Econimics Summary Chapter 18, Summaries of Global Economics

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The Economy โ€” CORE Textbook
Chapter Summary
Unit 18: The Nation and the World Economy
How the integration of national economies into a global system of trade and investment provides
opportunities for mutual gains and conflicts over the distribution of the gains
Opening Narrative: The Steamship Manila (1899)
โ€ข The Manila's 1899 voyage in and out of Genoa encapsulates the whole unit. Inbound, it offloaded
cheap Indian grain made possible by the Suez Canal (1869), new railways, and steam shipping โ€”
delighting Italian consumers but devastating local farmers. Outbound, it carried 69 emigrants to the
US; about 750,000 Europeans made this voyage annually in the following decade.
โ€ข Governments responded to the grain shock differently: France and Germany raised tariffs to protect
farmers (at consumers' expense); Denmark pivoted into dairy, using cheap imported grain as feed
for products that couldn't be cheaply shipped. Some Italian workers moved into the booming textile
industry. The conflict was between producers of different commodities, not simply rich versus poor
โ€” a pattern that recurs throughout the unit.
18.1 Globalization and Deglobalization in the Long Run
โ€ข Core argument: Global economic integration has followed an interrupted path โ€” not a steady
march. Two distinct eras of expansion (Globalization I, roughly 1870โ€“1914; Globalization II, 1945
onward) were separated by interwar deglobalization driven by government policy, not technology.
โ€ข Measuring globalization: The best indicator is narrowing price gaps between importing and
exporting countries, especially when combined with rising trade volumes. Trade volumes as a share
of GDP and bilateral trade flows are supporting measures. World merchandise exports rose from
~1% of world GDP in 1820 to ~8% in 1913, fell back to ~5.5% in 1950, then climbed to 26% by 2011
(Fig. 18.2).
โ€ข Price gaps and arbitrage: When trade costs fall, the gap between the export-market price and
import-market price narrows โ€” traders arbitrage it away. The Anglo-American wheat price gap
nearly vanished between 1840 and 1914 as steamships and railways slashed freight costs (Fig.
18.4). Similar convergence occurred across most USโ€“UK commodity pairs 1870โ€“1913 (Fig. 18.5);
sugar was the main exception due to tariff protection.
โ€ข The interrupted pattern: Trade costs fell 1870โ€“1913, rose sharply in the interwar period
(governments raised tariffs to fight unemployment after 1929), then fell again from the 1970s as
liberalization and improved transport resumed (Fig. 18.6). Tariffs remain higher in low-income
countries, though most have reduced them substantially since the 1980s (Fig. 18.7).
โ€ข Multinationals: Offshoring illustrates firm-level globalization โ€” Ford began abroad in 1904
(Canada), expanded to Australia (1925) and the Soviet Union (1930); by 2016, 144,000 of its
201,000 employees were outside the US (Fig. 18.1). National borders give governments extra policy
tools (tariffs, immigration controls, capital controls, monetary policy) but limit their reach โ€” there is
no world government to enforce contracts globally.
18.2 Globalization and Investment
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The Economy โ€” CORE Textbook

Chapter Summary

Unit 18: The Nation and the World Economy

How the integration of national economies into a global system of trade and investment provides opportunities for mutual gains and conflicts over the distribution of the gains

Opening Narrative: The Steamship Manila (1899)

  • The Manila's 1899 voyage in and out of Genoa encapsulates the whole unit. Inbound, it offloaded cheap Indian grain made possible by the Suez Canal (1869), new railways, and steam shipping โ€” delighting Italian consumers but devastating local farmers. Outbound, it carried 69 emigrants to the US; about 750,000 Europeans made this voyage annually in the following decade.
  • Governments responded to the grain shock differently: France and Germany raised tariffs to protect farmers (at consumers' expense); Denmark pivoted into dairy, using cheap imported grain as feed for products that couldn't be cheaply shipped. Some Italian workers moved into the booming textile industry. The conflict was between producers of different commodities, not simply rich versus poor โ€” a pattern that recurs throughout the unit.

18.1 Globalization and Deglobalization in the Long Run

  • Core argument: Global economic integration has followed an interrupted path โ€” not a steady march. Two distinct eras of expansion (Globalization I, roughly 1870โ€“1914; Globalization II, 1945 onward) were separated by interwar deglobalization driven by government policy, not technology.
  • Measuring globalization: The best indicator is narrowing price gaps between importing and exporting countries, especially when combined with rising trade volumes. Trade volumes as a share of GDP and bilateral trade flows are supporting measures. World merchandise exports rose from ~1% of world GDP in 1820 to ~8% in 1913, fell back to ~5.5% in 1950, then climbed to 26% by 2011 (Fig. 18.2).
  • Price gaps and arbitrage: When trade costs fall, the gap between the export-market price and import-market price narrows โ€” traders arbitrage it away. The Anglo-American wheat price gap nearly vanished between 1840 and 1914 as steamships and railways slashed freight costs (Fig. 18.4). Similar convergence occurred across most USโ€“UK commodity pairs 1870โ€“1913 (Fig. 18.5); sugar was the main exception due to tariff protection.
  • The interrupted pattern: Trade costs fell 1870โ€“1913, rose sharply in the interwar period (governments raised tariffs to fight unemployment after 1929), then fell again from the 1970s as liberalization and improved transport resumed (Fig. 18.6). Tariffs remain higher in low-income countries, though most have reduced them substantially since the 1980s (Fig. 18.7).
  • Multinationals: Offshoring illustrates firm-level globalization โ€” Ford began abroad in 1904 (Canada), expanded to Australia (1925) and the Soviet Union (1930); by 2016, 144,000 of its 201,000 employees were outside the US (Fig. 18.1). National borders give governments extra policy tools (tariffs, immigration controls, capital controls, monetary policy) but limit their reach โ€” there is no world government to enforce contracts globally.

18.2 Globalization and Investment

  • Core argument: Capital flows follow the same interrupted pattern as trade. Countries borrow and lend across borders, tracked through the balance of payments. A current account deficit means a country is borrowing; a surplus means it is lending.
  • The balance of payments: Records all payments between a country and the rest of the world (sums to zero). The current account (CA) covers trade in goods and services, income from foreign assets, remittances, and aid. Foreign portfolio investment (buying shares/bonds without control) and foreign direct investment (owning and operating assets abroad) both generate future CA income when profits are repatriated.
  • Historical pattern (Fig. 18.8 and 18.9): In the late 19th century, the UK, France, and Germany ran large CA surpluses and financed railways and infrastructure in Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the US โ€” investments that raised recipient countries' productivity and were repaid with interest. Capital flows collapsed after 1929 (strict controls), only recovering after liberalization in the 1970sโ€“80s. New York replaced London as the global financial centre after 1945 (Fig. 18.9).
  • Technology and price gaps: The 1866 transatlantic telegraph is a clean natural experiment โ€” financial price gaps between London and New York collapsed almost overnight once same-day communication was possible, because arbitrageurs could act immediately rather than waiting days for ships.
  • FDI destination puzzle (Fig. 18.10): Most US outward FDI 2001โ€“2012 went to high-wage Europe, not low-wage Asia. FDI is driven by market access, skilled workers, and legal certainty, not cheap labour alone. Netherlands, UK, and Luxembourg alone received more US investment than all of Asia and Africa combined.

18.3 Globalization and Migration

  • Core argument: Labour is the least globalized factor. Moving yourself across a border carries costs โ€” language, culture, family โ€” that simply don't apply to goods or money. As a result, wages across countries have not converged the way goods prices have.
  • Historical pattern (Fig. 18.11): Pre-WWI immigration was enormous โ€” immigrants accounted for over half of annual US population growth. The 1923 immigration law sharply cut flows; they have partially recovered since WWII but not returned to pre-WWI levels. Today's lower-income countries face far stricter barriers than 19th-century Europe faced.
  • No global wage convergence (Fig. 18.12): European countries โ€” Norway surpassed the US by over 20% โ€” and Japan/South Korea converged toward US manufacturing wages; Mexico and Sri Lanka remained far behind. Unlike goods prices, wages have no equivalent of arbitrage to equalize them globally without large-scale migration.

18.4 Specialization and the Gains from Trade Among Nations

  • Core argument: Specialization and trade are two sides of the same coin โ€” by producing a narrower range than you consume, you must trade. Countries specialize for two reasons: (1) differences in factor endowments, climate, and skills; (2) economies of scale and agglomeration, which can drive specialization even between identical countries.
  • Economies of scale (Fig. 18.13): If output rises faster than inputs (e.g., wheat output quadruples when land doubles), full specialization raises total output even without any endowment differences โ€” specialization is worthwhile regardless of who does what.

demand. In both cases, the country specializing in the good whose relative price rises captures more of the gains.

  • 19th-century parallel: Land-abundant countries (US, Canada, Australia, Argentina, Russia, the Punjab) exported agricultural goods; labour-abundant northwest Europe exported manufactures. Land rents rose in exporting regions; real wages rose in land-scarce Europe. European landowners responded with agricultural tariffs โ€” the first major globalization backlash.

18.7 Winners and Losers in the Very Long Run and Along the Way

  • Core argument: Trade shocks resemble technology shocks โ€” both raise long-run productivity but cause painful short-run adjustment. In the long run specialization shifts the price-setting curve up and can raise employment and wages; but the adjustment path involves job losses concentrated in specific industries and places that can persist for decades.
  • Labour market adjustment (Fig. 18.21): US specialization in aircraft raises productivity (price-setting curve shifts up). Short run: electronics workers are laid off (unemployment rises, Aโ†’B). Medium run: aircraft firms invest and re-hire (Bโ†’Cโ†’D). Long run: new equilibrium at higher wages. If workers demand more unemployment insurance because of greater job turnover, the wage-setting curve shifts up โ€” long-run employment could end up higher (point F) or lower (point E) than before.
  • Post-WWII bargain: Nordic countries traded open borders for generous welfare states โ€” unions accepted imports; governments funded retraining and unemployment insurance. Result: trade and the welfare state expanded together, and inequality fell.
  • The China shock after 1990: Job losses were geographically concentrated and long-lasting. Tennessee (furniture) suffered for decades; Alabama (not competing with Chinese goods) did not. Germany fared better than the US because its capital-goods exports matched China's industrialization demand, roughly offsetting import-competing job losses.

18.8 Migration: Globalization of Labour

  • Core argument: Immigration depresses wages and raises unemployment for existing workers in the short run (new arrivals expand the jobseeker pool, weakening bargaining power). In the long run, lower wages raise firm profitability, firms invest and expand, and wages recover โ€” incumbents end up no worse off and immigrants are typically better off. The short run can last years or decades, which is why immigration generates persistent political opposition even when long-run effects are neutral or positive.

18.9 Globalization and Anti-Globalization

  • Core argument: Globalization is politically self-undermining if its losers are ignored. Capital mobility creates a 'race to the bottom' as governments compete for investment by cutting taxes and weakening standards. Dani Rodrik formalizes this as a trilemma: no country can simultaneously have hyperglobalization, democracy, and national sovereignty โ€” at most two at once.
  • Rodrik's trilemma (Fig. 18.22) โ€” three rows: (1) Keep sovereignty + democracy โ†’ must limit hyperglobalization, because voters demand stabilization and redistribution that requires controlling capital mobility. (2) Keep sovereignty + hyperglobalization โ†’ must suppress democracy, since citizens will vote against globalization's costs. (3) Keep democracy + hyperglobalization โ†’ must

cede sovereignty to supranational institutions (EU, WTO, ILO) that set common labour, environmental, and tax standards.

  • Real-world examples: A US or German federation approximates Row 3 domestically โ€” free internal movement with federal standards preventing a race to the bottom. The EU is a partial supranational version of the same solution. Keynes (1933) argued for policy autonomy (Row 1); Kindleberger (1969) argued the nation-state was 'through as an economic unit' and Row 3 was inevitable. The evidence shows both were partly right.

18.10 Trade and Growth

  • Core argument: There is no single correct trade policy for growth. Trade promotes growth through competition and market-size effects, but can retard it by cutting short infant-industry learning or locking countries into low-innovation specializations. The empirical record shows diverse successful strategies.
  • Growth-enhancing channels: Competition forces firms to innovate or exit. Access to world markets allows scale economies that domestic markets cannot support. Both raise productivity.
  • Growth-retarding risks: Infant industries have high initial costs from limited learning by doing, small scale, and absent agglomeration โ€” temporary protection may let them reach competitiveness. Countries that specialize prematurely in low-innovation sectors (e.g., natural resource extraction in Latin America) may lock in slow future growth.
  • Historical diversity (Fig. 18.23): Germany and the US industrialized behind tariff walls. Scandinavia prospered through openness plus generous social insurance. East Asian governments picked winners and promoted exports. Latin American liberalization in the 1990s did not accelerate growth as predicted. China and South Korea converged rapidly toward US wages; Mexico and Sri Lanka did not. The lesson: outcomes depend on how integration is managed, not on integration per se.

When Economists Disagree: Heckscherโ€“Ohlin, the Leontief Paradox, and New Trade Theory

  • Heckscher-Ohlin theory: Comparative advantage comes from relative factor abundances โ€” capital-abundant countries export capital-intensive goods, labour-abundant countries export labour-intensive goods.
  • The Leontief Paradox (1953): Using his own input-output analysis (which traces labour and capital requirements through entire supply chains), Leontief found the opposite of H-O: US exports were labour-intensive and imports capital-intensive, despite the US being the world's most capital-abundant country. His proposed resolution: US labour may be effectively more abundant once cultural and organizational productivity multipliers are counted โ€” untested to this day.
  • New trade theory (Dixit, Helpman, Krugman, 1980s): Trade can arise from increasing returns to scale alone, with no factor differences needed. Identical countries trade similar goods (intra-industry trade โ€” cars for cars, machines for machines) to exploit specialization economies. This also provides a strategic argument for tariff protection: if an industry has monopoly profits, a government might try to capture them nationally โ€” though Krugman himself was sceptical of how robust this is in practice.

Key Concepts

When a country's inward receipts exceed its outward payments; the country is lending to the rest of the world.

Net capital flows Cross-border borrowing and lending tracked by the current account; inflows = borrowing, outflows = lending.

Foreign portfolio investment Buying bonds or shares in a foreign company without gaining operational control; returns flow home as dividends and interest.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) Ownership and operational control over productive assets in a foreign country, typically through subsidiaries or acquisitions.

Remittances Money sent home by migrant workers to their families; a significant capital flow for many developing countries.

Specialization Producing a narrower range of goods than one consumes, then trading to acquire the rest; the basis for mutual gains between trading partners.

Comparative advantage A country has comparative advantage in a good if its opportunity cost of producing it is lower than in other countries, even if it is not the most efficient producer in absolute terms.

Absolute advantage A country has absolute advantage if it can produce a good using fewer inputs than another country โ€” it is simply more efficient.

Economies of scale When doubling all inputs more than doubles output; encourages specialization even between otherwise identical countries.

Economies of agglomeration Cost reductions arising when firms locate near other firms in the same or related industries; distinct from single-firm economies of scale.

Bargaining power A party's advantage in securing a larger share of the gains from an economic interaction, such as setting the terms of trade.

Trilemma of the world economy Rodrik's argument that no country can simultaneously maintain hyperglobalization, national sovereignty, and democratic governance; at most two are achievable at once.

Race to the bottom Self-destructive competition among governments offering lower wages or weaker regulation to attract foreign investment.

Infant industry A new industrial sector with high initial costs from limited learning by doing, small scale, or absent agglomeration; may justify temporary tariff protection.

Learning by doing

The tendency for production costs to fall as workers and firms accumulate experience, independent of scale.

Leontief Paradox Leontief's 1953 finding that US exports were labour-intensive and imports capital-intensive โ€” the opposite of Heckscher-Ohlin's prediction for the world's most capital-abundant country.

Welfare state Government policies providing income smoothing and social insurance (unemployment benefits, pensions, retraining) to protect citizens from economic shocks, including those from trade.

Cartel A group of firms or countries that collude to restrict output and raise prices; referenced in the context of OPEC and the 1970s oil price shocks.