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C. Stephen Layman Seattle Pacific University (4-26-16)
Does God exist?
A worldview is a comprehensive philosophical position, one that provides a fundamental outlook on the world and on human existence. In this essay I’ll formulate both Christian Theism (hereafter simply “Theism”) and Naturalism, and then set forth a brief case for each. A critical evaluation of the arguments for these views is left up to the reader.
I. Theism Theism can be formulated as follows:
Theism: (1) There is exactly one Being that is (2) perfectly morally good and (3) almighty and that (4) exists of necessity.
Let me comment briefly on each of these clauses. (1) Christian Theists are monotheists, that is, they believe that there is only one God, not many gods. (2) Theists believe that God is perfectly morally good. Traditionally Christians understand this to mean that God is perfectly loving, perfectly just, and perfectly wise.
(3) “God is almighty” means roughly that God is maximally powerful; but are there any limits on the power it is possible for a being to have? According to most Christian theologians since at least the time of Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), the answer is yes, there are logical limits. Something is logically impossible if its description contains a logical contradiction (either explicitly or implicitly). For example, could God have the power to bring it about that God exists while he doesn’t exist? Or the power to lift an un-lift-able object? Or the power to force a person to perform a specific act while simultaneously allowing the person to perform that act freely? Or the power to be perfectly good while sinning? It seems that even God could not have these powers. 1 On the other hand, Theists insist that God has the power to do quite amazing things, such as create the entire physical universe ex nihilo (out of nothing), bring a dead person back to life, or still a raging storm.
An almighty being would be non-physical, since an entity counts as physical only if it is governed by laws of nature (such as the law of gravity) and an almighty being is not governed by laws of nature. 2 (If a being were governed by laws of nature, then it would be unable to do miracles and clearly, on the traditional conception, God can do miracles.) Traditional Theists also regard God as non-physical for another reason, namely, they think of God as the Creator of physical reality. But if God were a physical being, then God could create only part of physical reality, specifically, the part outside of himself.
If knowledge is a form of power, then if God is almighty, God has as much knowledge as it is logically possible to have (i.e., God is all-knowing). And it is plausible to suppose that knowledge is a form of power. Imagine a truth-false exam on all of the knowable propositions. Among the powers an almighty being would have, surely, would be the power to answer all the items on the exam correctly and infallibly. But then, clearly, an almighty being is also an all- knowing being.
(4) Most Christian theologians have insisted that God exists of necessity. A necessary being is one that cannot fail to exist. By contrast, a contingent being is one that does exist but would not exist under different circumstances. For example, human beings exist contingently. Presumably I would never have existed if my parents had never met and had sex. Yet, it is logically possible that one of my parents died at birth—that could have happened, though it did not.
Why do Christian theologians typically claim that God exists of necessity? For at least two reasons. First, Theists generally think of God as the most perfect being possible. And many Theists believe that necessary existence is a more perfect form of existence than contingent existence. Second, God is the creator of all contingent beings, according to Theists, but God is uncreated. So, God must not exist contingently, but of necessity.
II. Naturalism Naturalism can be formulated as follows:
Naturalism: (1) There is a physical reality that is by its very nature organized (i.e., the organization is not imposed by a god or any other force or agent); (2) physical reality exists eternally or by chance; and (3) leaving aside possible special cases (such as numbers or other abstract entities), all entities are physical.
Let me briefly comment on each clause. (1) Physical reality doesn’t need to be designed or organized by an intelligent being; it is inherently organized. Scientists can describe this organization in terms of the laws of nature, e.g., the laws of physics, chemistry, and biology.
(2) If physical reality wasn’t created, how did it “get here”? Naturalists will say either that physical reality has always been in existence or that it came into existence purely by chance. Now, the idea that physical reality “popped” into existence out of nothing (and without any cause) is not very plausible. So, Naturalists typically hold that physical reality in some form or other has always been in existence. Notice: they do not say that the physical universe of our acquaintance has always existed. According to contemporary science, our physical universe has existed for 12-15 billion years. That’s a long time, but it’s not an infinitely long time. So, Naturalists usually claim that our universe was preceded by some other physical state or situation.
(3) Physical reality is the ultimate reality, according to Naturalists. There is no God (or anything like God), no angels, no demons, and so on. Now, some Naturalists allow for the existence of abstract entities, which are not physical. An abstract entity is one that cannot enter into causal relations. For example, take the number seventeen. You cannot bump into it; you cannot strike someone with the number seventeen; you cannot make it vanish. (Yes, you can erase numerals from a chalkboard, but that has no effect whatsoever on the number seventeen. And humans might conceivably destroy themselves in a nuclear holocaust, but if they did, surely there would still be some number of planets, stars, etc., even if there was no one around who could count them.) So, some Naturalists do allow for the existence of non-physical abstract entities, but these entities can play no causal role. The only entities that can cause anything to happen are physical entities.
and in any case the appeal to God seems unhelpful. For example, suppose scientists cannot currently explain how a certain type of bird migrates to the same location every year. Nevertheless, this seems to be the kind of thing that science will someday be able to explain and furthermore, “God makes it happen” is not an illuminating explanation. It seems, then, that the belief that God exists is no more credible than the belief that watch-angels exist.
The Naturalist’s appeal to simplicity can best be evaluated by considering a cumulative case for Theism, which draws attention to phenomena that many believe Theism explains better than Naturalism does. We will examine a cumulative case for Theism in section IV below.
B. The Problem of Evil We are assuming, for the sake of the argument, that either Theism or Naturalism is true. Accordingly, an argument of the following form is in the offing:
- Either Theism or Naturalism is true.
- Theism is not true.
- So, Naturalism is true.
And Naturalists have a well-known argument in favor of premise (2). If God exists, then God is perfectly morally good and almighty. But given the suffering and evil in the world, it seems impossible or at least very unlikely that there exists a being who is both perfectly morally good and almighty. This, in a nutshell, is the problem of evil. Let me elaborate.
If God is perfectly morally good, God is perfectly loving and just. And if God is perfectly loving, God doesn’t want people to suffer unless there is a good (adequate) reason to let them suffer. Now, Theists have offered various reasons God might have for allowing suffering. And some of the reasons may explain some suffering. The problem is that the reasons don’t come close to explaining either the total amount of suffering in the world or the more intense kinds of suffering. For example, if God gives us free will, so that we can choose between good and evil, this might explain some suffering that results from the abuse of free will, e.g., one person tells a lie and someone else suffers as a result. But the appeal to free will explains none of the suffering that results from non-human causes, such as diseases, birth defects, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, droughts, floods, extreme temperatures, and animal attacks. Furthermore, even if the appeal to free will explains some suffering due to the abuse of free will, it doesn’t seem to justify the extreme suffering that results from genocide or torture. A loving parent would not allow such things to occur--he or she would interfere to stop them (if able to do so). Similarly, if God really is “our Father in heaven,” as Theists claim, God would interfere to stop such horrors. But since such horrors often occur, there can be no God who is both perfectly loving and almighty. And given our simplifying assumption, this means there is no god at all.
Of course, we could consider other theodicies , i.e., attempts to state God’s reasons (actual or possible) for permitting suffering and evil. For example, it has been suggested that God allows evil and suffering so we can understand and appreciate goodness. But it is very implausible to suggest that we could not understand and appreciate goodness unless genocide occurs from time to time! The proposed theodicies all become implausible when we consider a full range of the horrible suffering and evil that goes on in the world. So, it’s extremely unlikely that Theism is true. And we are left with Naturalism, given our simplifying assumption. 3
C. The Problem of Divine Hiddenness John Schellenberg’s “Hiddenness Argument” provides Naturalists with additional support for the claim that Theism is not true: 4
- There are people who are capable of relating personally to God but who, through no fault of their own, fail to believe that God exists.
- If there is a personal God who loves everyone, then there are no such people.
- So, there is no such God.
The support for premise 1 would include claims such as the following: Some people are brought up in non-theistic religions, such as Buddhism or Advaita Vedanta (a non-theistic form of Hinduism). And historically speaking, many cultures have believed in gods of a sort that do not engage in personal relationships with humans—e.g., gods who are not loving and who keep their distance from humans. Furthermore, some people are brought up by parents who teach them that theology is simply superstition. Finally, some people are brought up to believe in God, but as adults, when they examine the evidence for God’s existence, they honestly find it lacking, and— in spite of being predisposed to believe, their belief fades away. It is plausible to suppose that people in these types of situations are not at fault for lacking the belief that God exists.
The support for premise 2 runs as follows: A loving God would want a personal relationship with every human, for such a relationship would be a blessing for each human. But humans cannot have a personal relationship with God if they do not believe that God exists. Hence, God would make his existence known to each human--except perhaps in the case of humans whose free choices have in some way blinded them spiritually or rendered them unsuited to the knowledge of God’s existence.
Someone might ask, “But do the people who don’t believe that God exists try hard enough to seek God out? Maybe the problem is that they just don’t try hard enough.” Several questions need to be considered here. First, if God really wants a personal relationship with everyone, why would God make it hard to know that he exists? Second, is it really plausible to think that non-believers in general don’t try hard enough to seek God out? What’s the standard for trying hard enough? (Do believers in general try harder than non-believers?) Third, if you believe that God exists, do you honestly think you would have that belief if you had been brought up in a religion that does not include it, such as Buddhism? Finally, consider your attitude toward religions or philosophies of life other than your own. Have you made it a priority to seek out the truth about each of them? If not, can you reasonably blame those having non- theistic world views if they don’t make it a priority to seek out the truth about Theism?
To sum up, an almighty God would be able to make his presence known to human beings. A loving God would want to make his presence known to them. Yet, a great many people, past and present, do not believe that a loving God exists. And it is implausible to suppose that this lack of belief is always the fault of the human individuals. So, there is no God who loves all humans. But, again, if Theism is not true, then, given our simplifying assumption, Naturalism is true.
absolutely clear, i.e., there would be decisive evidence in favor God’s existence and it would be positively irrational not to believe that God exists. (Not believing that God exists would be like not believing the earth is round.) Now, God wants to give us space to choose to be the kind of persons we will be; God does not want to overwhelm us, manipulate us, or constantly play the role of an unwelcome chaperon. (God is like the king in Kierkegaard’s story of the king and the beautiful peasant maiden. The king falls in love with the maiden, but because of his exalted status, power, and wealth, he must, at least for a time, relate to her in disguise; otherwise she will be overwhelmed, unable to be herself, and unable to return his love authentically. 6 ) God’s hiddenness gives human beings the option of rationally adopting a way of life that does not involve trusting God. And in fact it is apparent that many people choose not to live a life focused on love, as God requires; that’s why we have to lock our doors, use passwords, fear taking a walk late at night, and so on. On the other hand, many people interpret the evidence differently, and form the belief in God and try to follow the way of holy love. Still others, of course, seek goodness but cannot see their way to belief in God; assuming they fail to believe through no fault of their own, God will not judge them negatively for their non- belief.
- Purifying the Motives of the Favorable. People who are favorable to religion but do not believe that God exists through no fault of their own are in various spiritual states: (a) Some are favorable to religion but mostly because of how and where they were brought up. It would be good for them to make their favorable attitude more “their own” by having to seek God. (b) Some may be favorable to religion but for less-than-ideal motives, e.g., to get “earthly” blessings, to gain power or influence, or to avoid divine punishment. Having to seek God may help these to purify their motives--to love God because of God’s moral beauty. 7
- Skeptical Theism. Divine hiddenness is a problem only on the assumption that we would be likely to know God’s reasons for remaining hidden if an omniscient God exists; but this assumption is not warranted. We stand to God as a little child stands to its parents: just as a little child is often unable to conceive of or grasp its parents’ motives, we often cannot conceive of or grasp the divine motives. God remains hidden for reasons we humans cannot possibly fathom.
Which, if any, of the above responses to the hiddenness argument seem most promising to you? Which, if any, seem least promising?
IV. A Cumulative Case for Theism It is widely agreed that the best case for Theism involves a combination of different arguments. This might be compared to the combination of lines of evidence in a murder trial, for instance, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence (e.g., fingerprints on the murder weapon), and the defendant’s confession. While none of these lines of evidence may be adequate all by itself, together they may form a strong body of evidence.
A. Religious Experience The phrase “religious experience” can refer to many different types of experience, e.g., the experience of prayer, a feeling of peace while meditating, a conviction of guilt over sin, or an emotional “high” while singing a hymn. But for the present let’s focus on theistic mystical experience , the apparent direct awareness of the presence of God. The prophetic literature in the Bible contains many descriptions of such experiences. But here are two modern examples:
I was in perfect health: We were on our sixth day of tramping, and in good training.... I can best describe the condition in which I was by calling it a state of equilibrium. When all at once I experienced a feeling of being raised above myself. I felt the presence of God—I tell of the thing just as I was conscious of it—as if his goodness and his power were penetrating me altogether. The throb of emotion was so violent that I could barely tell the boys to pass on and not wait for me. I then sat down on a stone.... I thanked God that in the course of my life he had taught me to know him.... Then, slowly, the ecstasy left my heart; that is, I felt that God had withdrawn the communion which he had granted, and I was able to walk on, but slowly, so strongly was I still possessed by the interior emotion. 8
Then, just as I was exhausted and despairing—I had the most wonderful sense of the presence of God. He was in a particular place in the room about five feet from me—I didn’t look up, but kept my head in my hands and my eyes shut. It was a feeling of an all- embracing love which called forth every ounce of love I had in me. It was the tenderest love I have every encountered. 9
The appeal to religious experience can be formulated as an argument:
- Any apparent experience of something is to be regarded as veridical unless we have sufficient reasons to the contrary. 10 (The Principle of Credulity)
- Experiences occur which seem to their subjects to be experiences of God.
- There are no good reasons for thinking that all or most experiences which seem to their subjects to be of God are non-veridical (delusive).
- So, some experiences of God should be regarded as veridical.
Let me comment briefly on the premises of this argument. A veridical experience is one that is really of the object it appears to be of--as opposed to, say, an hallucination or a mirage. The first premise is called the Principle of Credulity. It says, in effect, that any experience should be given the benefit of the doubt. In other words, in general, we don’t have to prove that an experience is veridical; on the contrary, we need good reasons to deny that an experience is veridical before rejecting it. The Principle of Credulity is defended by claiming that, unless we accept it, we will fall into radical skepticism. For example, we have no way of proving that our sense experiences are veridical. 11 We have to proceed by assuming that our sense experiences are veridical, rejecting only experiences that are problematic in some specific way. To illustrate: a pencil placed in a glass of water looks bent, but feels straight. This conflict between visual experience and tactile experience forces us to discount one or the other experience in these circumstances.
Notice that any appeal to experience seems to depend on the Principle of Credulity. Consider, for example, our experience of trees:
a. Any apparent experience of something is to be regarded as veridical unless we have sufficient reasons to the contrary. (The Principle of Credulity) b. Experiences occur which seem to their subjects to be experiences of trees. c. There are no good reasons for thinking that all or most experiences which seem to their subjects to be of trees are non-veridical. d. So, some experiences of trees should be regarded as veridical.
Thus, Saul was certainly not expecting an experience of the risen Lord but his experience of the Lord on the road to Damascus convinced him that Jesus was Lord and Christ (Acts 9: 1-19). Another example is that of the French philosopher Simone Weil (1909-43), who had never believed in God and found the standard arguments for God’s existence unconvincing. One day while she was reciting a poem, she had an experience of the presence of God, and as a result she became a believer. Commenting on her numerous experiences of this type, Weil later remarked, “In my arguments about the insolubility of the problem of God I had never foreseen the possibility of that, of a real contact, person to person, here below, between a human being and God. I had vaguely heard tell of things of this kind, but I had never believed in them.” 15
Regarding (D), the defenders of religious experience may suggest that it is wrong to assume that every veridical experience can be tested in the way sense experience can be tested. For example, through introspection I may know that I’m feeling a bit sad today, but if someone is skeptical about my introspective experience, what test can be applied? There doesn’t seem to be any test, at least nothing similar to the way in which a visual experience (say, seeing a tree) can be tested by a tactile experience (touching the tree), or by asking someone else if they see the tree. And if we can trust introspection without having tests for it, perhaps it is reasonable to trust religious experience without tests.
As for (E), defenders of religious experience will remind us of the need to distinguish between proximate causes and more remote causes. For example, the proximate cause of my visual experience of a tree may be a brain process; it doesn’t follow that the tree itself is not a link in the causal chain that produced my experience. Similarly, even if the proximate cause of a religious experience is a brain process or a psychological factor, God could still be a more remote cause of the experience.
Regarding (F), defenders of religious experience may make several observations. First, all experience is interpreted and reports of sense experience often conflict--think of two eyewitnesses disagreeing in a court of law. We do not for these reasons conclude that sense experience in general is delusory. It is true, of course, that if experience-reports conflict logically, we need some reason to accept one report over another, or else we can only suspend judgment. But we need to make sure that the reports really do conflict logically and in the case of religious experience, this is not always easy to discern. Second, many religious doctrines are not based on religious experience. For instance, the Christian belief that Jesus died on a cross is not based on religious experience; Christians take it to be based ultimately on eyewitness reports of his crucifixion. So, we should not automatically assume that, if the doctrines of two religions conflict, those doctrines are based on conflicting religious experience-reports. Third, in many cases the content of the experience-report is itself problematic. For example, some religious believers claim that God has told them to perform immoral acts. 16 Such alleged revelations seem highly dubious assuming that God is loving and just. And consider the experience of some Hindu and Buddhist mystics that all apparent distinctions or differences are unreal. This experience directly contradicts the deliverances of our sense experience, which tell us that there are many distinct objects in the world and many distinct persons. And if the report of a religious experience conflicts with what sense experience tells us, doesn’t that mean the report is highly problematic? It would seem so. Or consider that, within Hinduism, “a great many kinds of experiences are of Brahman [Ultimate Reality], and its identity with the self.” 17 Can a human self be identical with Ultimate Reality? And if so, would that mean that all human selves are in
the end identical with each other? If not, is the meaning of the experience-report sufficiently clear to base any conclusion on? Finally, consider an experience, common among Buddhists, in which the meditator “sheds various delusions and attachments. The last one to go is the delusion that he or she is a self.” 18 There is no abiding self--“all of reality is made up of sequences of momentary events.” 19 But in order to have an experience, doesn’t there have to be an “experiencer,” a self, a subject, a thing that has the experience? If so, then, again, the very content of the experience-report seems problematic.
People react to the appeal to religious experience in various ways. Some dismiss it completely. Others enthusiastically endorse it. Still others steer a middle course: These people find religious experience intriguing but feel that it leaves us with only a “maybe”--more precisely, religious experience can rightly lead us to take the possibility that God exists more seriously than we otherwise would, but by itself religious experience provides rather weak evidence for God’s existence; however, we can at least say that given theistic mystical experience, “God exists” is in a very different category than, say, “Santa Claus exists” or “Watch-angels exist,” for there is a long tradition of apparently sincere reports of the experience of the presence of God, and nothing similar in the case of Santa and watch-angels.
B. Cosmological Argument Roughly speaking, cosmological arguments move from the existence of the world (cosmos) to the existence of a Being who causes (or caused) the world to exist. There are a variety of cosmological arguments, but we will consider just one here. This version depends on the distinction between contingent beings and necessary beings.
Recall that a necessary being is one that cannot fail to exist under any circumstances, while a contingent being is one that exists but could fail to exist under different circumstances. Most of the beings of our acquaintance seem to be contingent. Animals are born, they die, and cease to exist. Plants also come into being, then die and cease to exist. According to physicists, even subatomic particles did not always exist, but came into being at an early stage in the expansion of the universe. So, all of these beings are apparently contingent.
Are there any necessary beings? This is a matter of controversy. But numbers are arguably necessary beings. Some people deny this because they think of numbers as existing in our minds. But suppose all human beings were annihilated in a nuclear war. Wouldn’t there still be some number of planets and stars? Furthermore, there is no reason to think that one can destroy numbers by destroying physical objects. (If there were no physical objects, the number of physical objects would be zero, and not one, not two, and so on.) So, it is plausible to suppose that numbers exist of necessity; they cannot fail to exist under any circumstances. Now, Theists think of God as the greatest being possible, so they think of God as having the greatest possible mode of existence. And necessary existence seems greater than merely contingent existence. So, if God exists, then God exists of necessity. (Surely numbers do not have a greater mode of existence than God!) Furthermore, Theists think of God as the creator of all contingent beings but not the creator of himself. So, again, from the perspective of traditional theism, if God exists, then God must exist of necessity.
Consider all of the contingent beings—a vast number of entities. What explains their existence? Let’s start with the currently living animals and plants. Naturally, we can explain their
- In general, if hypothesis H1 explains the presence of X (some phenomenon) better than a rival hypothesis H2 does, we have a reason to accept H1 over H2.
- So, the presence of contingent beings gives us a reason to accept Theism over Naturalism.
Notice that the conclusion is not that God exists. Rather, the point of the argument is that the presence of contingent beings gives us some reason to believe that God exists. (Recall that we are examining a cumulative case for God’s existence. So, this argument is meant to be combined with others.)
Now, you might be thinking: If Naturalism can’t explain the presence of contingent beings, Theism can’t explain the existence of God; so these hypotheses have a similar deficiency. But remember, according to our Theistic hypothesis, if God exists, then God is a necessary being. And a necessary being simply cannot fail to exist under any circumstances. So, there is no need to find a cause or further explanation of the existence of a necessary being. By its very nature it cannot fail to exist. Asking, “Why does God exist?” is like asking, “Why does 1 + 1 = 2? Or why is every object identical with itself? Answer: It can’t be otherwise.
One of the all-time great philosophical questions is, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” Theism suggests, in effect, that we get the best answer to that question if we postulate a Creator who exists of necessity. And notice that it’s important to the Theistic argument that God is loving, for it is God’s love (and hence God’s generosity) that explains why God would want to create intelligent conscious beings and share good things with them. It is God’s free decision to create that explains the presence of contingent beings.
But couldn’t Naturalists postulate that some part or aspect of physical reality is a necessary being? In principle they could, though they seldom do. First, since necessity is not testable in a scientific way, many Naturalists reject the idea of a necessary being entirely. Second, if Naturalists attempt to explain the presence of contingent beings by postulating a necessary entity of some sort, then they complicate their hypothesis in two very significant ways;
- Many physical entities are plainly contingent, so Naturalists who claim that some physical entities are necessary would be committed to a dualism of physical entities, i.e., there are two radically different kinds of physical entities, the contingent ones and the necessary ones. Such a dualism would be mysterious.
- Naturalists would need to explain how the necessary part of physical reality generates contingent beings. Of course, Naturalists are free to speculate, but they cannot do so without complicating their hypothesis.
In short, Naturalism faces a dilemma. Either it cannot explain the presence of contingent beings or it must take on significant complications that sharply qualify its original “appeal to simplicity.”
Some Naturalists might reply that they simply accept the presence of contingent beings as a brute (inexplicable) fact. Why not? But consider how Naturalists would be apt to respond to a Theist who said, “I simply accept the presence of suffering as a brute fact. I feel no need to explain it.” While no worldview can explain everything, the failure to explain some salient
feature of the world is always a “demerit” for a worldview. A worldview is supposed to help us make sense of the world and of our place in it.
C. Design Argument Scientists tell us that if certain fundamental features of the physical universe had been
only slightly different, it would not support life. To use the current idiom, the universe is “fine-
tuned” for life. For example:
- If the initial force of the big bang explosion had been slightly stronger or weaker—by as little as one part in 10^60 , then life would be impossible; stars could not have formed, and life depends on energy derived from stars such as our Sun. 20
- There is an “almost unbelievable delicacy in the balance between gravity and electromagnetism within a star. Calculations show that changes in the strength of either force by only one part in 10^40 would spell catastrophe for stars like the Sun.” 21
- If the weak nuclear force (which governs radioactive decay) had been slightly stronger or weaker, heavy elements could not have formed. And heavy elements such as carbon are presumably necessary for life—there can be no life at all if there are only gases such as hydrogen and helium. 22
- If the strong nuclear force (which binds together such particles as protons and neutrons) had been just 2 percent stronger (relative to the other forces), all hydrogen would have been converted into helium (so there would be no hydrogen for stars to burn). If the strong nuclear force had been 5 percent weaker, there would be nothing but hydrogen. Either way, life would presumably be impossible.
- If the electromagnetic force were 4 percent weaker, there would be no hydrogen, hence no fuel for stars to burn. 23 If the electromagnetic force were a little stronger, there would be no planets. 24 Either way, there could presumably be no life at all.
Roughly twenty such parameters must have values that fall within highly restricted ranges in order for life to be present. 25
To understand what “fine-tuned” means, it may be helpful to imagine that you’ve received a “Creation Machine” in the mail. The machine has about twenty dials on it, and a start button. You set the dials and push the start button to create a universe. One of the dials is labeled “Force of the Big Bang.” It has 10^60 marks around it. Now, 10^60 is a big number:
1060 = 1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,
If you set the “Force of the Big Bang” dial but are off by one mark, you will get a universe that does not contain life. Similar remarks could be made about each of the dials.
Three further remarks may help to clarify what is meant by the phrase “fine-tuned universe.” (1) A fine-tuned universe is one that produces the types of chemicals, such as carbon, that are necessary for life, and also the environments in which life is possible, such as the planet earth. (2) We are speaking of basic or fundamental aspects of physical reality, not derivative ones. For example, if our planet were much further from the sun, it would be too cold to support life. But earth’s distance from the sun can be explained in terms of more basic structures, such as the law of gravity. “Fine-tuning” refers to the ultimate or most basic structures of our universe.
sequence of cards, say, ten of diamonds, jack of hearts, five of spades, ace of clubs, nine of hearts,... (a typical random sequence)? The answer is: One chance out of 52 x 51 x 50 x ,.. .,
- In other words, one chance out of:
80,658,175,170,943,878,571,660,636,856,403,766,975,289,505,440,883,277,824,000,000,000,
That’s an astronomically small chance, but still “improbable things occur” seems the best explanation of the sequence.
Suppose, however, that the sequence of cards turned out to be diamonds in perfect descending order (ace, king, queen, jack, ten, nine, eight, seven, six, and so on), followed by hearts in perfect descending order, followed by spades in perfect descending order, followed by clubs in perfect descending order. How likely is that sequence? The numerical answer is the same. But “improbable things occur” seems inadequate to explain this sequence. Why? Because the sequence is one of special interest to card-players and so we suspect the sequence has been rigged.
Theists typically find the “improbable things happen” explanation of our fine-tuned universe hard to swallow. After all, we have some reason to suppose that God exists. And we have seen that a good--hence, loving and generous--God would have strong reasons to create intelligent, embodied, conscious beings, in order to share good things with them—things such as beauty, physical pleasure, the delight in acquiring knowledge, the joy of personal relationships, and the satisfactions of creative activity. Such beings would be the crowning feature of a physical world. And a fine-tuned universe would make it possible for such beings to live. Accordingly, we reasonably find our fine-tuned universe “suspicious.” From this perspective, the appeal to mere chance seems a good bit less than satisfying.
Faced with any puzzling phenomenon, we can always use the “improbable things happen” explanation. But unless we know the underlying structures and causes, as we do in the case of card-shuffling, lotteries, and dice-throwing, this type of explanation seems weak. And, indeed, many Naturalists share the feeling that “improbable things happen” is not an adequate explanation of the fine-tuned universe. Some of them have made the following proposal:
Physical reality can take only one form, precisely the form we find our universe to have.
We might call this the Single-Universe hypothesis. This hypothesis is arguably flawed for multiple reasons. First, what is “the form we find our universe to have”? The form is summed up in the terms “fine-tuned” or “life-supporting.” But there simply is no logical connection between “Physical reality can have only one form” and “Physical reality is life-supporting.” Thus, the Single-Universe hypothesis does not explain fine-tuning, it simply presupposes fine-tuning. Accordingly, the Single-Universe hypothesis is an explanatory failure. Second, most physicists assume the universe could be structured in various ways. So, the assumption that physical reality can have just one form is very much open to doubt. Third, the claim that physical reality can have only one form is a large-scale metaphysical claim, not an empirical or scientific claim. Thus, if we add the Single-Universe hypothesis to Naturalism we significantly complicate Naturalism, thus undermining the Naturalist’s claim to have a simpler view than Theism.
Perhaps the current, front-running naturalistic proposal is the multiverse hypothesis. The basic idea of this hypothesis is that our universe is merely one among many actual universes.
There are lots of actual universes with their basic physical structures varying at random. They are regarded as distinct universes because they are distinct space-times, having different initial conditions (such as the total amount of energy), different laws of nature (such as the law of gravity), and/or different constants (such as the speed of light); in addition, there is no possibility of an object moving from one universe to another. The central idea of the multiverse hypothesis is this: given that there are many actual universes differing randomly in regard to their basic physical structures, it is not surprising that at least one universe is life-supporting.
To understand the multiverse hypothesis, think about playing poker. One cannot reasonably expect to be dealt a royal flush very often, but if one spends lots of time playing poker, one will probably eventually be dealt a royal flush. Similarly, if there are lots of actual universes whose basic physical features (e.g., laws, constants, and initial conditions) differ randomly, it is not surprising that at least one universe is fine-tuned.
Of course, no one has observed other universes. But Naturalists are free to speculate. And many physicists take the idea of a multiverse quite seriously, though, as physicist-turned- theologian John Polkinghorne observes:
The many-universes account is sometimes presented as if it were purely scientific, but in fact a sufficient portfolio of different universes could only be generated by speculative processes that go well beyond what sober science can honestly endorse. An example of such a metascientific idea would be the hypothesis that the universe eternally oscillates, the big bang subsequent on each big crunch producing a world with totally different physical laws. 26
In short, the multiverse hypothesis, as employed by philosophical Naturalists, is metaphysics, not physics.
Does Naturalism together with the multiverse hypothesis—“Multiverse Naturalism”— offer a better explanation of fine-tuning than Theism does? Here we must consider at least two issues. (1) Obviously, Multiverse Naturalism complicates the Naturalistic hypothesis by adding on striking new claims--not just the claim that there are many universes, but also claims about how these universes are generated. And we need mechanisms that guarantee enough universes whose basic structures differ in random ways.
(2) It seems that there could be infinitely many universes, yet none that support life. Suppose we name all the possible universes, using the natural numbers: U1, U2, U3,.... If there are infinitely many universes, then clearly there are infinitely many odd numbered universes, but what if none of them support life? Perhaps only a few of the even numbered universes support life. So, it seems possible that there could be infinitely many universes (namely, the odd- numbered ones), yet none that support life. The question, then, is this: Even if we allow that there are infinitely many universes, does this (by itself) guarantee that at least one will probably support life? Apparently not. More importantly, if Multiverse Naturalists insist that they’ve postulated enough universes to make fine-tuning unsurprising, a second problem emerges: Multiverse Naturalism explains too much, too easily; for by appeal to the multiverse we can explain any physical phenomenon P just by pointing out that, given that there are so many universes differing in random ways, it’s not surprising that one of them contains P. Any arrangement of physical particles or structures is apt to be realized if we postulate enough universes. So, the multiverse hypothesis can apparently explain any physical phenomenon. But
be. In this section and the next we’ll explore two possible connections between God and morality. In both cases, however, we must work through some significant philosophical preliminaries before we can state an argument for God’s existence.
Whenever we deliberate, we apparently assume that we have free will. Take a mundane case. You go to an Italian restaurant, look at the menu, and consider what to order: spaghetti or pizza? Let’s say you opt for the spaghetti. Nevertheless, the fact that you deliberated indicates that you assumed you could have ordered the pizza instead. Your decision to order spaghetti marks a small “fork in the road” in your life; things might have gone otherwise, and the issue (however minor) was up to you, within your control.
Now, it is widely agreed that there is a connection between free will and moral responsibility. Suppose we hold someone morally responsible for robbing a bank or committing an act of arson. Aren’t we generally assuming that the agent could have done otherwise? At minimum, he or she could have refrained from robbing the bank or starting the fire. Does it make sense to blame a person for doing some wrong act if he or she had no other options? Probably for most of us, the answer is, “No, it doesn’t.”
This answer is currently challenged by many philosophers. They offer one or more so- called “Frankfurt cases”--a special kind of thought experiment--in support of their view. 30 Here is a typical Frankfurt case. Suppose a mad scientist, Dr. X, has invented a “neuro-computer” that can monitor and control the brains of other people. Dr. X wants one of his assistants, Boris, to murder someone he (Dr. X) dislikes, namely, Joe. As it happens, Boris also dislikes Joe and has been thinking about killing him. (Dr. X and Boris aren’t exactly the nicest people!) By using the neuro-computer, Dr. X finds out what’s on Boris’ mind. Dr. X could take control of Boris’ brain and force him to kill Joe, and Dr. X will do so if the neuro-computer predicts that Boris will decide not to kill Joe. But the neuro-computer predicts that Boris will kill Joe, so Dr. X does not activate the control mechanism. And, indeed, Boris kills Joe. In this scenario, it seems that Boris would be morally responsible for killing Joe, but Boris had no alternative to killing Joe, because if the neuro-computer had predicted that Boris would not kill Joe on his own , then Dr. X would have activated the control mechanism and Boris would have killed Joe.
Does the Frankfurt case really show that we can be morally responsible for doing something when we have no other option? That seems very doubtful. First, Boris does have an alternative to freely killing Joe; for if Boris does not choose on his own to kill Joe, Dr. X will activate the control mechanism, in which case Boris will not kill Joe freely. If Dr. X activates the control mechanism, it is agreed that Boris becomes merely a tool in Dr. X’s hands and Dr. X is responsible for the act. Second, in the absence of the neuro-computer (operated by Dr. X), it is assumed that Boris would have options, e.g., he could refrain from killing Joe. The neuro- computer is what is supposed to remove alternative courses of action for Boris. But on reflection this cannot be so. Here’s why: if Dr. X wants Boris to act on his own, then Dr. X must make his decision not to activate the control mechanism before Boris makes his decision. But how could the neuro-computer infallibly predict what Boris will decide to do? That could only happen in a deterministic universe, in which Boris’ decision and action were already guaranteed by the past and the laws of nature. In that case, the neuro-computer presupposes a deterministic universe and the Frankfurt case should be rejected by anyone who thinks determinism rules out free will. On
the other hand, if Boris’ actions are not determined and the neuro-computer is making merely fallible predictions, then Boris might change his mind (and decide not to kill Joe) moments after Dr. X has decided not to activate the control mechanism , in which case Boris has an alternative after all. 31
But is free will compatible with determinism? Determinism is the idea that given the past, only one future is possible. When you deliberate, you assume that multiple possible futures are open to you. You might phone your friend at time T, or you might read a book instead. You might turn right at the next intersection, but then again you might turn left. And so on. But if determinism is true, the appearance of multiple options is an illusion. In each case, only one of the apparent possibilities can be actualized.
Many philosophers think we can be both free and determined. This is the compatibilist view of freedom. From this perspective, a free act is one the agent performs because he or she wants to, all things considered. For example, at the restaurant, you might have had some desire for both spaghetti and pizza, but you couldn’t eat both and (on this occasion) your desire for spaghetti was stronger than your desire for pizza. So, spaghetti was what you wanted, all things considered. No one coerced you--you did what you wanted to do, so your act was free. If we ask why your desire for spaghetti was stronger than your desire for pizza, the answer is that the strength of these desires was determined (necessitated) by the past and the laws of nature.
Of course, many philosophers think that free will is incompatible with determinism—this is the incompatibilist view of freedom. These philosophers reject the compatibilist view of a free action. On the incompatibilist view, a free action is undetermined but it is not a mere random occurrence; it is up to the agent. More precisely, one performs an act A freely at a time T if and only if one performs the act at T but at T one has the power to refrain from doing A. Thus, if someone robs a bank freely at time T, then at time T he (or she) had the power to refrain from robbing the bank.
The most important argument against the compatibilist view is the consequence argument. 32 In order to state the argument succinctly, we need to consider some preliminaries. Let’s assume, for the sake of the argument, that determinism is true and that it is true because the universe is governed by deterministic laws of nature. A deterministic law of nature has the following form:
Deterministic Law: Given initial conditions A, B, and C, event D must occur.
In other words, once the initial conditions are met, only one result is possible, e.g., if we heat water to 212 degrees Fahrenheit, it always boils. We are assuming that every event that has ever happened has resulted from initial conditions operating in accordance with a deterministic law of nature. The history of the universe is one long chain of events tightly linked as one set of initial conditions gives rise to a result which in turn becomes an initial condition leading to another result.
Now, let L stand for a conjunction of all the laws of nature. In other words, L is a proposition of the form “A and B and C.. .” where each letter stands for a law of nature, such as the law of gravity. L includes every law of nature, including any that are yet to be discovered.
