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Strategic studies
Introduction Three main topics: strategy, the use of military force and war. Strategic theories, the tools of war. Also cyberwarfare. Encouraged to read the classics: Sun Tzu (the whole thing) and Clausewitz (some parts). End of March – beginning of April: field trip to Marzabotto on the 29 th^ March Class 1 – Week 1 Strategy, what?
- Is it a plan? A plan is part of a strategy, but not the whole thing. - Is it a policy? It is in colloquial terms; it is part of a policy. - “According to your new science called strategy ” (War and Peace). Prussian idea that you could fight a war in a very structured, calculated, rational way. If you have a good strategy, you beat the enemy. “Strategy (“grand strategy”) is the art of combining the different tools available to the political leadership to achieve certain political goals. War is one of these tools or, rather it is a consequence, when leaders decide to revert to organised violence and the other side responds accordingly.” - Devoto-Oli: “A branch of the military art that regulates and coordinates the various war options in sight of the purpose of the war” - An art, not a science. Combines different abilities of men, sometimes imprecise. A practical art, or an empirical science. - Tools: like performing an experiment by combining different components. Economic or political pressure, military instruments (violence, use of force). You combine them in different proportions. - Difficult to define because it applies to different levels, there are several types because of how the war has changed over time. - Political goals: the state represented by the government states its aim, could be both realistic and unrealistic. o The choice of a specific strategy should be the consequence of a rational decision of the state, the result of a clear evaluation of the costs and benefits that can derive from the appeal to violence, also considering alternative solutions. - War is the end result if and only if both parties decide to use force and respond militarily. War is organised collective violence. Origins of strategy: ancient Greece Strategos = the General (aka the Commanding Officer, CO) Strategiké epistéme = the general’s knowledge and “how to”. You know how to do your job, the technical background. Not a big deal, you study and learn and then you know how to manoeuvre phalanxes and deploy soldiers. Strategon Sophia = the General’s wisdom (or sapience). That something more, intuition, creativity, coup d’oeil that allows you to adapt your movements once you spot an opportunity, great generals see something that others can’t see. You can’t teach this, this is part of your personality, it’s a gift. Taktike Téchne= tactics or warfighting. For the soldiers mostly, generals should still be competent but not the most important skill. War & Strategy? War: a complex social phenomenon (but also one of the “institutions” in IR as in H. Bull). o True, it is the collective (because everyone wants it), organised (because you intend to apply violence) use of force to achieve political
aims (in the most general sense, no investigation on this). The broader definition is “a complex social phenomenon”. o Complex means that it is subject to chaos theory: the “Butterfly effect”, even if everything looks the same, in a complex phenomenon it is enough to slightly variate some of the original variables and you get a completely different output. If you double the input, you have no idea of what comes out. o Social : it involves human beings, which further complicates its complexity. Like a weather forecast. o If you have a good strategy, you may have a better idea of what might probably be the outcome, but there’s no certainty. Grand strategy: includes military strategy and also the national security strategy, in addition to diplomacy, economics, information (DIME); this contributes to the “Logic” of war (Clausewitz) o USA use DIME acronym, Diplomatic Information Military and Economics. Military strategy is just a part of military strategy. Warfare (how to make war): operational level, technological innovation, military genius; or we can say “grammar 1” (Clausewitz). It has to do with the grammar, how you write as to be understood. Warfare is the actual thing, how you make war, that is the idea. Combat: individual level, psychological motivation, or “grammar 2”. Realest violence, it affects individuals. Generals, Strategy & Tactics In Politics & War, strategy is often confused with “policies” or “vision”: the goals, what you want to achieve. Strategy is part of how you want to achieve that.
- Policies are what you want to achieve, your ends, strategy is how you get there (and your probability to get there), how you get those ends. How you move, with limited means, overcoming obstacles, to those ends. No certainty at all, in any case. - Tactics is also “how”, but how you take a bridge or a city. - Strategy in war is how those military objectives help you reach the political ends. How the soldiers act in the field. Tactics and strategy are complementary, and even if both are well sorted out, you only gain a small chance to get what you want. Strategy and tactics: some historical definitions Sun tzu. Strategy: survival of the state (generic); 5 elements. Every combination of means is fine as long as you guarantee the survival of the state. o Tactics: how to fight. Ancient Greece (400 BC). Strategy: the General’s art, made of episteme and Sophia (Strategos) o Tactics: “regulated”, “ordered”, “planified”. Romans think the same as the Greeks, then nothing for a long time due to rise of Christianity Machiavelli (1500). Strategy: the supremacy of politics on the army. He brings back the link between military means and politics (war is the continuation of politics with other means, Clausewitz) o Tactics: the model of fighting and combat of the classical times (Ancient Rome). France (1801). Strategy as the method to defeat the enemy. o Tactics: how you manoeuvre on battlefield, science of military manoeuvre. Clausewitz (1830). Strategy: the use of battle engagements to achieve (military) objectives.
Variables and constants Constants :
- Time, if we discount relatively - Space-geography, terrain morphology and distance, because speed of moving has changed Variables : - Firepower, range rate of fire, precision. Never before weapons have been more effective and deadly. - Movement, manoeuvre - The “fog”: the fog of war, Clausewitz again. Is it a variable or a constant? The makers of strategy: Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Jomini (development of modern army, rather than strategy itself), von Moltke, Mao Tse Tung (irregular warfare), Raimondo Montecuccoli, Frederick the Great, Delbruck, Giulio Duhet, Alfred Mahan, Lawrence of Arabia (irregular warfare). The greatest soldiers of all time (ranked): Genghis Khan, Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Napoleon The principles of war Ingredients you need before you start to increase your odds. - Mass (concentration of efforts, more soldiers than the enemy) - Objectives (unity of efforts, better defining objectives) - Initiative – offensive (what about defence?). You have to dictate what happens on the battlefield. - Surprise, a force multiplier. - Economy of forces (limited resources) - Manoeuvre (flexibility) - Unity of command - Operational security, more recent concept. When you’re planning, take a lot of care in not letting the enemy guess what you’re going to do, how to disseminate information, etc. - Simplicity (of battle plans), like clear objective. The simpler, the more chance of winning, especially if you’re not very able. - Moral (aka the human factor), individual motivation of officers/soldiers/commanders, willpower to achieve military (and political) objectives. 25 th^ February The classics: “Pre-Clausewitzians”, from Thucydides to Napoleon (class 2 – week 1) Sun Tsu in NOT on the list – Clausewitz didn’t even know he existed! “War is king and father to us all" – Herodotus “Was is the most important of state affairs, matter of life and death, it has to be thoroughly studied” – Sun Tzu “War is hell” – G.T. Sherman “War is an act of organised violence perpetuated by political entities against other political entities” – Hedley Bull “War made the state that made war” – Charles Tilly the state is an organisation/structure very effective in gathering resources with the scope of war fighting, it is very successfully organising means and resources to fight war. War made modern state, so that it can consequently make war.
Peloponnesian War: intention with which the author started his investigation, he wanted something that would remain for future generations – a couple of millennials after his writing it’s still a central topic. It’s the first crucial text. Thucydides and the Science of History Herodotus is the father of history – whereas the first “modern” historian is Thucydides, because of his scientific method. Former general from a wealthy family, dismissed at some point for some military failure, he is also a rentier so that he can support his research with his personal wealth. Peloponnesian war lasts for 27 years (432-404 BC) but his analysis ends in 411 BC, nobody knows why. The book has no end, maybe the rest was lost or he didn’t finish it? The rest of the analysis was completed by Xenophon, who covers the remaining years. Research of the root causes of the conflict, this is the basis of modern scientific investigation, what are the causes of some effects. Crucial book. o First book where you find the security dilemma (differently phrased) o First book where the first hegemonic war is examined o First book using a scientific method to answer a specific question, preliminary hypotheses, data gathering that either support or deny the initial hypotheses, etc. Galileo and Newton used the same methodology, explore the cause-effect relation. Battlefield.
- Sparta and its allies: land power, militarily stronger on land but almost non- existent economy. Today that would be Russia, very powerful militarily speaking, but no economy. - Athens and its allies: maritime power, could rely on international trade to gather resources and it boosted its wealth, it could pay for the allies, weapons, training, etc. History does not simply repeat itself, it can give us some ideas, but a lot of this (especially warfare) is a complex social phenomenon, very sensitive to the slightest variations, so if these are changes, the result can change dramatically. Macedonian syntagma vs. the Hellenic phalanx Phalanx: long line, 4-5 rows deep, strongest most experienced men at the back to push? The possession for all time The immediate causes for Sparta’s aggression are formal pretexts, he wanted to identify the main rationale for war, its primary profound causes. Sparta was afraid of losing its parity with Athens due to its increasing wealth, fearing it would prevail over time. Let’s go to war now when we can still prevail, until it’s too late. “The real cause I consider to be the on which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war inevitable.” Sounds familiar? It’s IR 101 and inspired the balance of power , hegemonic war and the security dilemma. But can this work help generals win wars? Is it useful for war fighting? Unlike Sun Tzu, Thucydides is helpful if you’re the head of state and have to develop a grand strategy. Excellent insights on how to combine land and sea power, how to manage or not alliances, how to respond to revolts, how to destroy agricultural economy to damage extensively if the main source of wealth, etc.
Italy was a constant battlefield where France and Spain confronted each other. Great powers against many Italian cities and kingdom of Naples. One of the very few instances where Italy stood together and alone against France is the Battle of Fornovo July 1495, bad weather hindered Italian attack and France resisted, it was a draw in the end. Machiavelli’s thinking Mercenaries are unreliable because they dissolve the crucial link between the military instrument and politics. He is in favour of conscription (militias and a return to classical Greece and rome patterns with no Christian influence). Conscripts had their own motives for defending their own country, motivational factor. Order , discipline , and training are all necessary for the army (the Art of War) Virtue (the commander’s ability – much like the merging of Episteme and Sophia for the Ancient Greek) and fortune (chance) both are equally essential; with the former you can influence the latter. You can’t discount nor eliminate the impact of chance, the best you can do is to moderate the impact of chance by having a lot of virtue. Virtù and fortuna. The centrality of decisive engagement to win the war. From Machiavelli to Clausewitz: Raimondo Montecuccoli and the 17th^ empire
- Feldmarschall of the Hapsburg empire - Tactically he conforms the Swedish experience of the 30 years’ war. - Considered the first modern military analyst because of his methodological approach, he showed where he took his ideas He strove for a universal paradigm that merged together the military, political and scientific knowledge and approach with the requirements of the church (Zeitgeist) which relies on faith and a lot unexplained and unexplainable, whereas the former relies of rationality and the need for explanations. It proved to be impossible. Military analyst - Inductive method , from empirical observation to theory - Della Guerra col turco, large use of footnotes - Classical sources: Tacitus, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Cesar, Polybius, Vegetius and Machiavelli “(Socio)political solutions are often preferable to employing the military instrument.”. Based on his experience, sometimes it is better to look for other solutions that may be more effective that the military one, a great lesson that policy-makers often forget. The role of economy, financial resources in particular (absent in Clausewitz but present in other philosophers). The minister of finance as a warfare engineer. Money as “the nerves of war” ( pas d’argent, pas de guerre ), in order to fuel the war and make it function you need money to pay for resources, weapons, transportation means, etc. War is “applying force against a foreign prince or people” War is an act in which both adversaries try to harm each other with any possible means The purpose of war is victory. That is? The art of war is the ability of fighting well and winning. Supporter of the decisive engagement (as Machiavelli). Up to Clausewitz, the way of conducting a military campaign was to come up to a decisive battle (possibly of your own choosing and time) that was a win or lose
situation, if you win the battle you win the war. Clausewitz is a different perspective; from his experience it hardly ever happens.
- Winning without a battle is an illusion (Sun Tzu? The other way round!) - “War is an evil, but is part of the natural order of things”. It is inevitable (remember that he’s a strong Catholic believer). It’s not something you can wish will go away eventually. - Montecuccoli does not make distinction between strategy, tactics and operations, as he considers them a “whole” entity. He doesn’t make a lot of analysis based on one level or the other. - Empirical research of the constant principles of war as to make it part of the “scientific progress” with predictable outcomes. Based on the empirical research it is possible to find some principles of war that makes it possible to come up with predictable outcomes – the scientific and systematic study of warfare of the phenomenon and the resulting knowledge can be used to forecast outcomes, and this traces back to virtue, you can increase your episteme and therefore your Sophia as a way to contrast the impact of chance. It is not guaranteed, but it’s the best you can get. Frederick the Great From scholars to generals and soldiers. He strongly influences Clausewitz, he wrote analyses based on his experience, but his writing is not so remarkable. The rise of Prussia The perception that Prussia was a military state at the time is wrong. He had a very modern education. The philosopher King Kant became full professor at the university of Danzig at that time, culturally virtuous time. Voltaire was one of his friends and he lived during the Enlightenment. Frederick allowed and promoted religious freedom (no imposed one) and freedom of the press , so as to create a public sphere where Prussians could express their opinions and ideas. o When you go to war, you don’t have a choice but to obey the order of the king. But domestically, you are free to do whatever you want in terms of religion and allowed readings. Incredible level of freedom inside Prussia at the time, no state religion. For these reasons, Kant saw Frederick as “the man who first liberated mankind from immaturity”. Frederick the general - The invincible power of the Prussian army rests on subordination. This, so indispensable and so burdensome, is moderated but not obstructed by the freedom to think out loud. - Prussia was very small but managed to beat bigger and more powerful enemies. - Battle tactics were not original, they had existed in the past, but he adapted them to his times and needs. Fred in the Seven Years War (1756-1763) 28 th^ Feb Frederick’s field battles. Most of the time Prussia was in numerical inferiority. Despite this, the percentages of casualties show that Prussia inflicted more casualties on the enemy. For Frederick it was essential to combat a defensive limited war showing that he was capable of withstanding a bigger formation.
do decisive engagement, with few exceptions. The enemy couldn’t be brought to one single decisive engagement, too much of the resources of the state were invested in war fighting so that it was impossible to get a single decisive clash and then that was it. o Even if you lose, you can always come back with the huge resource availability provided by the state. If becomes difficult to beat the enemy in one decisive occasion, especially if it’s a rich one. Attrition (different than friction) preferred to manoeuvring (Borodino & Ulm: speed and execution of manoeuvre depend on available means…) Preference for offensive operations , initiative is crucial. Holding the initiative is central to keep the enemy on wrong footing (so Napoleonic). Seizing the moment, if you just defend yourself you’ll never win the war. Therefore, wars become costlier. How do we get to Clausewitz?
- Machiavelli: war is always subordinated to politics, always a political decision decisive engagement - Montecuccoli: analytic approach, you need to read what has been written in the past and then observe empirically and then formulate your own theories. Readings AND empirical observation battles are necessary to win. - Frederick: winning with few casualties. It was mandatory at his times identification between the state and the army - Napoleon: it was impossible to win with no casualties because of huge numbers. So moral, tempo (rhythm of military operations), execution, draft, initiative, historical examples (military history) disagreement on decisive engagement? (and Sun Tzu?) Clausewitz says decisive engagement is wishful thinking in modern warfare, can’t actually be performed. The enemy is simple too strong to be defeated in one single shot. At the level of combat, everything that counts is survival. Carl von Clausewitz Born in 1780 from a minor aristocratic family (“von”). Joined the army at 12 and see first combat at 13 (already brave and smart). Experienced in staff working, less so in commanding troops on the battlefield. Served with Prussia at Jena (1807) and Wavre and Ligny (1815) and with Russia at Borodino (1812). At Ligny and Wavre he’s the Chief of Staff of 3rd^ Army Corps. Major general and director of the war college in Berlin (1818) Retired and began to re-write his Vom Kriege in (1827-30) first drafts in 1809- Back to service in 1830 and died in 1831 while in Poland, during the same cholera epidemic that also killed Hegel. Der Vom Kriege was published, incomplete, by his wife Maria in 1832 (read the foreword by his wife!) How to read Vom Kriege - You should start from Book 2 chapter 2 because it contains the methodology, the theory of war. - Chapter 5 and 6: critical thinking and analysis (you assess the value of a piece of information, pros and cons, etc.) and historical examples the methodology - Book 1, chapter 1 most important part (with Book 8): the trinity, and war as a political act, as a result of a political decision. War should be studied holistically : war should be studied as a social complex phenomenon as a whole, it cannot be disaggregated, then you can get into details with single
armies, weapons, battles. Studying the single battles, armies, weapons is NOT studying war and warfare.
- Book 3, operational level (operations) - Book 4, chapter 11: (Sun Tzu…) winning without bloodshed? Absurd for him. You cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs. - Book 5: military forces (lines of communications, central topic for De Jomini) - Book 6: defence, chapter 26, introducing people’s war , Volkskrieg (why is this important? It’s the basis of irregular/guerrilla warfare, insurgencies, mass mobilisation etc. Mao and Lenin used this concept) - Book 7: offence, the culminating point of attack, and then it inevitably declines once you run out of resources, stamina, motivation… - Book 8 : “the plan of war” is with Book 1 the core of the whole work o C. re-examines many concepts presented in Book 1 and introduces absolute war & real war, limited war, etc. o Distinction between ends (“what’s the purpose?”) and objectives (“what is necessary in war?”), the steps you need to make in order to (be likely to) win the war. Many times policy-makers decide to use organised violence without asking themselves what is the end, they focus on the tool only. Both ends and objectives should be discussed during the planning phase, before actual war. Clausewitz’s work is still the most comprehensive, perceptive and modern contribution to political/military and strategic thought. He does not attempt to sell a programme or prescribe solutions. He understands that leaders will face a strategically different scenario and world. His theory is essentially descriptive of the nature of human-on-human strategic problems; his purpose is to develop our human capital – to help the reader develop his/her own strategic judgement in order to deal with the ever-changing strategic environment, to stimulate one’s own critical thinking. He thought his audience would be military professionals, but he got so much into deeply and critically analysing war theory that he produced a political scientist-oriented piece. March 4th Clausewitz’s method Analytical approach to history and dialectics (not Hegel but Plato’s… what’s the difference?) o Hegel: thesis, antithesis, synthesis o Plato: thesis, antithesis Seven Years’ War, war of Spain’s succession (France vs Europe 1701-1714) the wars against the Turks in the East (but Napoleon is everywhere) History in relative terms, no absolutism, no value judgement (history should be contextualised), history is the result of contingencies. Post-Napoleonic evolution of war? “Quasi-absolute” but also limited (as before Napoleon) One of the most important inconsistencies: try and give an idea of what war would be like after the Napoleonic era war will go back to being a limited war. Napoleonic wars were such an anomaly that war afterwards will be again limited, limited use of force. Napoleonic war so unusual because of duration, extension, soldiers involved, so new that it will probably change warfare, new types of war. Critical analysis o Analysis: the search for deep causes o Critical: actions examined at every level (tactics, operations, strategic, political). Abusing history
o Is never an isolated act (before and after) o Is never completed in one, single event o Never (hardly) produces a definitive outcome Thus, war has limitations. (antithesis) “… it is simply the continuation of politics with the aid of other means” The synthesis is that we should be very aware of the type of war we are undertaking… And it is not possible to forecast exactly the outcome, even I if do everything right, I might still not achieve my goals or end up losing the war. War is not only a rational instrument, it is something else (… a social complex phenomenon), therefore difficult to predict. For way too long, political scientists forgot this. End ( Zweck ) + Military objectives ( Ziel ) + Ways and means ( Mittel ) Notwithstanding this, Clausewitz doesn’t deny the inhumanity of organised violence. “the continuation of POLITIK with (the aid of) other means” Clausewitz’s best known quote, but also the most misunderstood. English is the best language because it distinguishes politics and policy. War is a rational tool of state POLICY (1) But, as human undertaking , it is also in part POLITICS (2) Politics: the political debate, political clash of ideas and values (party politics), discussions among different factions, influenced by irrational and a-rational factors. War and the military instrument are subordinated to Politik 1-2 (Clausewitz has been heavily criticised for this). Clausewitz meant to include POLITICS and POLICY in his definition. This distinction is possible because war has its own grammar (praxis, the way you do it) but NOT its own logic (or sense), which can only be that of and come from politics/policy, political leaders. Also the political motivation, another component besides the solely rational one. Wars also have an emotional component, an irrational element. Why is that? It explains the perpetuation of violence once the military/political ends have been attained, why people hate each other. o E.g. WWI, it was clear that the German could never achieve their political goals, so in 1916 they should have surrendered and set for peace with the French, but instead both factions continued despite this fact being evident. Irrational component took over. March 7th Absolute and Real war
For Clausewitz, absolute war = absolute violence (and no political control). Since there are no limits to the level of violence, in theory, something such as absolute war might be feasible. However, it is just a philosophical construction. In reality, it never gets to absolute war. Below the dotted line there are situations which actually happen (based on empirical experience). Threatening violence. Lowest level of violence (rising) and highest level of political control (diminishing). Psychological violence, no actual physical violence, no armies. From this point onwards it becomes more difficult to exploit the rational component of violence because it comes into balance because of other factors, for example the political leader is no longer capable to control what happens during warfare, unable to impose own political will (e.g. WWI, American Civil War) loss of political control, furtherly increased violence. ‘Salami’ tactics. I take a portion of the adversary’s territory and use that to bargain. Low level of violence, still a lot of political control because policy- makers get to decide the conditions for the bargain (political demands). Limited war. If the other side responds to violence by using violence. Can be a consequence of ‘salami’ tactics (you took my territory; I’m fighting you but just until I can take my territory back). The side that initiated the hostility cannot control what the other side will do, in terms of both political control and violence. Limited objectives, limited military investment. Prolonged war. The useless piece of land can instead give rise to a prolonged conflict if other factors play a role (religion, religious war) so that limited objectives are no more feasible, one of the sides feels it has to punish the other. The paramount goal becomes punishment. Now, even the side who initiated the conflict is obliged to respond accordingly: surrender or keep fighting (escalation of power, further loss of political control, especially when unconventional weapons are used). It gets very fast from here Unconditional surrender. Punishment is no longer enough, the whole territory must be attacked after an unconditional surrender. Violen Political
REAL WAR
EMPIRICAL
IDEAL
Threatening violence
‘SALAMI’
LIMITED
PROLONGUED
UNCONDITIONAL
WAR OF
‘ALMOST’ ABSOLUTE
TOTAL
ABSOLUTE
- Correlation of ends and means - Economy of force - Other There are, however, other elements that can’t be controlled by human rationality, which limit human rationality and the rational conduct of war (this side is too often forgotten by classical IR theory). This is because war is a social complex phenomenon: - Friction - Chance - Poor intelligence - Passions & hate - Political goals are irrational - Other So what is the Nature of Real war? Clausewitz’s trinity War is constrained by rationality. However, the essence of war (its nature) is military operations, influenced by: - RATIONAL COMPONENT. - IRRATIONAL SET. There are two more elements which disturb the appreciation of war a purely rational phenomenon, there is an irrational component: Primordial violence and passion (people). This is outside rationality’s domain; hate can’t be controlled. - PROBABILISTIC, A-RATIONAL SET. Still, there’s something missing. The chance and probability (probability being a modern term not used by Clausewitz) influenced by creativity. It’s the a-rational component. Nobody can control the weather, luck, misfortune, chance, but still these have an impact on the conduct of war. Or, they can be controlled in a very little way. The amazing trinity The combination and interaction of the rational, irrational, a-rational components gives birth to the deep nature of war, which is Trinitarian. The Trinitarian analysis and the nature of war Military’s will influences government Military strategy influences political objectives People’s will influences Military’s will influenced by people Justifies effort required to achieve political objectives People’s will influences government “ESSENCE OF WAR”: MILITARY OPERATIONS CHANCE AND PROBABILITY INFLUENCED BY WAR SUBORDINATED TO POLICY AND SUBJECT TO REASON PRIMORDIAL VIOLENCE AND PASSION People THE PEOPLE Primordial violence ‘Passions, hate’ THE GOVERNMENT ‘Political aims’ ‘Reason’ ‘Calculations THE NATURE OF WAR
The trinity…again!
- Political leaders are the expression of the rational side of the nature of war (cost/benefit, political objectives…) - The irrational side (hatred, violence) is associated with the people intended as those irrational subject being constantly carried away by emotions, human nature, going with the flow, and that the political institutions somehow feel they need to counterbalance. - The military commander is in charge of controlling chance as much as he can, through competence, plans, personal experience, etc. The real trinity therefore is: EMOTION – POLITICS (POLICY) – CHANCE. Most of the time authors cite POPULATION – GOVERNMENT – MILITARY as the real trinity. This is not true, this is a REPRESENTATION of the trinity itself, with its agents. As a convention, this second is somehow addressed as the canonical trinity. How close is the relationship between the three elements? Clausewitz says that rationality MAINLY comes from the government, which doesn’t mean rationality is only coming from the government, or irrationality is MAINLY (but not solely) coming from the people. March 11th The operational level in Clausewitz (minor contribution) Books 6-8 are about the conduct of operations. For C this was the real subject of theory, which had not been explored (of course!) by previous authors (esp. 18th^ century). They were strictly talking about the military instrument, no diplomacy, no economic tools. But this is within the vast realm of military affairs, not simply how you conduct operations. The requirements for an ‘operational’ level (Clausewitz did NOT use this term) were the ‘dimensions’ of theatres and the mass armies (Napoleon called it ‘grand tactics’). - From von Moltke to B.H. Liddel Hart. Tactics = how to do combat. Operational level = terminology used by the Soviets in the 30s and the Germans (the term was their idea). Basically how to conduct operations. Clausewitz’s “Other” ideas Friction : accidents, small delays, setbacks. o Concept taken directly from classical physics. Self-education was very common back them, Clausewitz self-educated himself at talks, seminars, conferences. If you throw a ball through, that doesn’t go on endlessly because of the friction from the air. Same for a surface, it creates resistance. In space there’s no friction. THE COMMANDER AND HIS ARMY ‘The play of chance, probability, and the creative spirit’ - ‘The element of subordination’ – ‘Instrument of policy’ Polic Politic y Governm s Emotio (^) Chan Populati Milita ce
o This concept was fully embraced by Lenin and the Soviets, Mao, became a catchphrase as well. o He saw that mainly as a defensive instrument. Moral and the human factor (motivation) The genius for war : Napoleon, coup d’oeil, knack for exploiting opportunities, ability to ‘read’ the battlefield. It is that something that some generals and military leaders have and others don’t. It is not just Episteme (the knowledge), but also Sophia (the virtù, that only few have). “Illiberal” values , royalist, European balance of power Sun Tzu Is Sun Tzu the antithesis (or an alternative) to Clausewitz? Big mistake, there are big differences but should be seen as complementary, both are necessary. Sun Tzu didn’t know anything about the Greeks and the Romans, as much as no Western knew anything about China’s history yet. His publication was just one of the many circulating on the matter. There were several ‘war schools’ across the Chinese Empire. His work was by accident well-preserved among others, not necessarily a masterpiece. Main differences between Clausewitz and Sun Tzu: “ Winning without fighting ” vs. “ bloodshed ”. o Winning without fighting is the highest evidence of military ability, you are a great general. Same applies for great chess players, they know in advance how the match will work out. Instead, Clausewitz talks about bloodshed. War is like a wrestling match with lots of violence. o It depends on the historical condition, not necessarily either one or the other. If you are a gifted general, it is true that you can anticipate many moves of your adversary and because of that you can put him at disadvantage in a short matter of time, the more this is the less the enemy will be inclined to fight. So it is likely it will surrender before the clash even starts. It was not considered dishonourable at Sun Tzu’s times for a general to give up without fighting due to an excessive military inferiority. o At Clausewitz’s times, armies were so large, so many people were involved in fighting (not just military commanders) that it was impossible for a single man to lead that and to anticipate moves and win battles without even clashing once. Also, very large fighting arenas. Behind belligerents there was the whole state financing and providing tremendous resources of any kind to the battlefield. It was almost impossible to win without bloodshed. Both are correct, just a different time in history. Napoleon actually won a couple of times without fighting. Emphasis on the destruction of the enemy’s will more than physical forces. o This related to the concept of centre for gravity. Destroying the whole army is not necessary, as long as you manage to destroy the enemy’s will to resist, to subjugate the enemy, to make it conform to our own will. If you manage to do this, you’ve won. Military instrument is subordinated to politics. o The original trinity is RATIONAL CALCULATION – HATRED AND PASSION – CHANCE. Clausewitz attributes each of these stages to some agents (GOVERNMENT – PEOPLE – ARMY). The point on which both agree is that the political leadership decides what are the ultimate goals of organised violence. As far as the organisation of violence is concerned, the other two have a huge impact as well. Each war has a
different character but the deep nature is unchanged (politics decides when and why to use it). Sun Tzu’s “unitary vision” of China, Clausewitz never liked the idea of a “united Europe” Sun Tzu (circa 500 BC) The art of war is a manual, how to (“Warfare for dummies”). Clausewitz was also trying to write a textbook but he got carried away by unveiling the deep nature of war, and so he ended up with a complex sociological and philosophical treatise. Winning without fighting (enemy’s perceptions). You have to know the enemy AND know yourself (your limits and abilities, what your military instruments can do, what your forces can do); if you have this, then there’s no way you can lose, and you can avoid fighting. The enemy simply loses its will to resist you. Avoid long wars. (Not in Clausewitz, very long wars instead). Long wars are financially expensive and wear your manpower down. The sooner you win (subjugate the enemy), the shorter the war, the better it is. Dispersion & concentration (mass). You should keep your army dispersed so that the enemy can’t figure out your future moves, but still ready to concentrate and attack. Rapidity & fluidity (water). Quick and adapting to the morphology of the ground, to the circumstances. This reminds of Clausewitz’s “war as a chameleon”. The commander should be able to adapt on the battlefield. Surprise and shock (shock and awe in Iraq 2003). In order to defeat the enemy, you should rely also on surprise and shock. Strike quickly and shock the enemy, so that he will quickly and less reluctantly be subjugated. The more violent the impact, the quicker the enemy will give up his own will to resist. Moral and human factor. Politics > alliances > army > cities. List of priorities. o First you have to attack politics , that is the enemy’s will to resist , possibly concentrate on the enemy’s leader perceptions, the mind of the political leadership. o If this is not possible and if there are alliances, try to break these up. Alliances are a force multiplier but can be broken up quite easily. You should demolish the links that keep the alliance together. o If this doesn’t work, focus on the army. This is the battle on annihilation , actually try and defeat on the battlefield. o Last resort, try and use sieges to take over cities. You should try and avoid this at any time because it is long, expensive, tiring, destroys moral and will of your own army. Cheng & ch’i. You have to rely on two forces/movements: a blocking force to keep the enemy in place and the striking force. Holding the enemy with one hand and hitting him with the other so that he can’t run away or avoid the confrontation. “Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”. THIS WILL BE IN THE TEST Clausewitz relies on the military; Clausewitz doesn’t say anything about politics. Sun Tzu instead writes a lot about the importance of diplomacy, of intelligence and spying, which is totally absent in Clausewitz. From the military leadership’s point of view, once you are to use force, it should be in the quickest time possible. Once you are decided, max violence available. Very problematic concept, doesn’t go well with political leadership. Sun Tzu’s textbook was intended mostly for political leaders, not for military leaders (?). C was the other way round.
