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i ~The Federalist Papers: No, 10. To the People of the State of New York: Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. ‘Ihe friend of popular governments never finds himselt’so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when be contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. Ile will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it, The instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished, as they continue Lo be the favorite and fruitful Lopies from which the adversarics to liberty derive their most specious declamations. ‘Ihe valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainty be ton much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as efiectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable, that the public goud is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures are tou often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior fores of an interested and averbearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in same degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that same of the distresses under which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our goverinents; but it will be found, at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of i public engagements, and alarm fer private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent lo the other, These must be chiclly, if net wholly, cffects of tho unsteadiness and injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations. By a faction, J understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects, There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential Lo ils existence; (he other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worso than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire ils destructive agency. The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his sel{love, bis upinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will atlach themselves, The diversily in the facultics of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. Lhe protection of these 
