Civil Rights Laws, Criminal Laws, Regulatory Laws, Interstate | Study notes Law

Con$Law$Outline$–$Professor$Wright$

$ $ us.docsity.com$

Civil%Rights%Laws%and%the%Meaning%of%‘Commerce%Among%the%States’$

A. Civil$Rights$Act$was$enacted$based$under$the$commerce%clause%because$14th$

amendment$was$only$a$limit$on$state$discrimination;$private%action%can%only%be%

regulated%under%the%Commerce%Clause%Powers$

B. Court$was$unwilling%to%limit%Congress%to$act$under$commerce$clause$exclusively%

to%advance%economic%efficiency%

Heart&of&Atlanta&Motel&v.&US&(1964)(p.139;+261)+court+upheld+constitutionality+of+Civil+

Rights+Act+when+motel+refused+rooms+to+blacks+

i. In$evaluating$law$and$application,$only$questions$are$(1)$whether$Congress$had$

a$rational%basis$for$finding$racial$discrimination$affected$commerce$and$(2)$if$

there$was$a$basis,$whether$the$means$were$reasonable$

ii. Means%are%exclusive%discretion%of%congress$and$ok$as$long$as$reasonably%

adapted%to$the$end$permitted$by$the$constitution$(moral%motives%don’t%matter)%

Katzenbach&v.&McClung&(1964)(p.141;+262)+upheld+CRA+to+small+business+that+didn’t+serve+

out+of+town+people;+used+cumulative+effect+and+getting+meat+out+of+state+as+a+tie+

i. Using$the$rational%basis%test,$court$concluded$that$cumulative$effect$cause$

restaurants$to$sell$less$goods;$Congress’s$power$is$broad%and%sweeping$

Criminal%Laws%

A. Congress$has$used$commerce$power$to$enact$federal$criminal$laws$

Perez&v.&US&(p.143;+263)+prohibition+of+loan+sharking;+

’s+activity+was+only+in+NY+and+no+proof+

that+he+engaged+in+organized+crime+

i. It$was$rational%to%conclude$that$even$intrastate$loan$sharking→sufficient$effect$

ii. Particular%findings$were$no$required$for$a$law$to$be$upheld$

Regulatory%Laws%

A. Congress$can$regulate$purely%intrastate%activities,$including$all$aspects$of$

business,$if$there$is$a$rational%basis$for$believing$there$is$an$interstate$effect$

Hodel&v.&Indiana&(p.143;+260)+law+stands+as+long+as+there+is+a+rational+basis+and+reasonable+

connection+between+the+means+and+the+asserted+end+

B. Is%the%Broad%Definition%Desirable?$

i. Although$complex$problems$facing$society$necessitates$congressional$authority$

to$regulate,$core$constitutional$law$provides$federal$government$as$a$limited$

power$

ii. Who$should$protect$the$state$sovereignty?$$Should$the$judiciary$protect$the$

states,$or$should$the$only$check$be$the$political$process?$See$cases$below$

National&League&of&Cities&v.&Usery&(p.145;+319)+declared+unconstitutional+the+application+of+

minimum+wage+payments+to+state+employees+because+Congress+violates+10th+amend+when+it+

interferes+with+traditional&state&and&local&government&functions+(didn’t+define+‘traditional+

functions’)+

iii. The$Usery%case$was$rarely$applied$and$expressly$overruled$by$Garcia$

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Civil Rights Laws and the Meaning of ‘Commerce Among the States’ A. Civil Rights Act was enacted based under the commerce clause because 14th amendment was only a limit on state discrimination; private action can only be regulated under the Commerce Clause Powers B. Court was unwilling to limit Congress to act under commerce clause exclusively to advance economic efficiency Heart of Atlanta Motel v. US (1964)(p.139; 261) court upheld constitutionality of Civil Rights Act when motel refused rooms to blacks i. In evaluating law and application, only questions are (1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding racial discrimination affected commerce and (2) if there was a basis, whether the means were reasonable ii. Means are exclusive discretion of congress and ok as long as reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the constitution ( moral motives don’t matter) Katzenbach v. McClung (1964)(p.141; 262) upheld CRA to small business that didn’t serve out of town people; used cumulative effect and getting meat out of state as a tie i. Using the rational basis test , court concluded that cumulative effect cause restaurants to sell less goods; Congress’s power is broad and sweeping Criminal Laws A. Congress has used commerce power to enact federal criminal laws Perez v. US (p.143; 263) prohibition of loan sharking; Δ ’s activity was only in NY and no proof that he engaged in organized crime i. It was rational to conclude that even intrastate loan sharking→sufficient effect ii. Particular findings were no required for a law to be upheld Regulatory Laws A. Congress can regulate purely intrastate activities , including all aspects of business, if there is a rational basis for believing there is an interstate effect Hodel v. Indiana (p.143; 260) law stands as long as there is a rational basis and reasonable connection between the means and the asserted end B. Is the Broad Definition Desirable? i. Although complex problems facing society necessitates congressional authority to regulate, core constitutional law provides federal government as a limited power ii. Who should protect the state sovereignty? Should the judiciary protect the states, or should the only check be the political process? See cases below National League of Cities v. Usery (p.145; 319) declared unconstitutional the application of minimum wage payments to state employees because Congress violates 10th^ amend when it interferes with traditional state and local government functions (didn’t define ‘traditional functions’) iii. The Usery case was rarely applied and expressly overruled by Garcia

Garcia v. San Antonio Transit (p.148; 321) overruled Usery iv. The Usery approach was unworkable (traditional functions) v. The protection of state prerogatives should be through political process and the Judicary has no place to be the one to limit Congress a. Supposedly, the political process ensures that the laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated b. This is a processed based argument ; so long as states are represented, they process will protect them vi. Dissent: courts are abdicating from responsibility to at least police the boundaries between the states (Majority makes this political question issue) a. You can establish a workable application; ‘liberal majority didn’t want to’

4. 1990s -‐ ???: Narrowing the Commerce Power and Revival of the Tenth Amendment as a Constraint on Congress a. What is Congress’s Authority to Regulate ‘Commerce Among the States’? A. Regulation of noneconomic activity ( Lopez and Morrison ) US v. Lopez (1995)(p.153; 265) Gun Free School act made federal offense for carrying firearm in school zone; Court concluded law was unconstitutional b/c not substantially related to IC i. Congress may regulate three broad categories; 3 -‐Part Lopez Test a. Use of the channels of interstate commerce (hotels/restaurants) b. Regulate and protect instrumentalities of interstate commerce (railroad etc) c. Regulate those activities having ‘ substantial relation to interstate commerce’ 1. More restrictive interpretation of this ( e.g. substantial effect)(probably uses the rational basis test with teeth ) ii. This was not economic activity→ concerns with finding authority here included : a. Criminal behavior

Can’t aggregate the effects because it isn’t a commercial transaction b. No Jurisdictional Element
The statute didn’t limit the reach to prevent criminalizing activity not in interstate commerce (not sufficiently narrowly tailored) c. The area of regulation was typically left up to the states d. Congressional findings aren’t Dispositive

i. To avoid the constitutional question, the court interpreted the law not to include the migratory bird rule under the Act and that the administrative branch overextended its power ii. When the administrative interpretation invokes the outer limits of Congress’ power (regulating dried up lake as waters)→must be clear Congressional indication that it was meant to extend to the outer limit iii. Stevens Dissent (Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer) a. CWA was ‘watershed legislation’ and should have allowed regulation b. The regulation doesn’t encroach upon ‘traditional state power’ over land use ; instead, it is environmental regulation B. Lawyer’s Tool: lawyers need only show that the application of the law would raise ‘constitutional doubts’; not that the statute is unconstitutional on its face or as applied i. SC has never explained how serious the constitutional doubts must be Reaffirming Congress’s Ability to Regulate ‘Channels of Interstate Commerce’ Pierce County v. Guillen (2003)(p.175; 271) affirming federal statute dealing with road safety and governmental immunity from discovery; the roadway is a channel of interstate commerce → therefore it is regulable Gonzalez v. Rauch (Supplement p.53) whether medical marijuana may be prohibited by federal law A. Court used the rational basis test without teeth; cited Wickard (wheat case) and used the same aggregation argument i. Stands for the idea that intrastate production of a commodity sold in interstate commerce is economic activity →may use aggregation B. Scalia’s Flip i. Necessary and Proper Test – allowing behavior will undermine congress’s ability to regulate drugs→any undermining of Congress→allow regulation C. O’Connor Dissent i. This isn’t economic activity → we should be using rational basis test w/ teeth ii. Use the test similar to Lopez and Morrison Implications of the Current Decisions A. Morrison, Jones, and Solid Waste Agency show this is the beginning of a major change in Court’s approach to the commerce clause (5 conservative justices, usually for advocating judicial restraint, are the ones advocating for the unconstitutionality) B. Questions that Arise: i. How far can Congress go to protect channels of interstate commerce ii. What is a ‘substantial effect’ on interstate commerce iii. How do you define the difference between ‘ economic and non economic’ activity

b. Does the 10th^ Amendment Limit Congress’s Authority? New York v. US (1992)(p.177; 323) 2nd^ time in 55 years that court invalidated a federal law as violating the 10th^ amendment; Congress may regulate disposal of radioactive waste , but the take title provision (forcing accepting ownership) impermissibly commandeered state governments A. Congress may either i. Use incentives; or a. Attaching strings to state and local government grants ii. Preempt and take over a. Setting standards that state and local governments must meet B. Commandeering in this manner undermines government accountability because Congress could make a decision , but the states would take political heat i. If a federal law compels state legislative or regulatory activity , the statute is unconstitutional even if there is a compelling need for federal action C. White Concurrence/Dissent (Blackmun, Stevens) i. States wanted this as well→everyone came together to decide these regulations a. Encourages preemption which wouldn’t be collaborative effort ii. Majority would say that you can’t consent to a violation of the 10th^ amendment a. You shouldn’t be able to collude to consent a violation of the balance of pwr Printz v. US (1997)(p.186; 324) whether the Brady Act violated 10th^ amend by requiring state/local law officers conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers; the provision was found unconstitutional because I commandeered state executive officials to implement a federal mandate A. The court violates the 10th^ amendment when it ‘ conscripts state governments ’ B. Congress may not give the executive authority to implement the law to state and local law enforcement absent particularized constitutional authorization i. Collusion among the branches will not permit this because it is a violation of the separation of powers C. Scalia – also violates separation of power because compels state officials to act D. Stevens Dissent (Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer) i. The consitution authorizes this (disagreeing with NY v. US and Printz) because Congress may impose affirmative obligations; we’ve also been doing this anyway Reno v. Condon (2000)(p.195; 325) challenge of Driver’s Privacy Protection Act → prohibited disclosure of personal information gained by department of motor vehicles; upheld the law A. Court upheld the law because it was constitutional as an exercise of Congress’s commerce clause power→States sold the information and it generated great revenue B. Law didn’t violate the 10th^ amend because it was a negative prohibition of conduct, not an affirmative mandate as NY v. US and Printz i. Congress may prohibit state governments from engaging in harmful conduct (particularly if law applies to private entities as well) so long as the prohibition doesn’t involve affirmative duties (bill making etc) ii. Most duties, however, may be characterized as prohibitions of conduct/duties

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