Game Theory: Definitions and Nash Equilibria in Intermediate Microeconomics, Exams of Game Theory

Definitions and concepts related to game theory in the context of intermediate microeconomics. Topics include strategies, utility functions, strategy profiles, strictly and weakly dominant strategies, nash equilibria, and symmetric games. Students are encouraged to use examples to better understand these concepts.

Typology: Exams

2021/2022

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SHRI RAM COLLEGE OF COMMERCE
BA (HONS.) ECONOMICS SEM 4C SESSION 2019-2020
INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS -2
Game Theory Definitions -1
Note:
Put these definitions to work with the help of examples done in class and from the readings. You may
also create your own examples in order to better grasp the definitions. This is rigorous work and should be taken
seriously.
A strategy is a complete contingent plan of action.
A game in strategic form or normal form is a triple Γ (N, {Si}iN , {ui}iN ) in which:
- N = {1, 2, ..., n} is a finite set of players
- Si is the set of strategies of player i, for every player i N - the set of strategy profiles is denoted
as S ≡ S1 × ... × Sn,
- ui : S → R is a utility function that associates with each profile of strategies s ≡ (s1, ..., sn), a
payoff ui(s) for every player i N.
When the Si is finite for each i
N, we will refer to Γ as a finite game.
A strategy profile of all the players will be denoted as s ≡ (s1, ..., sn) S. A strategy profile of
all the players excluding a Player i will be denoted by si. The set of all strategy profiles of
players other than a Player i will be denoted by Si.
A strategy si of player i
strictly dominates
her strategy si if for all s-i S-i,
ui(si, s-i) > ui(si, s-i)
A strategy si Si for Player i is
strictly dominant
if it strictly dominates every si Si\{si}.
A strategy si
weakly dominates
strategy si if for every si Si,
ui(si, si) ui(si, si),
with strict inequality holding for some si.
A strategy si is
weakly dominant
if it weakly dominates every other strategy si Si\{si}.
A strategy si Si for Player i is
strictly dominated
if there exists si Si such that si strictly
dominates si, i.e., for every si
Si, we have
ui(si, si) < ui(si, si).
A strategy si Si for Player i is
weakly dominated
if there exists si Si such that si weakly
dominates si, i.e., for every si
Si, we have
ui(si, si) ui(si, si)
with strict inequality holding for some si.
pf2

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SHRI RAM COLLEGE OF COMMERCE BA (HONS.) ECONOMICS – SEM 4C SESSION 2019- 2020 INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS - 2 Game Theory – Definitions - 1

Note: Put these definitions to work with the help of examples done in class and from the readings. You may

also create your own examples in order to better grasp the definitions. This is rigorous work and should be taken seriously.

  • A strategy is a complete contingent plan of action.
  • A game in strategic form or normal form is a triple Γ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) in which:
    • N = {1, 2, ..., n} is a finite set of players
    • Si is the set of strategies of player i, for every player i ∈ N - the set of strategy profiles is denoted as S ≡ S 1 × ... × Sn,
    • ui : S → R is a utility function that associates with each profile of strategies s ≡ (s 1 , ..., sn), a payoff ui(s) for every player i ∈ N.

When the Si is finite for each i ∈ N , we will refer to Γ as a finite game.

A strategy profile of all the players will be denoted as s ≡ (s 1 , ..., sn) ∈ S. A strategy profile of all the players excluding a Player i will be denoted by s−i. The set of all strategy profiles of players other than a Player i will be denoted by S−i.

  • A strategy si of player i strictly dominates her strategy s’i if for all s-i ∈ S-i, ui(si, s-i) > ui(s’i, s-i)
  • A strategy si ∈ Si for Player i is strictly dominant if it strictly dominates every s’i ∈ Si{si}.
  • A strategy si weakly dominates strategy s’i if for every s−i ∈ S−i, ui(si, s−i) ui(s’i, s−i), with strict inequality holding for some s−i.
  • A strategy si is weakly dominant if it weakly dominates every other strategy s’i ∈ Si{si}.
  • A strategy si ∈ Si for Player i is strictly dominated if there exists s’i ∈ Si such that s’i strictly

dominates si, i.e., for every s−i ∈ S−i , we have

ui(si, s−i) < ui(s’i, s−i).

  • A strategy si ∈ Si for Player i is weakly dominated if there exists s’i ∈ Si such that s’i weakly

dominates si, i.e., for every s−i ∈ S−i , we have

ui(si, s−i) ui(s’i, s−i) with strict inequality holding for some s−i.

  • A strategy profile (s∗ 1 , ..., s∗n) in a strategic form game Γ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) is a Nash

equilibrium of Γ if for all i ∈ N

ui(s∗i , s∗−i) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i) ∀ si ∈ Si.

  • A strategy profile (s∗ 1 , ..., s∗n) in a strategic form game Γ ≡ (N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) is a strict

Nash equilibrium of Γ if for all i ∈ N

ui(s∗i , s∗−i) > ui(si, s∗−i) ∀ si ∈ Si{s∗i}.

• A strictly dominated strategy will never be part of a Nash Equilibrium. A weakly dominated

strategy may be part of a Nash Equilibrium. A weakly dominated strategy will never be part of a strict Nash Equilibrium.

• A strategy si of Player i is a best response to the strategy s−i of other players - i if

ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s’i, s−i) ∀ s’i ∈ Si.

The set of all best response strategies of Player i given the strategies of other players, s-i, is denoted by

Bi(s−i) := {si ∈ Si : ui(si, s−i) ≥ ui(s’i, s−i) ∀ s’i ∈ Si}.

Now, a strategy profile (s∗ 1 , ..., s∗n) is a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ N, s∗i ∈ Bi(s∗−i). Hence, Nash equilibrium requires non-emptiness of best response set at the equilibrium strategy profile. s* is a strict Nash equilibrium iff ∀ i ∈ N, s∗i ∈ Bi(s∗−i) and Bi(s∗−i) is a singleton set, i.e., {s∗i } = Bi(s∗−i).

  • If s∗i is a strictly dominant strategy of Player i, then {s∗i } = Bi(s−i) for all s−i ∈ S−i. Hence, if (s∗ 1 , ..., s∗n) is a strictly dominant strategy profile , it is a unique Nash equilibrium. If s∗i is a weakly dominant strategy of Player i, then s∗i ∈ Bi(s−i) for all s−i ∈ S−i. Hence, if (s∗ 1 , ..., s∗n) is a weakly dominant strategy profile , it is a Nash equilibrium.
  • A two-player normal form game is symmetric if the players’ sets of strategies are the same and the players’ payoffs are represented by the payoff functions u 1 and u 2 for which u 1 (s 1 , s 2 ) = u 2 (s 2 , s 1 ) for every pair (s 1 , s 2 ). E.g., The Prisoners’ Dilemma.
  • A strategy profile s* in a normal form game in which each player has the same set of

strategies is a symmetric Nash Equilibrium if it is a Nash Equilibrium and si* is the same

for every player i. ( Check if the Prisoners’ Dilemma and The Battle of sexes are games with symmetric Nash equilibria.)