Charitable Trusts and Charitable Corporations: A Historical Analysis of Property Rights, Exercises of Law

An historical analysis of charitable trusts and charitable corporations, focusing on the legal framework and property rights. It discusses the Elizabethan courts' recognition of charitable trusts, the limitations on charitable trusts, and the differences between charitable trusts and charitable corporations in various states such as Virginia, Maryland, and New York. The document also touches upon the implications of the courts' decisions for donors and charitable institutions.

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WASHINGTON
UNIVERSITY
LAW
QUARTERLY
Volume
XXIV
DECEMBER,
1938
Number
1
THE
CHARITABLE
CORPORATION
AND
THE
CHARITABLE
TRUST
THOMAS
E.
BLACKWELLt
I.
INTRODUCTORY
The
past
thirty
years
or
more have
witnessed
a
vast
increase
in
the property
and
funds
held
by
educational,
philanthropic,
and
other
charitable
institutions
in
this
country.
Statistics
in
this
field
are
difficult
to
assemble,
but
incomplete
estimates
indi-
cate
the
magnitude
of
the
problem. According
to
a
survey
made
in
this
field
in
1932 by Wood,
Struthers
&
Company
of
New
York,
"the
fact
that
philanthropy's
trustees
have
a
responsibility
of
monumental
size
may
be
grasped
by
examining
the
following
exhibits
* *
*"I
'
Philanthropies
Property
and
Endowment
Religion
------------------------
$3,839,500,000.00
Higher
Education---
..............
2,815,000,000.00
Hospitals
------------------.-------------
1,400,000,000.00
Foundations
----------.--------
1,000,000,000.00
Organized
Charity
---------------
239,000,000.00
Total
-------------------------------
$9,293,500,000.00
It
is
a
matter
of
common
knowledge
that
the
majority
of these
great
institutions
and foundations
are
corporations-charitable
corporations.
In what
capacity
do
these
corporations
hold
their
funds-as
technical
trustees,
subject to
all
the restrictions
and
f
Ph.B.,
University of
Chicago,
1921;
M.S.
in
B.A.,
Washington
Univer-
sity,
1925;
J.D.,
1938;
Comptroller of
Washington
University.
1.
Trusteeship
of
American Endowments
(1932)
6.
According
to
the
Office
of
Education
of
the
United
States
Department
of
the
Interior,
insti-
tutions
of
higher
education,
in
1934,
held
physical
property
and
permanent
funds
totalling
$3,792,605,030.00.
Of
this
amount,
$1,472,946,354.00
repre-
Nented
endowment
funds.
Statistics
of
Higher
Education,
19.3-34,
Bien-
nial Survey of
Education
in
the
United
States
(1932-34).
pf3
pf4
pf5
pf8
pf9
pfa
pfd
pfe
pff
pf12
pf13
pf14
pf15
pf16
pf17
pf18
pf19
pf1a
pf1b
pf1c
pf1d
pf1e
pf1f
pf20
pf21
pf22
pf23
pf24
pf25
pf26
pf27
pf28
pf29
pf2a
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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

LAW QUARTERLY

Volume XXIV DECEMBER, 1938 Number 1

THE CHARITABLE CORPORATION AND

THE CHARITABLE TRUST

THOMAS (^) E. BLACKWELLt

I. INTRODUCTORY The past thirty years or more have witnessed a vast increase in the property (^) and funds held by educational, philanthropic, and other charitable institutions in this (^) country. Statistics in this field are difficult to assemble, but incomplete estimates (^) indi- cate the magnitude of the problem. According to a survey made in this field in 1932 by Wood, Struthers (^) & Company of New York, "the fact that philanthropy's trustees have a responsibility of monumental size may be grasped by examining the following exhibits * * *"I' Philanthropies Property and Endowment Religion ------------------------ $3,839,500,000. Higher Education--- .............. 2,815,000,000. Hospitals ------------------.------------- 1,400,000,000. Foundations ----------.-------- (^) 1,000,000,000. Organized Charity --------------- 239,000,000.

Total ------------------------------- $9,293,500,000. It is a matter of common knowledge that the majority (^) of these great institutions and foundations are corporations-charitable corporations. In what capacity do (^) these corporations hold their funds-as (^) technical trustees, subject to all the restrictions and

f Ph.B., University of Chicago, 1921; M.S. (^) in B.A., Washington Univer- sity, 1925; J.D., 1938; Comptroller of Washington University.

1. Trusteeship of American Endowments (^) (1932) 6. According to the Office of Education of (^) the United States Department of the Interior, insti- tutions of higher education, in 1934, held (^) physical property and permanent funds totalling $3,792,605,030.00. (^) Of this amount, $1,472,946,354.00 repre- Nented endowment funds. (^) Statistics of Higher Education, 19.3-34, Bien- nial Survey of (^) Education in the United States (1932-34).

2 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24

limitations evolved by courts of equity in the field of trusts, or in absolute ownership, subject only to the provisions of their own charters? The very phrasing of this question may startle some, so general is the assumption that institutions of this char- acter hold their funds in trust. A survey of the cases, however, indicates an interesting con- flict of opinion. One need only contrast the view expressed by the Restatement of the Law of Trusts^2 with that of a recent decision in Nebraska^3 in order to frame the issue. According to the Restatement, if the charitable institution receiving (^) the

  1. Restatement, T'usts (1935) sec. 348, Introductory Note: "Where property is given to a charitable corporation, a charitable trust is not created, even though by the terms of the gift the corporation is directed to hold the principal forever and to devote the income only to the accom- plishment of the purposes of the corporation, and even though by the terms of the gift the corporation is directed to use the property only for a par- ticular one of its purposes."
  2. Hobbs v. Board of Education of Northern Baptist Convention (Neb.
  1. 253 N. W. 627: "The endowment fund was initiated June 23, 1892, by a gift from 'The American Baptist Education Society' under a written proposal in the fol- lowing terms: 'Will contribute to Grand Island College located at Grand Island in the State of Nebraska for the purpose of endowment for said institution, and to be invested and preserved inviolable as such, the sum of five thousand^ dollars.^ * *^ *' "Under these circumstances and the conditions the question recurs: Does this endowment fund constitute a charitable trust? If so, it is not subject to the claims of creditors, and, if not, it belongs to the general assets of the college. ***** * ***** "We think that all these cases are distinguishable from the one under consideration by the fact that the absolute control of the corpus of the estate conveyed was transferred to the grantee, while here the body of the gifts and contributions were distinctly stated to be for the endowment of the college, the corpus to be kept intact and inviolable, and the income only to be used for the general purposes of the college. While the legal title or estate may be said to be in the college, it is not an absolute estate. The college is given no control over anything but the income arising therefrom. The college has no beneficial interest in the body of the gift, and the real beneficiaries of the trust are the students who attend the college for the purpose of education. ***** * ***** This is in its very nature a charitable trust, and to put any other construction upon t]ie instruments evidencing the donations would destroy and render nugatory the benevolent intentions of the donors." See also Woman's Foreign Missionary Society v. Mitchell (1901) 93 Md. 199, 48 At. 737, 53 L. R. A. 711; Clarke v. Sisters of Society of the Holy Child Jesus (1908) 82 Neb. 85, 117 N. W. 107; Bennett v. Baltimore Hu- mane Impartial Society (1900) 91 Md. 10, 45 Atl. 888; Bird v. Merklee (1895) 144 N. Y. 544, 39 N. E. 645, 27 L. R. A. 423; Wetmore v. Parker (1873) 52 N. Y. 450; Whitmore v. Church of the Holy Cross (1922) 121 Me. 391, 117 Atl. 469; Doan v. Vestry of Ascension Parish (1906) 103 Md. 662, 64 At. 341, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1119; Art Students' League v. Hinkley (D. C. D. Md. 1929) 31 F. (2d) 469, aff'd (C. C. A. 4, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 225, cert. denied (1930) 281 U. S. 733.

4 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24

liberal (^) rules of which the nature of the case admits.^7 This liber- ality has apparently led the courts into certain inconsistencies. Thus in each (^) of the two cases referred to, the charitable gift was sustained or protected against adverse claimants, in the (^) Mary- land case by holding the fund an absolute (^) gift to the charitable corporation and not an attempt to create a trust for "indefinite and uncertain beneficiaries," (^) banned by Maryland's statutes and legal precedents, and in the Nebraska case by ruling that it was not an absolute gift to the Grand Island College, subject to the demands of its creditors, (^) but a charitable trust, not to be dissi- pated and diverted from its original charitable purpose. This rule of Liberality toward charitable (^) gifts and bequests is not difficult to justify. Springing as they usually do, from the very best (^) that is in human nature, (^) and having for their object the ameliora- tion of the hard condition of those who are at odds with (^) fate and fortune, it is the (^) policy of an enlightened jurisdiction to uphold and sustain them wherever this can be done with- out violation of positive principles of law. 8 II. INCEPTION (^) AND MEANING OF THE CHARITABLE TRUST The development of (^) the law of charitable uses is an exceed- ingly interesting field and has given rise to great (^) conflict of opinion. The early history of the subject is beyond (^) the scope of this article, and it will be necessary to restrict consideration (^) of the (^) topic to the issues that serve to explain and reconcile the con- flict of decisions in this country. The (^) most important landmark in this entire field is, of course, the Statute of Charitable Uses.^9 Although the remedial sections of the statute were repealed by Parliament (^) in 1888,10 the pre- amble was considered of sufficient importance by way of (^) exhibit- ing the spirit of charities to warrant retention. Frequently cited by the courts of this country, it reads:

Whereas lands, tenements, rents, annuities, (^) profits, here- ditaments, goods, chattels, money and stocks of money,

7. Rusell v. Allen (1883) 107 U. S. 163; Ould v. Washington Hospital (1877) 95 U. S. 303; Hadley v. Forsee (1907) 203 Mo. 418, 101 S. W. 59, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 49. 8. Green's Adm'rs v. Fidelity Trust Co. of Louisville (^) (1909) 134 Ky. 311, 120 S. W. 283, 288, 20 Ann. Cas. 861; (^2) Perry, Trusts (7th ed. 1929) sec. 691. 9. 43 Eliz. c. 4 (1601). 10. (^51) & 52 Vict. c. 42, sec. 13 (1888).

THE CHARITABLE CORPORATION

have been heretofore given, limited, appointed and assigned, as well by the Queen's most excellent (^) Majesty, and her most noble progenitors, as by sundry other well-disposed persons; some for relief of aged, impotent and poor people, some for maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners, schools of learning, free schools, and scholars in universi- ties, some for repair of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks and highways, some for education and preferment of orphans, some for or towards relief, stock or maintenance for houses of correction, some for marriages of poor maids, some for supportation, aid and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen and persons decayed, and others for relief or redemption of prisoners or captives, and for aid or ease of any poor inhabitants concerning payments of fifteens, setting out of soldiers and other taxes; which lands

      • have not been employed according (^) to the charitable intent of the givers and founders thereof, by reason of frauds, breaches of trust, and negligence in those that should pay, deliver and employ the same for redress and remedy whereof :- The remedial portions of the statute authorized the Chancellor to commission (^) certain officials to inquire into breaches of chari- table trusts. Although this recital of the types of charity given recognition by Elizabethan (^) courts is of general interest to the student of the history of equitable jurisprudence, it is clear that modern courts should not accept it as an exclusive list of charitable trusts to be given recognition and protection under modern concepts of social needs. One of the most frequently cited definitions of a legal charity is that of Justice Gray: A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of edu- cation or religion, by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint, by assisting them to establish them- selves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or by otherwise lessening the burdens of govern- ment. 1

11. Jackson v. Phillips (1867) 14 Allen (96 Mass.) 539, 556, quoted in whole or in part in (1896) Stuart v. Easton (1896) (^164) U. S. 706; (1898) 170 U. S. 383; In re Hinkly (1881) 58 Cal. 457; Buckly v. Monck (Mo.

  1. 187 S. W. 31; Crow v. Clay County (^) (1906) 196 Mo. 234, 95 S. W. 369; Haggerty v. St. Louis, Keokuk & Northwestern R. Co. (1903) 100 Mo.

1938l

THE CHARITABLE CORPORATION

of private trusts, i. e., the rule against (^) remoteness of vesting of contingent interests, the comnmon (^) law rule against restraints on alienation, the statutory (^) rules against undue suspension (^) of the power of alienation, or the rule against unduly postponing (^) the direct enjoyment of property. (^) Moreover, some of these rules do apply to a degree to charitable (^) trusts. However, it is true that this power (^) to erect a plan of benevolence (^) extending into the indefinite future exists and (^) courts have been compelled to evolve in the cy pres doctrine, compensatory powers of modification and control equally unusual and (^) anomalous. The phrase originally used was (^) cy pres comme possible and freely translated (^) meant "as near as possible."' 1 Generally (^) speak- ing, it refers to that power vested (^) in a court of equity which permits it to make specific a general (^) charitable intent of a settlor and, (^) where lapse of time and changed (^) conditions render an original (^) specific intent impossible or inexpedient, (^) to substitute another plan of administration (^) which approaches "as nearly (^) as possible" the (^) original scheme of the donor. In (^) other words, it designates (^) that power which courts of equity (^) have evolved to correct the lack (^) of wisdom and foresight of the benevolently (^) in- clined, permitting them to mould (^) the charitable trust to meet the vicissitudes of a changing (^) world. The (^) nice distinctions between the judicial and prerogative cy pres (^) powers have been considered in detail (^) by the text writers.'^16 The doctrine is of immediate (^) interest here only to the extent (^) that it serves (^) to throw light on the question of (^) the extent to which the power of equity over charitable (^) uses depends upon the Statute of Elizabeth. The (^) answer to this problem has a direct bearing upon the (^) conflict of authority in this country.

III. EFFECT (^) OF LEGISLATIVE REJECTION OF ENGLISH STATUTES A. The Charitable (^) Trzust in Virginia and Maryland In the leading (^) case of The Trustees of the Philadelphia (^) Bap- tist Association v. Hart's Exec 1tors," (^7) the United States Supreme Court was called (^) upon to pass on the validity of a bequest to an

15. Ironmongers' (^) Company v. Attorney General (H. L. 1844) (^) 10 Cl. & Fin. 908, 8 Eng. Rep. 983. 16. 2 Bogert, Trusts (^) (1935) see. 432; Note (1907) 14 L. R. A. (^) (N. S.) **59.

  1. (1819)** 4 Wheat. 1.

1938]

(^8) WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY (^) [Vol. 24

unincorporated (^) society, whereby Hart, a citizen of Virginia, (^) at- tempted to create an endowed scholarship (^) "for the education of youths of the Baptist (^) denomination, who shall appear promising for the ministry." Since at the (^) time of the death of testator the society (^) was unincorporated, the court took the (^) position that the gift could be sustained (^) only as a charitable trust with the (^) indi- vidual members as trustees. Had the (^) society been a charitable corporation, the court indicated (^) that the bequest could be con- strued as an absolute (^) gift to the corporation, for its corporate purposes and those ancillary thereto. Unfortunately for the so- ciety and for the subsequent (^) history of charities in this country, the Virginia (^) legislature had, three years prior (^) to the death of Hart, repealed (^) all English statutes. Although obviously (^) not aimed at the destruction of the jurisdiction (^) of equity over chari- table trusts, the Statute of Elizabeth fell (^) with the others. Counsel for (^) the society strongly urged that "the peculiar (^) law of charities" did not originate (^) with the famous statute,-that it did not even "profess to give any validity (^) to devises or legacies not before good, but (^) only furnishes a new and more convenient mode of discovering and (^) enforcing them. Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court, held that prior (^) to enactment of the stat- ute in England (^) in 1601, charitable uses such as the one (^) in ques- tion were not recognized, and that they (^) owe their validity in England either to the (^) statute or to prerogative cy pres powers, neither of which were part of the law (^) of Virginia. 8 It then became accepted Virginia law that In short, there cannot be a trust (^) without a cestui que trust, and if it (^) cannot be ascertained who the cestui que trust is, it is the same as if there (^) were none.',

18. Gallego's (^) Ex'rs v. Att'y Gen. (1832) 30 Va. 450; (^) Stonestreet v. Doyle (1881) 75 Va. 356. "These principles, it is (^) confidently believed, are the general principles of the (^) common law upon this subject. If there are (^) ex- ceptions to these principles, those exceptions may (^) without doubt be shown. A diligent (^) search has led me to the conviction, that there (^) was no case at common law, in which a bequest or a trust of this indefinite (^) character would be supported; and the learned (^) counsel on both sides have acknowl- edged that they have been (^) unable to discover any case anterior to the Statute (^43) Elizabeth in which the validity of such (^) bequests has been dis- tinctly recognized. (^) It ought, therefore, perhaps suffice to (^) rest the argu- ment here, since, if under the general principle the bequest would be void, it is incumbent upon those (^) who claim to be protected by an exception to establish (^) that exception." Gallego's Ex'rs v. Att'y (^) Gen., supra, at 467. See also Kain v. Gibboney (1879) (^101) **U. S.362.

  1. (1832) 30** Va. 450, 466.

10 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24

Virginia but was an error copied from the Supreme Court of the United States. This same position was taken four years later,2^3 and it appeared as though the state might free (^) itself from its narrow view of the inherent power of (^) equity over charities. Some eight years later, however, the court felt compelled to return to its old doctrine on the grounds that the law (^) had been built up by a long line of decisions and, though based upon possibly er- roneous conceptions, was too well settled to be overturned by judicial legislation.24 Subsequent Virginia cases have been con- tent to follow this^ reasoning. 5 The legislature of (^) Virginia has been willing to make minor modifications, 26 but the (^) general limitations upon charitable trusts remain. It should be noted that, with the exception (^) of these statutory provisions for certain charitable (^) trusts, the only satis- factory procedure available to the charitably inclined in Virginia is to make the gift or bequest directly to a charitable corporation for one or more of its corporate (^) purposes. 2 Since West Virginia did not (^) sever its ties with Virginia until Civil War days, it is not surprising that its decisions on this, as well as many other points of law, are practically parallel. In 1873 the supreme court of the new state approved the Virginia doctrine. 2 After the Virginia court made its first attempt to break away in 1885, we find the following conservative comment: *** * *** we are not moved to depart from, the line of safe precedents established by the Court of Appeals, from the time of the decision (^) in Gallego's Executors v. Attorney Gen- eral and followed by this court to the present time *** *** * 21 In the absence of a definite (^) cestui to initiate equitable pro- ceedings against the trustee in the event of serious deviations from the original intent of the donor, adequate control may be lacking; and the West (^) Virginia court evidently preferred to ad-

23. Trustees v. Guthrie (1889) 36 Va. 125, 10 S. E. 318, (^6) L. R. A. 321.

  1. Fifield v. Van Wyck (1897) 94 Va. 557, 570, 27 S. E. 446. 25. (^) Jordan v. Richmond Home for Ladies (1907) 106 Va. 710, 56 S. E. 730; Jordan v. Universalist General (^) Convention Trustees (1907) 107 Va. **79, 57 S. E. 652.
  2. See Va. Code (1936) sees. 587:-590.
  3. Jordan v. Universalist General Convention** Trustees (1907) 107 Va. 79, 57 S. E. 652. For cases holding such a bequest to a charitable corpora- tion valid see Roy's Ex'rs v. Rowzie (1874) 66 Va. 599; Fitzgerald v. Dog- gett's (^) **Ex'rs (1930) 155 Va. 112, 155 S. E. 129.
  4. Bible Society v. Pendleton (1873) 7 W. Va. 79; see also Knox v. Knox (1876) 9 W. Va. 124.
  5. Wilson v. Perry (1886) 29 W. Va. 169, 1** S. E. 302, (^) 321.

THE CHARITABLE CORPORATION

here to the plan of restricting charitable administration to cor- porations with definite and limited charter powers. It was care- ful to explain that its (^) doctrine was not intended to banish charity from the state, nor "to dry up the streams of (^) charitable feelings and actions," but to control to (^) a limited extent the manner of their operation. The law on this subject has had a very similar history in Maryland. Although the legislature did not (^) specifically repeal all English statutes after the (^) Revolution, the Maryland Consti- tution of 1776 provided that only those (^) passed before the time of the first immigration to the state and which were found ap- plicable to local needs (^) were to be considered in force. In 1822 its courts (^) were compelled to determine whether the Statute of Charitable Uses had been thus engrafted into the common law of the state. (^) The state had theretofore commissioned one Kilty to draft a report as (^) to the English statutes to be rejected. His opinion that the English system of charitable uses was ill adapted to local needs was followed (^) by the court with the comment that

"it was a safe guide in exploring an otherwise dubious path." 30 But, as in Virginia, gifts to charitable corporations for one or more corporate purposes were early recognized in Maryland. Since in order to sustain the charity it (^) was necessary that the court find an intent to make an absolute gift and not (^) an attempt to create a trust for indefinite and uncertain beneficiaries, even the use of the most precise terminology did not deter the courts. In the federal case discussed at the beginning of the article 3 ' the words "in trust" were not sufficient to turn the scales. But further on the court made a most illuminating comment:

It is also of significance that gifts and devises to corpora- tions for charitable purposes, (^) which we hold to be valid in Maryland, because we deny that they are trusts, would be called charitable trusts in those jurisdictions in which such settlements are valid in accord with the rule in the Girard Will case. 32

In attempting to rationalize its doctrine with reference to the absolute title of charitable corporations, the Maryland (^) court has

30. Dashiell v. Attorney General (1822) 5 Har. and (^) J. (Md.) 392, 9 Am. Dec. 572. 31. Art Students' League v. Hinkley (D. C. D. Mo. (^) 1929) 31 F. (2d) 469, (^) aff'd (C. C. A. 4, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 225, cert. denied (1930) **281 U. S.

  1. 31** F. (2d) at 478.

1938]

THE CHARITABLE CORPORATION

The (^) status of the charitable trust in the District of Columbia is the same as in Maryland for the obvious (^) reason that, although the District was originally carved from Virginia and Maryland, the part ceded by Virginia (^) was retroceded in 1846, leaving Mary- land law as the rule of decision in the (^) new territorial subdivi- sion. 37 This was confirmed by the United (^) States Supreme Court in 1877. 8 Thus Virginia, West Virginia, Maryland, and (^) the District of Columbia may be grouped together in this analysis since (^) the doc- trine announced by them (^) may be traced to a general repeal of the English statutes and a refusal on the part of their courts to admit the somewhat anomalous doctrine of the (^) charitable use into (^) the body of the common law. B. The New York Doctrine Another group of states adhering to a somewhat (^) similar posi- tion consists of New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. In 1829 the New York (^) legislature attempted a codification of the law of (^) uses and trusts, abolishing all except those specifically authorized. At this early (^) date in the history of the state, with little accumulated wealth to give (^) rise to litigation with reference to gifts to charity, (^) it is not surprising that those drafting this code failed even to mention the charitable (^) trust.3 9^ When it was contended that this early statutory revision impliedly (^) excluded the charitable trust, the court (^) refused to entertain such a view "so contrary to the public (^) interests and to the spirit of the (^) age. 4 0 However, six years later' the court evidently yielded (^) to the per- suasive (^) eloquence of counsel for disappointed heirs and held the

(1906) 103 Md. 662, 64 At]. 314; Eutaw Place Baptist Church v. Shively (1887) (^67) Md. 493, 10 Atl. 244; Gray v. Peter Gray Orphans' Home (1916) 128 Md. 592, 98 Atl. 202; Hanson v. Little Sisters of the Poor (1894) (^) 79 Md. 434, (^32) Atl. 1052, 32 L. R. A. 293; Pratt v. Sheppard and E. P. Hos- pital (1898) (^88) Md. 610, 627, 42 Atl. 51; Rizer v. Perry (1882) 58 Md. 112; Shaeffer v. Klee (1905) 100 Md. 264, 59 Atl. 850; Snowden (^) v. Crown Cork & Seal (1911) 114 Md. 650, 80 Atl. (^) 510, Ann. Cas. 1912A 679; Trinity M. E. Church South v. Baker (1900) 91 Md. 539, (^46) Atl. 1020; Van Reuth v. City Council of Baltimore (1934) 170 Ati. 199; Waters (^) v. Order of the Holy Cross (1928) 155 Md. 146, 142 Atl. (^) 297; Williams v. Baptist Church (1901) 92 Md. 497, 48 Atl. (^) 930, 54 L. R. A. 427; Woman's Foreign Mis- sionary Society v. Mitchell (1901) 93 Md. 199, (^48) At. 737, 53 L. R. A. 711.

37. Zollman, American Law of Charities (1924) 20. 38. Ould v. Washington Hospital (1877) 95 U. S. 303. 39. N. Y. Rev. Stat. (1839) (^) 727.

  1. Shotwell v. Molt (^) (1844) 2 Sandf. (N. Y.) 46, 51.
  2. Yates v. Yates (1850) 9 Barb. (^) Ch. (N. Y.) 324.

1938l

14 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol.^24

language of the statute too plain (^) and unequivocal to be disre- garded, criticizing the earlier holding as judicial legislation and calling upon the legislature to correct the situation by a more thorough (^) revision of the statutes. The court wavered in its position (^) on the subject, 42 but by 1873 the controversy was practically closed. By this time the only way a testator could devote his property (^) to charity was to give it to a charitable corporation already chartered by the state or to be formed within a limited period. The court in that year said: *** * *** corporations can only take and hold property to the amount and for the purposes prescribed by their charters (^) or acts of incorporation, and to this extent each act of incor- poration is a dispensation in favor of the particular corpora- tion, in respect to the prohibitions of (^) the statute against perpetuities. But for this dispensation, which is in effect a repeal pro tanto of the statute against perpetuities, (^) grants of property to charitable (^) corporations, for their general pur-

poses would be incompatible with the statute * * * for the

reason that every such grant implies that it is to be held in

perpetuity for^ the^ purposes^ of^ the^ grantee^ *^ *^ *.

In 1891 the New York court faced an (^) acid test of this doctrine. Samuel J. Tilden attempted by his will to create a charitable trust of some five million dollars "to establish and (^) maintain a free library and reading room in the City of New York, and to promote such scientific and educational objects as my said exe- cutors and trustees may designate." 44 The court felt constrained to follow its rule (^) previously established, but the size of the estate lost to charity and the national prominence of the donor stimu- lated a critical (^) examination of the subject.^45 In 1893 the New York legislature took cognizance (^) of the prob- lem to the extent of passing a statute-termed "The Tilden Act.""

  1. See Williams v. Williams (1853) 4 Seld. (8 N. Y.) 425; Owens v. Missionary Society (1856) 4 Kern (14 N. Y.) 380; Downey v. Marshall (1861) 23 N. Y. 366.
  2. Holmes v. Mead (1873) 52 N. Y. 332, 339-40.
  3. Tilden v. Green (1891) 130 N. Y. 29, 28 N. E. 880, 29 N. E. 1033, 14 L. R. A. 33, 27 Am. St. Rep. 487.
  4. Ames, The Failure of the Tilden Trust (1891) 5 Harv. L. Rev. 289.
  5. An act to regulate Gifts for Charitable Purposes, N. Y. Laws of 1893, c. 701: "Sec. 1. No (^) gift, grant or devise to religious, educational, charitable or benevolent uses which shall, in other respects be valid under the laws of this state, shall or be deemed invalid by reason of the indefinite- ness or uncertainty of the persons designated as the beneficiaries there- under in the instrument creating such a gift, grant, bequest or devise, if there is a trustee named to execute the same, the legal title to the lands

16 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol.

In re Bogart's Will, 51 decided (^) six years after the Tilden Act, gives clear evidence that the New York courts continued to hold gifts and bequests to charitable corporations as absolute and not in trust wherever possible. The gift was

* * * to the Reformed Dutch Church of North Hampstead,

to be invested in safe and productive securities ***** * ***** and the income thereof to be applied, first, in the payment of the salary of the pastor of said church *** *** * and the remainder shall be applied to the general uses and purposes of said church (^) ***** * , and the court ruled: There is an absolute gift *** * . The fact that the testator has designated the purpose for which the legacy must be used does not indicate (^) a desire on his part to create a trust


Other cases after 1893 show a similar trend. 5 3 Even where a fund was given subject to an annuity to the donor, the court has refused to find an intent to create a trust.5^4 The document was drawn with all the formalities of a declaration of trust and was thus termed. It created an endowment fund for the college subject to a "trust" in favor of the settlor for a portion of the income during his life; yet the court held that the college, even during the term of the annuity, did not hold (^) as trustee but as absolute owner (^) for the particular purposes set forth in the in- strument. Two cases that discuss (^) in detail the problem of construing gifts

51. (1899) 43 App. Div. 582, 60 N. Y. S. 496. 52. 60 N. Y. S. at 498. 53. Bird v. Merklee (1895) 144 N. Y. 544, 39 N. E. 645, 27 L. R. (^) A. 423; In re Arrowsmith (Sup. Ct. 1914) 147 N. Y. S. 1016, aff'd (1915) 213 N. Y. 704, 108 N. E. 1089; Congregational Unitarian Society v. Hale (1898) 29 App. Div. 396, 51 N. (^) Y. S. 704; Corporation of the Chamber of Com- merce v. Bennett (Sup. Ct. 1932) 143 Misc. 513, 257 N. Y. S. 2; In re Donchian's Estate (Surr. Ct. 1923) 120 Misc. 535, 199 N. Y. S. 107; In re Durand (Surr. Ct. 1907) 56 Misc. 235, 107 N. Y. S. 393, aff'd (1908) 127 App. Div. 945, 111 N. Y. S. 1118; In re Griffin (1901) 167 N. Y. 71, 60 N. E. 284; In re Hart (1923) 205 App. Div. 703, 200 N. Y. S. 63; In re Isbell's Estate (1896) 1 App. Div. 158, 37 N. Y. S. 919; In re Johnson's Estate (Surr. Ct. 1933) 148 Misc. 218, 265 N. Y. S. 395; In re Lister's Estate (Surr. Ct. 1937) 161 Misc. 734, (^) 292 N. Y. S. 870; Johnson v. Hughes (1907) 177 N. Y. 446, 80 N. E. 373; In re Roche (App. Div. 1907) 104 N. Y. S. 1138, 106 N. Y. S. 1142; (^) St. George Church v. Morgan (Sup. Ct. 1915) 88 Misc. 702, 152 N. Y. S. 497; Sherman (^) v. Richmond Hose Co. (1921) 230 N. Y. 462, 130 N. E. 613; Warburton Avenue Baptist Church v. Clark (1913) 158 App. Div. 230, 142 N. Y. S. 1089.

  1. Robb v. Washington & Jefferson College (App. Div. 1906) 93 N. Y. S. 92, modified and aff'd (1906) 78 N. E. 359, 185 N. Y. 485.

THE CHARITABLE CORPORATION

and bequests that purport to establish permanent endowment funds, in view of the fact that the "Tilden Act" was silent on the question of perpetuities, are (^) of special interest. The first 55 presented the following (^) situation. In 1891 the Fifth Avenue Baptist Church (^) entered into an agreement with John D. Rockefeller (^) accepting certain securities to be held upon the "trusts" and conditions that (1) the securities (^) were to be left in the custody (^) of a named trust company; (2) the entire income was to be paid to the Tabernacle Baptist Church, (^) a second cor- poration; (3) power of reinvestment was given to the (^) Fifth Avenue Church. Here, if ever, was a situation (^) where one chari- table corporation held (^) merely as trustee for a second. The only incidents of ownership vested in the Fifth Avenue (^) Church were those of reinvestment; it (^) did not even have custody of the corpus. And yet if the court held the fund (^) to constitute a charitable trust, it would violate the statute of perpetuities sill (^) in force in New York, even with reference (^) to public trusts. Faced with this dilemma, the court countered with: *** *** * the legal effect of the agreement (^) was to pass the absolute title to the bonds to the (^) Fifth Avenue Baptist Church subject only to the payment of (^) the income to the plaintiff *** *** * and upon the conditions expressed (^) therein *** * .* As we construe the instrument, it (^) falls within the class of so-called (^) trusts arising out of gifts and bequests to charitable and religious corporations (^) for the promotion of some corporate purpose, which have (^) been held not to create a trust, in the legal sense. Such a gift does not (^) create a trust in any such sense as that term is (^) applied to property. 56 A second frank (^) admission of judicial perversion of legal con- cepts in (^) the desire to preserve the charity is found in an opinion construing a testamentary gift "in (^) trust" to an Ohio education corporationY.1 The New York (^) court conceded that the bequest was, in a sense, in trust to the Ohio corporation. But a strict construction would invalidate it as contravening (^) the statute against perpetuities, said the court, gifts in (^) trust for charitable uses having long been deemed absolute gifts, (^) in order to enable

55. Tabernacle Baptist Church v. Fifth Avenue Baptist Church (^) (1901) 60 App. Div. 327, 70 N. Y. S. 181, aff'd (^) **(1902) 172 N. Y. 598, 64 N. E.

  1. 70 N. Y.** (^) **S. at 184-185.
  2. St. John v. Andrews Institute (1907) 191 N. Y. 254,** (^83) N. E. 981; and see (^) Smithsonian Institution v. St. John (1909) 214 U. S. 19.

1938]

THE CHARITABLE CORPORATION

However, this passive acceptance of New York precedents was sharply criticized in the dissenting opinion. Moreover, when the court was faced with an almost identical situation some seven years later, it preferred to find that the city took, not as absolute owner, but as trustee of a public or chari- table trust." Property of testatrix had been given to the City of Oshkosh for the purpose of establishing a manual training school, clearly a corporate function of a municipal corporation. Yet the court concluded that its former doctrine has one fatal weakness, i. e., the problem of enforcement of the terms of the gift or bequest. If the city takes as absolute owner, how can it be compelled to comply with provisions of the bequest? The court, reasoning on this point, observed: It seems highly improbable that the testatrix had in mind the giving of this splendid donation in a way that it might be dissipated or disposed of for any purpose which the city saw fit as soon as it came into possession of the property. It is likewise improbable that the donation would have been made had the donor understood that any such result could legally follow. 5 But in 1920 we find the Wisconsin court apparently returning to its former line of reasoning, again in order to preserve the funds for the charity." The gift was *** *** * to the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, upon this express condition, that the fund so^ received^ *^ * *^ shall always be kept separate and distinct from other funds of said society, and that no part of the principal shall be di- verted or used, and to be known always as the George B. Burroughs Fund * * * The Society claimed^ that^ upon^ the^ death^ of^ the^ son^ without^ law- ful issue, the estate vested in it, charged however with the pay- ment by it of an annuity, while the trustees for 'the estate argued that the Society's charter did not authorize it to act as trustee. Thus, the issue was drawn. If trusteeship in the technical sense was ultra vires the corporation, to hold the fund a chari- table trust was to render it lost to charity notwithstanding the provisions of the will as to the perpetual character and isolation of the fund, and despite a factor of greater significance, that during the life of the annuitant, it could scarcely be said that

64. Maxcy v. City of Oshkosh (1910) 144 Wis. 238, 128 N. W. **899.

  1. 128 N.** W. at 904. 66. State Historical Society v. Foster (Wis. 1920) 177 N. W. 16.

1938]

20 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 24

the entire (^) legal and equitable interest in the fund vested in the corporation, according to traditional legal concepts; (^) yet the court felt constrained to hold that the corporation was absolute owner of the fund and that the payment of such an annuity was not the performance of trust duties. One excerpt from a fairly recent Minnesota (^) case^67 may suffice to indicate how far (^) that state has been content to follow along with New York. The court was considering a bequest in the fol- lowing terms: I (^) give, devise and bequeath in trust to the State Conven- tion of Universalists of the State of Minnesota all of the property * * * of which I shall die seized. All the (^) income and profit arising from the estate to be used * * * to pay ***** * * the salary of the minister who may be located where said graves (^) are located * * The court announced (^) that Weight (^) may be given to the fact that respondent is a religious corporation (^) * * * organized for religious, educa- tional and benevolent purposes *. It is really a gift or devise to respondent direct, to be used according to its known general practice. The use of the words "in trust" should be attributed to hazy (^) notions of legal terms., 8 Other decisions show a similar pattern of judicial reasoning. C. Summary of the Virginia-New York Doctrines The (^) foregoing historical survey would seem to justify the con- clusion that in those states where the Statute of Elizabeth was rejected and the inherent power of equity over charitable uses denied, either by direct statutory expression of policy or (^) by judicial interpretation of English precedents, the courts were compelled to evolve the doctrine that gifts and bequests to a charitable corporation for one or more corporate purposes be- come the absolute property of the corporation and are not held

  1. In re Little's Estate (Minn. 1919) 173 N. W. 659.
  2. Id. at 660.
  3. Wells v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C. C. A. 8, 1933) 63 F. (2d) 425; Atwater v. Russell (1892) 49 Minn. 57, 51 N. W. 629; Cone v. Wold (1902) 85 Minn. 302, 88 N. W. 977; In re Henrickson's Estate (1925) 163 Minn. 176, 203 N. W. 778; Lane v. Easton (1897) 69 Minn. 141, 71 N. W. 1031, 38 L. R. A. 669; In re Minneapolis Police Dept. Relief Ass'n (1902) 85 Minn. 302, 88 N. W. 977; Peterson v. Northwestern Baptist Hos- pital (1935) 194 Minn. 399, 260 N. W. 512; Shanahan v. Kelly (1903) 88 Minn. 202, 92 N. W. 948; Watkins v. Bigelow (1904) 93 Minn. 210, 100 N. W. 1104; Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Horn (1913) 120 Minn. 404, 139 NX. W. 905.