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CHINA AND THE GLOBAL STRATEGIC BALANCE*

Jonathan D. Pollack

January 1984

INTRODUCTION

Among the factors (^) influencing Chinese foreign relations, China's relationship (^) to the global strategic balance has (^) always been pivotal. For better or for worse, the postwar (^) world continues to be dominated by the power rivalry between (^) the United States and the Soviet Union. By any reasonable (^) measure--economic capabilities, conventional (^) military strength and reach, or (^) their enormous nuclear arsenals--the United States and the Soviet Union remain great powers (^) distinct from all others, with a unique capability (^) to affect war and peace in the international system. China's leaders profess considerable (^) distaste for this state of affairs. They assert that the (^) politics of "superpower hegemonism" offer neither understanding of nor solutions for (^) the long-term problems and crises (^) of international politics. Indeed, the Chinese (^) view the Soviet-American rivalry as (^) a relic of history, to be supplanted ultimately by a more egalitarian, far less (^) coercive international order. -- (^) Despite China's self-characterization (^) as a Third World state and its

*long-standing critique (^) of the domination of international politics (^) by a few great powers, the Chinese (^) have few illusions about the workings (^) of the (^) contemporary international system. (^) They recognize that they must -p function within (^) the existing international system, (^) even if they insist *' that their actions (^) and objectives are intended to transform (^) global politics. For China, there (^) is no escape from either the Soviet-American rivalry or (^) the attendant conflicts that have made Asia (^) the major

• battleground (^) of the post-war era.

*This essay (^) will also appear in Harry Harding, ed., (^) China's Foreign (^) Relations in the 1980s, Yale University Press, (^) New Haven, 1984.

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Chinese security: (1) (^) identify the principal political and military threat to China, and do not allow China to be embroiled in conflicts of less than vital interest; (2) whenever possible, avoid international isolation or outright confrontation with one or both superpowers; and (3) lean toward the less threatening and more helpful of the two superpowers, but never in irrevocable fashion. All three maxims offered

K sound general principles, but there has frequently been a divergence

between theory and practice. In several key instances, Mao did not heed his own advice, especially in periods when the debate about security became deeply enmeshed in domestic political conflict. On other occasions, Soviet and American leaders did not always act as China's leaders anticipated or hoped. Reviewing the successes and failures of Chinese foreign policy over the past three-and-one-half decades enables us to see more clearly both the strengths and limits of China's power position and approach to global strategy. As noted earlier, China's search for security was qualitatively different from the CCP's revolutionary experiences. As one nation in a world of sovereign states, China experienced a significant reduction in .* its freedom of action and room for maneuver. (^) Even more important, the PRC was severely disadvantaged in relation to the structure of world S- power the Chinese leadership confronted in 1949. By the time of the Chinese Communist Party's victory over the Kuomintang, the international system had undergone a major ideological, political, and military polarization. The Soviet-American wartime alliance had been supplanted by a stark political, ideological,^ and^ military^ confrontation^ in^ Europe,^ E"^ " with the European nations now playing a subsidiary role (^) in the broader Soviet-American competition. An event as dramatic as the COP triumph -

,0^ thus^ assumed^ global^ significance,^ all^ the^ more^ in^ view^ of^ China's adherence to Marxism-Leninism. Even if the PRC leadership had wished to insulate itself from the Soviet-American rivalry, circumstances did not permit such detachment. - The consolidation of Communist rule on the Chinese mainland virtually

0 guaranteed that the Cold War would extend to Asia as well as Europe.

The United States, having long sought to infuse the Nationalist (^) ,s

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government with at least symbolic standing as a major world power, now sought to deny the legitimacy of the new Chinese (^) government through political, economic, ane military means, and to impede the PRC's territorial consolidation and economic rehabilitation. At the (^) same

• time, the United Sta.es was (^) increasingly committed to a renascent Japan

• -closely (^) aligned with U.S. political and strategic goals in the Pacific. A confrontation (^) with American power in East Asia ill served China's long- term interests, but the ingredients for such a confrontation were all too evident in the fall of (^) 1949. Thus, China was severely disadvantaged (^) in relation to American power. The Soviet Union (^) had rapidly consolidated its control of Eastern Europe, enabling Moscow to compete against the United States with a series of buffer states to the west. China had no such (^) geographic advantage. (^) In dire economic circumstances and highly vulnerable to American power, China therefore recognized (^) the imperative need to seek at least (^) a partial accommodation with the Soviet Union. In critical (^) respects, the Sino-Soviet alliance of early 1950 represented a marriage of convenience. Yet it is doubtful (^) whether any Chinese leaders--including Mao--saw any reasonable alternative. (^) China and the USSR shared both a long border and (at least nominally) a common ideology. The achievement of (^) correct if not wholly intimate interstate relations (^) with the Soviet Union was a vital need for the Chinese, if only to avoid the nightmarish vision of hostile relations with (^) both Moscow and WashingLon. Although (^) excessive dependence on the Soviet Union (^) was hardly desirable, the potential gains for Chinese security and economic (^) needs far outweighed the risks.

• -The consummation of the Moscow-Peking (^) alliance further abetted the stark polarization of the (^) international system. Some of the dangers inherent in such a situation (^) rapidly became evident, as the onset of the Korean conflict in June 1950 brought American (^) military power to China's 0~ northeastern doorstep, compelling the PRC's intervention (^) on behalf of North Korea. The PRC thus found itself (^) on the front lines of a major military conflict. (^) China's vulnerability to external power had now been accentuated rather than diminished.

*--

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status in both global and Asian politics. (^) Equally important, China initiated a major effort (^) to develop its own nuclear weapons, since (^) an independent nuclear deterrent (^) was essential for China to guarantee its own security. China's effort to forge an independent (^) foreign policy was still frustrated by U.S. policy toward (^) the PRC. Peking could not define a more symmetrical position (^) in relation to Washington and Moscow (^) as long as the United States continued (^) to view China as a threat to global peace and stability equal to or greater (^) than the USSR. Throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s, the United (^) States judged China to be the principal (^) source of "revolutionary Communist expansionism"--a (^) view made more understandable by Peking's strident (^) attacks on "Soviet revisionism" '- and Moscow's alleged "capitulation (^) to U.S. imperialism's global counterrevolutionary (^) strategy."'^ Despite the mounting evidence (^) of

• (^) Sino-Soviet estrangement over ideology (^) and foreign policy, the United .. States failed to (^) exploit the political and diplomatic opportunities inherent in such circumstances. (^) Indeed, the perception of a common American and Soviet (^) interest in forestalling the further spread (^) of nuclear (^) weaponry--with China as the obvious candidate--led (^) Washington to pursue common ground (^) with Moscow in the field of arms control, (^) to the detriment of Chinese interests. Peking, (^) therefore, acted in defiance'of both superpowers, even if (^) this posture entailed additional risks to China (^) s security and economic well-being. Peking's (^) defiance was fueled by Chinese internal (^) politics. Mao was ,F% (^) not only defying Moscow in international (^) affairs; he was also trying to purge the CCP (^) of those oppcsed to an increasing radicalization (^) that -'.would (^) subsequently lead to the (^) xenophobia and convulsion of the Cultural Revolution. (^) In a marked departure from a decade-long (^) effort to forge . expanded (^) relations abroad, China increasingly withdrew (^) from both diplomatic and foreign policy involvement, (^) leaving itself isolated and vulnerable in the (^) midst of domestic turmoil and violence. At the same time U.S. military (^) involvement in the Vietnam conflict began (^) to grow appreciably. Maiy predicted that the (^) growing military

0 'See, in particular, Two Different Lines on the Question of War and

*Peace: Comment (^) on the Open Letter of the Central Committee (^) of the CPSU (V), Foreign Languages Press, (^) Peking, November 19, 1963.

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-7-

tensions in Southeast Asia would mute the Sino-Soviet conflict, and draw Peking (^) and Moscow closer together. But Mao publicly rejected the calls

9of Khrushchev's successors for Sino-Soviet joint action to oppose the United States in Vietnam; in spirit if not in letter, the Sino-Soviet alliance was now dead. China (^) assisted Vietnam on its own--even as it warily allowed the shipment of Soviet military aid through China--but conveyed to the United States that it wished to avoid a wider Sino-American conflict. In the eyes of the Chinese strategists, America's Vietnam (^) involvement was from the outset doomed to failure. In a region of marginal strategic value (^) to U.S. interests, the United States could only grow more enmeshed in a quagmire in which there were no reasonable limits, nor was there any easy means of extrication. Such an evaluation was vindicated in the remainder of the 1960s and in the early 1970s. As a result, however, the Soviet Union steadily augmented is military power, without provoking serious American reactions. Even worse for (^) Chinese interests, much of this growth in Soviet power occurred on China's northern doorstep. Soviet (^) alarm over Cultural Revolution xenophobia--exacerbated (^) by Mao's references to Chinese territory that had been seized by the czars and was still held by the Soviets--led Moscow to upgrade its defeises (^) along heretofore thinly manned borders opposite China. Peking's worst strategic nightmare was coming to pass: China, convulsed in (^) internal disarray without credible allies or even powerful friends, faced acute political and military (^) pressure on separate geographic fronts from both superpowers. But the Chinese themselves (^) were largely responsible for these inauspicious developments. The "plague (^) on both your houses" mentality then evident in Chinese foreign policy had led to severe isolation, internal dislocation, and a societal vulnerability all too tempting to external adversaries. China was far weaker (^) than either the United States or the USSR, yet Peking's internal and external course alienated and affronted both superpowers and precluded effective collaboration with either. All three of Mao's cardinal rules of international strategy were being neglected; the internal disarray evident in the Cultural Revolution had spread throughout the Chinese political process, including foreign policy.

I

4-. (^) value within the global balance of power. Although (^) the Chinese from the first realized that the (^) U.S. agenda in forging ties with Peking differed from their own, this did not diminish the fact (^) that the new Sino-American relationship also marked the realization (^) of China's long- sought strategic objective. Not only could China seek to (^) parlay its relationship with the United States into more effective (^) opposition to the growth of Soviet power in Asia. (^) What is more, the American connection also accorded (^) Peking unparalleled international stature and legitimacy (^) in both the socialist and capitalist world. It is little wonder, therefore, (^) that Mao's role in creating this "revolutionary line in foreign affairs" (^) remains among the few areas where the late Chairman's role^ in^ Chinese^ politics^ remains^ largely^ sacrosanct. Thus, the full logic of a triangular (^) world had finally emerged. Before the late 1960s, (^) China had yet to gain full acceptance as an accredited (^) major power acknowledged by both Washington and Moscow. Until the United States as well (^) as the Soviet Union were prepared to confer (^) such stature, China could not and did not play an international role commensurate with its size, (^) power potential, and centrality in postwar East Asia. (^) Neither state, to be sure, had been able to ignore Chinese power. The United States had fought a war with (^) the Chinese in Korea, (^) and for two decades had deployed substantial military (^) forces both to contain and to deter China from (^) undertaking any provocative international actions. The Soviet Union, for its part, (^) now found itself committing substantial military (^) forces to a potential conflict with the PRC. With (^) the growing accommodation between the United States and China, however, a new stage (^) had been reached: Both global powers now had to weigh the implications (^) of their actions toward China against the effect of these actions on their relations with (^) each other. For the Chinese, their long-sought (^) international legitimacy was a major political breakthrough, especially (^) in view of China's vulnerabilities at the close of (^) the 1960s. However, full triangularity created problems as well as opportunities. China (^) had long condemned the (^2) For the (^) fullest official (^) exposition of Mao's (^) foreign policy doctrines, see Editorial Department of People's Daily, (^) "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation (^) of the Three Worlds Is a Major *- Contribution (^) to Marxism-Leninism," Renmin Ribao, November 1, 1977, trans. in Peking (^) Review, No. 45, November 4, 1977, pp. 10-45.

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%7. (^) "hegemonism of big power politics," (^) yet it benefited by the inclusion of a China factor in the Soviet-American global rivalry. (^) Even as the Chinese continued to criticize both the Soviet Union and the (^) United .-. States for their global ambitions, (^) Peking clearly stood to gain from

antagonism between (^) the two superpowers. A sounder relationship with the United States (^) permitted China to deflect Soviet political and military pressure directed (^) against it--provided that Peking's ties with "- - Washington tempered (^) rather than provoked Moscow. At the same time, China (^) did not want to risk embroilment in any Soviet-American confrontation. China, in effect, could gain from (^) superpower rivalry, even from a degree of tension, (^) but not from an overly antagonistic Soviet-American relationship that verged on (^) major crisis. As a consequence, (^) the Chinese leadership needed to weigh carefully not only its own interests in Sino-American relations but (^) also how it perceived American interests (^) and strategies toward both China and the Soviet (^) Union. In this regard, Peking was persuaded that (^) the United States at (^) long last intended to disengage from Vietnam, and in other respects would curtail U.S. military activity in the (^) Western Pacific. In addition, to the extent that the United States (^) pursued better relations with both Peking and Moscow, new pressures would (^) be placed on Hanoi to negotiate with Washington. (^) Yet the Chinese also understood that the Nixon administration gained additional leverage (^) in its dealings with the Soviet Union (^) by enjoying high level access to leaders in Peking. (^) The United States, in effect, could trade on its improving relations (^) with Peking to elicit greater responsiveness from Moscow (^) on

• (^) matters of vital interest to superpower relations, most (^) notably agreements (^) on strategic arms control as well as a negotiated peace (^) in ". Vietnam. Thus, triangularity posed an additional (^) risk for the Chinese: that the United States (^) would simply seek to parlay its ties with Peking into improved ties with the Soviet Union. China's experience (^) in the Sino-Soviet alliance (^) had been a sobering one. Peking would (^) never again permit excessive dependence (^) on an outside power, let alone cede any of its sovereign (^) political prerogatives. China's acute vulnerability to Soviet power made partial accommodation with Washington (^) a compelling political and (^) security need, but the Chinese did not want to become a

0. **.....

--12 -

search for (^) new sources of technological, economic, and even security assistance. The only possible source for such aid was (^) the West and Japan. As a result, China increasingly argued that the Thviet strategic challenge was so pervasive and threatening that the PRC could (^) no longer equivocate about ties with the United States and the other (^) major Western powers.

*^ II Joint collaborative efforts were thus required "to frustrate the war

*.. schemes of the Soviet hegemonists." (^3) Peking seemed closer to an explicit security relationship with one (^) of the superpowers than at any time since the highpoint of the Sino-Soviet (^) alliance in the 1950s. The normalization of Sino-American relations (^) at the end of 1978, followed immediately by China's (^) border war against Vietnam and some months later by the Soviet (^) invasion of Afghanistan, portended a stark repolarization of Asian international (^) politics. Thus, (^) the dramatic improvement in Sino-American relations at (^) the end of the 1970s was based on a conjunction (^) of internal and external needs. It reflected not only heightened Chinese (^) anxieties about Soviet political and military encirclement, (^) but also the ascendance of leaders in Peking (in particular Deng Xiaoping) who were prepared (^) to cement ties 2." with the West. Deng judged a united front strategy (^) against Moscow as the most credible, effective way to prevent (^) further Soviet geopolitical gains in Asia. To the extent that Deng (^) could persuade leaders abroad that China was almost reflexively opposed (^) to any Soviet political or military actions, China could (^) expect the United States and other Western powers to (^) provide assistance vital to China's modernization effort. At the same (^) time, Deng understood a concomitant need not to provoke Moscow (^) or exacerbate Sino-Soviet tensions. Notwithstanding (^) the somewhat

• "extravagant. (^) flavor of China's united front (^) rhetoric, Peking did not seek

a major confrontation with Soviet military power, least (^) of all along the

• Sino-Soviet (^) border. Nor did the Chinese want to see U.S.-Soviet tensions (^) escalate to an acute level, especially if this threatened (^) to involve China, (^) as well. The goal of a security alignment with the West

(^3) For an authoritative defense of China's united front (^) strategy with

• (^) the United States, see Red Flag Commentator, (^) "The Plotter of a Siege Is Being Besieged," (^) longqi, No. 11, November 1978, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report--People's (^) Republic of China, November (^) 29, 1978, pp. A9-13.

%%

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was to deter Moscow, not provoke (^) it. While the Chinese leadership refrained from forging any (^) formal security relations with the United States, they did conclude that informal security ties (^) could serve as a tacit signal to Moscow that China was considering the option (^) of leaning further (^) toward the West in the event of undiminished Soviet pressure against (^) China. China's most compelling needs, however, (^) were in the area of national economic development. (^) China's modernization prospects hinged on several key considerations: (1) diminishing (^) direct Soviet pressure against China, (^) thereby making defense needs less imperative; (2) devising a credible, consistent basis for heightened economic (^) and technological exchanges with the West; and (^) (3) creating a stable and peaceful international environment (^) that would be congruent with orderly economic development. All three (^) factors reflected a dramatic departure in Chinese economic (^) strategy from the previous emphasis on voluntarism and domestic mobilization and toward a more orderly pursuit (^) of development goals. Thus, a united front (^) strategy posed risks as well as potential gains. (^) If China's preeminent interest was in a peaceful international (^) environment, excessive polarization between China and (^) the West, on the one hand, and the (^) Soviet Union, on the other, could easily undermine (^) such a goal. There was no firm guarantee that both China (^) and the United States shared a common (^) viewpoint on the best means of restraining Soviet (^) power. It remained for the two countries to define a common set of assumptions about (^) the character and objectives of their security dealings that would also be comprehensible to leaders (^) in Mloscow. By (^) the close of the 1970s, however, many of China's key political and strategic objectives had been achieved. The contrast (^) with Peking's i.- political and military environment at (^) the outset of the decade was palpable. Though still subject (^) to severe military pressure and efforts (^) at encirclement, China was no longer, isolated internationally. With (^) increasingly diversified economic ties, it could use the (^) prospect of its untapped economic potential to induce broadened (^) trade and technology (^) purchases from the West. And, though lagging severely (^) behind its major military rival, China did not face the likely (^) prospect of

serious military conflict, except along the Sino-Vietnamese (^) border. The

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collaboration. Formal security (^) ties were too binding: They restricted Chinese freedom of action and, even (^) worse, threatened to embroil Peking in a (^) Soviet-American confrontation, whether or not the Chinese (^) judged their (^) own security interests at risk. But even though the (^) Sino-American relationship (^) in no sense constituted an alliance, it nonetheless represented a major international (^) breakthrough. An informal security coalition between (^) the United States and China, further facilitated (^) by the close economic (^) and political ties of both states with Japan, loomed as a serious possibility, with the goal of restraining (^) provocative Soviet actions in Asia. Such expectations (^) proved exaggerated or premature. China (^) has instead assumed a (^) far more assertive and independent political posture; moreover, it again describes the United States as a (^) "hegemonic *superpower" that (^) threatens rather than guarantees international (^) peace and stability. (^) Although a Sino-American security dialogue (^) continues, it is now substantially (^) diminished, with uncertain prospects in the immediate future for higher (^) level strategic ties between Washington and Peking. Numerous hypotheses (^) have been offered to explain these major departures from Chinese policy of the late 1970s. (^) The prevailing view is that (^) China's unhappiness with Reagan Administration policy (^) toward Taiwan led Peking to reevaluate the possibilities (^) (at least in the near term) for expanding (^) ties with Washington, including the further institutionalization of a Sino-American (^) anti-Soviet united front. There is considerable support for (^) this interpretation, yet it does not offer a fully persuasive (^) explanation for Chinese behavior. A (^) number of additional (^) factors placed serious limits on the further development (^) of Sino-American security ties. In (^) retrospect, the late 1970s are better viewed as a transitional period in Chinese (^) policy than as a fundamental and enduring realignment. (^) Bold steps may have been needed to shake China (^) loose from its previous complacency, but they did (^) not offer a realistic basis for a long-term (^) strategic course. Several (^) recurring concerns in PRC security strategy stand (^) out as

• even (^) more pivotal issues than Taiwan. China's abiding (^) suspicions about alliances with (^) states far more powerful than itself continued to argue against open-ended security (^) arrangements with either superpower. A S,

' ".-..

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never again" mentality thus pervades China's foreign policy: Its experience (^) in the 1950s had left Peking perpetually suspicious of excessive dependence on a major external power. Although it may have to provide initial assurances (^) to the United States that its dealings with the West were (^) of a long-term, strategic nature, Peking appears to have anticipated that inescapable differences (^) in national power and security -i needs would limit Sino-American (^) cooperation. In Peking's view, the United States, as the far more powerful (^) partner, would inevitably seek to take advantage of China's weakness and vulnerability, (^) and thus could not be expected to support (^) a genuine commitment to "a strong and secure China."' *. (^) Such an inevitability seems to have taken place (^) even sooner than many anticipated. (^) The election of the Reagan administration, and its *adop.ion^ -J (^) of a staunchly anti-Soviet orientation, appeared to portend an accelerated pace of Sino-American (^) security dealings. Yet the new leadership in Washington (^) expressed unease about overly close ties with a major Communist power, no matter how anti-Soviet (^) its rhetoric. At the same time, the PRC judged the (^) Reagan administration disrespectful or even contemptuous of past Sino-American understandings (^) over Taiwan. Possible transfers (^) of various "dual ase" technologies were also blocked or impeded, suggesting to China that the United States did (^) not seriously intend to facilitate China's modernization, (^) especially if to do so might strengthen the PRC militarily. (^) In the view of leaders in Peking, these ,4 (^) and related developments suggested (^) that America's commitments were feigned (^) rather than real and that the United States, in effect, had yet

• to decide whether China was friend (^) or foe. China's perception of parallel strategic interests--and its willingness (^) to call for -- accelerated Sino-American security cooperation--diminished (^) just as

• -"rapidly as it had developed. In a manner reminiscent of (^) the disintegration of the Sino-Soviet alliance, (^) China again cast itself as the disadvantaged, aggrieved, (^) and manipulated junior (^) partner. But in a certain sense China was

" " 'The Uaites States (^) first expressed such a commitment to the Chinese

• during Zbigniew (^) Brzezinski's visit to China in May 1978. See President Carter's instructions to (^) Brzezinski in Brzezinski, Power and Principle--Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981, (^) Farrar V. Straus Giroux, New York,^ 1983,^ pp.^ 551-555.

-V.,

• ' ..