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Discourse as action

Speech act theory

Lesson 05

6 March 2017

Discourse as action

Communication is performative , it’s action!

All language is performative in some way!

A key element in the analysis of written and spoken discourse is purpose (remember the CPPR framework?). This means that we use language as a tool to perform actions (e.g. to obtain information, conduct relationships, express our feelings, get things done, etc.).

The field of linguistic research that studies discourse as action is called pragmatics.

Central to pragmatics is speech act theory.

Discourse as action

Speech act theory: origins

Speech act theory stems from ordinary language philosophy , a school of philosophy that flourished in England in the mid-20th century.

Its proponents wanted to analyse philosophical problems by looking at ordinary language. For example, they thought that the ethical question of what is good/bad could be answered by studying the way people apologise for bad behaviour.

Speech act theory

Austin distinguished three kinds of action within each speech act: Locution is the physical act of producing an utterance. Illocution is the act that is performed by producing the utterance (order, request, promise, congratulation, etc.). Perlocution is the production of an (intended) effect through locution and illocution (e.g. the execution of the order by the addressee).

Speech act

Speech act theory

Activity : formulate possible illocutions and perlocutions.

Locution Illocution(s) Possible perlocution(s) A: It’s a bit cold in here. Request Order Complaint

B offers to close window B closes window B empathises with A A: Paris is a wonderful city. Praise Invitation Expr. of gratitude

B is flattered B accepts to go to Paris B thanks A A: I didn’t mean that. Apology Request

B apologises to A B provides something else A: You did your best. Consolation Congratulation

B feels better B thanks A

Speech act theory

These examples clearly show that the same locution may have different illocutions and perlocutions , depending on the context and the situation.

Locution Illocution(s) Possible perlocution(s) A: I’ll find you wherever you are. Threat Promise Expr. of love

B is scared B is reassured B is happy A: Be very careful. Advice Threat Expr. of concern

B takes advice B is scared B feels cared about A: Anyone want some coffee? Invitation Request

B accepts invitation B makes coffee

Speech act theory

Another example of how the same locution may have different illocutions and lead to different perlocutions:

A: There’s a good movie tonight.

Illocution Perlocution Uptake by the listener Invitation B accepts B: Okay, let’s go. Advice/offer B takes advice/offer B: Thank you, I’ll go. Excuse B excuses A B: Never mind, see you tomorrow. ... ... ...

Speech act theory: classification

4) Commissives : speech acts whereby speakers commit themselves to some future action.

A: I’ll be back. A: We will do that.

5) Expressives : speech acts whereby speakers express their attitude towards something.

A: Well done, mate! A: That’s interesting. A: I’m sorry.

Speech act theory: classification

Activity: what type of speech act is performed in each utterance?

Philip: I won’t let you down again! commissive Andrew: I’m feeling a bit sick today. expressive President: I hereby declare the Olympic Games officially open. declaration Joanna: Bring me that book, please. directive Seth: There is a book on the table. representative

Speech act theory

When does an illocution lead to the intended perlocution? In other words, when are illocutions successful? This problem has raised much debate among pragmaticians.

Clearly, certain minimum conditions must be met in order for an illocution to be successful. For instance, you cannot sentence somebody if you’re not a judge.

So the question is: what requirements should be met for a certain illocution to be successful? John Searle (1969) and Jürgen Habermas (1981) have elaborated two approaches to this issue (see next slides).

Searle’s approach: felicity conditions

Searle (1969) formulated four felicity conditions that illocutions must meet to be felicitous (i.e. successful).

These conditions are illustrated below in regard to the illocution PROMISE:

1st felicity condition: the propositional content condition

The act that the speaker commits him/herself to must be a future action to be performed by the speaker him/herself. One cannot make a promise for someone else or promise to do something that has already been done.

Searle’s approach: felicity conditions

Felicity conditions for other types of speech act:

REQUEST

1. The requested act is a future act by B
2. A believes that B can perform the act; B would not perform the act without being asked
3. A genuinely wants B to perform the requested act
4. The utterance counts as an attempt by A to have B do an act

Searle’s approach: felicity conditions

ORDER

1. The ordered act is a future act by B
2. B is able to perform the act; B has the obligation to do so
3. A genuinely believes that B should perform the act
4. The utterance counts as an attempt by A to oblige B to do an act

WARNING

1. It is about a future event
2. A believes that the event will occur and will be harmful to B; A believes that it is not obvious to B that the event will occur
3. A genuinely believes that the event will be harmful to B
4. The utterance counts as an attempt by A to have B recognise that a certain future event will be harmful to him/her

Habermas’ approach: validity claims

According to Habermas (1981), when speakers produce speech acts they presuppose that the illocutions are valid, that is, true , sincere and legitimate.

For example, if you say “I am the boss now” you presuppose i) that it is true that you’re the boss; ii) that you really mean it; iii) that you have the authority to proclaim yourself the boss.

Therefore, an illocution is successful, i.e. it leads to the intended illocution, only if the receiver acknowledges its validity in terms of truth , sincerity and legitimacy.

Habermas’ approach: validity claims

Look at this example:

Teacher to student: Could you bring me a coffee?

In what cases may the illocution be unsuccessful? The student may refuse the teacher’s request as invalid on the basis of:

Truth , i.e. the teacher knows that I cannot do that. Sincerity , i.e. the teacher does not really want any coffee. Legitimacy , i.e. the teacher has not right to ask me that.

Illocutions in discourse

Another example:

A: Your left eye has brownish-yellow spots.

This can be interpreted as a simple statement (a representative speech act), but it may also be seen as a warning if the situation being described is dangerous. This requires some knowledge of the world (c), namely, that the pigmentation of the white portion of the visible eyeball could indicate a pathology.

Directvs indirect speech acts

Take a look at this cartoon:

Wally (deliberately) misunderstands an indirect request for action as a direct request for information. The joke can be explained with reference to direct vs indirect speech acts.

Directvs indirect speech acts

Speech acts are direct when the syntactic form of the locution corresponds to the intended illocution. For example, an order formulated with an imperative verb:

A: Hey, move out of the way!

Speech acts are indirect when the syntactic form of the locution does not correspond to the illocution. Examples:

A: Do you have to stand in front of the TV? [Interrogative locution intended to be a request, not a question] A: You’re standing in front of the TV. [declarative locution meant to be a request, not a representative]

Directvs indirect speech acts

Activity : The following are indirect speech acts. Why?

1. A: I’m so tired. B: I’ve made some coffee. [declarative locution intended to be an offer]
2. A: Don’t you think it’s a bit cold in here? (B closes the window) [interrogative locution intended to be a request]
3. A: I think I owe you an apology. B: I think you do. [declarative locution intended to be an apology]
4. A: I promise I will kill you. [locution has syntactic form of a promise, but the illocution is threat]