Deepening Involvement, 1945-1965, Summaries of French

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T he U.S. A rmy C ampaigns of the V ietnam W ar

DEEPENINVO

VETNLEM

CMH Pub 76–

Cover: A U.S. Army Special Forces soldier gives instruction on the carbine to trainees of a Civil Defense Group in the Province of Thua Thien, 22 July 1963. (National Archives)

Introduction

To many Americans, the war in Vietnam was, and remains, a divisive conflict. Now almost fifty years after the beginning of major U.S. combat operations in Vietnam, the war has faded from much of America’s consciousness. Over half of the U.S. population was born after the war and has no direct memory of the conflict, yet this does not lessen its importance. The massive American commitment—political, military, and diplomatic—to the independence of South Vietnam beginning in the 1950s and continuing with U.S. direct combat operations in the 1960s and early 1970s makes it important to remember those who served. U.S. involvement in this corner of Southeast Asia began after World War II when Vietnam was fighting for independence from France. Although generally favoring Vietnamese independence, the United States supported France because the rebels—or Viet Minh—were led by Communists and in the days of the Cold War U.S. officials considered any and all Communists to be little more than the puppets of Moscow and Beijing. France’s defeat in 1954, the bifurcation of Vietnam into a Communist North and non-Communist South, and America’s assumption of the job of training the armed forces of the newly created non-Communist Republic of Vietnam pulled the United States deeper into the conflict. Framed primarily as a fight to defend democracy against the forces of international communism, the United States gradu- ally committed more troops and materiel to fight Communist-led Southern guerrillas (or Viet Cong) and the regular military forces sent to South Vietnam by the politburo in Hanoi. By the time President Lyndon B. Johnson committed major combat units in 1965, the United States had already invested thousands of men and millions of dollars in the fight to build a secure and stable South Vietnam. That commitment expanded rapidly until by 1969 the United States had over 365,000 soldiers in every military region of South Vietnam with thousands of

Deepening Involvement, 1945–

The triumphant end of World War II for the forces of the United Nations (principally the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and China) seemed to usher in a new era of international cooperation. However, the alliance that conquered Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan soon fractured over a host of issues that the necessity for unity in the face of a common threat had only papered over. The expansion of world communism at the point of Red Army bayonets into Eastern Europe and the rapid fall of the Nationalist Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek to the forces of Mao Zedong’s Communist guerrillas seemed to portend the reawakening of a monolithic Communist threat intent on world revolution. These events coincided with the rapid collapse of the empires of Britain, France, and the Netherlands that between them dominated much of the remainder of the globe. The United States found itself inheriting both the struggle against a resurgent Communist movement and the destabilizing problems of decolonization that provided fertile ground for Communist and Communist-inspired movements to seize more and more control over those new states and their natural resources. Nowhere would this dilemma be more acute than in French Indochina where the forces of nationalism and communism combined to oppose the re-establishment of French control after the defeat and withdrawal of the Japanese occupation forces. The Japanese had occupied French Indochina in 1940– as part of their expansionist moves into Southeast Asia. They were hungry for the oil and rubber of the region and needed bases as they moved south against the Dutch East Indies (later Indonesia) and the United States in the Philippines. For a time,

the French flag still flew over Indochina despite the Japanese occupation, but in March 1945 the Japanese took total control over the region and killed or captured much of the French garrison. Because France was by now one of the Allied powers, the first direct actions of the United States in the region were to support the remnants of the French forces with airpower and advisers as they tried to fight the Japanese (Map 1). With the Japanese surrender in September 1945, the United States pushed for, and achieved, the movement of a Chinese corps into northern Vietnam to disarm the Japanese while the British Army performed a corresponding mission in the half of the country below the 16th Parallel. Members of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), some of whom had parachuted into northern Vietnam to work with the French forces retreating from Japanese attacks in early 1945, worked with the Chinese to attempt to recover Allied prisoners and disarm the Japanese. Other OSS personnel had joined members of the native Vietnamese resistance movement against the Japanese known as the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi, or Viet Minh, led by a dynamic Communist who called himself Ho Chi Minh. The United States found itself caught between the Viet Minh, with links to the Communist international movement, and its French allies who were intent on re-establishing their hold over the colony. Both sides took advantage of the

Ho Chi Minh (standing, third from left) at a farewell party for the OSS in 1945

CMH Files

unsettled nature of the immediate end of the war to build allies and construct political agreements to weaken the other entity. The result was open warfare between the returning French forces and the Viet Minh by November 1946. The United States, not wishing to oppose an ally who was crucial to the U.S. position in a vulnerable Europe, was also reluctant to support an independence movement that was obviously controlled by Communists. As the Truman Doctrine began to take shape in response to Communist attempts at subversion in Eastern Europe and Greece, the view that the Viet Minh were simply additional players in the worldwide Communist movement, controlled directly from Moscow, was only strengthened. In the end, U.S. policy toward Indochina during France’s attempt to retake and pacify their colony from 1946 to 1954 remained ambiguous. The United States provided financial support and military aid to France in small amounts, but much of its support was focused on building up the French forces in Europe. However, in March 1950 the French asked directly for military equipment to assist in their fight against international communism while simultaneously rebuilding their empire in Indochina. With the Cold War now in full swing, the United States determined that such aid was critical in the fight against Communist aggression. In September 1950, the United States established the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Indochina, in Saigon to supervise the flow of that aid.

Strategic Setting From the establishment of the MAAG in 1950 until the end of French rule in Indochina in 1954, the United States was increas- ingly engaged in providing military equipment, development aid, agricultural assistance, and economic support to Vietnam to assist the French effort to defeat the Viet Minh. The Viet Minh, on the other hand, increasingly turned to the Chinese, now ruled by the Communist dictator Mao Zedong, for military aid and advisers. With the United States fighting the Chinese in Korea from 1950 to 1953, the war in Indochina was seen as a crucial test of western resolve, and the aid flowed correspondingly. As U.S. fears of direct Chinese intervention in the conflict grew, and thus concerns also grew about the fall of yet another “domino” to the forces of international communism, American engagement in the fate of Indochina deepened.

The MAAG was initially staffed with only a handful of U.S. officers and men—less than eighty personnel in all. It engaged France’s military and helped determine their requirements in equipment, supplies, and expertise; forwarded their requests back to Washington; and then supervised the arrival and distri- bution of the supplies to the French Army. Once the equipment and supplies were in Vietnam, U.S. personnel were supposed to monitor their use and inspect them for long-term maintenance requirements. However, the lack of effective French equipment accountability methods, poor maintenance procedures, and ill- disguised resentment of U.S. personnel by the French colonial authorities at having to ask for help interfered with attempts at improving the situation. French dislike and distrust of U.S. military support dimin- ished somewhat in the fall of 1950 and early 1951 when the Viet Minh unleashed a major ground offensive that captured several French outposts in the Tonkin region of Vietnam near the Chinese border and near the Hanoi-Haiphong region. In January, two Viet Minh divisions attacked the town of Vinh Yen northwest of Hanoi, and only the use of American-supplied napalm bombs (a form of jellied gasoline) and artillery staved off a shattering defeat. As the flow of American materiel increased in early 1951, it was obvious that only French superiority in aviation, artillery, and mobility that resulted from that flow was keeping the Viet Minh at bay. Despite American assurances that the aid would continue, there was deep concern that French unwillingness or inability to create an effective national Vietnamese Army would under- mine all attempts at defeating the Viet Minh. MAAG personnel suggested on numerous occasions that U.S. equipment should flow directly to Vietnamese units (many of which were still offi- cered by the French) to bolster the idea of an independent, non- Communist, nationalist alternative to the Viet Minh. However, French authorities rejected such ideas out of hand. Rather than contemplate such a development, which would obviously have been fatal to their hopes of restoring their colonial empire, the French threatened to pull out of Vietnam completely and abandon the struggle against Communist aggression. The United States could not easily consider such a development in 1951 with the Communist Chinese on the offensive in Korea and war-torn Europe under threat from potential Soviet aggression.

implement grand plans with its limited resources and decreasing support from its government and people.

Dien Bien Phu: The Gamble On 20 November 1953, French paratroopers jumped into a valley deep in Vietnam, almost to the Laotian border, near the small village of Dien Bien Phu. The plan was to establish a heavily fortified installation deep in enemy territory to support counter- guerrilla operations and draw enemy main force units out in the open where French firepower and air support could destroy them. The French succeeded in drawing out enemy main force units. Over the next few months, the Viet Minh moved four infantry divisions and an artillery division onto the hills surrounding Dien Bien Phu and sustained them using an army of porters, bicycle transports, and handcarts. Quickly cutting off all land supply lines and then neutralizing the French artillery, the Viet Minh turned the fortress of Dien Bien Phu into a trap. It could only be resup- plied with men, ammunition, and food by a long and tenuous air line of communications. Despite mobilizing all of their air transport fleet and obtaining the support of a number of United States Civil Air Transport C–119 Flying Boxcar transport aircraft (a CIA–run airline that painted French markings on the planes), supplies quickly ran short in the cutoff outpost as the Viet Minh

French machine gunners have just enough time to throw themselves on the ground and put their weapon in play as Viet Minh soldiers attack.

U.S. Navy

drew the noose ever tighter. Attempts to parachute in reinforce- ments only trickled in small packets of soldiers. At first it seemed as if despite its isolated position, French firepower might yet prevail. On a visit to the outpost in February 1954, General O’Daniel noted a number of flaws in the French deployment of forces, but he also saw extensive bunkers with inter- locking fields of fire and left encouraged by the overall impression of French strength. By then, however, the buildup of Viet Minh forces outside the besieged position numbered over thirty-five thousand soldiers with at least a hundred artillery pieces on the high ground overlooking the fortress. Beginning on 13 March, the Viet Minh launched a series of attacks against the French strong points that protected the main position and quickly overran them. This reverse marked the beginning of the end for the French fortress. While assisting France with providing supplies for their cutoff troops at Dien Bien Phu, the United States faced a series of deeper questions: Should it directly intervene militarily to prevent a French defeat? If it did not, what effect would this have on the global struggle against communism? Conversely, if the United States did intervene, how would it do so, in what strength, with what goals, and with what chance of success? Would it have the desired effect or just throw good money after bad? These were

General O’Daniel (right) inspected the Dien Bien Phu outpost in February 1954 and was encouraged by the impression of French strength.

Indochina Archives

Commission consisting of representatives of India, Poland, and Canada, and free elections were to be held in North and South Vietnam in July 1956. The United States did not concur in the final declaration but pledged to “refrain from the threat of the use of force to disturb” the agreements while warning that it would not stand idly by at any renewal of attacks in violation of the agreements. The outcome was nothing less than a major defeat for France, the United States, and the free world. The Geneva Agreements ceded half the country to Ho Chi Minh’s Communist- controlled Democratic Republic of Vietnam, with its capital in Hanoi. This left South Vietnam under the weak remnant of a government headed by the last Vietnamese emperor Bao Dai and his new prime minister, Ngo Dinh Diem, with its capital in Saigon.

OperatiOnS The final collapse of the French in Indochina, even with the establishment of a non-Communist zone in the southern half of Vietnam, also signaled the collapse of U.S. policy in the region, which had focused on bolstering France’s position. All arguments about direct U.S. military intervention, either by bombings in support of the French at Dien Bien Phu or even the direct involve- ment of up to seven divisions of American combat troops in the Red River delta region (up to five more in the event of Chinese

French soldiers escort Viet Minh into Hanoi, October 1954

Indochina Archives

intervention), foundered on the simple fact that the Eisenhower administration did not have the money or the forces to pursue a policy that had so little chance of success. Yet the impulse to oppose the further expan- sion of Communist influ- ence in Asia was powerful. What, then, was the United States to do now? The decision to expand American advisory efforts to assist the new South Vietnamese government was made even before the signing of the Geneva Agreements. In May, the French, reeling from their defeat at Dien Bien Phu, had consented to the placement of U.S. advisers with Vietnamese units to train those units as well as to ensure the proper maintenance and use of U.S.-supplied equipment. This had been a longstanding request and only desperation had moved the French to accept it. The total collapse of France’s effort in 1954 prevented any implementa- tion of this initial advisory effort and postponed any further initia- tives until after the creation of South Vietnam. The fledgling South Vietnamese government under Prime Minister Diem soon turned to the United States for help, asking for assistance in moving eight hundred thousand refugees from North Vietnam to the south as permitted by the Geneva Agreements. President Eisenhower endorsed Diem’s request and dispatched a fact-finding mission on military aid led by former Chief of Staff of the Army General Collins. This group recom- mended an expansion of the U.S. training mission to build a new South Vietnamese Army. On 12 February 1955, the new MAAG chief, General O’Daniel, assumed full responsibility for the orga- nization and training of the South Vietnamese Army. In the eyes of many Vietnamese, however, the French colonial masters had merely been replaced by Americans (Map 2). General O’Daniel’s new Military Support Mission (later called the Training Relations and Instruction Mission [TRIM])

South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem

CMH Files

incorporated approximately 200 French officers who had been previously attached to South Vietnamese units along with 68 U.S. officers with 149 being added over the next few months. The French continued to provide officer and specialist training for the South Vietnamese Army while the Americans established basic training centers and schools. However, there was no small amount of friction between the U.S. and French advisers and instructors and between the French and their South Vietnamese counterparts who resented continuous French criticism of their new army. It was not a congenial arrangement. The awkwardness of the continuing French advisory compo- nent was aggravated by the presence of three French combat divi- sions. Diem considered them an unnecessary relic of the colonial past that served only as a propaganda tool for the Vietnamese Communists to exploit. He therefore withdrew from the French Union, restricted special French commercial benefits, and abolished the monarchy before the end of 1955. The French took the hint, and by May 1956 had withdrawn virtually all troops and advisers from South Vietnam, leaving the advisory effort completely to the Americans. General O’Daniel departed in October 1955 and was replaced by Lt. Gen. Samuel T. (“Hanging Sam”) Williams, who created a new Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), Vietnam. One of the first challenges faced by General Williams was accounting for the vast amount of U.S. equipment that had been supplied over the past ten years to the French in Indochina. Much of the equipment, in dubious states of repair, had been dumped on the unpre- pared South Vietnamese as the French departed. With only a rudimentary army and no established logistical, mainte- nance, repair, or depot storage

Lt. Gen. Samuel T. Williams

National Archives

system, much of that equipment was unusable. The U.S. advisers, only 342 strong by the end of 1955, slowly began to establish a system to deal with this flood of material while also advising on the formation and training of a completely new South Vietnamese Army. In excess of $700 million in American equipment, desper- ately needed for that army, was rapidly vanishing without a trace. The solution was to dispatch a team of 350 additional U.S. officers and men to South Vietnam to form a Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM). In addition, the MAAG gained another forty-eight permanent spaces to assist in handling the expanded workload. The TERM team members began arriving in June 1956 and were fully integrated into the MAAG’s advisory and training effort. In fact, most of the members of TERM were quickly diverted to the operational and staff training missions of the MAAG. Only seven team members were directly working on equipment recovery issues by the end of 1957. All pretense as to the team’s real purpose was dropped in 1959, and the TERM team was fully absorbed by the advisory group, a major expansion of the MAAG size and mission. MAAG, Vietnam, operated under two chains of command. As part of U.S. forces in the Pacific region, the advisory group reported to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, on all operational matters. The group also reported to the U.S. ambassador to Vietnam on all policy matters involving the implementation of the in-country military assistance program. As such, the MAAG was part of the ambassador’s Country Team, a loosely structured committee headed by the ambassador that included representatives dealing with all aspects of U.S. support to a country. The Country Team was meant to impose some manner of cooperation and coordination on the various American initiatives, but the loose structure and lack of clear lines of authority often prevented a truly integrated approach. As was often the case, the military and the State Department did not always agree on policy, leaving the MAAG chief caught in the middle. Along with the MAAG, the Country Team in Vietnam included representatives of the CIA, which gathered intelligence and provided advice and assistance on building South Vietnamese national police and intelligence capacity; the United States Information Service, which handled information and propaganda