Concept Formation - Lecture Notes | PSYCH 100, Study notes of Psychology

Material Type: Notes; Class: Introductory Psychology; Subject: Psychology; University: University of Massachusetts - Amherst; Term: Unknown 1989;

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Concept formation
Categories and concepts
PCategory: set of entities (things, actions,
properties, ...) In the world
PConcept: our mental representation of a category
PAre categories arbitrary? Or based on what is in
the world?
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Concept formation

Categories and concepts

P Category: set of entities (things, actions,

properties, ...) In the world

P Concept: our mental representation of a category

P Are categories arbitrary? Or based on what is in

the world?

Borge’s Taxonomy of Fauna

Taken from Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things

The taxonomy of the animal kingdom, from The Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge : On those remote pages, it is written that animals are divided into (a) those that belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed ones, (c) those that are trained, (d) suckling pigs, (e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray dogs, (h) those that are included in this classification, (i) those that tremble as if they were mad, (j) innumerable ones, (k) those drawn with a very fine camel’s hair brush, (l) others, (m) those that have just broken a flower vase, (n) those that resemble flies from a distance. (J. L. Borges, 1966, Other Inquisitions

What are the functions of concepts?

P Permit inferences

< Allow reasoning about new things

P Support communication

< Add new information about concepts < Permit economy of communication

Eleanor Rosch’s position

The “Roschian revolution”

P Observation 0 (Wittgenstein): you usually can’t

find defining features for categories

P Observation 1: an entity usually belongs to several

different categories

< But one is “BASIC”

P Observation 2: categories have better and worse

members

< Categories don’t have fixed boundaries

Basic Level Terms

And superordinate and subordinate terms

P Taxonomies of categories

< Animal-mammal-dog-collie < Artifact-furniture-chair-easychair

P Rosch’s observations

< Basic level the preferred name < Fastest to verify name-object match < Learned first < Shortest < ASL, single sign

Figure 8.10 (p. 279) Levels of categories for furniture and vehicles. Rosch provided evidence for the idea that the basic level is “psychologically privileged.”

Basic level principles

P Basic level: the highest (most inclusive) level at

which all instances share a large number of

features

P Feature listing

< Superordinate (furniture): few features < Basic level (chair): many features < Subordinate (easy chair): only a few more features

P Hemenway, members of basic level categories

have parts in common; not so for superordinates

Typicality and category membership

Within-category structure

P Relations between categories: Basic level

analysis

P Within-category relations: Typicality and graded

category membership

Rate the typicality....

P Fruits

< Apple

< Fig

< Olive

< Grape

P Birds

< Robin

< Bat

< Flamingo

< Seagull

Typicality effects

P Time to identify name as category member

P Time to identify picture as category member

P Ease of learning category membership

P Name members of category: frequency of naming

P Similarity ratings (asymmetry): less typical

members are more similar to more typical

members than v.v.

Prototype models

Alternative ideas of prototype

PIdealized, abstract form

PSome kinds of instances

PMental representation of ideal form or instances

Thought transmission?

P I’ll pick number between 10 and 50

P it has to be odd

P each of its digits has to be odd

P its two digits have to be different

< 11 is not good < 15 is OK

P I’ll write it down and think about it

P Then YOU write down what I’m thinking

Exemplar theories of concepts

These theories contrast with prototype theories

P Prototype theory claim: You lean some kind of

abstraction, some single mental representation of

a category

P Exemplar theory claim: You remember individual

instances (exemplars) of concepts, and compare

new things to these remembered instances to

categorize these new things

Exemplar theories of concepts

Their virtues

PExplain typicality effects very well

PPermit mathematical models

< Supports quantitative predictions of choice, learning

PAccounts for feature variation effects

< “pizza” vs “quarter”

PAccounts for feature covariation effects

< “little singing birds” vs “big nonsinging birds”

Strengths and weaknesses of exemplar models P Strengths < Accounts for typicality effects PLUS variability and covariability effects < Permits development of explicit, accurate mathematical models P Weaknesses < Supporting data come from odd experiments that encourage instance memory < People CAN form abstractions < Model doesn’t address main points of why we have concepts (economical prediction) < Exemplar models depend on how you compute similarity

Concepts as theories

Murphy & Medin

P Theory as glue that holds concept together

P Theory as whatever principles tell you which

properties should be important, which

unimportant

< And WHY! < That is, they tell you how to compute similarity

Evidence for concepts as theories

P Facilitation in learning concepts (e.g., “thing that

can be used as a hammer” “prey vs. predator”)

P Ability to form ad hoc categories

P Belief in “essences” (essentialism)

P Keil “transformation” studies (children’s

concepts)

More evidence for concepts as theories

P Illusory correlation: Chapman and Chapman

P Clinicans’ diagnoses of mental disorders: Kim

and Ahn

< DSM IV: checklists of symptoms; presumably theory- free < But diagnosis is categorization < Individual clinician’s diagnosis affected by his/her theory of the disorder

Collins and Quillian expt

Reaction Time to Verify

P Propertyquestions < An oak has acorns?

  • distance 0 < A spruce has branches
  • distance 1 < A birch has seeds
  • distance 2 P Category questions < A maple is a maple?
  • distance 0 < A cedar is a tree?
  • distance 1 < An elm is a plant?
  • distance 2

Collins & Quillian Expts

Spreading activation

P A metaphor: a concept can be active to a greater

or lesser degree

P Its activation spreads to related concepts

P Priming

P Distance effects

P Fan experiments

Fan Experiments, phase 2

P Augmented learning materials

< Marty broke the bottle; Marty did not delay the trip; Marty was chosen to address the crowd < Herb produced sour notes; Herb realized the seam was split; Herb painted an old barn < + six more pairs

P Test phase

< Same as before: Marty broke the bottle, etc.

Fan: three links

Was chosen to address the crowd

Did not delay the trip

Broke the bottle

Marty

Fan experiments

P The time to verify the original facts was longer

when the third fact about each individual was

added

P Interpretation: The activation spreading from the

“Marty” node was divided among more other

nodes (3, not 2). Therefore these other nodes

were activated more slowly.

The paradox of the expert

P the start of the paradox: learning some material

slows you down in remembering other material

and even causes you to forget the other material

(retroactive inhibition)

< So who should have the hardest time remembering material? < well, the person who has learned the most other material – an expert! < but experts seem to have the BEST memory for a topic, not the worst