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without qualifications, reservations or additions: see, e.g., Nicolene v. Simmonds (1953). Thus, conditional acceptance ≠ acceptance: see, e.g., Winn v.
Typology: Lecture notes
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Lee A. Bygrave
Ad. (i): acceptance may be oral, written or by conduct on part of offeree. Need to be able to infer intention by offeree to be bound by terms of offer. Cannot stipulate silence as acceptance: see Felthouse v. Bindley (1862). Cf. Re Selectmove Ltd. (1995).
Ad. (ii): person must know of offer in order to be able to accept it, but motive in accepting is irrelevant.
Ad. (iii): reply to offer is only effective as acceptance if it accepts all terms of offer without qualifications, reservations or additions: see, e.g., Nicolene v. Simmonds (1953). Thus, conditional acceptance ≠ acceptance: see, e.g., Winn v. Bull (1877). NB: The “battle of the forms” – Butler Machine Tool Co. Ltd. v. Ex-Cell-O- Corp. Ltd. (1979). Cf. The issue of long-term relationship and context – Tekdata Interconnections Ltd. v. Amphenol Ltd. (2009)
Ad. (iv): acceptance must be communicated and is effective when and where received by offeror. See, e.g., Entores v. Miles Far East Corp. (1955). Onus on offeree to get message through to offeror, and offeree must believe, as reasonable person, that acceptance has been received. Thus, reasonable expectations of offeree = point of departure for resolving issue of when and whether communication of acceptance has occurred. See espec. Brinkibon v. Stahag Stahl (1982). (Poole: “a general principle appears to be identifiable, namely that if the offeree has done all that he might reasonably be expected to do to get his message through, that acceptance should take effect when the offeree might reasonably expect it to be communicated to the offeror” (p. 63))
Specifying method of acceptance?
Exceptions to communication rule:
Agreement must be sufficiently certain and complete before it is legally valid. The criteria of certainty and completeness are separate, albeit related. Certainty refers to need for terms of agreement to be sufficiently precise and clear; completeness to need for specification of all of essential terms of agreement. Cf. Poole, chapter 3 treats completeness as aspect of certainty.
The requirements are in terms of sufficiency and are thus necessarily relative. Generally, a court will try to find that the requirements are met, but it will not repair a deficiency if the requirements are not fulfilled.
Regarding completeness , importance of term depends on circumstances of each agreement. For instance, in agreement for sale of land, specification of both property and price (or mechanism for establishing price) is essential.
If agreement is executed, a court is more likely to find the requirements are met: see, e.g., Foley v. Classique Coaches Ltd. (1934); RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v. Molkerei Alois Müller GmbH & Co (UK Production) (2010).
Regarding certainty , an “agreement to agree” will usually be found void for uncertainty. So too will open-ended “lock-out” agreement (i.e., requiring parties to exclusively negotiate with each other): Walford v. Miles (1992). However, if “lock-out” agreement stipulates definite time period for negotiation, it might be sufficiently certain: Pitt v. PHH Asset Management Ltd (1994) per CA.
If agreement expressly stipulates duty to negotiate in good faith, this might be sufficiently certain where the court can find concrete criteria by which to operationalize the duty: see cases referred to in Poole, p. 89.
If initial agreement is reached on price in long-term, ongoing contract, certainty will usually be found: see, e.g., Mamidoil-Jetoil Greek Petroleum Co. SA v. Okta Crude Oil Refinery (No. 1) (2001).