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A review of key topics in the CS4860 Applied Logic course, including pure and applied logic, formal methods, and computer science. It discusses the role of constructive type theory in integrating these topics and includes sample exam questions. The document also mentions Cornell's implementation of Brouwer's intuitionistic type theory in their Nuprl proof assistant and the implementation of fundamental principles of intuitionistic mathematics. The course covers propositional logic, theorems in mathematics, evidence for propositions, and first-order logic.
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Abstract
This document reviews key topics in the course. It relates them to each other and discusses the role of constructive type theory in integrating them into a coherent foun- dation for constructive mathematics and computer science. It also includes a few sample questions similar to what might be on the exam.
The document mentions the fact that at Cornell we have provided the first implementa- tion of Brouwerâs intuitionistic type theory in our Nuprl proof assistant. We formalized and implemented the fundamental principles of Brouwerâs intuitionistic mathematics, bar induction and the continuity principle. These required that we implement the no- tion of free choice sequences, briefly discussed in the course.
We did not devote course time to explore details of the fundamental new features of intuitionistic mathematics. It is interesting to know that these principles have been implemented and are now being used in real analysis. As far as we know, Nuprl is the only proof assistant that implements these principles, providing the first implementa- tion of fully intuitionistic mathematics. It is highly likely that other proof assistants will implement intuitionistic principles in due course. In this summary document we mention at most one or two new result in the area, discovered and published while the course was progressing. For instance, we have shown that Markovâs Principle is false in the Cornell implementation of intuitionistic type theory. This important was discovered and confirmed as this course was being taught. You were among the first to know about it when it was mentioned in the final lecture.
This course on Applied Logic covered the major topics in both pure logic, an ancient subject, and in applied logic, a modern subject strongly tied to formal methods and computer science. We used Raymond Smullyanâs book First-Order Logic [7] as a starting point and then added
material from other sources and wrote new notes on topics related to recent Cornell research in this very active area. Raymond Smullyan has written other very interesting and lively books on logic [9, 8, 10, 11]. His student Melvin Fitting also wrote two excellent books and edited others [3, 4, 5, 2].^1
In the final lecture we mentioned some new results in applied logic and type theory including the discovery that Markovâs Principle is false in fully intuitionistic type theory [1]. It is important in this class to know the statement of Markovâs Principle.
Here is a list of the lectures and the most key concepts in each one.
Having this background in logic might help you untangle misleading statements you can find on the web and in survey articles. We just found something lately from people trying to axiomatize relativity theory. They claim that FOL cannot model the real numbers R, so it cannot be used for this formalization. What is misleading about that claim? What might they want to say?
G by Seq(S) H, S G H ` SExplain why the rule is valid. There is an important result in proof theory that says that any proof using cut can be done without it. What is a simple way to understand this result? In other words, why do we know that this should be true in the normal way mathematics is done informally. What is a standard way to accomplish what this rule accomplishes if we were writing an informal explanation of why G is true given the hypotheses in H?
[1] Mark Bickford, Liron Cohen, Robert Constable, and Vincent Rahli. Computability beyond Church-Turing via choice sequences. In 33nd Annual ACM/IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS), 2018. To appear.
[2] Robert L. Constable. Formal Systems, Logics, and Programs. In Melvin Fitting and Brian Rayman, editors, Outstanding Contributions to Logic, volume 14, pages 23 â 38.
[3] M. Fitting. Intuitionistic model theory and forcing. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1969.
[4] M. Fitting. Fundamentals of Generalized Recursion Theory. North-Holland, 1981.
[5] Melvin Fitting and Brian Rayman, editors. Raymond Smullyan on Self Reference. Springer, 2017.
[6] Jean-Louis Krivine. Une preuve formelle et intuitionniste du thorme de compltude de la logique classique. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 2:405â421, 12 1996.
[7] R. M. Smullyan. FirstâOrder Logic. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1968.
[8] R. M. Smullyan. What is the name of this book?? Pelican, 1984.
[9] Raymond M. Smullyan. 5000 B.C. and Other Philosophical Fantasies. St. Martinâs Press, NY, 1983.
[10] Raymond M. Smullyan. G¨odelâs Incompleteness Theorems. Oxford University Press, New York, 1992.
[11] Raymond M. Smullyan. Diagonalization and self-reference. Number 27 in Oxford Logic Guides. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994.