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Rebecca Bailey-Harris*
THE FAMILY LAW
REFORM ACT 1995 (CTH):
A NEW APPROACH TO THE PARENTICHILD
RELATIONSHIP
INTRODUCTION
T
H E Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) which came fully into operation on 11 June 1996 implements the most wide-reaching changes to private law regulation of the parendchild relationship to have occurred in Australia for many years. The new Act makes significant amendments to Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth). The Australian amendments draw substantially on the provisions of the English Children Act 1989.l Yet there are significant differences between the two Acts. These reveal certain contrasts in the philosophical approach to legal regulation of the parendchild relationship in the two countries. Moreover the differences of detail have significant practical implications for the use and operation of the new range of orders which are created. Australia has chosen to adopt the broad underpinnings of the English legislation, but with adaptations suited to local social conditions. The differences between the two legislative approaches may prove to be as significant as their similarities.
THE POLICY FOUNDATIONS OF THE 1995 ACT
The policies underpinning the new Australian provisions are clearly articulated in s60B which states:
(1) The object of this Part is to ensure that children receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their full potential, and to ensure that parents fulfil their duties, and meet their responsibilities, concerning the care, welfare and development of their children.
(2) The principles underlying this object are that, except when it is or would be contrary to a child's best interests:
(a) children have the right to know and be cared for by both their parents regardless of whether their parents are married, separated, have never married or have never lived together; and
* M A, BCL (Oxon); Professor of Law, University of Bristol, England.
1 Family Law Council's Letter of Advice to the A-G on the Operation of the (UK) Children Act 1989 (AGPS 1994).
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b) children have a right of contact, on a regular basis, with both their parents and with other people significant to their care, welfare and development; and
(c) parents share duties and responsibilities concerning the care, welfare and development of their children; and
(d) parents should agree about the future of their children.
These principles apparently derive from the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. There is no equivalent express declaration of policy in the Children Act 1989 (UK).
Three main themes emerge from s60B. The first is the conceptual shift away from partmtal rights to parental responsibilities: children are not objects but subjects, with their own rights of which the correlatives are parental obligations. This re-casting of the parentlchild relationship represents the continuation of a trend apparent in case-law such as Gillr'ck v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA3 and fuelled by the UN Convention itself. It draws upon the Children Act 1989 (UK).
The second theme evident in s60B is the model of joint parenting - parents' responsibilities
Should be shared and are unaffected by the breakdown (or non-existence) of the two adults' relationship inter se, and it is assumed to be in the child's interests to have contact with both parents. This policy of joint parenting is clearly reflected in the detailed provisioris of the Act dealing both with parental responsibility and with parenting orders: see infra. The
concept can be criticised as an unrealistic ideal - and by some feminists is seen as a
triumph of the political pressure brought to bear by father's group^.^ Significantly., the
model of joint parenting is cast far more widely in the Australian legislation than in its English equivalent. In Australia both parents have joint parental responsibility by operation of law irrespective of marital ~ t a t u s , ~whereas the English Children Act 1989 discriminates between the married and the unmarried father; the latter does not enjoy parental responsibility by operation of law but must take positive steps to acquire it by court order or by agreement, or alternatively by obtaining a residence order.6 The practical implications of this difference will be discussed later in this paper.
The third theme to emerge from the policy statement in s60B is the encouragement of parental agreements as the preferred mode of resolving issues of child upbringing. 'This policy is also expressed in s63(B), which provides that:
2 See in particular Arts 7 & 18. 3 [I9861 AC 112. (^4) Graycar "Equal Rights versus Father's Rights: The Child Custody Debate in Australia" in Smart and Sevenhuijsen (eds), Child Custody and the Politics of Gender (Routledge, London 1989). (^5) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s61C(l). (^6) Children Act 1989 (UK) ss2,4 & 12(1).
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KEY FEATURES OF THE NEW PROVISIONS
The Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) creates a number of new legal concepts -"'parci:ntal
responsibility", "residence" and "contact" - which replace traditional notion!; of
"guardianship", "custody" and "access" in earlier legislation. The general aim (derived directly from the English model) is to move away from quasi-proprietorial notions of the parentfchild relationship, particularly after family breakdown, and to remove the concept of litigation over children as involving a "win or lose" outcome.15 The change is intended to bring about a fundamental re-thinking of the relationships between parents themselves and between parents and their children - it is not intended to be a mere cosmetic chang,eof terminology. l 6 The new concepts employed in the Act will require practitioners to rethink the structure of post-separation parenting. The new concepts as defined in the legislal.ion, and their relationship to the now outdated notions of "guardianship", "custody", and "access" are not without certain ambiguities. Their meaning and operation will inevitably fall to be clarified by judicial interpretation in the years to come. The significant differences of detail between the Australian and English legislative schemes rnust necessarily introduce a note of caution into the use of precedents under the Children Act 1989 ( U K ) as guides to the interpretation of the amendments to Part VII of the Family ,Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Parental Responsibility
As has been observed, a significant policy aspect of the new legislation in Australia (and in England) is a shift away from the concept of parental rights and towards that of parental responsibilities and obligations. The key concept of parental responsibility is define'd in s61B:
In this Part, "parental responsibility", in relation to a child, means all the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents have in relation to children.
This provision is very similar to its English equivalent - s3(1) of the Children Act 1989 -
except for the significant omission from the Australian Act of the term "rights"; the Australian definition must clearly be preferable in this respect.
What does "parental responsibility" mean, and how does it differ from the former concept of "guardianship"? The definitions adopted in both Australia and England are open to
15 Para 3.10. (^16) The Children Act 1989 ( U K ) was described by Lord Mackay as "the most comprehensive and far-reaching reform which has come before Parliament in living memory": Han.~ard HL Vol502, col488.
criticism in that they are essentially "non-definitions":17 the statutory definition merely refers to the general law (i.e, common law and other statutes) to reveal the content of parental responsibility. Both the English and the Australian legislation takes the view that it is impracticable and undesirable to list the incidents of parental responsibility. However, guidance may be had from the recent Children (Scotland) Act 1995 which takes a different approach and spells out the content of the concept:
sl(1) [A]^ parent has in relation to his child the responsibility^ -
(a) to safeguard and promote the child's health, development and welfare;
(b) to provide,^ in a manner appropriate to the^ stage of
development of the child -
(i) direction;
(ii) guidance,
to the child;
(c) if the child is not living with the parent, to maintain personal relations and direct contact with the child on a regular basis; and
(d) to act as the child's legal representative,
but only in so far as compliance with this section is practicable and in the interests of the child.
s2 [A] parent, in order to enable him to fulfil his parental
responsibilities in relation to his child, has the right -
a) to have the child living with him or otherwise to regulate the child's residence:
(b) to control, direct or guide, in a manner appropriate to the stage of development of the child, the child's upbringing;
(c) if the child is not living with him, to maintain personal relations and contact with the child on a regular basis; and
(^17) Lord Meston in the debate on the Children Act 1989 (UK), Hansard HL, Vol 502, col
grows, as explained by the majority of the House of Lords in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA,19 a proposition accepted by a majority of the High Court of Australia in Secretary, Dept of Health and Community Services v JWB and SMB (Re Marion).
Who has parental responsibility? The Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) s61C states simply that:
(1) Each of the parents of a child who is not^ 18 has parental responsibility for the child;
and moreover that:
(2) Subs^ (1)^ has effect despite any changes in the nature of the relationships of the child's parents. It is not affected, for example, by the parents becoming separated or by either or both of them marrying or remarrying.
Thus the Australian Act confers the model of joint parenting responsibility irrespective of the marital status of the parents, on the unmarried as well as the formerly married family. The establishment of parenthood is itself sufficient to attract the obligation. By contrast, under the Children Act 1989 in England, whilst the mother has parental responsibility by operation of law, only the father of a child born within marriage shares it.21 His unmarried counterpart must acquire it directly22by application to court for a parental responsibility order23 or by making a formal agreement with the mother. Alternatively, an unmarried father in whose favour a residence order is made automatically acquires parental re~ponsibility.~~The English model appears unacceptably discriminatory to Australian eyes more accustomed to taking equality arguments for granted; it will be recalled that joint guardianship has been enjoyed by unmarried as well as married fathers since amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) in 1987. The Australian provision has the great merit of emphasising equality of responsibility between separated parents irrespective of the formal status of their relationship. Nevertheless, where parents have never lived together or no longer do so, some practical problems may arise in the exercise of joint parental responsibility which will inevitably have to be resolved by court order.
A key concept of the Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) is that parental responsibility is not lost by the breakdown of the relationship between the parents. However, it is equally important to realise that the exercise of parental responsibility by a parent can be made
19 As above, fn 3. (^20) Re Marion (1992) 175 CLR 218. 21 Children Act 1989 (UK) s2. 22 Section 4. 23 Case-law shows an increased judicial willingness to make such orders in favour of fathers who show commitment: see Re S (Parental Responsibility) [I9951Family Law 596. 24 Children Act 1989 (UK) s12(1).
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subject to "any order of the court": see s61C(3). The usual order will be a "parenting order" made under Division 5. In essence, a court order may regulate the exercise of particular aspects of parental responsibility. Section 61D elaborates this point, in providing that:
(1) A parenting order confers responsibility for a child on a person, but only to the extent to which the order confers on the person duties, powers, responsibilities or authority in relation to the child.
(2) A parenting order in relation to a child does not take away or diminish any aspect of parental responsibility of any person for the child except to the extent (if any):
(a) expressly provided for in the order; or
(b) necessary to give effect to the order.
Hence the exercise of parental responsibility - more particularly, specific aspects thereof -
by a parent may be modified by the terms of a "parenting order" obtained either by the other parent or by a third party. The practical implications of this legislative scheme in concrete situations relating to a child's upbringing is not without difficulty, and will be discussed infra in the context of the range of new "parenting orders" which can be made under the new legislation.
A related area of difficulty is the exercise of parental responsibility by parents who have separated or who have never lived together. Parental responsibility is joint, but is it also several? Section 61C states simply that each of the parents has parental responsibility notwithstanding any changes to their relationship. The section does not state in express terms whether that responsibility can be exercised by one parent severally as well a,s by both jointly. In contrast, the English Children Act 1989 is perfectly clear:
s2(7) Where more than one person has parental responsibility for a child, each of them may act alone and without the other (or others) in meeting that responsibility.
The same position is adopted in the Children (Scotland) Act 1995 s2(2). Of course, the unilateral exercise by one parent of the power to make decisions about a child's upbringing can be prevented under the English Children Act 1989 by the other parent obtaining a court order: for instance, a "specific issue" or "prohibited steps" order under s8. How is the Australian provision to be interpreted? Its silence is unfortunate on a matter of such crucial practical importance. How, for instance, are decisions about a child's education or medical treatment to be taken? Jointly, or severally by parents who do not live together? Both interpretations of the relevant Australian provisions are possible. On the one band s60B speaks of shared responsibilities, whereas on the other s61C states that each parent
(^92) BAILEY-HARRIS - FAMILY LAW REFORM ALCT
How often will parenting plans be used, in practice, and what degree of judicial scrutiny of a child's interests is involved in the initial registration process? It is probably of some symbolic significance that the provisions dealing with parenting plans are placed in the
amended legislation before those dealing with court orders - again, to emphasise the
primacy of the aim of resolution without recourse to litigation. The new parenting plans closely resemble "child agreements" under the repealed legi~lation.~'A novelty, however, is that parents are now expressly encouraged to regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration when reaching agreement about matters concerning children. To what extent can this be enforced, or is it simply empty rhetoric? Can a court refuse to register a parenting plan which in its view does not promote a child's best interests? To answer this one must consider s63E which specifies the registration process:
(1) Subject to this section, a parenting plan may be registered in a court having jurisdiction under this Part.
(2) To apply for registration of a parenting plan:
(a) an application for registration of the plan must be lodged in accordance with the Rules of Court; and
(b) the application must be accompanied by a copy of the plan, the information required by the Rules of Court, and:
(i) a statement, in relation to each party, that is to the effect that the party has been provided with independent legal advice as to the meaning and effect of the plan and that is signed by the practitioner who provided that advice; or
(ii) a^ statement to the effect that^ the plan^ was developed after consultation with a family and child counsellor (as defined in section 4) and that is signed by the counsellor.
(3) The court may register the plan if it considers it appropriate to do so having regard to the best interests of the child to which the plan relates. In determining whether it is appropriate to register the plan, the court:
(a) must have regard to the information accompanying the application for registration: and
3 1 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss66ZC - 66ZE prior to amendment.
32 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) as amended, s63B(b).
(b) may, but is not required to, have regard to all or any of the matters set out in subsection 68F(2).
(4) The Rules of Court:
(a) must prescribe what information is to accompany an application for registration of a parenting plan; and
(b) may prescribe other matters relating to the procedures for registration.
This section was inserted by way of late amendment to the original Bill. It certainly envisages some degree of judicial scrutiny in that the court is to have regard to the best interests of the child when deciding whether to register the plan (s65E(3)). It must take that decision in the light of the information supplied by the parents. However, the application of the full "best interests checklist" in s68F(2) is optional, not mandatory. Much will turn on the amount of supporting information which is required to accompany an application for registration of a parenting plan. This remains to be determined by the Rules.33 The Honourable Justice Richard Chisholm has suggested that if the Rules require too much supporting material, parenting plans may not be used by parents as it will be easier to obtain a consent order.34 It is worth observing that the operation of the "no order" principle in the English Children Act 198935 where parents have reached agreement appears to have reduced the number of consent orders made in that jurisdiction.
Parenting Orders
Division 5 of the new Part VII of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) gives the court power to make "parenting orders". This Division lies at the heart of the new legislation, since the "menu" of new orders available is intended to effect far more than merely cosmetic change of terminology. Three36new orders require consideration. Whilst the Australian scheme draws heavily on the English Children Act 1989, there are significant differences of detail which have important practical implications.
33 Sections 63E(2)(a) and (4). 34 Butterworth's Australian Family Law Bulletin No 132, January 1996 [626]. Note that the application of the "best interests checklist" is not mandatory when a consent order is made: s68F(3). 35 Section l(5).
36 The fourth type of order - a child maintenance order - does not represent any change from
the previous law.
of the time, it appears that the most appropriate order would be an order giving each party residence for the relevant periods, rather than making orders for the wife to have residence and the husband contact on alternate weekends.
What is the English experience of shared residence orders since the Children Act 1989 came into operation? Such orders have become somewhat more common in recent years, 1 although they are by no means the norm. The leading authority on shared residence orders under the English provisions in now A v A (Minors)(SharedResidence Order)46 where the matter was fully considered by the Court of Appeal. An appeal from a mother against an order for joint residence (whereby the children were to live with the mother and stay with the father on alternate weekends) was dismissed. The commentary on the decision by Gillian Douglas is illuminating:
The decision may now be regarded as the leading case on shared residence orders. It makes clear, as Butler-Sloss LJ put it, that the Children Act 1989 specifically contemplates, in s11(4), that a child might have a residence with more than one person. The Act has, accordingly, overruled Riley v Riley [I9861 2 FLR 429, and this decision should no longer be relied upon in resisting a shared order. Furthermore, the view expressed by the Court of Appeal in Re H (A Minor) (Shared Residence) [1994] 1 FLR 717 that a shared residence order, while permitted under s1 l(4) of the Children Act 1989, should rarely be made and would depend upon exceptional circumstances, would now appear to have overstated the case. This is not to say that shared orders are to become the norm. Both judges made clear their view that such an order is unusual, and only appropriate where it can be demonstrated, in the light of the welfare check-list in s1(3), that there will be a positive benefit to the child.
Butler-Sloss LJ considered it unlikely that an order would be made where there are concrete issues still arising between the parties which have yet to be resolved, such as the amount and type of contact to take place, or the child's eduction. She also agreed with the view, expressed by Purchas LJ in Re H (A Minor) (Shared Residence) (above), that a child should not have two competing homes likely to cause him confusion and stress. The
cases suggest the following as suitable circumstances for shared orders -
where it perpetuates the arrangement the two children have become used
44 Per Chisholm J, as above, fn 34; see also Conway, "Shared Residence Orders" in Family Law [I9951 435. 45 For examples, see M & A (Wardship: Removal From Jurisdiction) [I9931 2 FLR 715; G v G (Joint Residence Order) [I9931 Family Law 615; Re H (A Minor) (Shared Residence) [I9941 1 FLR 717. 46 [I9941 1 FLR 669.
96 BAILEY-HARRIS - FAMILY LAW REFORM .ACT
to, and fits in with their own views of what they want (see G v G (Joint Residence Order) [I9931 Fam Law 615); to stress the equality of the parents' position vis-a-vis one another against a background of considerable dispute and acrimony over the care each is giving to the child (see Re A (A Minor) (Shared Residence Orders) [I9941 Fam Law 431); and 'where there is no dispute that substantial periods of the child's time will be spent with each parent, and there is no possibility of confusion in the child's mind as to where he will be at any particular time (the present
The relative infrequency with which shared residence orders are made in England can be explained by the operation of the "no order" principle: where parents are highly cooperative, no order at all will be made.
However, there is one respect in which the use of shared residence orders in England has no application in Australia. Since under the Children Act 1989 (UK) a residence order confers parental responsibility on a third party, shared residence orders can be used to confer parental responsibility on a non-parent such as a step-parent or parent's cohabitant. In Australia a residence order does not confer parental responsibility on a third party, and so a parent's new partner will have to seek a specific issue order under the new s64B in order to obtain aspects of parental responsibility.
Contact Order
Under the new provisions of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) as amended, a parenting order under Division 5 may deal with contact between a child and another person or persons. If shared residence orders were to become common in Australia, then the scope for contact orders would be reduced; as Justice Chisholm has suggested, contact orders would be confined to matters such as telephone and letter contact ("indirect" contact).50 The meaning of a contact order is more fully defined in the Children Act 1989 (UK) than it is in the new Australian provisions, as an order requiring the person with whom a child lives "to allow the child to visit or stay with the person named in the order, or for that person and the child otherwise to have contact with each other".51 The new Australian provision, whilst more laconic, is still child-focused: it emphasises contact between the child and another person, not vice-versa. This is in accordance with the new philosophy of children
47 [I9941 Family Law 432. (^48) Re H (Shared Residence: Parental Responsibility) [I9951 2 FLR 883: cf Re WB (Residence Orders) [I9951 2 FLR 1023. 49 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) as amended, ss64B(2)(b), (4) and (7). The general obligations created by a contact order are found in s65N. 50 As above, fn 34. (^51) Children Act 1989 ( U K ) s105.
98 BAILEY-HARRIS - FAMILY LAW REFORM .14CT
and step-parents have the right to apply for residence or contact orders without Other persons must obtain leave? this includes grandparents. The object of the complex leave provisions under the English legislation is to act as a filter to protect children and families from "the stress and harm of unwarranted interference and the harassmerit of actual or threatened proceedingsW.59In practice grandparents experience no difficulty in obtaining leave, but once they do there is no presumption under English law in favollir of contact between a child and them.60 Grandparents (and possibly other relatives too) in Australia may well be in a stronger prima facie position as regards contact. Firstly the new Australian provisions contain no "filter" in terms of leave requirements. Instead, s69C speaks in positive terms of those who may institute proceedings, and makes spe~cific mention of grandparents. Secondly, s60B(2)(b) refers expressly to the child's right of contact with not only parents but also "other people significant to their care, welfare and development". The stronger position of non-parent relatives under Australian law may well reflect greater recognition of the ties of the extended family in a multicultural society. The English legislation is arguably underpinned by a narrower conception of the family unit, and by stronger notions of parental autonomy.
Specij?c Issue Order
The third type of new order created by the Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) i:!; the
specific issue order - terminology once again taken directly from the Children Act :I
(UK).61 The essence of such an order is to deal with aspects of parental responsiklility other than residence, contact or maintenance. It confers, "duties, powers, responsibilities or authority" in relation to a child.62 It may deal with aspects of parental responsibility relating either to the long-term care of the child or to day-to-day care.63 A specific issue order may be made in favour of a parent or a third party.
It seems likely that the specific issue order will be used more frequently in Australia than in England under the Children Act 1989 ( U K ). Several differences between the legisliative schemes justify such a prediction. Firstly, a residence order in favour of a non-parent in Australia does not automatically confer parental responsibility, unlike its English counterpart. So, for example, a step-parent in Australia who wants some status in a child's upbringing will apply for aspects of parental responsibility under a specific issue order, whereas in England he or she would seek a residence order. Moreover, a specific issue order may be sought in Australia by a parent who wishes to "bolster" a residence order
(^57) Children Act 1989 ( U K ) ss10(4), (5). 58 Section lO(l)(a)(ii). (^59) Lord Mackay LC, Hansard Vol502, col 1227. 60 Re A (See 8 Order: Grandparents' Application) [I9951 2 FLR 153; Re S (Contact: Grandparents) [I9961 1 FLR 158. (^61) Children Act 1989 ( U K ) s8(1). 62 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) as amended, s64B(7). The general obligations created by a specific issue order are found in s65P. 63 Sections 64B(6) and 65P.
with additional powers over the child's day-to-day care.64 Second, in Australia all biological parents already possess parental responsibility by operation of law, irrespective of their marital status; a larger population of parents are thereby empowered to make decisions jointly or severally in Australia than in England, with a correspondingly larger number of disputes likely to require resolution by specific issue orders. Thirdly, the English Children Act 1989 contains a fourth type of order absent from the "menu"
available in Australia - the "prohibited steps order". This order empowers a court to place
a specific embargo on the exercise of parental re~ponsibility.~~It can be used, for instance, to prohibit the removal of a child from the jurisdiction, to prevent a change of name, or to prohibit medical treatment (assuming such decisions to be within the ambit of parental responsibility). In Australia such matters will be dealt with under a specific issue order.
The specific issue order in Australia will probably be the primary means of resolving disputes between parents who have separated or who have never lived together, and between parents and third parties, concerning medical treatment and education of children, sport and their removal from the juri~diction.~~It remains to be seen the extent to which it will be invoked to resolve disputes about routine day-to-day matters.
It is important to bear in mind that a specific issue order is confined to determining issues (other than residence, contact or maintenance) which are within the scope of parental
responsibility. Hence matters outside the ambit of parental decision-making - such as the
sterilisation of a mentally incompetent minor,67 - must under the new Australian provisions
continue to be referred to the "welfarejurisdiction" of the Family Court under s67ZC(l).
The Interests of the Child
Unlike the English Children Act 1989, the Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) effects a change in terminology from the child's "welfare" to that of the child's "best interests" as the paramount consideration.68 The intention is to bring Australian domestic law into line with the language adopted in the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child.
The. general principle that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration applies when the court is deciding to make a particular parenting order.'j9 However, the "best interests checklist" found in s68F(2) applies mandatorily only to contested proceedings: its consideration is optional when an order is made by consent,70 or a parenting plan is
(^64) As suggested by Chisholm J, as above, fn 34. (^65) White, Carr and Lowe, The Children Act in Practice (Butterworths, London, 2nd ed 1996) p120. 66 For illustrative English decisions, see Re R (A Minor) (Blood Transfusion) [I9931 2 FLR 757; Re D (A Minor) (Child Removal From Jurisdiction) [I9921 1 FLR 637. 67 Re Marion (1992) 175 CLR 218; P v P [I9951 FLC 92-615. 68 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) as amended, ss63B, 65D and Division 10. 69 Section 65E. 70 Section 68F(3).
In the past the tendency has been for Australian legislation and courts to follow at a respectful distance behind their English counterparts. In the Family Law Act Australia has chosen its own path in this social field.
Only the pattern of future case-law will reveal whether the Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) will ultimately be regarded as following or departing from the model of the Children Act 1989.
Prior to such judicial elucidation, the following points are raised for speculation as the issues on which most debate in theory and in practice will centre:
1. The exercise of parental responsibility: what will this mean in practice to the parent with whom the child does not live, especially in respect of decisions concerning the day-to-day management of a child? How frequently will a specific issue order be used to modify decision-making about both long-term and day-to- day management of a child? 2. Residence: will shared residence orders become common, with a reduced scope for orders relating to direct contact? 3. Contact: will the new legislative provisions lead to even further emphasis on the desirability of a child maintaining contact with both parents? And will this be extended to a (quasi-) presumption in favour of contact with other relatives, notably grandparents? 4. Parenting Plans: will these be popular, or will parents who agree prefer to seek consent orders?
78 (1976) FLC 90-124 at 75,587.
