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Definitions and concepts related to game theory in the context of intermediate microeconomics. Topics include strategies, utility functions, strategy profiles, strictly and weakly dominant strategies, nash equilibria, and symmetric games. Students are encouraged to use examples to better understand these concepts.
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SHRI RAM COLLEGE OF COMMERCE BA (HONS.) ECONOMICS – SEM 4C SESSION 2019- 2020 INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS - 2 Game Theory – Definitions - 1
also create your own examples in order to better grasp the definitions. This is rigorous work and should be taken seriously.
A strategy profile of all the players will be denoted as s ≡ (s 1 , ..., sn) ∈ S. A strategy profile of all the players excluding a Player i will be denoted by s−i. The set of all strategy profiles of players other than a Player i will be denoted by S−i.
ui(si, s−i) < ui(s’i, s−i).
ui(si, s−i) ≤ ui(s’i, s−i) with strict inequality holding for some s−i.
strategy may be part of a Nash Equilibrium. A weakly dominated strategy will never be part of a strict Nash Equilibrium.
The set of all best response strategies of Player i given the strategies of other players, s-i, is denoted by
Now, a strategy profile (s∗ 1 , ..., s∗n) is a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N, s∗i ∈ Bi(s∗−i). Hence, Nash equilibrium requires non-emptiness of best response set at the equilibrium strategy profile. s* is a strict Nash equilibrium iff ∀ i ∈ N, s∗i ∈ Bi(s∗−i) and Bi(s∗−i) is a singleton set, i.e., {s∗i } = Bi(s∗−i).
for every player i. ( Check if the Prisoners’ Dilemma and The Battle of sexes are games with symmetric Nash equilibria.)