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The CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Program for Indigenous Resources) project in Zimbabwe, which aims to place wildlife management in communal lands under the control of local communities. The success of the project depends on the government's willingness to decentralize decision-making and the capacity of rural communities to adopt this concept of devolution. The document also explores the historical context of land tenure and resource management in Zimbabwe.
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THE LEGACY OP D U A L I S M AND
DECISION —MAKING: THE PROSPECTS
F O R L O C A L I N S T I T U T I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T
Steve J. Thomas.
Paper prepared for the Second Annual Conference of the
International Association for the Study of Common
Property (IASCP) held at University of Manitoba,
Winnipeg, Canada. September 26 - 29, 1991.
THE LEGACY Of DUALISM AND DECISION—MAKING: the
prospects for local institutional development in "CAMPFIRE".
Steve J. Thomas.
Abstract
'CAMPFIRE' is Zimbabwe's 'Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources'. It seeks to place the management of the wildlife in communal lands into the hands of those communities intimately affected by it. Much of the communal lands is a marginal environment to which the majority of the African population was relocated under divisive legislation introduced by the colonial powers. Parallels are drawn between the colonial and post-colonial periods; the legacy of dualism providing the context within which the prospects for institutional development are discussed.
The fugitive nature of the resource suggests the determination of jurisdictional boundaries within which appropriate institutions might function is problematical. Moreover, the 'costs' incurred in 'producing' wildlife must be more than compensated by the benefits accruing from its utilisation. How these benefits are distributed must be decided by 'producer communities' themselves.
The success of 'CAMPFIRE' will hinge on the will of central government to decentralise decision-making and control over wildlife resources to local communities, and the willingness and capacity of rural communities to adopt and further this concept of devolution. The legitimacy of the local institutional arrangements which develop will be critical to this success.
i
institutional arrangements for its management. For example, how does one define a wildlife 'producer community' in considering the allocation of benefits from wildlife?
In order to place the prospects for local institutional development (LID) in 'CAMPFIRE' into context, the historical development of the communal areas, the demographic and cultural consequences of their establishment, and the socio-political environment in these areas 11 years after Zimbabwe's Independence are discussed briefly. The institutional framework for development introduced by the present government in 1984 and the legislation impacting on 'CAMPFIRE' are then summarised.
The success of 'CAMPFIRE' will hinge on the will of central government to decentralise full control over the wildlife resource to local communities, and the willingness and capacity of rural communities to adopt and further this concept of devolution. The legitimacy of the local institutional arrangements which develop will be critical to this success.
The History of Wildlife Management in Zimbabwe
There is a suggestion in much of the literature on CPR management that natural resource use, prior to the imposition of colonialism, was regulated by forms of 'traditional management'. Effective management regimes must, of necessity, be responsive to the dynamics of the particular resource. Whilst the current situation is unlikely to bear much resemblance to that which existed 100 years ago, there are similarities in management responses to resource depletion.
Traditional systems were unlikely to manage a resource related to modern technical aspects of its sustainability. Management of resources in the nineteenth century reflected a more holistic and less technical approach: Schoffeleers (1979:5), discussing the ecological dimension of territorial cults, provides this description:-
"Cult communities are territorial groups. The fact that one lives in a particular area means that, one shares with all other inhabitants the same environment and the same responsibilities towards it. ............... In line with this principle, immigrants are expected to make an act of formal recognition of and submission to the local territorial cult, which means among other things that they formally acknowledge common duties in respect of a shared environment.
Cults whose philosophy is based on a logic of this kind are necessarily communal institutions involving the entire population of a geographic area in a system of common obligations. Moreover they generally form part of a wider organisation which in various ways and to varying degrees establishes links between neighbouring communities. Quite extensive areas are thus converted by a system of interlocking cults which provide a basis for wide ecological cooperation."
At the time of colonisation in the late nineteenth century the Ndebele had extended their influence across much of what is now known as Zimbabwe. Clearly these communities, with a basically carbohydrate diet, would have been in constant search for protein supplement. There is ample evidence that hunting was an annual activity in many African societies. Hunting frequently involved the deployment of large forces under chiefly control. The great annual elephant hunts of Sepopa and Lewanika or the mass hunts of the Ndebele under Mzilikazi and Lobengula were celebrated events. Traditional African hunting, however, was relatively inefficient (Mackenzie, 1987).
The advent of European hunting, with the introduction of firearms, changed this situation dramatically. The period 1850 to 1875 witnessed a staggering destruction of elephants for the export of ivory and hides. The remaining elephant populations retreated to the less populated areas of the country. Other forms of game, notably buffalo, antelope and zebra, were ruthlessly exploited during the last two decades of the century. During this period Africans, exhibiting an insatiable demand, acquired vast quantities of meat.
Interestingly, at this time, both Mzilikazi and Lobengula tried to limit the entry of European hunters into their kingdom, but with little success. At the beginning of his reign, Lobengula issued hunting regulations restricting European hunters to a particular route and charged a licence fee. These hunters were restricted to the outer regions of the kingdom in an effort to protect Ndebele hunters from competition. He also forbade hunters, African and European, to shoot cow elephants or take ostrich eggs. In 1883, he fined the hunters Selous and Martin for shooting hippopotamus against his wishes (Cobbing 1976, quoted in Mackenzie, 1987). Lobengula's efforts to control hunting were a response to the significant decline in the numbers of game which must have been very apparent in the last decades of the Ndebele kingdom. Ndebele hunters found that they had to move further and further from the heartland of their state in order to secure game of any sort. It is a paradox that the 'management' of any resource increases with its increasing scarcity.
The Development of Dualism : Land and People
2 Zimbabwe's land area totals some 390,760 km. The country is divided into five agro-ecological regions. Regions I and II represent the most fertile areas with rainfall exceeding 750mm per annum. These regions are classified as "suitable for intensive systems of farming based on crops and/or livestock production" (GOZ, 1984a). They cover only 17% of the country (Table 1). Regions III, IV and V receive less than 800mm of rainfall per annum and are recognised as "marginal for maize, tobacco and cotton production or for enterprises based on crop production alone" (GOZ, 1984a).
The communal areas represent 42% of the total land area. At the time of the last census (1982) Zimbabwe's population was reported to be 7.5 million (CSO, 1985), some 56% of whom lived in the communal areas (formerly known as 'Tribal Trust Lands' and before that 'Native Reserves'). More than 90% of communal lands are located within Natural Regions III, IV and V and some 76% of the rural population live within these three regions (Tables 1 & 2). The majority of the population came to find themselves in these marginal areas through the divisive land legislation introduced by the colonial administration.
TABLE 1 I.AND DISTRIBUTION BY NATURAL REGION
X Total Land Area
X Total Land Area designated as Communal Lands
%Communal Areas
NATURAL R E G I O N I
IV
V
TOTAL
[Source: Weiner et al. 1991]
In 1901, when the African population numbered 700, (CSO, 1985), the average population density was 1.8 persons per square kilometre. European settlers often identified land for expropriation by the higher population density of local cultivators (Abel and Blaikie, 1988) which suggests very large areas of the country, those unsuitable for dryland agriculture, were scarcely inhabited at the turn of the century. The failure to find a second Rand, the reason Europeans settled originally, meant that by 1907 they were encouraged to take up farming instead. This necessitated
the expropriation of large tracts of land from the Shona and Ndebele people.
TABLE 2 COMMUNAL LAND POPULATION D I S T R I B U T I O N AND DENSITY BY NATURAL R E G I O N — 1982
Distribution (%) Density
NATURAL REGION
I
89.
I I
62.
I I I
46.
IV
18.
V
12.
TOTAL/
25.
[1] Communal area population density [ppkm^2 ] related to communal land area totalling 163,393 km^2. [Thomas, forthcoming]
The Land Apportionment Act of 1931 legalised the expropriation of 198,539 km^2 (51%) of the land by the settler community. Native reserves, amounting to 117,602 km (30%) of the poorer grade, marginal land, were allocated to the African population who, at that time, represented 96% of the population. The remaining land, 72,859 km^2 (19%) was reserved for national parks, forestry and state land (Kay, 1970). The intention of such legislation appears to have been to undermine the viability of African agriculuture in order to provide a source of cheap wage labour for the mines and farms of the settlers. In this way 'native reserves' effectively became 'labour reserves', although it would be incorrect to assume the general demise of peasant agriculture. It has been posited that increased population pressure lead to an intensification of agricultural production in some areas (Mosley [1983], quoted in Weiner, 1988). Ranger (1985) suggests the response of the majority population was to adopt the 'peasant option'; a conscious refusal to be forced into a process of proletarianisation.
The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 had as its stated objective:
"to provide for the control of the utilisation and allocation of land occupied by natives, and to ensure its efficient use for agricultural purposes; and to require natives to perform labour for conserving natural resources and for promoting good husbandry."
The 1980s closed w i t h o u t the land issue being satisfactorily resolved:-
"In practice there has been little major change in the overall patterns of land use, production and environmental effects compared with earlier decades. The developments of the 1980's can probably best be summarised as 'more of the same'." (Murphree & Cumming, 1991:14)
The intent and effect of the colonial legislation was to concentrate the African population into the more marginal areas of Zimbabwe. Less obvious, perhaps, was the impact this must have had on traditional social relationships. A "strong emotional bond exists between individuals and the territory of their ancestors. The desire to live there is equalled only by the desire to be buried there." (Lan, 1985:20). The translocation of the majority of the African population from their traditional homelands to 'foreign' territories must have been traumatic. Those people moved in this way would have been "expected to make an act of formal recognition of and submission to the local territorial cult" (Schoffeleers, 1979:5). However, the assimilation with a new clan identity and, hence, a closer association with the new territory is a process which is only likely to occur over "a very long period of time." (Lan, 1985). Prior to the arrival of the settlers in 1890 it is reasonable to assume relatively homogeneous communities existed, although this assumption is rejected by Murombedzi (1989) who suggests "stratification and inequality existed even prior to the colonial era....". Whilst in many cases the area settled was dominated by people from one tribal grouping, the effect of colonial land legislation was to create, or increase significantly, the heterogeneity of communities.
Post-Independence Institutional Framework for Development
Independence in 1980 brought with it an understandable air of optimism and expectations of change. "When ZANU-PF overwhelmingly won the first Independence elections, it appeared that a socialist transformation was on the agenda." (Davies, 1988:18). The TNDP of 1982 declared "a democratic, egalitarian and socialist society" a primary objective. In 1984 the Prime Minister issued a Directive which outlined the institutional framework for development in Zimbabwe. The declared objective of this Directive was:-
"To define the administrative structures at provincial and district level and the relationships and channels of communication between all participants in development at provincial and district level in order to achieve the co-ordinated development of provinces and districts in Zimbabwe." (GOZ, 1984b)
An ancillary objective of this policy of decentralisation (which might be seen to contradict the above statement), was to increase the involvement of local communities in the planning and development of their areas. The rhetoric emphasised the 'grass-roots', 'bottom-up' rationale of the new structures. In retrospect it was naive to expect a rapid and universal understanding of the essence of Independence after 90 years of subjugation and dependency. As Murombedzi (1989:42) points out, the absence of such structures until recently "makes them novel structures and in such a situation, it is to be expected that participation will only gradually develop as the people come to have a better understanding of the workings of local government."
Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) were identified as the fundamental planning units. Each VIDCO would represent 100 households (approximately 1,000 people). The committee would submit plans on an annual basis to the Ward Development Committee (WADCO). The WADCO, representing six villages (approximately 6,000 people), would coordinate the plans from all VIDCOs in its jurisdiction. It would then submit the coordinated plan to the District Development Committee (DDC) which coordinates district plans for approval by the District Council (DC). The DC, it should be noted, only 'approves' plans coordinated by the DDC, yet the DC is the only democratically-elected body at district level; it comprises the ward councillors, who are automatically the chairpersons of their WADCOs.
Originally it was envisaged that wards should submit their annual plans direct to the DC, which would then refer matters to any of its technical committees if necessary. This would have enabled the ward "to follow the progress of its activities through its chairperson" (GOZ, 1985). This arrangement would appear more appropriate than the existing situation. The DDC, which coordinates ward plans, is composed entirely of district heads of central government ministries and departments and therefore has no 'popular' representation. The district plan, once 'approved' by the DC, is submitted to the Provincial Development Committee.
Figure 1 shows the hierarchical structure established by the 1984 Directive. It should be noted, in order to avoid confusion, that this structure anticipated the amalgamation of Rural Councils[1]^ with District Councils to form Rural District Councils. This amalgamation has not taken place to date.
[1] Rural Councils, created in 1966, constitute the local authorities governing the predominantly European-owned commercial farming areas and their service towns cf. District Councils which represent the communal areas.
A notable exclusion from this institutional structure for development is any representation by traditional leadership. Moreover, VIDCO and WADCO boundaries have not necessarily been aligned with the coexisting communal boundaries, thereby creating uncertainties over institutional jurisdiction. Predictably, the transition from traditional and chiefly authority (i.e. local,
authority (i.e. transient and possibly immigrant) has been a source of conflict.
The extent to which the new structures may be judged to have been a success can be measured by a ministerial address given in 1989:
"What is however disturbing is that in some areas there is an unacceptable level of participation in the planning process by residents at the village and ward levels. Reports reaching my ministry suggest that people are not sufficiently involved or active in the village and ward development committees. They are not being effectively mobilized to actively participate in development committees in order for them to identify, prepare and plan their development needs." (MLGRUD [1989], quoted in Murombedzi, 1989:22). My emphasis added.
There are many reasons why the rural population has responded with such apathy. Firstly, as has already been suggested, much of the legislation enacted since Independence has been seen to remove, rather than empower, traditional leadership. The chiefs, sub-chiefs, headmen and kraal heads in effect constituted the communal lands' administrative and legal institutions with historically defined areas and sets of rules and regulations clearly understood by the rural people. New legislation has not only removed their authority over communal land resources, it has also sought to alter their 'jurisdictional' boundaries to accommodate the new administrative
VIDCOs and WADCOs then are perceived as instruments of local administration. Ostensibly representative of the rural populace, having been democratically elected to represent them, they are essentially implementation units for plans that continue to be developed in a 'top-down' fashion. The majority of the rural population appear to have chosen the 'peasant option' again in response to government's attempts to create a democratic, egalitarian and socialist society.
Eleven years after Independence, despite the radical restructuring of local government introduced in 1984, administrative structures within many communal lands remain a confused issue, at least from the perspective of the inhabitants. Government's intention to train VIDCOs and WADCOs in administrative skills has proved overly- ambitious, not least because of a lack of sufficient financial and human resources. VIDCOs and WADCOs have tended to operate, if at all, in a vacuum, without the wherewithal to enable them to function effectively and with no real mandate from their constituency. Rural people have had little option other than to 'get on with their own lives', much as they did prior to Independence. The air of optimism which introduced the 1980's has given place to an air of resignation.
Government has failed to honour promises made in 1980 and the disenchantment of the population is evidenced both by the relatively poor turnout for national elections and by the fall in attendance at political rallies held by the ruling party, ZANU-PF. However, probably the clearest indicator of popular disenchantment with the ZANU-PF Government was the performance of the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in the 1991 General Election. ZUM recorded a sizeable vote despite its sudden appearance prior to the election and its inability to project a clear and coherent political programme. Not surprisingly, most political commentators attributed its electoral performance to voter disenchantment with the ruling party; the so-called 'protest vote'.
It is within this institutional context that 'CAMPFIRE' is being promoted.
The Legislative Context
A number of Acts of Parliament impinge upon 'CAMPFIRE'. Those most relevant to this paper are: -
The Parks and Wildlife Act 1975 The Natural Resources Act 1941 The District Councils Act 1957 The Communal Land Act 1982 The Communal Land Amendment Act 1985 The Communal Land (Model)(Land Use and Conservation) By-laws 1985 The Communal Land (Model)(Land Use and Conservation) (Amendment) By-laws 1985 The Rural District Councils Act 1988
It was through a 1982 Amendment to the Parks and Wildlife Act that provision was made for the Minister of Environment and Tourism (MET) (then the Minister of Natural Resources
expenditure of revenues, whether these are derived from the exploitation of natural resources or not. However, it would be the appropriate body to consider questions of the sustainable use of the wildlife resource and, for example, the issuing of hunting permits.
The Rural District Councils Act of 1988, which provides for the amalgamation of rural councils (which are responsible for commercial farming areas and their service towns) with DCs (responsible for communal areas) has yet to be implemented. It reflects current institutional policy. The Rural District Council (RDC) is empowered to be a Natural Resources Conservation Committee (NRCC) for the whole or any part of its area which is declared an intensive conservation area by the Minister responsible for the administration of the Natural Resources Act. The Rural District Councils Act further allows for the formation of sub-committees within one or more wards within the council area to which all or any of the functions of the conservation committee may be delegated. The chairman of such sub-committee shall be the councillor for the ward (or one of them) and the chairman of the RDC shall be an ex- officio member of every such committee.
Section 88 allows RDCs to make by-laws in relation to any matter specified in the Second Schedule (see below) - in respect of the whole council area or any part thereof:-
"After a council has resolved to pass any proposed by-laws, they shall be submitted to the Minister (MLGRUD) for his approval,......Once the Minister has approved any proposed by laws.., he shall cause them to be published in the Gazette, and they shall have the force of law within the area to which they apply...." [Section 90 paras 1 & 4]
The sections of the Second Schedule relevant to this paper are: -
" 'Protection of common property'
Paragraph 9 "Preventing damage to any property to which the inhabitants of a council area or any portion thereof have a common right and providing for the recovery of compensation for such damage."
'Conservation of natural resources'
Paragraph 11 "The preservation and conservation of natural resources."
The Communal Land Act 1982 and the Communal Land Amendment Act 1985 laid the foundations for rural development within communal areas. The 1982 legislation transferred legal authority over land allocation from traditional leaders to DCs. The 1985 Amendment enabled DCs to levy charges (rates) "for any services, amenities or facilities provided by the State........ whether....... such service is used or not." (Section 2 [4][a]). These enactments facilitated the underlying intention of the government to introduce the demarcation of arable and grazing lands, and areas for rural housing construction. For many local people this is reminiscent of the series of land legislation which supported the colonial government's divisive land policy between 1930 and 1960.
Whilst the Prime Minister's 1984 Directive sought to promote 'grass-roots' development (see page 9), the Communal Land (Model)(Land Use and Conservation) By-Laws 1985 authorised DCs to prepare and adopt development plans of their own volition [Section 4 (1)]. In preparing any plan the council was to seek the advice of those regional officers of government ministries tasked with land use planning, viz;
No mention was made of consultation with local people, other than the fact that when a plan has been prepared and approved by the council, a copy should be sent to the chairman of every VIDCO of council affected by the plan [Section 4 (5)(c)] who is given 30 days to consult local inhabitants and report back any objections to the plan to council, together with the identity of the objectors [Section 4(6) ].
Section 6 of the Communal Land (Model) (Land Use and Conservation) By-laws stipulate the "Contents of a Plan". This covers grazing areas, cultivation plots and, of relevance to this paper, "measures appropriate for the conservation and proper use of any wild life in any grazing area", a clause inserted by a later amendment to these By- laws. Unfortunately, the rather autocratic nature of these model by-laws tends to preclude their potential to enable rural people to plan their own land use strategies.
The legislation impacting on 'CAMPFIRE' is ambiguous and certain Acts contradict each other, particularly in regard to resource use. However,in practice little reference is made to these official precepts.
These variables are generally recognised as:-
Whilst little precedent exists for community wildlife management in the modern state, the nature of the resource is comparable with that of fish, about which much has been written. These resources are classified as "fugitive- renewable" and the fugitive nature has unique implications for the development of appropriate management institutions. Bromley & Cernea (1989:24) suggest that "if open access is to be converted to an effective common property regime, then the existence of clear resource boundaries, small (manageable) resource size and scope, and accessible information about the condition of the resource are critical." (Emphasis added).
In the Zimbabwean context, wildlife comprises species which reside within a single jurisdiction (the term 'producer community' has been coined although its relevance to existing jurisdictional boundaries is ambiguous); other species may range across the jurisdictions of two or more producer communities; and still others, such as elephant (Loxodontus africana), may roam across international boundaries. The implications for collection of sufficiently reliable data for the sustainable utilisation of the resource seem obvious. However, it has been argued that local management has a comparative advantage over centrally-managed systems in this respect (Freeman, 1989).
The characteristics of the users is another critical factor affecting the outcome of CPR management. It is generally accepted that successful CPR management "will be facilitated in those instances in which the size of the user group is small, the users are reasonably homogeneous in important socio-economic characteristics, and the users reside in close proximity to the resource." (Bromley & Cernea, 1989:24).
In Zimbabwe, the propensity for local membership organisations (MOs) to take organised collective action to meet common goals has been illustrated by Bratton (1986). One of the distinguishing features of collective action is that it is "self-managed", involving voluntary membership, government by agreement and social control by peer pressure. Such organisations have the potential to become recognised institutions, but, paradoxically, lack the legitimacy and authority accorded to LAs or LGs for resolving conflicts. There is an urgent need, to enable such
organisations to draw up rules which effectively institutionalise the resolution of conflicts.
Moreover, MOs have no recognised legal status. Communities wishing to engage in enterprises will have to enter into agreements regulating the rights and obligations of members which, in effect, means forming an association recognised by law (Wood, 1991). Co-operatives are attractive in this respect and may be the only form of association available to rural communities to satisfy this need. It is unfortunate that the performance, to date, of co-operative societies in Zimbabwe has been uninspiring and this tends to be, with some notable exceptions, a world-wide phenomenum (Uphoff, 1986). The potential of co-operatives has been undermined by the feature which makes them more appropriate than MOs as institutions, that is official recognition by the state. Bratton points out: -
"As states penetrate the countryside, political conflict will inevitably arise as the central quest for integration collides with the local urge to retain autonomy. This conflict is already manifest in Zimbabwe in disputes between farmer organizations (sic) on the one hand and the ruling party and co-operatives ministry on the other." (Bratton, 1986:382)
It is questionable whether the criterion that "users reside in close proximity to the resource" has any heuristic value when discussing fugitive resources such as wildlife. Where CPRs are static, there is at least some chance that the underlying boundary conditions determined by nature will concur with the jurisdictional boundaries determining the legitimacy of the decision-making body. Wildlife is a "multi-jurisdictional resource" (Buck, 1989); as such, whilst the underlying boundary conditions may be defineable in technical terms of species composition and numbers, the physical nature of the animal is to ignore jurisdictional boundaries. Consequently wildlife as a resource affects, and is affected by, a variety of user groups - one or more may be small and reasonably homogeneous; others, because of the nature of the resource, will be larger and more heterogeneous. "These overlapping jurisdictions generate complex management problems which require innovative institutional arrangements." (Buck, 1989:130).
The complexity of the management problem is exacerbated by the historical development of the legal and political environment in which the users reside. When the European settlers moved into the country the resident Shona were organised under fragmented polities or chiefdoms; the Ndebele were under centralised rule. The boundaries of the various polities, and the sub-divisions within them, were contiguous and constituted defined jurisdictions (Murphree
