European Integration, Lecture notes of European Union law

EMU European Integration Internal market

Typology: Lecture notes

2022/2023

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Lecture 13
EMU
1. History of EMU
oTreaty of Maastricht 1992; includes EMU and 3 stage plan to establish EMU:
1.) monetarists
2.) 1994-1998 governmnets agreed on the name of the new currency, ECB was created
and SGP (ms behave fiscally) – art. 191 TFEU
3.) ms joined the euro 1999 who met the SGP criteria
Further economic coherence idea
In reality this did not live up ; exacerbated problems – more distinction between
monetary and fiscal policy -> mp – centralized – excl. competence of the EU
Central banks > ECB as a last resort
SGP
oPreventive arm – submit stability programs, they should relay that the GDP deficit did
not go bellow 3% and debt below 60% of GDP
oFrance and Germany – deficits in 2001-2003 – the Council did not adopt measures, the
Commission
2. Sovereign debt crisis -> Collapse of Lehman investment banks (it held too many toxic
assets- mortgages that could not be repaid; financial deregulations in the US (1970s
onwards))
2008 financial crisis in US => 2010 sovereign debt crisis /countries that have debts,
countries refinance these debts by selling government bonds to investors, risk in borrowing
money/
North-South differences; structural imbalances (Greece could not raise new money and risked
default; Irish banks bought lots of toxic assets from US banks -> bloated the Irish state and IR could
not repay its debts; Spain – liquidity crisis: could not borrow any more debts from the financial
markets)
Common factors:
oStructural differences – inflation rates > asymmetries between Germany and other ms;
oStrong single currency – they could borrow money but did not look at the economies of
the ms borrowing.
Fiscal irresponsibility
Monetary policy is exclusive competence of the EU: no devaluation of currency
= Spread of risk among ms
3. The bailouts
Temporary loan programs:
a> EFSM:
Legal basis / art. 122(2) TFEU – created by regulation 407/2010
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Lecture 13 EMU

1. History of EMU o Treaty of Maastricht 1992; includes EMU and 3 stage plan to establish EMU: 1.) monetarists 2.) 1994-1998 governmnets agreed on the name of the new currency, ECB was created and SGP (ms behave fiscally) – art. 191 TFEU 3.) ms joined the euro 1999 who met the SGP criteria  Further economic coherence idea  In reality this did not live up ; exacerbated problems – more distinction between monetary and fiscal policy -> mp – centralized – excl. competence of the EU  Central banks > ECB as a last resort SGP o Preventive arm – submit stability programs, they should relay that the GDP deficit did not go bellow 3% and debt below 60% of GDP o France and Germany – deficits in 2001-2003 – the Council did not adopt measures, the Commission

  1. Sovereign debt crisis -> Collapse of Lehman investment banks (it held too many toxic assets- mortgages that could not be repaid; financial deregulations in the US (1970s onwards)) 2008 financial crisis in US => 2010 sovereign debt crisis /countries that have debts, countries refinance these debts by selling government bonds to investors, risk in borrowing money/ North-South differences; structural imbalances ( Greece could not raise new money and risked default; Irish banks bought lots of toxic assets from US banks -> bloated the Irish state and IR could not repay its debts; Spain – liquidity crisis: could not borrow any more debts from the financial markets) Common factors: o Structural differences – inflation rates > asymmetries between Germany and other ms; o Strong single currency – they could borrow money but did not look at the economies of the ms borrowing. Fiscal irresponsibility Monetary policy is exclusive competence of the EU: no devaluation of currency = Spread of risk among ms
  2. The bailouts Temporary loan programs : a> EFSM: Legal basis / art. 122(2) TFEU – created by regulation 407/

The commission borrow money in the name of EU art. 2 EFSM b> EFSF Est. in Luxembourg, euro area ms; borrow money on secondary financial markets and lend them to ms; c> Then ms created ESM Treaty to create a постоянно решение Permanent, reforming the economies ; intergovernmental Objective: to ensure financial stability of euro area Financial assistance to ESM states under strict conditionalities – negotiated by the Commission and ECB23+ Political agreement, not a legal instrument 3.1 art. 125 (1) TFEU; art. 13 (2) TEU Pringle case -art. 136 TFEU simplified treaty amendment Question – Irish supreme court > political importance ; CJEU rejected all the challenges that mr. Pringle brought ; ESM in accordance with EU law Questions:

  1. whether this simplified amendment procedure of 136 TFEU was in accordance with EU law
  2. changing the exclusive competence?
  3. No-bailout clause (art.125 TFEU)
    • Objectives of ESM is to maintain the eurozone as a whole
    • Fiscal policy is a competence of ms  Doesn’t infringe EU law CJEU: ms can adopt ESM treaty because it complies with eu law, ms can adopt supplementary measures in economic policy > fiscal responsibility ensured 3.1 no-bailout clause: teleological interpretation of art. 125 TFEU > the purpose of art. 1 st^ objective: ensure budgetary discipline (lend ms money; criteria) 2 nd^ objective: safeguard financial stability of the euro area as a whole ; Effects of financial crisis: rise of intergovernmentalism and executive control; lack of transparency > ESM includes strict secrecy of the decisions The European Council and the Council. CJEU – Ledra Advertising (2016) Cypriot banks that had financial difficulties; banks needed to be saved – Cypriot banks should be restructured; applications resulted in loss of value of Cypriot banks accounts; Brought an annulment action –