Intermediate Microeconomics Final Exam, May 5, 2005, Slides of Microeconomics

The final exam questions for an intermediate microeconomics course, covering topics such as consumer theory, producer theory, supply and demand, nash equilibria, and oligopoly. Students are required to provide arguments to support their answers.

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Intermediate Microeconomics 301
Final Exam
Thursday, May 5, 2005
Time: 2 hours.
Instructions. To obtain credit, you must give arguments to support your answer. The numbers
in brackets at the start of each question are the numbers of points the questions are worth.
Exercise 1 [15]:Consumer theory
Jacob’s utility function is
U= 10XY 2
The price of Xis pX= $10 and the price of Yis pY= $5, and his income is m= $150. What is
his optimal consumption bundle? Show in a graph.
Exercise 2 [25]:Producer theory
Suppose a production function is given by f(K; L) = KL1
3, and that the price of capital is $10
and the price of labor is $16. The capital is xed at the level K= 4.
1. What is the quantity of labor that minimizes the cost of producing any given output?
2. What is the minimum cost of producing yunits of output ?
3. What are the marginal cost of production and the average total cost, average variable cost
and the average xed cost?
4. Derive the rm’s short run supply curve.
Exercise 3 [20]:Supply and Demand
The supply curve for T-shirt is given by the equation P= 6Q. The demand curve is given by
the equation p= 18 3Q.
1. What is the equilibrium price and quantity?
2. At a price of $18, will there be a surplus? Indicate by how much.
3. At a price of $6, will there be a surplus? Indicate by how much.
Exercise 4 [15]: Nash Equilibrium
1. In the following game, players must move simultaneously. What are the Nash equilibria of the
game? How many are there?
1n2 L M
L 3,8 5,0
M 2,3 7,4
2. Which equilibrium will occur if players play sequentially and player 1 makes her decision rst?
Why? Give an extensive representation of the game (tree).
3. Which equilibrium will occur if players play sequentially and player 2 makes her decision rst?
Why? Give an extensive representation of the game (tree).
1
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Intermediate Microeconomics 301

Final Exam Thursday, May 5, 2005

Time: 2 hours.

Instructions. To obtain credit, you must give arguments to support your answer. The numbers in brackets at the start of each question are the numbers of points the questions are worth.

Exercise 1 [15]: Consumer theory Jacobís utility function is U = 10XY 2

The price of X is pX = $10 and the price of Y is pY = $5, and his income is m = $150. What is his optimal consumption bundle? Show in a graph.

Exercise 2 [25]: Producer theory Suppose a production function is given by f (K; L) = KL (^13) , and that the price of capital is $ and the price of labor is $16. The capital is Öxed at the level K = 4.

  1. What is the quantity of labor that minimizes the cost of producing any given output?
  2. What is the minimum cost of producing y units of output?
  3. What are the marginal cost of production and the average total cost, average variable cost and the average Öxed cost?
  4. Derive the Örmís short run supply curve.

Exercise 3 [20]: Supply and Demand The supply curve for T-shirt is given by the equation P = 6Q. The demand curve is given by the equation p = 18 3 Q.

  1. What is the equilibrium price and quantity?
  2. At a price of $18, will there be a surplus? Indicate by how much.
  3. At a price of $6, will there be a surplus? Indicate by how much.

Exercise 4 [15]: Nash Equilibrium

  1. In the following game, players must move simultaneously. What are the Nash equilibria of the game? How many are there?

1 n 2 L M L 3,8 5, M 2,3 7,

  1. Which equilibrium will occur if players play sequentially and player 1 makes her decision Örst? Why? Give an extensive representation of the game (tree).
  2. Which equilibrium will occur if players play sequentially and player 2 makes her decision Örst? Why? Give an extensive representation of the game (tree).

Exercise 5 [25]: Oligopoly In a Cournot duopoly, each Örm has a marginal cost of 40 (i.e., the total cost for each Örm i is ci(qi) = 40qi), and market demand is Q = 100 2 p (recall that Q = q 1 + q 2 )

  1. What are the best response functions of each Örm?
  2. What is the best output level for each Örm?
  3. How does the total output level compare to the cartel output level?
  4. How much does Örm 1 produce if it is the leader in a Stackelberg model? How much does Örm 2 produce? Which one gets a higher payo§?