Immanuel Kant: A Pivotal Force in Philosophy | Exams Philosophy

APEH Mr. Whitton & Mr. Walters

Immanuel Kant

A pivotal force in the history of philosophy, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, b. Apr. 22, 1724, d.

Feb. 12, 1804, radically altered the nature of philosophic inquiry. Kant was born in Königsberg, East

Prussia, to lower-middle-class p arents who were devout pietists. At the age of 8 he entered the Co llegium

Fridiricianum, a pietistic Latin school; he remained there for 8 1/2 years and then entered the University of

Königsberg in 1740 to study theology and, subsequently, natural science and philosophy. While at the

university he was greatly influenced by a follower of Christian Wolff, the German rationalist. He also read

the works of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz and Isaac Newton. Other important influences on Kant's later

thought were the writings of David Hume and Jean Jacques Rousseau. The death of his father forced him to

interrupt his studies, and he became a tu tor for private families from 1746 to 1755. In 1755 he returned to

the University of Königsberg, where he remained for the rest of his life. In 1756 he was granted a degree

and made a lecturer , and in 1770 he was appointed a professor.

Pre-Critical Period (1755-81)

By 1755, Kant had written Principiorum Primorum Cognitiones Metaphysicae Nova Dilucidato (The

First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge), which was somewhat critical of the Leibnizian philosophy,

and The Gener al N atural History of the Heavens (Eng. trans., 1900), in which he employed Newtonian

laws to formulate the Kant-LaPlace hypothesis of the origin of the so lar system. In this period his works

were primarily scientific, but some contained discussions of methodology. For example, in 1756 he

published Physical Monadology (Eng. trans., 1928), which contrasted Leibnizian with Newtonian ways of

thinking and introduced the distinction between things-in-themselves and things-as-they-appear.

In his writings during the 1760s he was explicitly critical of the Leibnizian-Wolff ian philosophy. In 1763,

in An Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (Eng. trans., 1911), he

argued that some physical relations, such as causality, cannot be reduced to logical relations, and in

Enquiry into the Proofs for the Existence of God (1763; Eng. trans., 1836), he rejected Ren é Descartes's

attempt to prove existence by logic. In Inquiry into the Distinctness of the P rinciples of Natural T heology

and Morals (1764; Eng. trans., 1949), he directly attacked the Leibnizian methodology of modeling

philosophy solely on the deductive m ethod. Kant's inaugural dissertation, The Forms and Principles of the

Sensible and Intelligible Worlds (1770; Eng. trans., 1928), marked a complete breach with the Leibnizian

metaphysics.

Critical Period (1781-90)

Between 1770 and 1781, Kant published very little. Between 1781 and 1790, however, he produced his

most important works, representing the full development of his critical powers. In 1781 he published the

Critique of Pure Reason (Eng. trans., 1838), his most fa mous work. It is divided into two major parts:

"The Transcenden tal Doctrine of the Elements," which deals with the sources of human knowledge, and the

"Transcendental Doctrine of Method," which deals with the proper and improper uses of reason. Kant used

the word transcendental to designate the method that examines the necessary but nonempirical conditions

of knowledge. In 1785 he publish ed The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Eng. trans., 1969)

and, in 1787, The Critique of Practical Reason (Eng. trans., 1949), both of which examine moral

philosophy. The third critique, The Cr itique of Judgment (1790; Eng. trans., 1895), deals with aesthetic

and teleologic, or purposive, judgments. Dur ing this period Kant also published seven other major works.

Philosophy

From Kant's point of view, the philosophical traditions of both empiricism and rationalism had reached a

"dark, confused, and useless" dead end. What he proposed was a radical, new synthesis in which he would

incorporate both experience and reason without falling into the skepticism of the empirical school or the

vast, unverifiable metaphysical structure of the rationalist school. The problem of knowledge, as he saw it,

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APEH Mr. Whitton & Mr. Walters

Immanuel Kant

A pivotal force in the history of philosophy, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, b. Apr. 22, 1724, d. Feb. 12, 1804, radically altered the nature of philosophic inquiry. Kant was born in Königsberg, East Prussia, to lower-middle-class parents who were devout pietists. At the age of 8 he entered the Collegium Fridiricianum, a pietistic Latin school; he remained there for 8 1/2 years and then entered the University of Königsberg in 1740 to study theology and, subsequently, natural science and philosophy. While at the university he was greatly influenced by a follower of Christian Wolff, the German rationalist. He also read the works of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz and Isaac Newton. Other important influences on Kant's later thought were the writings of David Hume and Jean Jacques Rousseau. The death of his father forced him to interrupt his studies, and he became a tutor for private families from 1746 to 1755. In 1755 he returned to the University of Königsberg, where he remained for the rest of his life. In 1756 he was granted a degree and made a lecturer, and in 1770 he was appointed a professor. Pre-Critical Period (1755-81) By 1755, Kant had written Principiorum Primorum Cognitiones Metaphysicae Nova Dilucidato (The First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge), which was somewhat critical of the Leibnizian philosophy, and The General Natural History of the Heavens (Eng. trans., 1900), in which he employed Newtonian laws to formulate the Kant-LaPlace hypothesis of the origin of the solar system. In this period his works were primarily scientific, but some contained discussions of methodology. For example, in 1756 he published Physical Monadology (Eng. trans., 1928), which contrasted Leibnizian with Newtonian ways of thinking and introduced the distinction between things-in-themselves and things-as-they-appear. In his writings during the 1760s he was explicitly critical of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy. In 1763, in An Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (Eng. trans., 1911), he argued that some physical relations, such as causality, cannot be reduced to logical relations, and in Enquiry into the Proofs for the Existence of God (1763; Eng. trans., 1836), he rejected René Descartes's attempt to prove existence by logic. In Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals (1764; Eng. trans., 1949), he directly attacked the Leibnizian methodology of modeling philosophy solely on the deductive method. Kant's inaugural dissertation, The Forms and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible Worlds (1770; Eng. trans., 1928), marked a complete breach with the Leibnizian metaphysics. Critical Period (1781-90) Between 1770 and 1781, Kant published very little. Between 1781 and 1790, however, he produced his most important works, representing the full development of his critical powers. In 1781 he published the Critique of Pure Reason (Eng. trans., 1838), his most famous work. It is divided into two major parts: "The Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements," which deals with the sources of human knowledge, and the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method," which deals with the proper and improper uses of reason. Kant used the word transcendental to designate the method that examines the necessary but nonempirical conditions of knowledge. In 1785 he published The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Eng. trans., 1969) and, in 1787, The Critique of Practical Reason (Eng. trans., 1949), both of which examine moral philosophy. The third critique, The Critique of Judgment (1790; Eng. trans., 1895), deals with aesthetic and teleologic, or purposive, judgments. During this period Kant also published seven other major works. Philosophy From Kant's point of view, the philosophical traditions of both empiricism and rationalism had reached a "dark, confused, and useless" dead end. What he proposed was a radical, new synthesis in which he would incorporate both experience and reason without falling into the skepticism of the empirical school or the vast, unverifiable metaphysical structure of the rationalist school. The problem of knowledge, as he saw it,

was how to connect the "is" of sense experience with the "must" of necessary and universal truth. His starting point was the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. An analytic judgment is one in which the predicate is contained in the subject—for instance, "Triangles have three sides." The truth of such a judgment can be known by an analysis of the subject. A synthetic judgment is one in which the predicate adds to or expands the subject—for instance, "Triangles were the earliest figures to be discovered in geometry." The truth of such a statement cannot be known through an analysis of the subject. Kant also distinguished two ways in which judgments could be known: something is known a priori if it is neither derived from nor testable by sense experience; it is known a posteriori if it is derived from or testable by experience. Philosophers before Kant had held that analytic judgments were known a priori and that synthetic judgments were known a posteriori. Analytic a priori judgments were always and necessarily true—but true only about the meaning and relations of words, not about the world. Synthetic a posteriori judgments, on the other hand, were about the world—but they could only be contingent or probable truths. This meant that we could have no certain knowledge about experience, and Kant believed that we had such knowledge. Thus he formulated this problem: "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" His solution, in essence, was that experience provides the content (the synthetic element) and the mind provides the structure (the a priori element) that determines the way in which the content will be organized and understood. Kant calls the contribution of the mind a "category." He distinguishes four groups of categories by which the contents of experience are ordered: quantity, quality, relation, and modality. Examples of specific categories within these groups are space, time, causality, and substance. These categories are contentless and only prescribe the structure for objects of possible experience. Space, for example, is not something external to us but a structure in the mind that relates objects to one another. The active contribution of the mind gives meaning to the external material of experience. Whether things really are the way they appear to us is something we can never know, for all our knowledge comes prestructured through the filter of the mind. This is the basis for Kant's famous distinction between the unknowable noumenon, or thing-in-itself, and the phenomenon, or thing-as-it-appears. Kant held that synthetic a priori judgments were possible in mathematics and physics but not in metaphysics. Thus he thought it a mistake for metaphysicians to attempt to go beyond sense experience in order to define concepts like God, freedom, or the immortal soul. All theoretical knowledge consists in applying the categories to perceptual material located in space and time, and these concepts lie outside the spatiotemporal categories. Such ideas have, for Kant, an indispensable function. Whereas most concepts have a "constitutive" function (they classify experience), concepts like God, freedom, or soul have a "regulative" function: they guide us toward certain goals useful for science and ethics. They are held "as if" they were true. In the moral sphere Kant says that he has denied knowledge to make room for faith. Because moral law cannot be justified by reason it can only be obeyed for its own sake. Kant's ethical theory thus rests on the concept of duty. A good person acts out of duty, not because he or she fears punishment or hopes for reward or happiness, but only because it is his or her duty. Like other concepts, moral laws are only mental structures, so the primary moral law will be a contentless form of judgment that can be applied universally; Kant calls this the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative states that a person should "act in such a way that it is possible for one to will that the maxim of one's action should become a universal law." Kant gives the example of someone who borrows money, promises to repay it, but has no intention of doing so. If this were a universal law—that is, if everyone behaved this way—promises would be meaningless, and no one would lend money to anyone. In his aesthetic theory, Kant holds that judgments that ascribe beauty to something, although they rest on feeling, do have a claim to validity and are not merely statements of taste or opinion. When a person judges something to be beautiful, imagination, perception, and understanding are in harmony; there is a harmony of the experienced object with mental structure. The concepts involved in such judgments are purpose and purposiveness.

Immanuel Kant: A Pivotal Force in Philosophy, Exams of Philosophy

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APEH Mr. Whitton & Mr. Walters

Immanuel Kant