Acceptance; Intention to Create Legal Relations, Lecture notes of Communication

without qualifications, reservations or additions: see, e.g., Nicolene v. Simmonds (1953). Thus, conditional acceptance ≠ acceptance: see, e.g., Winn v.

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JUS5260 Autumn 2012 – Acceptance; Intention to Create
Legal Relations; Certainty & Completeness
Lee A. Bygrave
Acceptance
1. What is acceptance?
(i) the final and unconditional expression of consent to offer;
(ii) made in response to offer;
(iii)exactly matching terms of offer;
(iv) communicated to offeror.
Ad. (i): acceptance may be oral, written or by conduct on part of offeree. Need to be able
to infer intention by offeree to be bound by terms of offer.
Cannot stipulate silence as acceptance: see Felthouse v. Bindley (1862). Cf. Re
Selectmove Ltd. (1995).
Ad. (ii): person must know of offer in order to be able to accept it, but motive in
accepting is irrelevant.
Ad. (iii): reply to offer is only effective as acceptance if it accepts all terms of offer
without qualifications, reservations or additions: see, e.g., Nicolene v. Simmonds (1953).
Thus, conditional acceptance acceptance: see, e.g., Winn v. Bull (1877).
NB: The “battle of the forms” Butler Machine Tool Co. Ltd. v. Ex-Cell-O-
Corp. Ltd. (1979). Cf. The issue of long-term relationship and context – Tekdata
Interconnections Ltd. v. Amphenol Ltd. (2009)
Ad. (iv): acceptance must be communicated and is effective when and where received by
offeror. See, e.g., Entores v. Miles Far East Corp. (1955).
Onus on offeree to get message through to offeror, and offeree must believe, as
reasonable person, that acceptance has been received. Thus, reasonable
expectations of offeree = point of departure for resolving issue of when and
whether communication of acceptance has occurred. See espec. Brinkibon v.
Stahag Stahl (1982). (Poole: “a general principle appears to be identifiable,
namely that if the offeree has done all that he might reasonably be expected to do
to get his message through, that acceptance should take effect when the offeree
might reasonably expect it to be communicated to the offeror” (p. 63))
Specifying method of acceptance?
If offeror stipulates that offer must be accepted in a certain way then only
acceptance by that method – or an equally effective one – will be binding. To
be equally effective, the alternative acceptance method must be at least as fast
and as advantageous for the offeror as the method stipulated by the offeror:
see Tinn v. Hoffman (1873); cf. Quenerduaine v. Cole (1883).
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JUS5260 Autumn 2012 – Acceptance; Intention to Create

Legal Relations; Certainty & Completeness

Lee A. Bygrave

Acceptance

  1. What is acceptance? (i) the final and unconditional expression of consent to offer; (ii) made in response to offer; (iii)exactly matching terms of offer; (iv) communicated to offeror.

Ad. (i): acceptance may be oral, written or by conduct on part of offeree. Need to be able to infer intention by offeree to be bound by terms of offer. Cannot stipulate silence as acceptance: see Felthouse v. Bindley (1862). Cf. Re Selectmove Ltd. (1995).

Ad. (ii): person must know of offer in order to be able to accept it, but motive in accepting is irrelevant.

Ad. (iii): reply to offer is only effective as acceptance if it accepts all terms of offer without qualifications, reservations or additions: see, e.g., Nicolene v. Simmonds (1953). Thus, conditional acceptance ≠ acceptance: see, e.g., Winn v. Bull (1877). NB: The “battle of the forms” – Butler Machine Tool Co. Ltd. v. Ex-Cell-O- Corp. Ltd. (1979). Cf. The issue of long-term relationship and context – Tekdata Interconnections Ltd. v. Amphenol Ltd. (2009)

Ad. (iv): acceptance must be communicated and is effective when and where received by offeror. See, e.g., Entores v. Miles Far East Corp. (1955). Onus on offeree to get message through to offeror, and offeree must believe, as reasonable person, that acceptance has been received. Thus, reasonable expectations of offeree = point of departure for resolving issue of when and whether communication of acceptance has occurred. See espec. Brinkibon v. Stahag Stahl (1982). (Poole: “a general principle appears to be identifiable, namely that if the offeree has done all that he might reasonably be expected to do to get his message through, that acceptance should take effect when the offeree might reasonably expect it to be communicated to the offeror” (p. 63))

Specifying method of acceptance?

  • If offeror stipulates that offer must be accepted in a certain way then only acceptance by that method – or an equally effective one – will be binding. To be equally effective, the alternative acceptance method must be at least as fast and as advantageous for the offeror as the method stipulated by the offeror: see Tinn v. Hoffman (1873); cf. Quenerduaine v. Cole (1883).
  • If specified method of acceptance is only included for benefit of offeree, then latter does not have to use that method: see, e.g., Yates Building Co. Ltd. v. J. Pulleyn & Sons (York) Ltd. (1975).

Exceptions to communication rule:

  • Communication waived by offeror – typical in case of unilateral contract ( Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. );
  • However, offeror may not bind offeree by stipulating that silence = consent ( Felthouse v. Bindley );
  • Conduct of offeror – if offeror does not receive acceptance due to their own fault ( Brinkibon ; The Brimnes (1975));
  • Postal rule: If reasonable to use post, acceptance deemed completed on posting: Adams v. Lindsell (1818) o Postal rule may not apply if offeror (expressly or impliedly) excludes it: Holwell Securities v. Hughes (1974); o Postal rule does not apply when acceptance is by instantaneous mode of communication (telephone, telex, etc.) (and sent and received within ordinary working hours): Brinkibon ; Entores ; The Brimnes.  What = ordinary business hours? Thomas v. BPE Solicitors (2010): 18:00 on Friday evening in late August prior to long weekend = ord. business hours in that particular context!; The Brimnes : 17:30-18:00 = ord. business hours too.  Status of message left on telephone answering machine? (Poole, p. 64)  Status of fax? = instantaneous mode of communication ( JSC Zestafoni Nikoladze Ferroalley Plant v. Ronly Holdings Ltd (2004))  Status of email communication? (Poole, p. 65–66: preferred approach is to treat this as instantaneous communication. Supported in Thomas v. BPE Solicitors (2010) per Blair J (obiter only), and High Court of Singapore in Chwee Kin Keong v. Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd (2004)).
  1. Time period for acceptance – when does it begin to run?
  • In England, unclear.
  • Cf. Norwegian legislation – Contracts Act of 1918 (Avtaleloven) § 2: “akseptfrist”, if not regulated by offer, begins to run from date of letter if offer sent by letter, and from moment telegram is delivered to telegram office, if offer sent by telegram.
  1. Acceptance of unilateral offers? Generally assumed that no acceptance occurs until act is completely performed.

Certainty & completeness

Agreement must be sufficiently certain and complete before it is legally valid. The criteria of certainty and completeness are separate, albeit related. Certainty refers to need for terms of agreement to be sufficiently precise and clear; completeness to need for specification of all of essential terms of agreement. Cf. Poole, chapter 3 treats completeness as aspect of certainty.

The requirements are in terms of sufficiency and are thus necessarily relative. Generally, a court will try to find that the requirements are met, but it will not repair a deficiency if the requirements are not fulfilled.

Regarding completeness , importance of term depends on circumstances of each agreement. For instance, in agreement for sale of land, specification of both property and price (or mechanism for establishing price) is essential.

If agreement is executed, a court is more likely to find the requirements are met: see, e.g., Foley v. Classique Coaches Ltd. (1934); RTS Flexible Systems Ltd v. Molkerei Alois Müller GmbH & Co (UK Production) (2010).

Regarding certainty , an “agreement to agree” will usually be found void for uncertainty. So too will open-ended “lock-out” agreement (i.e., requiring parties to exclusively negotiate with each other): Walford v. Miles (1992). However, if “lock-out” agreement stipulates definite time period for negotiation, it might be sufficiently certain: Pitt v. PHH Asset Management Ltd (1994) per CA.

If agreement expressly stipulates duty to negotiate in good faith, this might be sufficiently certain where the court can find concrete criteria by which to operationalize the duty: see cases referred to in Poole, p. 89.

If initial agreement is reached on price in long-term, ongoing contract, certainty will usually be found: see, e.g., Mamidoil-Jetoil Greek Petroleum Co. SA v. Okta Crude Oil Refinery (No. 1) (2001).