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Belarus After Collaps Union, Publikacje z Socjologia

Беларусь после распада СССР, режим автократии

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2018/2019

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Belarus: Regime Transitions and State Building After the Collapse of Soviet
Union
Volha Chykun
Polish Naval Academy
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Abstract
This paper examines the political development of Belarus since the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and some specific traits of the Belarusian regime. Populism, the destruction of
checks and balances, a carrot-and-stick approach to differen social groups, information
controls and inflating perceptions of external threats have all been foundations of
authoritarianism throughout history. ' Additional trait is ambivalence regarding its national
identity. In many respects Belarus remains a work in progress, which gives the advantage to
the ruling regime.
Neoauthoritarian regime has been established in Belarus, providing consolidated and
institutionalized undemocratic regime, resulted by a process of retreat from democracy. It is
based on various forms of control and limits political freedoms and enjoys wide public
support, which is a result of effective social and information policies. Undemocratic political
regime in Belarus is a mix of Soviet and post-Soviet elements of exercising power and using
particular methods of governing and control over society. Unlike during Soviet times, the
regime does not seek to control private life and activities of individuals, neither it limits
entertainment and consumption, while provides the conditions for an individual (private)
business. These activities encourage significant part of the society to voluntarily resign from
political life, discourage participating in movements or political parties. The regime does not
try to eliminate its political opponents, but conducts the policy of discrediting and marginalization
of them. Changes of political regime in Belarus might occur not in consequence of social pressure or
the opposition’s activities, but as a result of weakening of the regime from inside.1
Introduction
1
1 P. Usow, „Białoruś – „neoautorytaryzm z ludzką twarzą?”, „Wschód Europy” http://
journals.umes.pl/we, 2019, s. 26
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Belarus: Regime Transitions and State Building After the Collapse of Soviet

Union

Volha Chykun Polish Naval Academy Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract

This paper examines the political development of Belarus since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and some specific traits of the Belarusian regime. Populism, the destruction of checks and balances, a carrot-and-stick approach to differen social groups, information controls and inflating perceptions of external threats have all been foundations of authoritarianism throughout history. ' Additional trait is ambivalence regarding its national identity. In many respects Belarus remains a work in progress, which gives the advantage to the ruling regime. Neoauthoritarian regime has been established in Belarus, providing consolidated and institutionalized undemocratic regime, resulted by a process of retreat from democracy. It is based on various forms of control and limits political freedoms and enjoys wide public support, which is a result of effective social and information policies. Undemocratic political regime in Belarus is a mix of Soviet and post-Soviet elements of exercising power and using particular methods of governing and control over society. Unlike during Soviet times, the regime does not seek to control private life and activities of individuals, neither it limits entertainment and consumption, while provides the conditions for an individual (private) business. These activities encourage significant part of the society to voluntarily resign from political life, discourage participating in movements or political parties. The regime does not try to eliminate its political oppo nents, but conducts the policy of discrediting and marginalization of them. Changes of political regime in Belarus might occur not in consequence of social pressure or the opposition’s activities, but as a result of weakening of the regime from inside.

Introduction

1 P. Usow, „Białoruś – „neoautorytaryzm z ludzką twarzą?”, „Wschód Europy” http:// journals.umes.pl/we, 2019, s. 26

The Republic of Belarus is still one of the countries in Europe where the undemocratic system operates and for 20 years the same man is ruled by Alexander Lukashenko. Belarus is not a political breakthrough in the post-Soviet space in which there are seven undemocratic states with different terms "Political existence" and four countries whose fate is hard to predict, nevertheless the authoritarian regime at the borders of the European Union arouses great interest. After dramatic events in Ukraine in 2014, Belarus was pushed to the margin of European policy, which also led to a change of approach and strategy towards this country - from isolation to dialogue - shaping the image of the political system in Belarus as "authoritarianism with a human face.” 2 Belarus lies at the interface between two civilization areas: Latin and Byzantine. This fact has influenced for centuries the nature of the ethnic identity of these lands, community ideologies and the shaping of the national idea. A civilizational identity expressed by a religion - on the one hand, Orthodoxy and on the other - Catholicism has been overlapping with primitive tribal communities for centuries, and later - on ethnic communities based on a common language and the traditions of folklore. In addition, the national-forming processes of the Belarusians were hampered by the complicated political history of these lands at the interface between Polish and Russian influences, as well as still vivid political ideas of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. For the clarity of the image, it must be distinguished the character of the popular identity and the ideology of successive political and national elites trying to impose their own vision of Belarus on the people. The people's consciousness is characterised by astonishing durability: it is a dichotomous division into "Ruthenian" (Orthodox) and "Polish" (Catholic). This consciousness, shaped in times of Kievan Rus', survived the changing fate of these lands and it is still present today. There are two "nations", treated as something natural and therefore deserving respect. There are also Jews and Tatars, but they are foreigners, as "unaware" they are not "nations" and are treated separately. Political and cultural elites attempted to demolish this division by treating Belarusians as an ethnic and national whole. Most of them came from Catholic or "Polish" environments, and this is still the case nowadays. In the Soviet Union times, the official national ideology had a "two-level" character, the notion of "Soviet nation" functioned (the Soviet people), but also "the Belarusian nation", which, according to the binding doctrine, was supposed be a kind of

2 Posledniaya inauguracja. Lukashenko verit, chto sposoben peredat’ vlast’ mladshemu synu, „Belaruskaya Prawda”, http://belprauda.org/lukashenko-verit-chto-sposoben-peredat-vlast- mladshemu-synu/, inf. z 11 II 2016.

after a three-century break in nation-building, Belarus began anew the process of defining institutional and cultural features that would distinguish its state and society from others. In contrast to neighboring states in Eastern Europe, Belarus's newfound independence did not come as a result of a long struggle. Instead, the national memory of independence has gradually disappeared, from the seventeenth century, when Belarus was part of Poland, through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when massive Russification distilled the strong cultural similarities between Belarus and Russia. The assimilation with Russia gave rise to what some analysts call a culture of "Soviet- Belarusian patriotism," or a gradual adoption of the Soviet identity in place of a national self- definition. 4 For of the twentieth century, Moscow forced Soviet identity onto Belarus, entrenching the idea of the "Soviet man"—based on concepts of ideational and language- based unity with Russia. While visiting Minsk in the 1960s, Nikita Khrushchev stressed that Belarusians' deep cultural and linguistic assimilation with Russia would help them become the first people to attain true communism. 5 When the end of the communist era, the task of self identification based on national culture, identity and, more broadly, a sense of belonging, was less straightforward for Belarus than for neighboring states such as Poland or the Baltic republics. Belarusian experts In a discussion that marked stressed that independence "fell on Belarusians unexpectedly," without real fighting or even mass enthusiasm (August 2011). 6 Alexander Lukashenko defined Belarusians as "Russians, but of higher grade," confessing that "we have not yet found that national idea which would lead the people to battle." 7 Alexander Milinkevich, a opposition candidate in the 2006 presidential election and leader of the "For Freedom" movement, stressed that "most Belarusians are in fact unclear on the meaning of national

4 Vitali Silitski, "Still Soviet? Why Dictatorship Persists in Belarus," Harvard International Review 28, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 47. Other analyses have likewise underscored the contrast between today's "unhappy totalitarian consciousness of the post-communist era [characterized by] nostalgia for the past" and the "happy totalitarian consciousness of the Soviet times." Oleg Manaev, Stanovlenie grazhdanskogo obshchestva v nezavisimoi Betarusii, ¡991-2000 [Civil society development in independent Belarus, 1991-2000] (Minsk: Filservplus, 2000), p. 233. 5 See, for example, a related discussion in Dmitri Alexandrov, "Belarus: To Be or Not to Be a Nation," Russia Journal, 18 July 1999 6 Alexander Klaskovski, "Uroki putcha dlia Belarusi" [Lessons of the coup d'état for Belarus], Naviny, 19 August 2011, http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/201 l/08/19/ic_articles_112_174797. 7 Tatiana Nechapaika, "Belarus: 'rayskoie mesto dlia poriadochnih russkih'" [Belarus: "heaven for law-abiding Russians"], BBC Russian, 27 July 2007; "Lukashenko: my eshcho ne nashchupali tu nasionalnuyu ideyu.. ." [Lukashenko: we have riot yet grasped a national idea.. .], Naviny, 23 November 201 r, http://ns2.belapan.eom/rubrics/society/2006/l l/23/ ic_news_l 16_

identity or the meaning of cultural and historical identities." 8 Today the ambivalence persists. According to the recent official census conducted in 2009, only a quarter of those citizens who identified themselves as ethnically Belarusian speak Belarusian at home, compared to 41 percent in 1999. 9 The use of Belarusian language is even lower and the overall trend is toward decline. Public opinion polls show the reported use of Belarusian language (by 3 percent of respondents) to be almost twenty times lower than the use of Russian (57 percent), while 24 percent use a mixture of two languages and 16 percent use both. 10 Since independence, most Belarusians have become accustomed to living in an independent state, and statehood itself has become the most important aspect of Belarusian national identity, not a shared history, culture or language. As a result, some experts have written that there is much more state in Belarus than nation. 11 Alexsander Lukashenko has used this ambiguity to his intersting, putting himself in the role of national unifier. In fact, after his election in 1994 he said only two factors related to national consolidation: state- building and increasing the power of the president as its guarantor. 12 In this regard, the role of the opposition has lost meaning for many Belarusians, who try to understand who these people are and what they represent. Some opposition leaders who promote a classical national identity—opposing close ties with Russia and are just missing the mark and pushing away potential supporters. Why so many people support the president: 12 percent of respondents answered, "people see that he successfully copes with problems in the

(^8) Vital Tsygankov, "Hto i shto pagrazhae belaruskai nezalezhnasti?" [What and who endangers Belarusian independence?]. Radio Liberty, 8 August 2011, www.svaboda.org/ content/transcript/24290650.html. 9 "Preliminary Results of the 2009 Census" (Minsk: National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus, 2009), 58; "The 1999 National Census: Principal Results" (National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus), http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/perepic/ p6.php. 10 "Trends of Change in Belarusian Public Opinion," IISEPS, June 2011, http:// www.iiseps.org/ etrend.html. 11 As one example, David Marples argues that "Belarus remained the least national of the former Soviet states in 1992." David Marples, Belarus: From Soviet Rule to Nuclear Catastrophe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 37; David Marples, Belarus: A Denationalized Nation (Netherlands: Harwood Academic, 1999). 12 Karhaevich, Alexander Lukashenko, 708-9; Grigori Ioffe, "Authoritarianism without Oligarchy," Pro et Contra 15, no. 3-4 (May-August 2011), http://www.carnegie.ru/ proEtContra/?fa=45424.

Belarus there are conditions for entertainment and consumption, individual (private) business, which contributes to the voluntary resignation of a large part of society from political life. The policy towards the opponents of the regime is not based on their complete elimination, but on the discrediting and marginalization of opposition structures, which discourages citizens from participating in movements or opposition parties. The Belarusian neo-authoritarian regime is a consolidated, institutionalized and centralized regime in which democracy, as in the previous Times an undemocratic regime, it has only the attribute "masking authoritarian domination", 16 needed for control and a certain social legitimacy. The consolidation and institutionalization of the neo-authoritarian regime consists in subordination democratic institutions to central governments, to establish control over these procedures that could favor the overthrow of these governments, and to establish new institutions that favor stabilization of the regime and social mobilization. At the same time, the functioning of state institutions is possible thanks to qualified employees of the bureaucratic apparatus. This means a neo-authoritarian regime can only arise and function in a modern state.

II. An important form of legitimization of the political regime are elections and other mechanisms of plebiscite democracy (referendum), which guarantees political stability and the elimination of internal threats. Political choices in Belarus do not only fit into the political mechanism, but are also a complex social and psychological process that: a) leads to atomization and conformism of society, forces society to subjugate b) favors the consolidation of the political system: "extralegal electoral strategies need high the degree of coordination and discipline. They require the reliability of the lower levels of power, which carry out controversial orders and keep them secret." 17 Legitimization of the regime can take place with the help of other social institutions, for example, the church, ideology, and mass organizations. It can be said that the Belarusian neo-authoritarian regime possesses mobilization capabilities, is able to create mass organizations that serve both to mobilize and to politicize the society. Pro-governmental non- governmental organizations have a role in the process of social control and mobilization. Pro- governmental non-governmental organizations include: Belarusian Republican Youth Alliance (BRSM), Belarusian Republican Pionierska Organization (BRPO), Honor Association,

16 L. Diamond, Thinking about hybrid regime, “Journal of Democracy” 2002, nr 2, p. 24 17 S. Levitsky, L.A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: the Emergence in the Post-cold War Era, Toronto

2004, p. 55

Republican Alliance of Non-Governmental Organizations, Republican Committee of Youth Organizations, Alliance of Belarus Writers, Belarusian Alliance of Women, Belarusian Federation of Trade Unions and others. Among all organizations that support or have been supported by the regime, it is worth mentioning primarily mass organizations such as the BRPO (Pionierska Organization), BRSM (Belarusian Republican Youth Alliance), Biała Rus and Federation of Trade Unions. In addition to the functions already mentioned above, these organizations also had many other social and political functions for the political regime:

  • mobilization,
  • socialization,
  • recruitment and preparation of human resources,
  • political control over specific social groups,
  • organization and conduct of ideological and propaganda work; ideologisation various social groups,
  • monopolization of channels of information exchange between society and the state, elimination of independent organizations from the public zone and their impact on society. Mass pro-government organizations are an additional political division that penetrates social and state structures. For example, BRBO and BRSM are oriented mainly for the youth environment: pupils and students, young employees state institutions, including schools, universities, public administration employees and state-owned enterprises, including those serving in the army and police (militia). In each of these institutions, an organizational unit must be in operation. In addition, another organization - Federation of Trade Unions - associates employees of all institutions and state-owned enterprises; it also fulfills this function quasi-party organization Biała Rus. In recent years, BRSM had approximately 490,000 young people from 16 to 30. 18 About 526 567 thousand members are members of BRPO students from 10 to 16 years. Although, according to the statutes of these organizations, membership in them is voluntary, in fact joining the organization is suggested. According to internal directives in schools and colleges, over 50% of students must be members of the BRSM or the BRPO. In relation to young people who do not want to join these organizations, the management Schools use various methods of pressure: the threat of spectrum problems on matura exams, bad grades in diplomas and relevant opinions that may make it difficult to get to university. Similar methods are also used at universities.

18 I. Kirilenko, O. Pusikova-Galinovskaja, Trudnyje deti, „Sovietskaja Bielarus” 19 XII 2009.

intellectuals, or with their help ". 19 Sciences, such as political science, sociology, and philosophy, are instrumentally used to theoretically and ideologically justify the process of creating ideology and "serve to justify state policy". 20 And so, the authors of the first book about the Belarusian state ideology entitled Basics of the ideology of the Belarusian state were 13 professors and postdoctoral doctors as well as 11 candidates for the sciences (doctors) and docents. In this way, the political regime by using the humanities sought to show the whole society that the creation of a state ideology is a rational, objective, and not a political process. At the same time, in this process, the regime tied the intellectual elite more closely to each other, created an ideological and political tool, which at the same time led to a lack of space for shaping intellectual and intellectual opposition in an open public space. 21

III. The Belarusian neo-authoritarian regime establishes extended political control, limits the functioning of opposition organizations and their influence on society, but nevertheless allows political alternatives to function in society. The state does not use political terror to eliminate the opposition and intimidate society. Repression is one of the instruments to fight the opposition. In addition, the opposition legally participates in political processes (elections), but it is not admitted to representative authorities, both at the central level and at local levels. The 15 political parties registered in Belarus are seven opposition parties: the Belarusian People's Front (BNF), the Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Gromada), the United Civic Party, the Belarussian Left Party of the Righteous (until 2009, the Belarusian Communist Party), the Conservative-Christian Party Belarusian People's Party, Belarusian Social Democratic Group, Belarussian Green Party, Social Democratic Party of "Narodnoj Zgody". In 2008, a movement was registered, headed by a candidate of united democratic forces, Alexander Milinkevich - Movement for Freedom (for beef). In addition to registered parties, there are also organizations and parties and movements that operate illegally. Among them the most well-known are: youth organizations: Young Front, Belarusian Freedom Party, Youth BNF, Youth Democrats,

19 T. Gieger, Die sozial Schichtung des deutschen Volkes, Stuttgart 1932, s. 77–79, [w:] J. Linz, Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, London 2000, p. 162. 20 0 O. Shparaga, Universitet (sociogumanitarnoje znanije) v politicheskoj topografii Belarusi, [w:] Vysshceje obrazovanije v Belarusi: vyzovy internacionalnosti, Vilnus 2007, p. 95 21 Osnovy ideologii belorusskogo gosudarstva, red. S.N. Kniazev, S.V. Reshetnikov, Mińsk 2004, p. 19.

Rebellion; political parties: Belarusian Christian Democracy, the Party of Freedom and Progress. In winter 2010, a new opposition movement called "Speak the Truth" ("Gowori Prawdu") was created. The opposition sector is very diverse and represents different directions and ideologies, nonetheless all these parties, organizations and the movements are very weak and virtually unknown to most people. In 2007, the united Belarusian opposition organized a socio-political campaign "Solidarity" and "Movement for Freedom" to popularize the opposition and mobilize society, however, 77.7% of citizens, according to the IISEPS data, said they had heard nothing about these opposition initiatives. 22 This testifies to the very low impact of the opposition on society and its ineffective activity. What's more, the leaders of various organizations and parties not only do not strive to create the only block and political front, but all the time they accuse each other of cooperating with the regime or Moscow, for corruption, etc. In other words, the hybrid opposition works to achieve the goals of power, but does not express the interests of society. "Opposition" is only a façade, a marker that is needed for the implementation of "political business".

IV. The Belarusian state occupies an important position in organizing and controlling the economic system. At the same time, despite the state's presence in the economy, it was not total as in communist systems. In Belarus's economic system, elements of the market economy were present, namely the functioning of private business. There was no complete return to the planned economy and the elimination of elements of the market economy. This economic model has been given the definition of "market socialism." The essence of this economic model consisted in "shaping a socially oriented, multi-system market economy, with the equivalent functioning of state and private ownership and with various forms of economic activity". 23 The state sector occupied a dominant position in the economy. In 2007-2008, 75% of GDP was generated in the state sector. 24 State ownership prevailed in heavy industry. Less than 1/10 of the state-owned enterprises produced 70% of the total industrial production. 25

(^22) IISEPS, Nacionalnyj opros v Janvarie 2007 goda, http://www.iiseps.org/data07-01-1.html, inf. z 17 V 2009. 23 V. Rudenkov, Razvitije ekonomiki Belarusi: model’ i problemy, „Belorusskij żurnal mezdunarodnogo prava i mezdunarodnych otnoshenij” 2003, nr 1, http://evolutio.info/ index2.php?option=com_content &task=view&id=617&pop=1&page=0&Itemid=54, inf. z 2 III 2010. 24 Ministerstvo Finansov Respubliki Belarus, O socjalno-ekonomicheskom polozenii Respubliki Belarus i sostojanii gosudarstvennych finansom, Minfin.gov.by, http:// www.minfin.gov.by/rmenu/budget/ analytic-data/year07/ys07/, inf. z 18 X 2009. 25 Ibid.

Geographically, the Belarusian territory was always under the disadvantage. Its distance from the Russian centrer made it interesting to foreign conquest by other European powers, which provided for a different ethnic and cultural diversity over the years. However Belarus would be one of the first territories to be mastered by the Russians. This fact inhibited any possibility of an autonomous Belarusian territory; the land’s fate was always be in the hands of the surrounding Eastern European powers, the most powerful of which ended up being Russia. The atrocities committed by the Nazis and Soviets wiped out nearly all of the land’s ethnic and cultural diversity. When the country unexpectedly became independent in the 1990s, it understandably came to build statehood around the only prevailing principles from its troubled history: deep divisions within the society and the related ambivalence regarding its national identity. In many respects Belarus remains a work in progress, which gives the advantage to the ruling regime.

Notes:

  1. "Preliminary Results of the 2009 Census" (Minsk: National Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus, 2009), 58; "The 1999 National Census: Principal Results" (National

Statistical Committee of the Republic of Belarus), http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/perepic/ p6.php.

  1. "Trends of Change in Belarusian Public Opinion," IISEPS, June 2011, http:// www.iiseps.org/ etrend.html.
  2. Alexander Klaskovski, "Uroki putcha dlia Belarusi" [Lessons of the coup d'état for Belarus], Naviny, 19 August 2011, http://naviny.by/rubrics/politic/201l/08/19/ ic_articles_112_174797.
  3. As one example, David Marples argues that "Belarus remained the least national of the former Soviet states in 1992." David Marples, Belarus: From Soviet Rule to Nuclear Catastrophe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 37; David Marples, Belarus: A Denationalized Nation (Netherlands: Harwood Academic, 1999).
  4. Dmitri Alexandrov, "Belarus: To Be or Not to Be a Nation," Russia Journal, 18 July 1999
  5. Georgiy Monro, "Paradoxi nezavisimosti" [Paradoxes of independence], Belaruskiy Partizan, 25 August 2011
  6. Ministerstvo Finansov Respubliki Belarus, O socjalno-ekonomicheskom polozenii Respubliki Belarus i sostojanii gosudarstvennych finansom, Minfin.gov.by, http://www.minfin.gov.by/rmenu/ budget/ analytic-data/year07/ys07/, inf. z 18 X 2009.
  7. Niskoefektivnyje predprijatija v Belarusi buduj peredany v chastnuju sobstvennost, Belta.by, 8 XI 2011, http://www.belta.by/ru/all_news/economics/Nizkoeffektivnye- predprijatija-v-Belarusibudut-peredany-v-chastnuju-sobstvennost_i_581097.html, inf. 10 XI 2011.
  8. P. Usow, „Białoruś – „neoautorytaryzm z ludzką twarzą?”, „Wschód Europy” http:// journals.umes.pl/we, 2019, s. 26
  9. Posledniaya inauguracja. Lukashenko verit, chto sposoben peredat’ vlast’ mladshemu synu, „Belaruskaya Prawda”, http://belprauda.org/lukashenko-verit-chto-sposoben- peredat-vlast-mladshemu-synu/, inf. z 11 II 2016.
  10. Selskoje choziajstvo v Respublikie Belarus. Statisticheskij zbornik, Mińsk 2011, p. 283
  11. Tatiana Nechapaika, "Belarus: 'rayskoie mesto dlia poriadochnih russkih'" [Belarus: "heaven for law-abiding Russians"], BBC Russian, 27 July 2007; "Lukashenko: my eshcho ne nashchupali tu nasionalnuyu ideyu.. ." [Lukashenko: we have riot yet grasped