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Design Protocols - Thinking Like Computers - Lecture Slides, Slides of Artificial Intelligence

Bidhan Chandra Krishi ViswavidyalayaArtificial Intelligence

During the course work of Thinking Like Computers, we study the key concept of artificial intelligence. The main points in these lecture slides are given as:Design Protocols, English Auction, Dutch Auction, First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions, Vickrey Auctions, Lies and Collusion, Beyond Auctions, Negotiation, Simple Negotiation Protocol, Zeuthen Strategy

Typology: Slides

2012/2013

Uploaded on 04/24/2013

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CSCI 100
Think Like Computers
Lecture 27
Fall 2008
Last Time …
•The game of chicken
•Mechanism design
•Auctions
Two issues
•1. Design protocols so that the interactions
would have desired outcomes
This is known as “mechanism design”
•2. Given a particular protocol, how can a
particular strategy be developed for an
agent so that it can maximize its own
welfare
Auctions
•Some issues:
Winner determination?
First-price, or second-price
Are bids known to each other?
Open-cry, or sealed-bid
How bidding proceeds?
One-shot or successive: ascending, des cending
English Auction
•First-price
•Open cry
•Ascending
•What’s the (apparent) strategy?
•Interesting when there is uncertainty about the
true value of the good.
Winner’s curse? (Nobody else valued s o highly?)
Dutch Auction
•Open cry
•descending
•What’s the (apparent) strategy?
•Interesting when there is uncertainty about
the true value of the good.
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CSCI 100

Think Like Computers

Lecture 27

Fall 2008

Last Time …

  • The game of chicken
  • Mechanism design
  • Auctions

Two issues

    1. Design protocols so that the interactions

would have desired outcomes

Š This is known as “mechanism design”

    1. Given a particular protocol, how can a

particular strategy be developed for an

agent so that it can maximize its own

welfare

Auctions

  • Some issues: Š Winner determination? ƒ First-price, or second-price Š Are bids known to each other? ƒ Open-cry, or sealed-bid Š How bidding proceeds? ƒ One-shot or successive: ascending, descending

English Auction

  • First-price
  • Open cry
  • Ascending
  • What’s the (apparent) strategy?
  • Interesting when there is uncertainty about the true value of the good. Š Winner’s curse? (Nobody else valued so highly?)

Dutch Auction

  • Open cry
  • descending
  • What’s the (apparent) strategy?
  • Interesting when there is uncertainty about

the true value of the good.

First-price Sealed-bid Auctions

  • One shot auction
  • Very simple
  • But what’s the best strategy? Š To be truthful? If not, how much less?

Vickrey Auctions

  • Second-price
  • Sealed-bid
  • Dominant strategy: bid his true valuation
  • But possible for anti-social behavior (if you

know some information)

If You are the auctioneer …

  • Which auction type you would like to use?
  • This has something to do with expected revenue. Š As an auctioneer. Your overriding consideration: maximize your revenue
  • For private auctions, the answer depends on the risk attitude of auctioneers and bidders Š Risk-neutral bidders: expected revenue to the auctioneer is identical Š Risk-averse bidders (prefer to get the good even if they paid slightly more than private valuation): Dutch and first-price sealed-bid. (seen as insurance) Š Risk-averse auctioneers: Vickery or English.

Lies and Collusion

  • These protocols are not immune to lying

and collusion by both bidders and

auctioneers.

  • Examples: Š Grand coalition of bidders Š Auctioneer lying in Vickery auctions Š Shills

Beyond Auctions

  • Auctions are very useful for allocating goods/resources, etc. Š But they are too simple for many settings
  • Combinatorial auctions Š Simultaneous bids for several things, with a collective price
  • Negotiation: reaching a deal Š A series of rounds, every agent making a proposal at every round Š Base on utility, dominance, pareto optimal

Negotiation

  • Price bargaining Š Single issue negotiation
  • Buying a car is more complicated Š Multiple issues (price, options, services, etc)
  • Symmetric? Š More preferred by one Ù less preferred by the other
  • One-to-one, Many-to-one, Many-to-many negotiations