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Book open innovation, Manual de Inovação. Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ)

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Open Innovation : The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting From Technology

Open Innovation

i-xvi Chesbrough FM 3rd 1/28/03 3:16 PM Page i

i-xvi Chesbrough FM 3rd 1/28/03 3:16 PM Page ii

Open Innovation

The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting

from Technology

Henry W. Chesbrough

harvard business school press Boston, Massachusetts

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Copyright 2003 Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

07–06–05–04–03——5–4–3–2–1

No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means (electronic,

mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise), without the prior permission of the publisher. Requests for permission should be directed to

permissions@hbsp.harvard.edu, or mailed to Permissions, Harvard Business School Publishing, 60 Harvard Way, Boston, Massachusetts 02163.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Chesbrough, Henry William.

Open innovation : the new imperative for creating and profiting from technology / Henry W. Chesbrough.

p. cm. Includes index.

isbn 1-57851-837-7 1. Technological innovations—Management. 2. Research,

Industrial—Management. 3. Diffusion of innovations. 4. High technology industries—Technological innovations—

United States—Case studies. I. Title. hd45 .c469 2003 658.5'14—dc21

2002151060

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Publications

and Documents in Libraries and Archives z39.48-1992.

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For Katherine

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Contents

Foreword—ix

Acknowledgments—xiii

Introduction—xvii

1. Xerox PARC—1 The Achievements and Limits of Closed Innovation

2. The Closed Innovation Paradigm—21

3. The Open Innovation Paradigm—43

4. The Business Model—63 Connecting Internal and External Innovation

5. From Closed to Open Innovation—93 The Transformation of the IBM Corporation

6. Open Innovation @ Intel—113

7. Creating New Ventures out of Internal Technologies—135 Lucent’s New Ventures Group

8. Business Models and Managing Intellectual Property—155

9. Making the Transition—177 Open Innovation Strategies and Tactics

Notes—197

Index—217

About the Author—227—

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ix

Foreword Innovating Innovation

A s a student of innovation for more than twenty years, I still findit amazing just how difficult innovation continues to be. But today we are faced with the extra problem that our ideas of innovation have gone stale. So we need to be innovative in the area of innovation itself, which is what this book will help us to do and what I mean by calling this foreword “Innovating Innovation.” By innovation I mean something quite different from invention. To me, innovation means invention im- plemented and taken to market. And beyond innovation lies disruptive innovation, which actually changes social practices—the way we live, work, and learn. Really substantive innovation—the telephone, the copier, the automobile, the personal computer, or the Internet—is quite disruptive, drastically altering social practices.

Disruptive innovation presents some major challenges. First, al- though it may be relatively easy to predict the potential capabilities of a technological breakthrough in terms of the products it enables, it is nearly impossible to predict the way that these products or offerings will shape social practices. The surprising rise of e-mail is but one example. It is not technology per se that matters, but technology-in-use, and that is precisely what is so hard to predict ahead of time. Nevertheless, tech- nological breakthroughs that do end up shaping our social practices can produce huge payoffs, both to the innovator and to society.1

A second major challenge is that a successful innovation often demands an innovative business model at least as much as it requires an innovative product offering. This is a hard lesson for research departments of large corporations to learn. It is also why so many great-sounding innovations in the research lab fail to see the light of day. In the lab, we have devised many ways to rapidly prototype an idea, explore its capabilities, and even

i-xvi Chesbrough FM 3rd 1/28/03 3:16 PM Page ix

test lead customers’ reactions to it. But innovations that intrigue the cus- tomer don’t necessarily support serious business models—as the dot- com boom and bust showed again and again—and even those that do may support a model that threatens to cannibalize the sponsoring corpora- tion’s existing business models. So, as one aspect of innovating innova- tion, we need to find ways to experiment not only with the product in- novation itself, but also with novel business models. Rapid business model prototyping is therefore critically important to the future of tech- nological innovation, and Henry Chesbrough makes it a centerpiece of the “open innovation” scheme of this book.

There are additional reasons to innovate innovation. Most prior mod- els turned on the creativity within the firm; in today’s world we are faced with two new realities. The first is that there are now powerful ways to reach beyond the conventional boundaries of the firm and tap the ideas of customers and users. Indeed, the networked world allows us essen- tially to bring customers into the lab as coproducers. We can tap not only the customers’ explicit knowledge, but also their tacit knowledge made manifest as they start to use a prototype. Prototypes used by real cus- tomers who are at work on their own problems afford a kind of reflection in practice that helps to flush out serious flaws, misleading instructions, and missing functionality before the product is brought to market.

The second reality has to do with the fact that today most of the world’s really smart people aren’t members of any single team but are dis- tributed all over the place in multiple institutions. Similarly, we are now looking for innovations in the interstices between different disciplines— for example, between bio- and nanotechnologies. Any new model of inno- vation must find ways to leverage the disparate knowledge assets of people who see the world quite differently and who use tools and methods foreign to those we’re familiar with. Such people are likely to work both in differ- ent disciplines and in different institutions. Finding successful ways to work with them will lie at the heart of innovating innovation.

New technology offers us new tools to help in this meta-innovation. I have already mentioned the use of the Net to bring customers’ practices (rather than just the customer’s voice) into shaping a prototype. Even cars are first rendered in software before they are actually built, and as such they can be directly experienced (and, in some cases, driven) as a soft, highly malleable prototype and can evoke a customer’s tacitly held opin- ions. With the power of today’s computers to simulate massively complex

x Foreword: Innovating Innovation

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and nonlinear systems coupled to phenomenal visualization techniques, the customer can be brought ever closer to the design process.

There is another set of tools that can deeply shape the practices of innovation, and, in particular, work on the business models that innova- tion also needs. These are financial tools that build bridges between the flexibilities of the venture world and the predictable financial con- straints of a public company. These tools use real options theory for managing the cash flow decisions in an innovation process. Unlike the use of net present value (NPV) calculations, which inherently view the innovation process as static, compound real options honor its inherently dynamic nature. These options provide a way to fold into the decision processes two sources of learning, one involving learning by doing (what is learned about the technology while developing the product), the other involving learning while waiting (what is discovered from the market as the product is being developed). At each stage for potentially scaling or exiting the project, both sources of information come into play. Furthermore, an options approach moves us from viewing the pur- suit of an innovation as making a bet to viewing it as buying a possibil- ity for the future while still delaying substantial cash flow. Although this is a complex topic all its own, I mention it here because it provides a wide variety of tools for modeling many of the ideas of open innovation, such as capturing some of the better properties of the venture capital world, only now it can be done inside the corporation.

The open innovation model that Chesbrough describes shows the necessity of letting ideas both flow out of the corporation in order to find better sites for their monetization, and flow into the corporation as new offerings and new business models. Finding the right balance and mech- anisms for this situation to take place is critical. If a rising corporate star brings forth a risky innovation that ends up failing, his or her career is apt to be damaged considerably more than that of the executive who squelches an innovation that could have been a winner. An open innovation model diminishes both the error of squelching a winner and that of backing a loser, and moves us closer to a world where protective moves and face- saving mechanisms no longer cause potentially great innovations to be shelved. Innovation is too important to let either corporate politics or outmoded assumptions carry the day. Let us be wary of the old, conser- vative, but still very powerful wisdom that can always find reasons or ex- amples from the past to prove that any particular innovation is foolhardy.

Foreword: Innovating Innovation xi

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Let us all, instead, engage in the vitally important work of innovating innovation. Open Innovation is a timely, carefully researched, and thought- fully articulated effort toward that end.

—John Seely Brown Director Emeritus,

Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC)

xii Foreword: Innovating Innovation

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xiii

Acknowledgments

This book results from a former Silicon Valley manager’s reflec-tions on his own experience in managing technology in industry and then considering the innovation process more generally from within academia. I hope that this book combines the practical with the theoret- ical, so that both managers and academics will find it to be of value.

Many of my colleagues at Harvard Business School have made sub- stantial contributions to the work contained in this book. Foremost among them is Richard Rosenbloom. His many decades of careful, thoughtful scholarship have greatly increased my understanding of the innovation process. Dick has also worked closely with senior leaders at the Xerox Corporation, and his insight into that company’s internal processes added immeasurably to my research on the spin-off compa- nies that left the Xerox nest. Clayton Christensen and Dorothy Leonard have also taught me a great deal about the problems of innovation. Each read an early draft of the entire manuscript and offered useful criticism. Other scholars of innovation at Harvard who have added to the thoughts in this book include Mary Tripsas, Stefan Thomke, and Josh Lerner. The Harvard Division of Research provided generous financial support for this research. Edward Smith helped with many of the Xerox spin-off company field interviews, while Anthony Massaro and Clarissa Ceruti also provided helpful research support. I am also indebted to my editor at HBS Press, Jeff Kehoe, for his support and guidance through the manuscript’s development and editing process.

Since this book highlights the importance of external sources of knowledge to the innovation process, it is no surprise that my own un- derstanding has advanced because of the work and ideas of others out- side my own academic institution. David Teece, David Mowery, and Bronwyn Hall all deepened my appreciation of the innovation process and the wealth of prior scholarship in the area. Richard Nelson, Steven

i-xvi Chesbrough FM 3rd 1/28/03 3:16 PM Page xiii

Klepper, and Keith Pavitt have provided timely criticism as the project moved forward. Others, including Brian Silverman, Fiona Murray, Kwanghui Lim, Annabelle Gawer, Andrea Prencipe, and Arvids Ziedo- nis, have helped me refine numerous points in this book.

A third critical source of information for this book has come from managers of companies struggling with the innovation process in their own firms. At Xerox, I have benefited tremendously from discussions with John Seely Brown, Mark Myers, Herve Gallaire, Mark Bernstein, Richard Bruce, Ramana Rao, William Spencer, and many other former Xerox employees who migrated into one of the thirty-five spin-off companies I studied. At IBM, I had useful exchanges with Nicholas D’Onofrio, Paul Horn, Philip Summers, John Wolpert, and John Patrick. At Intel, Leslie Vadasz, Sun-Lin Chou, Keith Larson, Howard High, David Tennenhouse, and the late Sandy Wilson generously shared their time with me. At Lucent, Andrew Garman, Tom Uhlman, Ralph Faison, and Stephen Socolof discussed their experiences with me. At Procter & Gamble, Larry Huston and Scott Cook outlined their new, externally focused innovation strategy. I hope that this book is worthy of these managers’ time and candor.

Other thoughtful observers of the problems of industrial innovation shared their perspectives with me. They included Arati Prabhakar, Pat Windham, Jerry Sheehan, Nancy Confrey, U.S. Navy Captain Terry Pierce, and Cameron Peters. My close friends Ken Novak, Rich Mironov, and Rudy Ruggles patiently endured early articulations of concepts in the book.

The students in my classroom have been a vital part of my own process of reflection on industrial innovation. Although they do not yet have the years of experience that my managerial sources possess, they bring a fresh perspective that challenges the conventional wisdom that often accompanies deep experience. Their questions, arguments, and conclusions have helped me test and revise my own thinking about innovation.

I am also indebted to my parents, Richard and Joyce Chesbrough, for their unflagging moral support while I wrote this book. My daugh- ters, Emily and Sarah, have helped me keep perspective during the writ- ing process and were (usually) understanding about letting me finish it. My deepest gratitude, however, goes to my wife, Katherine. From the early beginnings of the field research, to the conception of the book it- self in the cool air of the Sierra Nevadas, to the numerous revisions of

xiv Acknowledgments

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the resulting manuscript, she has given unconditional support and in- sightful criticism throughout. This book is far better as a result of her commitment to its realization. With my deepest appreciation and love, I dedicate this book to her.

—Henry Chesbrough henry@chesbrough.com

Acknowledgments xv

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i-xvi Chesbrough FM 3rd 1/28/03 3:16 PM Page xvi

1

Xerox PARC

The Achievements and Limits of Closed Innovation

T he xerox corporation, the leading copier company, has a sto-ried history of innovation. Much of that innovation arose from Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), which was aimed at a new market for Xerox, the computer industry. While Xerox’s problems with capturing value from its investments in innovation at PARC are well known, few know the whole story.

For Xerox’s experience with PARC poses a challenging puzzle: How could a company that possessed the resources and vision to launch a brilliant research center—not to mention the patience to fund the cen- ter for more than thirty years, and the savvy to incorporate important technologies from it—let so many good ideas get away? Did Xerox mis- manage PARC? Did PARC pursue the wrong projects? Did it abandon the wrong projects? Why did so many of PARC’s computer industry in- novations yield so little for Xerox and its shareholders?

The answers to these questions point both to the accomplishments and the problems associated with the way that Xerox managed its re- search and technology. Xerox’s approach was consistent with the best practice of most leading industrial corporations in the twentieth cen- tury. A brief history of Xerox illustrates the many benefits of this ap- proach and the increasing difficulties that it has recently encountered.

Xerox’s Innovation Achievements

In 1970, the Xerox Corporation was riding high. It had grown from a tiny company called Haloid in the 1950s into a Fortune 500 colossus.

1

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With a dominant share of the booming office copier market, Xerox was growing fast and was very profitable. Its stock was a darling on Wall Street, one of the so-called Nifty Fifty.

To the company’s credit, Xerox realized that this good fortune would not continue indefinitely. If the company wanted to ensure its future, it realized that it would need to make important investments to position itself for that future. In 1969, its chief executive, Peter Mc- Colough, commissioned Jacob Goldman, who was then the head of research at Xerox, to build a new laboratory within the corporate research organization. This new laboratory would provide the company with the technology necessary to realize McColough’s vision of “the archi- tecture of information.” McColough’s vision was that Xerox would transcend its current business of being the leading office copier com- pany to become the leading office equipment supplier of information- intensive products.

Goldman eagerly accepted the assignment. He strongly felt that such investments were needed if Xerox were to avoid the fate of com- panies such as RCA. RCA had been a pioneer in consumer electronics, both in radio and later in television. The company had developed strong capabilities in vacuum tube technology to give its products the best quality at low cost. When William Shockley and his colleagues at Bell Laboratories produced the transistor, RCA responded by deepen- ing its investments in vacuum tube technology. Although RCA did achieve further improvements, it failed to foresee the tremendous po- tential in solid-state electronic technology.1 By the 1960s, RCA had lost all of its technology edge in the market and had become a hollow shell of its former greatness. In Goldman’s view, only vigilant invest- ment in leading-edge technologies could protect Xerox from a similar fate in its own business.2

The Creation of PARC

Goldman recruited Xerox scientist George Pake to lead this new re- search facility. Pake received his assignment at a fortuitous time, when government research spending on computer technology was declining. As a result, Pake and his staff were able to recruit many of the world’s best researchers in the field. In 1970, Pake established the Palo Alto Re- search Center in Palo Alto, CA, to house this group.

2 Open Innovation

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PARC would turn out to be a true research success. It led the discov- ery of a variety of important innovations that today are a critical part of the personal computer and communications revolution. The graphical user interface originated at PARC. The bit-mapped screen, which re- placed the green ASCII characters on terminals, was also born there. The Ethernet networking protocol was developed there, as were other, higher-speed networking protocols. The leading font rendering pro- gram, PostScript, descends directly from PARC. Later PARC projects included document management software, Web searching and indexing technologies, and online conferencing technologies.

PARC also made important research contributions in semiconduc- tor diode lasers and in laser printing, developments that would prove highly important to Xerox’s copier and printer businesses. But, with the benefit of hindsight, much of PARC’s research and technology would create tremendous economic value for society, yet yield little value for its parent company.

PARC’s inability to capture value from its technology for Xerox has been debated at length. Some accounts fault Xerox’s corporate manage- ment in Stamford, CT, for failing to perceive the value of the technol- ogy being created at its West Coast laboratory. Other accounts fault the politics and infighting within the PARC facility, in addition to errors at corporate headquarters, for the problems in capturing value from PARC technology.3

These reasons seem unsatisfying. The Xerox Corporation had the vision to create and generously support PARC for more than thirty years. If the corporation were truly unaware of the value of the lab, it is hard to believe that this support should have continued for so long. And PARC scientists were not simply creating technology. They were build- ing highly advanced systems that integrated many different types of hardware and that ran very complex software applications. Accomplish- ing this integration required cooperation and connection across a vari- ety of scientific disciplines, which seems at odds with the notion of a re- search center riven by dysfunctional infighting.

These proffered accounts miss the root cause of PARC’s problems. The research center was not mismanaged; rather, it was managed ac- cording to the best practices of the leading industrial research laborato- ries. Nor were PARC’s leaders ignorant; they were intelligent, reason- able people who were up to date on good R&D management practice.

Xerox PARC 3

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And PARC was not ineffective; indeed, it contributed much of the sys- tems architecture and technology behind the personal computer and communications industries. Nor was the research center irrelevant to the rest of Xerox; the laser printers and advanced copiers sold by Xerox came directly out of PARC research breakthroughs.

We can learn a great deal by identifying the root cause of Xerox’s problems with PARC, because it determines the lessons we learn from Xerox’s experience. Some observers attribute Xerox’s problems to corpo- rate management’s ignorance or to internal politicking. The implications are that the rest of us have little to learn from Xerox’s experience. If, how- ever, Xerox managed its R&D according to the best practices that were typical of most leading industrial organizations, then the lessons from Xerox’s difficulties are vitally important for every innovating organiza- tion to understand. Understanding PARC’s situation more deeply may illuminate a different way to manage innovation activities going forward.

The Root Cause of Xerox’s “PARC Problem”

After carefully reviewing many projects within Xerox and inter- viewing nearly one hundred current and former managers, I have con- cluded that Xerox’s problems with PARC arose from the way Xerox managed its innovation process. Xerox managed PARC through a Closed Innovation paradigm: The corporation sought to discover new breakthroughs; develop them into products; build the products in its factories; and distribute, finance, and service those products—all within the four walls of the company. This paradigm was hardly unique to Xerox; it was used to manage all the leading industrial R&D facilities operating in the U.S. economy after World War II.

The greatest technological achievements that emerged from PARC, by contrast, could only take root—and create real economic value— when pursued in a far different context, a context of Open Innovation. Most of these achievements were realized only when key PARC re- searchers left Xerox and went to other, smaller companies or went out on their own to start up new companies. These companies could not af- ford to pursue the model of deep vertical integration that Xerox fol- lowed. Instead, they had to define a business model to commercialize their own technologies. They had to create systems and architectures that enabled their products to work with other companies’ products to build a system. Those start-ups that achieved commercial success did so

4 Open Innovation

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by applying their technology quite differently from how the researchers had originally envisioned when they left Xerox.

Some of the technologies took root through the departure of key employees to Apple, where the Macintosh computer embodied many of the user-interface design concepts created at PARC. Other technologies were commercialized at Microsoft. For example, the Bravo word proces- sor was the precursor to Microsoft Word. Despite their present-day size, both Apple and Microsoft were themselves very young companies when they absorbed some of PARC’s technologies, and neither had any inter- nal research capability at the time.4

The majority of technologies that left PARC, however, did so via newly formed, independent start-up companies, which were staffed by departing PARC researchers and funded by venture capitalists.5 Table 1-1 shows twenty-four of these PARC “spin-off companies” that were cre- ated to commercialize one of Xerox’s technologies from 1979 through 1998. As one would expect, many of these companies soon withered and died. Some companies, though, managed to prosper. Ten went public, and a few (such as 3Com, Adobe, and Documentum) were still operating as independent companies in 2002.

Table 1-1 also debunks another myth that has grown up around Xerox’s management of its spin-off technologies. Most of these tech- nologies did not “leak” out of Xerox through inadvertence and neglect on the part of Xerox’s research managers. Instead, Xerox gave its explicit permission for most of these technologies to leave—via a nonexclusive technology license from Xerox—and Xerox maintained an equity stake in many of them in return for that license.

If Xerox didn’t fumble these spin-offs, then why did it allow them to leave? Although the specific answer varies with every spin-off company, the general answer is that Xerox saw little further potential for each technology within Xerox. Continuing to develop each technology was expensive and took money away from other new initiatives that might be more important to Xerox. When Xerox’s research managers judged that a research project had little more to contribute to Xerox’s funda- mental knowledge or to its businesses, they cut off further funding of the research. In many cases, the researchers chose to work on new re- search projects with greater discovery potential or value to Xerox. Sometimes, though, the researchers wanted to continue with the proj- ect. Xerox chose to allow these researchers to gracefully exit the com- pany and take the project with them.6

Xerox PARC 5

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001-020 Chesbrough c1 2nd 1/28/03 3:18 PM Page 7

Although some of these departing technologies later became highly valuable, they did not start out as clear winners. The success of some of these departing spin-offs was largely unforeseen—and unforeseeable. When they left, these spin-offs were far more like ugly ducklings than elegant swans. The projects underwent significant development—and even transformation—on their journey to market after leaving Xerox. If they had stayed inside Xerox, this transformation would never have occurred and the value of these spin-offs likely never would have mate- rialized. Their success arose more from their response to subsequent external events than it did from the initial promise of the technology or the people. The path of this transformation is illustrated in the evolu- tion of SynOptics, a successful, though lesser known, Xerox PARC spin-off company.

The Transformation of SynOptics

SynOptics technology grew within PARC with the goal of making a fast version of Ethernet work over optical cables in the mid-1980s. The project continued the Ethernet research that Robert Metcalfe had commercialized out of PARC with his 3Com start-up five years earlier. But commercializ- ing this technology required other technologies that were many years away from being widely available, such as optical cables for computer networks, to be installed at customers’ locations. In order to use SynOptics technol- ogy, the customers would have to install networks with entirely new wiring to connect the computers, printers, and other devices—making the cost of installing and using the technology very expensive. Xerox decided that this was one technology it needn’t pursue any further internally—it was too far ahead of customers’ needs in the mainstream computer market.

Andy Ludwick and Ronald Schmidt decided to take this technology outside to see if they could make it into a company. They could afford to be patient for optical cabling media to become established in the mar- ket, and they thought that they could distribute their products through value-added distributors who were selling and installing optical gear. It might take a while and it might initially be expensive for customers to buy complete, optically wired networks, but once the market did get going, they would be well positioned to participate in the growth that would follow. A graceful exit from Xerox ensued, with Ludwick and Schmidt taking the technology outside, and Xerox retaining a 15 per- cent equity share of the company.

8 Open Innovation

001-020 Chesbrough c1 2nd 1/28/03 3:18 PM Page 8

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