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An insightful analysis of aristotle's theory of the four causes, explaining the differences between his concept of cause and the modern one. It clarifies the meanings of material, formal, efficient, and final causes and their applications to both artificial and natural objects. The document also discusses the importance of understanding aristotle's doctrine in modern times.
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Revision Notes : I talked with Dr. Haas about my first paper, and he agreed with your suggestion of abandoning the dialog form and instead writing a straightforward essay, because the dialog wasn’t essential to the discussion. I decided to focus on Aristotle’s Four Causes, and it seemed a little artificial and unnecessary to include references to Alice or Candide.
Today, understanding Aristotle’s doctrine of the Four Causes requires some effort, because our modern notion of “cause” differs from Aristotle’s. By giving a careful account of the Four Causes and explaining the relationship among them, we can appreciate Aristotle’s thinking despite our modernity. First of all, we need to clarify what Aristotle means by “cause”, because it is not what we mean by “cause”. In its modern usage, a cause is an event, which brings about other events, which we call its effects. For Aristotle, CAUSE has a broader meaning, as it is applicable not only to events but to almost anything. In the Aristotelian sense, a CAUSE is an explanatory factor: it is what we answer when asked a “why” question. The Four Causes, then, classify the ways we can answer a “why” question about a thing. With his doctrine, Aristotle disambiguates the senses of CAUSE and distinguishes four kinds: (1) Material CAUSE (“that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists” 1 ), (2) Formal CAUSE (“the statement of essence”), (3) Efficient CAUSE (“the primary source of the change”), (4) Final CAUSE (the end or ‘that for the sake of which’ a thing is done”). (^1) Aristotle. Physics. Translated by Robin Waterfield, and edited by David Bostock. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. (Selections)
The material and formal CAUSES explain how something is and the efficient and final CAUSES explain how something becomes. For example, the material CAUSE of a statue is its bronze, the formal CAUSE is its shape, the efficient CAUSE is its sculptor, and the final CAUSE is the goal the sculptor had in mind. Aristotle intended the Four Causes to apply not only to artifacts but also to natural objects. In the case of an artifact, the efficient CAUSE is the artisan and the final CAUSE is the artisan’s purpose. In the case of Nature, the analogy with artifacts seems problematic: is the efficient CAUSE God and the final CAUSE God’s purpose? Aristotle doesn’t say so. To motivate the need for the final CAUSE in Nature, Aristotle uses the example of how teeth grows, rejecting that it can happen by chance, because it “invariably or normally comes about in a given way; but of not one of the results of chance or spontaneity is this true.” 2 An attribute of a thing cannot just be a coincidence if it happens regularly. The final CAUSE explains the regularity of the connection. For a natural object, the final cause is what lies at the end of its development process. In this sense, the final CAUSE of a child is a man. A CAUSE can often range more than one of the four Aristotelian senses at once; in natural objects in particular, the final, formal and efficient CAUSES coincide. The final CAUSE is the form the natural object will ultimately achieve, and so the final CAUSE is the same as the formal CAUSE. For Aristotle, the efficient CAUSE of a child is the father, and so the efficient CAUSE is the same as the final CAUSE. For example, a man is a CAUSE of a man, in the final, formal and efficient senses. Though it seems circular and vacuous to say, “an X is for the sake of an X”, where X is a natural (^2) Aristotle. Physics. Translated by Robin Waterfield, and edited by David Bostock. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. (Selections)