ve to calls to rebel against their governments. This is a concern in states where the costs and benefits of development have been distributed in ways that create or worsen inequality. Frances Stewart used the term “ horizontal inequali;es ” to describe these differences in opportuni@es, experiences and en@tlements that stem from membership of an iden@ty group. This may be associated with a specific ethnic, religious or linguis@c group that reflects a cultural bond. Similarly, Gurr’s study iden@fied frustra@on as a key element in explaining violent rebellion. This foresta@on stems from gaps between the expecta@ons individuals have of what they can achieve and their ability to meet this expecta@ons. Expecta@ons is an elas@c concept, crea@ng the poten@al for gaps to widen as a result of policy change or shiXs outside the control of the government, such as falling commodity prices or refugee flows.
Stewart recommends that states experiencing horizontal inequali@es should tackle them directly through development policies, including forms of affirma@ve ac@on, even if this means sacrificing economic efficiency. This is a difficult balance to achieve: any new approach generates change, which may be raised by those benefi@ng from the status quo. It may also cause new frustra@ons by widening the gap between expecta@on and capabili@es claimed by other groups in society. An example are the case of Rwanda and Sri Lanka, where a^empts to redress historical discrimina@on fuelled inter-group tensions. Minority groups in the 2 states, the Tutsi and the Tamils, had been privileged during the colonial rule, gaining dispropor@onate access to educa@on and be^er work posi@ons. On independence na@onalist movements sought to redress this balance by favouring members of the majority Hutu and Sinhalese groups, but in doing so they generated new inequali@es, genera@ng new rebellions, which led to the civil wars in both cases and in Rwanda to genocide in 1994. Human development is mul@dimensional: it addresses the 7 dimensions of human security outlined by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and reflect a focus on the needs of individuals. Human security, human development and needs are connected. For individuals to feel secure they need to be able to meet their basic needs. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (1962) iden@fies a founda@on of basic physiological need associated with survival (water, food, air..) there are prerequisite for the achievement of higher level of needs. The second level iden@fies safety and security needs (physical safety, well being, good health). The third level, is love and belonging, related to community security. However his hierarchy offers 3 further levels, all connected with the fulfilment of individual poten@al: esteem; self-actualisa@on; self- transcendence. MARGIN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report focused on “Conflict security and development”, arguing that conflicts are s@ll ongoing even if they are much less than before, and so there are s@ll people in areas affected by fragility and violence. Development-focused acto r in NGOs , governments and interna@onal organisa@on recognise the need for basic physical security in order to pursue development programmes. For ex. there is a li^le sense in building schools and health clinics in areas where armed groups rou@nely abduct children to support their ac@vi@es. If people cannot move around safely, the construc@on of such services can become difficult and it also present risks for those a^emp@ng to access them. Development and security actors therefore oXen find themselves working in the same conflict-affected environments, among communi@es who feel ignored by their governments. They can also find themselves working towards connected goals: improve rela@onships between states and ci@zens. States with low levels of development and high dissa@sfac@on, oXen experiencing violent conflict, can provide safe havens for armed groups with global ambi@ons. Building and sustaining peace within and between states is therefore linked to the pursuit of development, par@cularly in countries caught in cycles of conflicts such as those in Africa. This has been seen by some as Human security dimension (UNDP) Examples of development solutions Level of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs Economic Personal Environmental Political Community Health Food Generation of remunerated employment Train and support security forces and justice system; Education and services to tackle domestic and other abuse Tackle pollution; protect common resources HR promotion; capacity building for parliaments and media; Protect minorities rights; education to promote tolerance Vaccinations; extend health system coverage; hygiene education Support transport links and infrastructures Safe and security Safety and security Physiological Safety and security Love and Belonging Safety and security Physiological
vic@ms with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the poli@cal demands of the perpetrators. (Wardlaw 1983) US department of state defini@on (2001): premeditated, poli@cally mo@vated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subna@onal groups or clandes@ne agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The la^er defini@on are concerned with the inten@on to have an effect on an audience that is larger that the group actually targeted. Terrorism works through fear, indeed it aims at inducing fear in a larger popula@on than that targeted, that’s why it a^racts so much a^en@on. State and sub state terror Wardlaw defini@on is concerned with the ac@ons of states against their own popula@on, whereas the US defini@on is concerned with sub-state actors, even if they may be supported or sponsored by a state. State terrorism is far more widespread in its effects, both in terms of direct casual@es and in the inducing of fear. Example of serious state terrorism: purges of Stalin in the 1930s and Mao’s China in the 1950s, also colonial powers used terror to maintain control over the colonies and especially during the period of decolonisa@on during the 1960s-70s. Example of sub-state terrorism: in the period of violent in norther Ireland, the Bri@sh government regarded the IRA as a terrorist organisa@on seeking to achieve a united Ireland by a sustained campaign of violence. However, poli@cal supporters of Irish unity, both in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, saw the IRA volunteers as freedom fighters trying to liberate Northern Ireland from Bri@sh rule. Sub state terrorism can originate in very different socie@es and with variable mo@va@ons. Even if categorisa@on is not easy, terrorism can be loosely divided into 2 orienta@ons:
- Revolu@onary terrorism: seeks change in a state or in society. It might be based on a poli@cal ideology of
a radical persuasion that may be either leX or right-wing in nature or might be based on religious commitment. It aims for fundamental change. For example al-Qaida and ISIS movements combine revolu@onary change with religious belief.
- The other form: seeks par@cular change for an iden@fiable community. Rarely has Interna@onal
ambi@ons and it is frequently separa@st in nature but may gave elements of revolu@onary poli@cs embedded in its thought: an example is ETA in Spain and the LTTE Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. Groups of this nature arise in response to poli@cal change that had damaged the prospects of the community from which they arise. Responding to terrorsim 3 approaches to responding to sub-state terrorism:
- counterterrorism rooted in policing, intelligence and security: paramilitary groups are iden@fied and taken into custody before they can carry out a^acks or if this fails then those responsible for a^acks are detected, detained and brought to jus@ce
- More openly military and involves direct military ac@on against paramilitary organisa@ons
- Mo@va@ons of terrorist groups and the environment from which they draw support: it’s rooted in the idea that most paramilitary groups have evolved and are opera@ng whiten a much wider context. They do not exist in isola@on but depend for support on a sector of a par@cular society that share their aims and approves of their methods. There are condi@ons in which nego@a@ons with paramilitary leaders become possible, oXen through a mediator. Most responses to terrorist campaign u@lise a combina@on of these methods. Many of leX-wing revolu@onaries in 1970s in Europe, including Brigate Rosse in Italy, believed that their violent ac@ons would provoke an uprising of the masses leading to a working class revolu@on. Even so, their campaigns did nothing to persuade the authori@es to make any changes in wage or working condi@ons. They authori@es did not see them as presaging a revolu@on. Instead, the response was of intelligence-gathering, coupled with some degree of increased security for poten@al targets, such as senior poli@cians.
In the Northern Ireland conflict, the Bri@sh authori@es adopted all 3 approaches to counterterrorism: intense policing and intelligence-gathering, the adop@on of new legal regula@ons, including courts without juries and internment without trial. The 9/11 response and the War on Terror Improved homeland defence with the main focus on the military. Major military campaigns were mounted against presumed state sponsors of the Al-Qaida movement in Afghanistan and Iraq, leading to regime termina@on in both cases, and military opera@ons were undertaken also in other countries, including Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. Al-Qaida movements has its origins among the Islamist paramilitaries who went to Afghanistan in the 80s to assist mujahideen in ous@ng the Soviet occupying forces. Aided by the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) and CIA, the resistance was successful in 1988 when the soviet troops competed their withdrawals. The key individuals of Al-Qaida being Osama Bin laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri in Saudi Arabia. The movement evolved into a transna@onal revolu@onary movement rooted in an extreme version of Islam that owed much to the thinking of the Egyp@an Said Qutb (Muslim Brothers), exerted in 1966. The 2 aims of the 9/11 a^acks were both to demonstrate to the world the capabili@es of Al-Qaida and to trap US in a protracted guerrilla war in Afghanistan, where the movement had re-established itself in support of the Islamist Taliban Movement. The aim was to wear down US forces like the soviet troops a decade before, but US used a combina@on of air power, special forces and the rearming of the Afghan Northern Alliance to defeat the Taliban sponsors of Al-Qaida. AXer the apparent success in Afghanistan in 202, the Bush administra@on developed the war on terror to encompass pre-emp@ve military ac@on against what it called an “axis of evil” of state believed to be developing weapons of mass destruc@on and sponsoring terrorism (Iraq, Iran, North Korea). Eight years aXer the termina@on of Saddam Hussein regime, thousand of people had died. The US forces were unable to contain the violence and the insurgent were able to develop techniques at a rate at least as fast as they could be countered. By 2009, US and its coali@on had achieved sufficient control in Iraq for the incoming Obama administra@on to announce a withdrawal. Al-Qaida movement which had dispersed to north-west Pakistan was much diminished and Osama Bin laden was killed in 2011. In that year the Arab Awakening started in Tunisia spread to Egypt, and then Syria. A civil war followed including strong elect of extreme Islamist paramilitary groups opposing Assad regime, some of them were linked to what remained of al-Qaida and had also strong links with Islamist groups in Yemen, Somalia and Nigeria. In 2011, NATO forces helped rebels terminate Gaddafi regime in Libya but the result was an insecure and failing state with a plethora of compe@ng mili@as. To complicate the ma^ers s@ll further, following the US withdrawal from Iraq, the previous al-Qaida elements in the country reformed and linked with other groups in Syria to form what become known as islamic state in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Obama decision to withdraw from Iraq was reversed and in 2014 a coali@on of western states was formed to defeat ISIS by using air power. By 2017 ISIS had lost 50 000 of its supporters and lots of its territory appearing to be defeated, but a suspicion that other movements would emerge in parallel remained. Trends in terrorism
- insurgency: prac@ce of employing regime termina@on as a major response to terrorism produced a
complex reac@on that mixes terrorism and insurgency. (Evolved in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya)
- Interna@onalism: in the first 6 years of war of terror, al-Qaida and its affiliates were able to carry out
a^acks in Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, UK, Yemen, France, Italy, Singapore and US. The same didi ISIS since 2015.
- Suicide terrorism: made by people with deep poli@cal or ethnic mo@ves, religious mo@va@on (especially
within Islam)
- Speed of learning: paramilitary groups forced to lead in order to survive and thrive (spread of tac@cs,
explosive devices, produc@on of explosively)
Most terrorist incidents have involved the killing of innocent people. Thus, here the “incident management” has a different meaning, referring to emergency response designated to help the wounded. The main measures of coutneterrorism concern efforts to curb the ability of terrorists to conduct a^acks (defensive security measures designated to protect poten@al targets and offensive measures intended to reduce terrorist capabili@es) Defence
- Defensive measures aim at the protec@on of individuals sites (buildings, military bases, embassies) and government facili@es, but the la^er have oXen more security at each site because the security also serves for other purposes. Short term protec@on is provided to important events such as inaugura@ons or major sport events.
- Second level of defensive measures is to provide security to enter systems. Very important is the avia@on, which provide the greater tole in counterterrorism. The mobility of airliners will always make them terrorist targets.
- General level: protec@on of an en@re country. Keep terrorist outside the borders. This implies substan@al increase in expenditure to defend the territory. However the geographic and other circumstances of each country make homeland security task different for each. For EU countries, free cross border movement with EU has made it more difficult for states to approach homeland security. Eu countries related the issue of border control with restric@ons on immigra@on. The main aim of defensive countermeasures is to stop an a^empted terrorist a^ack or deter terrorist from a^acking. Terorrist prepara@on is long and include study and surveillance of the target. We can say that the defences complicate their planning, slowing them down. More @me implies that it’s increase the chance that they may be caught. Defensive measures have limita@ons: expensive (such as machine that screen lagguage), produce inefficiencies on people being protected such as diplomats in fortress embassies. Moreover, not everything can be protected, but everything can be a target. Terrorists have on their side that they all chose where to a^ack. Another limita@on is the inherent openness of free, Western choices: easy to find cross in public places, here is very simple to kill people (Nice, Berlin and London) Going on the offensive A successful countermeasure saves from a^ack whatever target is being protected. A successful offensive opera@on that puts a terrorist cell out of business prevents it from a^acking. These measures are complementary to defensive measures. The tools used:
- diplomacy: engage in the help of other governments to obtain coopera@on on specific cases.
counterterrorist diplomacy can be mul@lateral or bilateral. The first is is most useful for crea@ng a worldwide climate that recognises terrorism as a shared problem. It uses interna@onal conven@ons on terorrism and establish rules on such ma^ers as jurisdic@on. However, the most prac@cal is the bilateral one. Individual terrorist cases typically involve only 2 or 3 states at a @me, and the handling of secret material is easier between a few states.
- Suppor@ng financial control in the form of freezing terrorist assets. However the financial control will be
limited because the money associated with terrorist ac@vity flows through channels that are hard to detect.
- Intelligence : hope that will uncover for the next terrorist plot, provide a more strategic sense of terrorrist
threats (which groups, which areas), give assistance to all the other tools, collec@on an analysis of informa@on on terorrist organisa@on (names, loca@ons of terrorist cells) Law enforcement and military force The issue is whether the problem would be considered one of “crime” or “war”.
Terrorist clearly commit crimes, while their poli@cal objec@ve give them something in common with warfare and dis@nguish their ac@ons from non-poli@cal crimes. Criminal jus@ce and military services play roles in counterterrorism. Arres@ng suspected terrorists, can prevent further a^acks because it can rise the fear to be caught. The problem is that terrorist move across interna@onal borders, and the jurisdic@on is different, complica@ng the applica@on of criminal jus@ce. (i.e. Problem over applica@on of death penalty) Some have looked at the Interna@onal Criminal Court as a place to prosecute interna@onal terrorists. But s@ll there is the problem of dis@nguish them from ordinary crimes that would be tried in na@onal courts. Use of military force for counterterrorism was the US-Led interven@on in Afghanistan against the Taliban (affiliated to Al-Qaida) following al-qaida a^acks in US of 2011. Another example was a military force against the mini-state caliphate that ISIS established in Syria and Iraq in 2004. A military strike can be even more drama@c demonstra@on of resolve that a prosecu@on. Issues and choices The treatment of suspected terrorist has raised many controversies concerning human rights and the issue that even the guilty should be treated humanely. Issues related the handling of suspected terrorist and how they are treated in jail or that they went to jain without a fair trial. Some countries can torture prisoners in order to receive informa@on, however torture is illegal for everyone. The assassina@on of individual terrorist leader (targeted killings) can prevent terrorist a^acks. The killing of Bin laden (al-Qaida leader) in 2011 was generally accepted as a legi@mate counterterrorist measure. However the successful raid highlighted limita@ons of this type of use of military force because the rela@onship between US and Pakistan deteriorated quickly, where Pakistani considered the raid a viola@on of soveregnity. CHAPTER 28 - COUNTERINSURGENCY CHAPTER 32 - MIGRATION AND REFUGEES (Week 5 - lesson 2) Migra@on has gained prominence on the int agenda because of its increasing scale and the consequences such movements have for Interna@onal affairs. The increase of popula@on movement can be a^ributed to:
- the ubiquitous nature of state control makes any int movement a ma^er of concern at least 2 or more states
- The world’s popula@on is s@ll growing
- Globalisa@on has brought about a revolu@on in communica@ons and transporta@on that has made people ware of vastly differing condi@ons and opportuni@es
- Turmoils can encourage people to more or escape The European refugee crisis In 2015-16 Europe experience mass migra@on (data from UNHCR), most crossing from Turkey or Greece and by sea from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and North Africa. In 2016 the number fella dyer the deal between Turkey and EU for Turkey to take back migrants. According to the interna@onal organisa@on for migra@on (IOM) the number of migrants grew in the second half of the 20th century, among which there are also million of refugees (those fleeing persecu@on). Refugee remind us that not only are some states not doing their job by protec@ng their people but they can also cons@tute threats to the human security of their own popula@on. Migra@on can cons@tute a threat to the security of states, socie@es and individuals. However, it can be economically beneficial to both sending and receiving countries and for the migrated sending countries can benefit hugely from remi^ances that migrants send home, and from the easing of pressure on employment, housing and other social facili@es. The receiving country benefit from availability of labour at lower cost.
Pales@nians into the neighbouring Arab states in 1948, when Israel was created; the migra@on of East Pakistanis into India to escape the Pakistan army in the 1970s; the moment of the Afghans to Pakistan in the wake of Soviet invasion in the 1980s. The receiving state will try to bring about a change in the situa@on of the sending country government that led to the exodus, or failing that, try to bring about a change of government there. This tends to lead to some sort of conflict between the sending and receiving state. OXen, the receiving states get involved in the conflict in the sending state, some@mes deploying their own armed forces. Events in Britain have illustrated that it does not take a large number of refugees to have a nega@ve impact. Britain gave refugee to a number of high-profile charisma@c Islamist clerics when they sought to escape repressive Middle East regime. Among them there were: Sheik Omar Bakhri Mohammed, who founded the Islamist student movement Al Mohajiroun and Bri@sh Muslim youth; Abu Hamza, the Afghan war veteran who converted Finsbury Park Mosque into a heaven for Islamists and a recruitment centre for al-Qaida. These extremist clerics helped radicalise Manu young Bri@sh Muslims, recruited and sent Bri@sh Muslims to fight in Bosnia and Chechnya. In the aXermath of 9/11 a^en@on in the West has focused on the poten@al security threat from some among their Muslim ci@zens of immigrant origin. But a^acks by Islamist based in the West go back to the a^ack on the US World Trade Centre in 1993 and the bombing campaign by Islamist Algerians on the Paris Metro in 1995. Most of those involve in the 9/11 were temporary migrants. Some of those involved in the Madrid bombing were Islamist resident of the countries that are now accused of a^acking. This creates suspicion about en@re communi@es and impacts upon social cohesion within these countries. The rela@onship between migra@on and terrorism were made in the context of the European Refugee Crisis of 2015-16. A major fear was that among them arriving in Europe, were members of the Islamic State (IS) groups with the purpose of carrying out terrorist a^acks. MIGRATION AND FOREIGN POLICY Immigrant or ethnic minority communi@es can play a significant role in world poli@cs. Their con@nued poli@cal involvement in states in which they no longer live, presents a serious challenge to the sovereignty of that state. Migrant communi@es tend to maintain connec@on with their home countries, they become involved in poli@cal ac@vi@es targeted at their home country. They will use all means at their disposal to influence events at home. Taking advantage of their status, being outside their home country and not subjected to its jurisdic@on, the can join poli@cal groups proscribed in the home country, publicise the agendas and demands of these banned groups and become the voice of a suppressed opposi@on. But If the migrant communi@es are ac@ng within the laws of the host state, there maybe li^le the host government can legally do to restrict their ac@vi@es. The consequence is the deteriora@on in the rela@onship between the host and home states. The case of Sikh community in the UK, US and Canada is a good example. The Sikh popula@on was influenced by the poli@cs of the Punjab and the demand for independence from India in the 1980s. Sikh communi@es abroad contributed significantly to the violence in the Punjab, which targeted Indian security forces and members of the Hindu community. Thy collected illegal transfer of funds to the Punjab for those caring out the secessionist movement in India. They also publicised the HR abuse of the Indian security forces. The diaspora Sikhs declared an independent state of Khalistan, established a government in exile in London and began issuing passports and banknotes for their new country. The Indian government tries to put pressure on Britain by ques@oning the UK gov on its provision of asylum and benefits to some Sikh refugees, and by trying to get the UK to restrict the ac@vi@es of the Khalistan Council. The Bri@sh gov was reluctant. The Indian gov then cancelled commercial orders for defence equipment with Bri@sh firms. In short, the ac@vity of the Sikh in the UK had the effect of damaging the long-standing and close rela@onship between Britain and India. The success of migrants to recruit their host governments and popula@ons to their cause in their home country depends also on the nature of the poli@cal system in the host country. The more open the system and the more suscep@ble to lobbying it is, the more likely it is that minority communi@es will succeed in geeng their concerns on the agenda. Migrant communi@es can also be used by their home country to pursue its aims vis-a-vis the host country. Host countries too will try to use their ethnic minori@es to achieve their own goals.
MIGRATION AND INTERNAL SECURITY
Migrants can turn homogeneous socie@es into mul@cultural ones by introducing ethically different people. Migrants threaten to undermine the popularity and strength of the na@on state. Na@on state is the dominant unit of social organisa@on across the globe. Their members are seen to share common history, language, religion that bind them into an integrated unit with a shared sense of na@onhood. Migrants clearly challenge tradi@onal no@ons of the meaning of na@onality and ci@zenship. Migrants and minority communi@es can be seen as bringing violence, instability but also can be perceived as an economic burden, also perceived to be criminal and carriers of diseases. The validity of the welfare state model in many countries, reliant on people’s taxes, is said to be threatened if the public begins to feel that their taxes are used to subsidise foreigners’ living expenses and health care, rather than taking care of those in need within the home society. Many western Eu countries took ac@ons against immigra@on. The 1990 Dublin Conven@on provided that an asylum seeker who has had his applica@on rejected in one Eu country cannot seek asylum elsewhere in the EU. Other direc@ves are in place in the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Migrants are received with hos@lity if they are perceived as a threat to the culture. This tends to happen when large numbers arrive in a short period of @me. Popula@on movement will con@nue. Since 1945, most of the world’s refugees originate from the developing world to richer countries but also within developing world itself. Thus there is no part of the globe that is untouched by migra@on. It would not be appropriate to conclude that the best policy for states would be to dras@cally restrict immigra@on. CHAPTER 34 - WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY (Week 6 - lesson 2) Introduc;on Since 2000, the UN SC has adopted a series of resolu@on focus on “Women, Peace and Security” (WPS) with the aim to overcome the historical exclusion of women and women’s rights from interna@onal approaches to peace and security. The first resolu@on was Resolu;on 1325 (2000) where women’s concerns and interests were acknowledged by the global community. The resolu@ons were the outcome of WPS’s ac@vism around the world, envisioning a change in approaches to int peace and security that would promote peaceful socie@es. Gender, war and Peace: the basis of the WPS agenda Gender determines our lives, it can structure rela@onships between different categories of people and different human ac@vi@es symbolically associated with masculinity or femininity. Our socie@es a^ribute specific traits, values and meaning to male and female iden@@es, construc@ng social differences on the basis of stereotyped ideas of masculinity and femininity. The “power of gender” shapes individuals, social, poli@cal and economic systems and in turn, those systems shape iden@@es and ins@tu@ons. In our social world, gender will determine our access to privilege and power, or to situa@ons of disadvantage and discrimina@on. The assump@on that our social world is gender-neutral misses the reality that it is structured in favour of par@cular ideas and hierarchies of masculinity. For example, the idea of war is premised on the expecta@ons of militarised masculini@es, and that men are naturally good soldiers and inclined to fight for their country, while women are seen as pacifist and not interested in par@cipa@ng in warfare. The WPS agenda established policy that aims to redress the ways that the power and privilege a^ached to masculinity has excluded women. The agenda evidences the need for gendered understanding and response to all aspects of security and peace. For women, this includes responses to the rights viola@ons that affect them during conflict, such as sexual violence, and to the barriers that prevent women’s par@cipa@on in post-war elec@ons. THE WPS AGENDA: GENEALOGY AND OVERALL APPROACH
KEY CHALLENGES AND CONTROVERSIES
1) S ecuri<sa<on of women’s rights On the 15th anniversary of Resolu@on 1325, the SC commissioned to review progress on its implementa@on. The problem is that women’s rights have had to fit with the mandate of the SC, rather that the council responding to the reali@es of the structural inequali@es in HR in women’s lives. 2) Gaps in implementa<on Since its adop@on, the WPS agenda has been characterised by glacial progress on implementa@on of the provisions and also a very few of the money invested have been spent for the promo@on of gender equality. The reasons are that: gaining entry as a “thema@c” concern, the WPS resolu@on are characterised by weak compliance where the SC “recommends” and “requests” rather that compels ac@ons. In addi@on, the WPS resolu@ons are considered to be “soX laws”, as they are not adopted under the SC’s Chapter VII enforcement provisions. For human rights trea@es, such as CEDAW, are considered “hard law” because their adop@on is accompanied by the establishment of commi^ees that monitor their enforcement. To address the implementa@on deficit, mul@ple accountability strategies have been proposed: request by the SC for annual reports from the UN Secretary-General; the adop@on of a “comprehensive Set of Indicators” that measure compliance to the resolu@on by UN agencies and member states; the adop@on of a 7-point ac@on plan on women’s par@cipa@on in peace building, which a^empts to enforce compliance of the UN system with the WPS agenda. The UN Secretary-General has called for member states to adopt “Na@onal Ac@on Plans on women, peace and security” (NAPs-WPS 2002). 3) Conflict related sexual violence Since the 1990s, conflict related-sexual violence are recognised as a crime. In many armed conflicts, sexual violence is evidenced to occur on a systemic and strategic basis: war;me rape is used as a “weapon of war” by armed groups because of the gendered meanings a^ached to sexual violence (in Yugoslavia, women were held in sexual enslavement, with forced pregnancies serving a strategy of ethnic cleansing). The SC’s engagement with sexual violence through the adop@on of 4 WPS resolu@ons focused on this issue prompted a significant shiX. Sexual violence “ used as tac<c of wa r” has been regarded as a crime by the UNSC in Resolu@on 1820 (2008). This, in prac@ce, means that the SC’s concern is invoked only when armed groups are evidenced to employ sexual violence as a “weapon of war”. CEDAW AND General Recommenda;on No. 30
- it is the only UN HR treaty that is specifically focused on women’s rights, while all other HR trea@es rackle
discrimina@on, CEDAW was the first to dis@nctly define it
- It is legally binding on state par@es that have ra@fies it. States par@es are held accountable to the
conven@on by repor@ng even 4 years to the CEDAW Commi^ee ()a panel if independent experts, who conduct monitoring and provide recommenda@ons
- It must be implemented in conflict and in post-war contexts. CEDAW Commi^ee has the power to adopt
General Recommenda@ons to provide addi@onal guidance to states on implementa@on of the conven@on. In 2013, it adopted “General recommenda@on No. 30” (GR30) on women in conflict preven@on, conflict and post-conflict situa@on. CHAPTER 35 - ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE (Week 8 - lesson 2) CHAPTER 36 - HEALTH (Week 5 - lesson 1) In march 2014, the WTO announced an outbreak of Ebola in the West Africa state of Guinea. It had spread to Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria. By June 2014, the aid agency Medecins sans fron@ers (MSN), warned
that the outbreak was out of control. Some western aid workers and nurses contracted the disease having helped to treat Ebola pa@ents. It was against this background that the UNSC passed Resolu@on 2177, considering the outbreak a “threat to interna@onal peace and security”. A disease had become the most pressing interna@onal security issue on the planet and must be taken into account that people on this planet is at greater risk, on a daily basis, from disease and other health threats than from war or terrorism. Diseases such as HIV, polio, malaria, SARS, bird flu, Zika, but also non-communicable disease such as tobacco-related illnesses and cardiovascular disease kill millions of people each year. Is global health a security issue? For many decades health and security have been limited linked and unidirec<onal because conflicts have caused health problems. However, in the 19th century, as interna@onal trade increased, so did the risk of infec@ous disease being brought into Europe from elsewhere. Disease was viewed as an exogenous threat to the op@mum func@oning of states, which had to be dealt with by means of int coopera@on. Thus the origins of int coopera;on of public health lie in the security concerns of Europe in the 19th. Soon this rela@onship disappeared because health became a human right issue and not a security issue anymore, which resulted in the establishment of WHO in 1948 and the WHO’s “Health for All” ini@a@ve of 1970s. In addi@on, the growing percep@on that disease could be overcame through the use of an@bio@cs and the fell of number of death in the West, made clear that health was not a security issue, at least for Western countries where living condi@ons were be^er. Therefore, global health became for the West less of a security concern than one of development. By the 1990s this has changed again. Disease started to travel faster thanks to the globalisa@on and the increased movement of goods and people. THE EMERGENCE OF HEALTH AS A NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUE (5 ISSUES)
- spread of new infecSous disease
The impact of diseases (HIV, SARS, HPAI, Ebola, Zika) have/had the poten@al to be global in nature. This phenomenon may be a by-product of the speed of movement of goods and people, and also that changes are occurring in the microbial world that are independent of these social forces. Modern biology is leading to the crea@on of new pathogens in laboratories. The developments triggered concerns in the security community because:
- the spread of these diseases could pose a direct threat to the health of all world popula@on
- a pandemic may cause social disrup@on and threaten the effec@ve func@oning of a state. Confidence in the state may be reduce if it cannot provide a basic level of protec@on against disease; social inequali@es may be highlighted as the rich obtain access to be^er health care, poten@ally leading to public disorder; violence and disorder mat appear if the authori@es become unable to cope. The stability of states may be at risk and weak state may fail because infec@on disease can prove a great stress on a state.
- a pandemic may contribute to economic decline by forcing governments to invest in health and reducing produc@vity due to the loss of skilled personnel (It can make the already poor poorer)
- The conSnued growth of HIV
HIV is the virus while AIDS is the health condi@on that eventually causes death. HIV pandemic has been iden@fied as a security issue by the UNSC in resolu@on 1308. AIDS appeared to pose economic problems because its full effects are postponed as those infected only become ill gradually. Economic decline may increase income inequali@es and poverty
- Bioterrorism
idea of using biological agents to cause disease as a weapon of war. In 1984 followers of Rajneesh Bhagwan tried to use salmonella to incapacitate voters in Oregon and aXer the 09/11, a series of le^ers were sent to US government officials containing anthrax spores, infec@ng and killing people.
