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Globalization, Corruption and the Structural-
Historical Perspective
GEORGE BAYlON RADICS
Corruption is an insidious plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies. This evil phenomenon is found in all countries-big and small, rich and poor-but it is in the developing world that its effects are most destructive. Corruption hurts the poor disproportionately-by diverting funds intended for development, undermininga government's ability to provide basic services, feeding inequality and injustice, and discouragingforeign aid and investment. Corruption is a key element in economic underperformance, and a major obstacle to poverty alleviation and development.
Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations Speech on UN Convention against Corruption, 2003
Corruption is one of the most salient issues currently affecting the Philippines. As a nation that experiences moderate economic advance in contrast to its rapid population growth, exploitation of what little exist only further denigrates Filipino Iivelihood. Corruption weakens the already limited capability of the bureaucracy to perform its duties efficiently according to established rules, hindering the possibility for political, economic and social progress. It is an endemic burden for the poor who must bear the brutal brunt of exploitation and marginalization, and provides for an unstable environment that typically benefits a select few while alienating the masses.
In the Philippines, it has been argued that corruption has metastasized from Malacanang Palace down to the barangay government.' (Coronel 1998:
- According to this view, the Philippines has experienced total systematic affliction where practically all government offices and projects are prone to corruption. Exploiting the bureaucratic procedures in the Philippines, it is reported that under the Ramos administration, each member of the lower house of Congress is able to skim Php62.5 (US$2) million per year from budgets allocated for the Depart- ments of Public Works and Highways, (DPWH) Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), Interior and Local Government
PHILIPPINE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW Vol. 49, Nos. 1-2 (2001): 39-58. 39
(DILG) and Health. President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada in January 2000 was
impeached on plunder charges for
allegedly embezzling over Php4 billion,
or US$80 million. In 1986, records show
that PresidentFerdinand Marcos was able
to amass over US$30 billion during his
twenty years in office; these figures stand
in stark contrast with the reality that the
average Filipino makes around US$500-
$1,000 per year (Philippine Census 2000).
In a study conducted by Transparency
International among businessmen currently
engaged in trade activities in countries
throughout the world, the Philippines
ranked 77th (with the first being the
least corrupt)." Meanwhile, in a study by
the Internet Center for Corruption
Research on perceptions among citizens
and businessmen on transparency and
integrity in public office, the Philippines
scored 92nd in a list of 133 (again with
the first being the least corrupt).' In both
instances, the Philippines scored in the
bottom quartile of the most corrupt
countries on earth.
Moreover, corruption plays an import-
ant role in economic growth. The Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), in its
study of growth rates in ASEAN found that
between 1970 and 1996, the Philippines
experienced the lowest level of economic
growth in the region. In fact, between
1980 and 1996, this economic growth
was lower than that of Sub-Saharan
Africa (Hicklin et aI., 2003:27). Therefore
in conjunction with extremely high
corruption rates relative to the rest of the
world, we also see extremely low devel-
opment rates. To many, the correlation
between the two is undeniable.
However, to attribute all national
problems to political elites who benefit
from corrupt behavior would be missing
the bigger picture. In order to understand
the current phenomenon of corruption
in the Philippines, one must first trace
its roots to colonization. Without the
construction of an entrenched political
elite class that would constantly side
with USpolicies during that crucial period,
the American colonial experiment would
have failed-especially since it was
precisely this group of elites who posed
the biggest threat to the newly formed
empire. This type of relationship is
continually sustained by global market
forces of capitalism that need allies in
order to maintain the conditions for the
expansion of the system. This is especially
in light of the fact that as this system
expands, it tends to enhance poverty and
inequalityinternationally. Thispaperargues,
then, that corruption becomes part of
the hegemonic global economic system,
institutionalized by the history of coloni-
zation and sustained by the structural
forces of capitalism.
Conveniently however, perhaps in
attempts to mask this reality, current
literature on corruption in the Philippines
tends to focus on the act of the corruption
and. the 'culture of corruption.' Scholars
such as Thompson (1995) and Hutchcroft
(1998), who constitute a group of (self-
described) 'talented new. generation of
scholars on Philippine politics," although
critical of older political models of the
Philippines such as that of the 'patron-
client' model pioneered by Carl Lande in
the 1960s, tend to overlook their own
criticism and continue to employ these
not simply manifest itself into social relationships. As Steinberg argues, it can be realized in international and bilateral arrangements as well:
The Filipinos felt that the United States owed them a massive amount of post- war support not merely because they had been allies but more essentially because they had fulfilled handsomely the obligations that cemented the 'special relationship'... Filipinos were crushed to discover that America seemed preoccupied and insensitive (Steinberg 1972:187).
Scholars on Philippine political science picked up where many of these early scholars left off by integrating these ideas about Filipino culture into their analyses of politics. According to Lande, a Yale University trained scholar,
Rural Filipinos, and to a certain extent, urban Filipinos as well, rely more heavily upon the help of their kinsmen in their various activitiesand less upon the cooperation of nonkinsmen than do inhabitants of modern Western countries... a major consequence of this Philippine kinship is that the typical Filipino community does not segment by vertical lines of cleavage into a series of discrete Iineages ... instead, [we see] an uninterrupted web of interwoven and overlapping kinship ties which directly or indirectly connect most or all of its inhabitants with one another (Lande 1965:16-18).
Therefore, Filipino social lives become dominated by a complex web of relations that are based on the cultural ideas of kinship and bonds of utang na loob. Furthermore, these 'web-like' associations become characterized by a 'patron-client' relationship where the rich tend to dish out favors to the poor who in return provide them with patronage. As a result, factions based on this patron-client model are often formed at the local level. These factions often take on the shape of family or regional rivalries. Ultimately, from these emerge national pol itics, wh ich are plagued with acute infighting found at the local level. According to Lande, this becomes a problem when local politics tends to create amorphous party lines at the national level. Because parties in the Philippines emerge from the bottom up instead of top down, politics is often guided more by personal relationship rather than national pol itical directorates. In the Philippines, if a political party refuses to endorse a candidate that is backed by a powerful provincial leader, local factions can switch sides or form their own political party to challenge the original party. In order to reconci Ie for this, many parties are forced to enact 'free zone' rules, which allow for multiple candidates to run on one slate, therefore alleviating the problem of party switching
(Lande 1965:56-58). Therefore, as local
politics based on flawed Filipino culture infiltrates national politics, institutional problems become grounded in cultural explanations.
Mark R. Thompson in The Anti- Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition takes this argument even further by arguing that as these patron-client relations become intense, they begin to take the form of a singular 'patron' who then begins to dominate all institutions. As a result, we begin to see massive plundering of national assets. Thompson of Yale University drew very heavily from his supervisor's work on 'Sultanisrn." Portraying Marcos as the ultimate 'Sultan,' he demonstrates how Marcos and many of his 'cronies' were able to take advantage of their position in government to dole out favorsand rewards to those who sided with the Marcos administration. Marcos' financial reach was extended furthest through 'crony capitalism,' a kind of subcontracting to his close friends important areas of the economy for plundering. Though production remained privately owned, Marcos allowed cronies to monopolize key commodities through special taxes, production privileges, or import-export licenses ...even Marcos' elderly mother had her sphere of influence in the Rice and Corn Administration (Thompson 1995:53). Therefore, as a result of patron-client relations, we see the emergence of' crony- capital ism,' a concept that has been used to characterize the corrupt nature of many third world nations. As friends and families submit their support to the Marcos regime, they in return receive favors that expand their realm of control-all the while reiterating the centralized power of the main patron. Following the logic of Lande,
this interpretation of the Marcos regime reflects the underlying notion that politics in the Philippines is truly guided by a patron-client relationship, one that traces its roots to the Filipino value of kinship and utang na loob. It should be noted that although Thompson uses the patron-client model to understand Filipino politics, he also recognizes several failings of the model based on 'flawed' Filipino values. He argues "c1ientelist theory simplifies the messy real ity of pre-martial law politics in the Philippines characterized by the near breakdown of Philippine democracy between 1949 and 1953 ... [Furthermore it] also overlooks the violence of pre- martial law elections." However, he adds, "like anomalies during normal science, these political phenomena do not severely undermine the c1ientelism's analytical effectiveness" (Thompson 1995: 16). Finally, as politics become dominated by Filipino culture, it becomesinevitable then that the Philippine economy begins to suffer as well. Paul Hutchcroft is another contem- porary scholar who analyzes Philippine political issues through the use of the patron-client model. Instead of looking at the direct implication of the model on political relationships however, he applies this framework to the political backdrop behind the financial sector. Initially characterizing the Philippines as patri- monial oligarchic state, he makes the case that instead of the political factions within the government directing national development, it is the large 'oligarchic' business class, grounded in the local
abused. A near-sighted driver who has had his eye test fixed is a menace on the roads. A real estate developer who bribes the building inspector in order to use cheap cement puts his tenants at riskatthe next earthquake. A defense attorney who buys a judge destroys justice, a sense of fairness in the system, and the integrity ofthe courts (Steinberg 1990:6-7).
Thus, at the core of some of the institutional problems of the Philippines are the flawed cultural values, some of which can be squarely accused of providing the foundation to some of the larger problems that persist today. The problem with these arguments, however, is that they are largely ahistorical and they often overlook, if not dismiss altogether, some of the prevailing structural circumstances that precede and maintain such problems. With this in mind, the paper can now proceed to shed light on some of the historical circumstances of colonialism that have contributed to the birth of such problems. It intends to look at some of the structural issues that make the historical legacy of colonialism persist to this day.
CHINESE MESTIZOS, THE RISE OF THE
FILIPINOIDENTITY AND COLONIALISM
Owing to the Spanish colonial policy of simply using the Philippines as a port of transfer between China and Mexico as opposed to a colony from which it could exploit massive amounts of resources, the
Spanish engaged in a different type of colonial policy in the Philippines than had been seen in other partsof the Spanish empire. Whereas in Latin America many of the indigenous people were forced to learn Spanish to facilitate the utilization of labor necessary to grow crops or mine precious minerals, in the Philippines, most Filipinos, (sincethis was never necessary), were able retain their native dialect
(Anderson 1988:5). Because the Spanish
government never fully developed the Philippine economy to one that would be economically self-sustaining, the Spanish colonial government had to rely on Chinese merchants and traders to maintain the necessary ties to the Chinese market as well as to continue benefiting from the trade that brought in some of the basic daily necessities that could not be found
on the islands (Wickberg 1964:67-68).
Although the Spanish could not live without the Chinese, they could also not live with them. As these Chinese traders began to profit from the relationship between themselves, the Spanish and the locals, their population began to grow both physically and economically. Given that the Spanish population was compa- ratively much smaller to the burgeoning Chinese trader community, in addition to the fact that this community was becoming highly dependent on the Chinese, the Spanish colonial government began to enact highly restrictive measures to curtail the growth of the Chinese com- munity, which was perceived asa growing threat. The colonial government enacted extremely restraining geographic mobility
rights on Chinese communities, often sequesteringChinese merchants to certain communities within the immediate control of colonial authorities. Chinese merchants were unable to purchase and own land as a direct consequence of this restricted mobility. Lastly, in order to limit the realm of power to which these traders had access, the Chinese were refused the right to transform their economic power into political power and were denied participation in any part of the government
(Wickberg 1964:70-75).
Coupled with anti-Chinese racial riots, these discriminatory practices made the situation for Chinese merchants in the Philippines far from an ideal situation.
Therefore in 1762, when the British
invaded the Philippines in response to the Spanish involvement in the Seven Years War, many of the local Chinese merchants immediately sided with the new colonial occupants. When the Spanish returned two years later, it was resolved that the Chinese were not to return to the Philippines given their potential to betray the Spanish if given the chance (Anderson
1988: 7). Consequently, after 1762,
Spanish colonial policy with regard the Chinese could be viewed as forced assimilation. Given the outright ban of Chinese immigration to the island along with the continuing necessity to maintain many of these traders to sustain the local economy, the Spanish colonial govern- ment, as a response, increased the pressureto have these Chinese merchants assimilated into the local culture. This was done through conversion to Catholicism and intermarriage. As a result of the latter solution to the Chinese problem, we begin
to see the meteoric rise of the Chinese
mestizo (Anderson 1988:7-9, Wickberg
1964:71-75, Cullinane 1982:257-271).
With the ability to take advantage of their fathers' financial network and the ability to navigate local social relations,' these Chinese mestizos, now without legal restriction, were able to amass a substantial amount of wealth. In Cebu' for instance, it was argued, "the wealthiest of these Chinese mestizos probably exerted more influence over the urban area than did any of the colonial authorities"
(Cullinance 1983:257). In addition, many
of these wealthy Chinese mestizos began to receive an education abroad, contri- buting to the argument that the existence of these elites.eventually led to the emer- gence of an 'indigenous intelligentsia
(Anderson 1988:8-9).
THE RISE OF THE 'FILIPINO IDENTITY'
AND RESISTANCE
It was from this intelligentsia that we begin to seeresistanceto Spanish colonial rule. As many Chinese mestizos became landed property owners or members of the social elite in the Philippines, and as their children became educated in some of the finest schools in Europe, it became very difficult for members of this elite group to accept their position as second class citizens within their own country. A result of this emerging identity was the 'Propaganda Movement? of elite Chinese mestizo children studying in Spain. While many of these students pursued profes- sional careers, they noticed that despite their ascendant status, they remained vulnerable to harassment and unequal
made ill practices and corruption run rampant, many of this class played an important role in the resistance effort not just for themselves but also for their country. It was through their cognitive liberation, financial base, and leadership that a viable resistance movement was able to pressure the Spanish government to relinquish its control over the archipelago and eventually sell the island to the US. Ironically, it was during the American occupation that we begin to see a dramatic turn in terms of the role these elites played in society.
US COLONIZATION AND THE 'POLICY OF ATTRACTION'
After the United States forcefully gained control of the islands and slaughtering nearly 1/6 of the population,'! the US government embarked upon a campaign to win the 'hearts and minds' of the population by enacting a 'policy of attraction."? An obvious attempt to win over the hostile Filipinos was by pronouncing 'benevolent assimilation' as the intent of the US colonial adventure. According to then US PresidentMcKinley,
It will bethe duty of the commander of the forces of occupation to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come not as invaders of conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employment and in their personal religious rights. All people who, either by activeaid or by honest submission, cooperate with the government of the United States to give effect the
beneficent purposes will receive the reward of its support andprotection...^13
As a product of this 'benevolence,' the Americans engaged upon one of the largest infrastructure projects in the region, building roads, schools and institutions such aspost offices and telegraph services. One of the most important projects the American colonialists embarked on was land reform. When the Americans arrived in the Philippines they encountered two major issues, 1) the unequal distribution of land due to Spanish concentration of land within the church and 2) a hostile and scheming elite classthat had the potential to destabilize the newly forming colony. In order to address both issues, the US colonial administration transferred nearly 400,000 acres of land from the churches to the elites. By doing so, not only did the colonial government address the large plots of idle lands under the old setup of the church, but also placated the group of individuals that posed the greatest threat to the administration. Secondly, in order to provide these Filipino elites with some incentive to develop these large tracts of land, the Payne Aldrich Act was passed in 1909 to allow these Filipino elites free and untaxed access to the US market, one of the largest markets of the world at that time (Anderson 1988:8-9). A second pol icy that pacified potentially hostile elites was the construction of a liberal democracy. Unlike other colonies throughout the world such as in Hong Kong or Singapore,
nearly 99 percent of the colonial adrnin-
istration in the Philippines was run by the colonial subjects themselves (Anderson
1988:9-10). This served as a perfect
opportunity not only to provide these elites with economic benefits but also with political power since according to the law, only those who owned property and were educated were able to vote
(Thompson 1995:15-32, Hutchcroft
1998:13-21, Anderson 1988:10). Providing
the elites with even more benefits, this Act also made it so that for the first time in the history of the Philippines we see the rise of a 'national oligarchy.' According to Anderson,
There more than at any previous time, they got to know one another well in a civilized "ring" sternly refereed by the Americans. They might dislike one another, but they went to the same receptions, attended the same churches, lived in the same residential areas, shopped on the samefashionable streets, had affairs with each other's wives, and arranged marriagesbetween each other's children. They were for the
first time forming a self-conscious ruling
class (Anderson 1988:9).
Lastly, it should not be ignored that main flaws inherent to the Philippines democratic system were in fact imported from the United States. Instances of election fraud, according to Nakano Satoshi, "could simply-be explained asan outgrowth of the Americanization of political institutions rather than stemming from indigenous culture or Spanish
influence" (Nakano 2003: 10). In his
revealing essay entitled A Tale of Two
Democracies: Scenes from Bilateral
Philippines-US History of Electoral
Democracy, Nakano argues that it was
precisely this 'policy of accommodation' that left lasting effects onto the practice of politics in the Philippine context. One is the legacy of the elites which the United States both nurtured and exploited for their compliance with American policies
(Nakano 2003:2). Secondly, Nakano
argues that many of the electoral problems that persist to this day in the Philippines can be traced to similar problems in the West when democracy was constructed in the Philippines. An example of this is the fact that while the US sponsored and supported candidates they believed represented their best interests, much of the fraud that accorn- panied their ascension to power reflected the same type of fraud that existed in the West at that time. Therefore, if the US implanted the system of democracy, how can it be that the flaws of this implanted system be solely attributed to those who availed of it? As seen in the preceding section, if it were not for US colonial intervention in the Philippines, many of the 'patron- client' issues American scholars tend to analyze may never have existed. History has shown how US colonial policies took what had originally been a class of liberated Filipinos whose sole purpose was to release the islands from the Spanish colonial stronghold and trans- formed it into an oligarchic class of leaders who used their position in society to aggrandize both their political and economic supremacy. The remaining section of the paper looks at how
Stephen Shalom "the World Bank, as already noted, refuses to make funds available to countries that nationalize foreign assets without compensation" (Shalom 1986: 141). Reverberating this sentiment is Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief economist of the IMF and former member of the Council of Economic Advisors under the Clinton Administration, who, in the preface to his book Globalization and its Discontents says "ideology guided policy prescription and countries were expected to follow the IMF guidelines without debate" (Stiglitz 2002: 14). As the IMF and the World Bank gained a larger role in policy decision-making with regard to the adjustment policies that accompanied its loans, this role reflected the interests of beneficiaries of the transnational capital ist system. In order to play to the needs of the international economic system, the pol itics of these adjustment programs rarely deviated from the three-point policy prescriptions required by all loan parti- cipants. The lowering of tariffs was the fi rst of these pol icy prescriptions. The rationale behind such a recommendation was that through the influx of inter- national competition, many of the poorly performing national industries would be forced to reform their inept and inefficient business habits to adjust to the more competitive environment (Broad 1988: 67). In order to address the problem of an overvalued, protected currency rate, a second policy prescription was removing controls on the currency, thereby devaluing its parity. By doing so, the local currency becomes attractive to foreign investment searching for cheaper
production costs. The higher purchasing parity promotes foreign investment and rapid industrial growth (Broad 1988:69). Thirdly, by promoting a policy of export promotion, state-led 'export processing zones' provided foreign investors with subsidized sites for labor-intensive activities. With factories equipped for labor-intensive industries in addition to the lax tariff restriction on imports, the devalued local currency and subsidized sites of export production, according to the Philippine Trade Ministry, under the advice of the IMF, "if this works, we'll have foreign exporters knocking on our doors' (Broad 1988:95). In contrast to such hopeful statements by the IMF and their representatives, the situation deteriorated very quickly under such conditions. While many of the larger Filipino-owned corporations were able to withstand the changes in the domestic market, many of the small-scale national industries were faced with the dilemma of competing against an ever strengthening local^ competition^ and growing multi-national corporation intervention.
According to Broad,
As far as the national entrepreneurs were concerned, the World Bank's power to influence economic policies that in the end effected their survival was ominous. Shattering national entrepreneurs' dreams of domestically- owned and oriented basic industries in the face of exigencies of a government that needed the Bank's seal of approval was only a first step. It coincided with
increasing numbers of national entre- preneurs falling into bankruptcy as a result of Bank-prompted reforms that opened the door to foreign investment and goods (Broad 1988: 111).
With regard the textile industry, one of the Philippines' strongest industries in the past, "no one denied that the restructuring was intended to buttress the handful of the largest, most modern mills and to weed out the rest quickly" (Broad 1988: 113). Secondly, Shalom contends that with the devaluation of the local currency, "81 percent of the population suffered hardship as a result" (Shalom 1986:143). He argued this was because real wage rates in the industrial establishments throughout the country declined by 19 percent for ski lied workers and 13 percent for unskilled workers. In addition, due to the devaluation of the local currency, the external debt increased 2.5 times its original figure within a span of five years. It was stressed that with the imple- mentation of such policies, "sufficient economic growth increases the demand for labor and ultimately to raise real incomes" (Broad 1988:121). In reality, this never took place. As real wages declined, so did the capacity of the average Filipino to meet daily subsistence levels. According to a social worker in Manila,
Right now its questionable whether low-skilled industrial workers' wages are even up to the Marxian level of "self-reproduction." Look at the workers in the export processing zones...we're seeing lots more protein
deficiency...malnutrition among these families. What food they can buy with their daily wage keeps shrinking ... Stomachs are no longer full ...And we're very afraid of the mental capacity of the next generation...We just can't live and reproduce at these wages levels (Broad 1988: 122).
The question is how and why such dismal situations, widely acknowledged to be a product of the policy prescriptions, can be perpetuated and accepted by the Filipino government. Surely, the nation's leaders can witness the detrimental effects of such policies, not just locally but worldwide. According to Filipino sociologist Walden Bello, among 24 countries that underwent stabilization and adjustment programs, capital accu- mulation slowed in 20 countries, the share of manufacturing in the G DP declined in 18 countries and export volumes decreased in 13 countries while countries which underwent export volume increases also experience 'negligible' balance of payments (Bello 1994:33). Oxford's specialist in structural adjust- ment Frances Stewart, observed, "the stabilization and adjustment policies advocated by the IMF and the World Bank and widely adopted in Africa have not succeeded in restoring growth in most countries; indeed, they have often been accompanied by continued economic deterioration" (Bello 1994:26). Therefore, ascan be witnessed inside and outside the Philippines, structural adjust- ment programs have caused more harm than good; yet how can they continue to be included as part of national devel-
elites, the transnational corporation and obviously the state, which is now caught in a desperate predicament where the loans become central to its survival.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, as seen in past colonial policies that had helped construct and benefit off a group of elites, the structural forces of transnational capitalism make it so that these historical relationships become indispensable. Whereas in the past, bilateral relations between the US and the Philippines was fairly direct, this relationship has currently become more complex as demonstrated by the triple alliance of transnational corporations, the stateand the local elites. A simple bilateral relationship has become multilateral while benefits to the local elites trans- cend direct access to the US market to global cooperation.. At this point it should be clear that while much of the work of contemporary scholars on Philippine politics largely ignore some very important issues in their analysis, the intent of the paper is not to discredit their work. In fact, the scholarly work that emerged from the Yale school of political science demonstrate some of the most complex and sophisticated analysis of Philippine political science, and has been described as contributing to the "new generation of scholars on Philippine politics." Many of the inter- views conducted and primary data gathered by the scholars from this school are out of reach to most researchers. As sophisticated and important as their
research is, however, these scholars contribute to two very important prevail- ing problems. Firstly, they tend to 'orient- alize' or construct an 'other' inextricably different from themselves. As a result, a second problem arises, which is the tendency to blame many of the structural faults on the actors themselves rather than the structural problems that under- lie many of these prevailing issues. In the process, knowingly or unknowingly, their research then tends to mask some of the negative implications of the capitalist system. According to Hutchcroft,
In conclusion, it is interesting to note that both the World Bank and the IMF andtheir strongest critics hadonething in common: they did not fully appreciate the deeply familial basis of the political economy, and as a result their analysis went astray ...it is the familial structure that undermined the intent of reforms and ensured that the banks neither took advantage of their new power nor merged in any systematic way (Hutchcraft 1998: 160).
As seen throughout the world, the policy recommendations of the IMF and the World Bank has failed miserably. If this is the case, perhaps we need a huge contingent of Yale scholars to interrogate the 'internal' issues of every state in which these policy recommendations have failed to justify their failure. Was it flawed kinship and utang na loob val ues that led to the problems of the privatization campaigns of the Former Soviet Union or the debt default of
IMF's star pupil Argentina in 2001? According to Thompson, in reference to Hutchcroft's work,
Under Martial Law, several ministries were run by so-called technocrats whose expertise and integrity won international respect for the regime; however, the thesis that the tech- nocrats, in alliance with the Inter- national Monetary fund (IMF) and the World Bank, dominated policymaking has been discredited (Hutchcroft 1985:55).
Therefore, not only are the countries suffering under these policies to blame, the relationship between these policies and this suffering is largely 'discredited.' Perhaps this new generation of scholars are a 'web-like' society of cronies who
merely support and reproduce similar arguments. The purpose of this paper, therefore, was to illustrate how corruption played an important role in perpetuating and expanding the global capitalist system. Through the US colonial 'pol icy of attraction' to the existence of a triple alliance, works such as those of Hutchcroft and Thompson, although important, help mystify the larger issues and effectively place the blame for structural problems such as poverty and stagnant growth rates on the victims themselves. Much like with every picture, both sides of the coin must be presented. If works such asthose of the 'patron-client cronies' begin to dominate the literature, the only coin that will exist is the coin that sits squarely in the capitalist's pocket.
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