Critical Systems: Understanding Dependability, Safety, and Security - Prof. Marvin V. Zelk, Study notes of Software Engineering

An overview of critical systems, their dependability properties, and development methods. It covers topics such as system dependability, safety-critical and mission-critical systems, availability and reliability, and development methods for critical systems. The document also discusses the importance of formal methods, static analysis, external quality assurance, and independent verification and validation.

Typology: Study notes

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Uploaded on 07/30/2009

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Dependability
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Objectives
To explain what is meant by a critical system
where system failure can have severe human
or economic consequence.
To explain four dimensions of dependability -
availability, reliability, safety and security.
To explain that, to achieve dependability, you
need to avoid mistakes, detect and remove
errors and limit damage caused by failure.
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Dependability

Objectives

l To explain what is meant by a critical system

where system failure can have severe human

or economic consequence.

l To explain four dimensions of dependability -

availability, reliability, safety and security.

l To explain that, to achieve dependability, you

need to avoid mistakes, detect and remove

errors and limit damage caused by failure.

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Topics covered

l System dependability

l Availability and reliability

l Safety

l Security

Critical Systems

l Safety-critical systems

 Failure results in loss of life, injury or damage to the environment;  Chemical plant protection system;

l Mission-critical systems

 Failure results in failure of some goal-directed activity;  Spacecraft navigation system;

l Business-critical systems

 Failure results in high economic losses;  Customer accounting system in a bank;

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Achieving dependability

l Redundancy

 Keep more than 1 version of a critical component available so that if one fails then a backup is available.

l Diversity

 Provide the same functionality in different ways so that they will not fail in the same way.

l But adding diversity and redundancy adds complexity and this can increase the chances of error.

l Some engineers advocate simplicity and extensive V & V as a more effective route to software dependability.

Diversity and redundancy examples

l Redundancy. Where availability is critical (e.g.

in e-commerce systems), companies normally

keep backup servers and switch to these

automatically if failure occurs.

l Diversity. To provide resilience against

external attacks, different servers may be

implemented using different operating

systems (e.g. Windows and Linux)

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N-version programming as a model

What’s wrong with this model?

N-version programming

l The different system versions are designed

and implemented by different teams. It is

assumed that there is a low probability that

they will make the same mistakes. The

algorithms used should but may not be

different.

l There is some empirical evidence that teams

commonly misinterpret specifications in the

same way and chose the same algorithms in

their systems.

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Socio-technical critical systems

l Hardware failure

 Hardware fails because of design and manufacturing errors or because components have reached the end of their natural life.

l Software failure

 Software fails due to errors in its specification, design or implementation.

l Operational failure

 Human operators make mistakes. Now perhaps the largest single cause of system failures.

Dependability

l The dependability of a system equates to its

trustworthiness.

l A dependable system is a system that is

trusted by its users.

l Principal dimensions of dependability are:

 Availability;  Reliability;  Safety;  Security  Others …

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Dimensions of dependability

Dependability

Availability Reliability Security

The ability of the system to deliver services when requested

The ability of the system to deliver services as specified

The ability of the system to operate without catastrophic failure

The ability of the system to protect itelf against accidental or deliberate intrusion

Safety

Other dependability properties

l Repairability

 Reflects the extent to which the system can be repaired in the event of a failure

l Maintainability

 Reflects the extent to which the system can be adapted to new requirements;

l Survivability

 Reflects the extent to which the system can deliver services whilst under hostile attack;

l Error tolerance

 Reflects the extent to which user input errors can be avoided and tolerated.

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Dependability vs performance

l Untrustworthy systems may be rejected by their users

l System failure costs may be very high

l It is very difficult to tune systems to make them more dependable

l It may be possible to compensate for poor

performance

l Untrustworthy systems may cause loss of valuable information

Dependability costs

l Dependability costs tend to increase

exponentially as increasing levels of

dependability are required

l There are two reasons for this

 The use of more expensive development techniques and hardware that are required to achieve the higher levels of dependability  The increased testing and system validation that is required to convince the system client that the required levels of dependability have been achieved

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Costs of increasing dependability

Cost

Low Medium High Very high

Ultra-high

Dependability

Dependability economics

l Because of very high costs of dependability

achievement, it may be more cost effective to

accept untrustworthy systems and pay for

failure costs

l However, this depends on social and political

factors. A reputation for products that can’t

be trusted may lose future business

l Depends on system type - for business

systems in particular, modest levels of

dependability may be adequate

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Reliability terminology

Term Description System failure An event that occurs at some point in time when the system does not deliver a service as expected by its users System error An erroneous system state that can lead to system behavior that is unexpected by system users. System fault A characteristic of a software system that can lead to a system error. For example, failure to initialize a variable could lead to that variable having the wrong value when it is used. Human error or mistake

Human behavior that results in the introduction of faults into a system.

Observation

Event

Cause

Testing consists of observing failures. Debugging consists of finding the event that causes the failure. Finding the ultimate cause (i.e., the fault) of the error is extremely difficult.

Faults and failures

l Failures are a usually a result of system errors that are derived from faults in the system l However, faults do not necessarily result in system errors  The faulty system state may be transient and ‘corrected’ before an error arises l Errors do not necessarily lead to system failures  The error can be corrected by built-in error detection and recovery  The failure can be protected against by built-in protection facilities. These may, for example, protect system resources from system errors

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Perceptions of reliability

l The formal definition of reliability does not always reflect the user’s perception of a system’s reliability  The assumptions that are made about the environment where a system will be used may be incorrect

  • Usage of a system in an office environment is likely to be quite different from usage of the same system in a university environment  The consequences of system failures affects the perception of reliability
  • Unreliable windscreen wipers in a car may be irrelevant in a dry climate
  • Failures that have serious consequences (such as an engine breakdown in a car) are given greater weight by users than failures that are inconvenient

Reliability achievement

l Fault avoidance

 The system is developed in such a way that human error is avoided and thus system faults are minimized.  The development process is organized so that faults in the system are detected and repaired before delivery to the customer.

l Fault detection

 Verification and validation techniques are used to discover and remove faults in a system before it is deployed.

l Fault tolerance

 The system is designed so that faults in the delivered software do not result in system failure.

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l Primary safety-critical systems

 Embedded software systems whose failure can cause the associated hardware to fail and directly threaten people.

l Secondary safety-critical systems

 Systems whose failure results in faults in other systems which can threaten people

Safety criticality

l Safety and reliability are related but distinct

 In general, reliability and availability are necessary but not sufficient conditions for system safety

l Reliability is concerned with conformance to a

given specification and delivery of service

l Safety is concerned with ensuring system

cannot cause damage irrespective of whether

or not it conforms to its specification

Safety and reliability

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l Specification errors

 If the system specification is incorrect then the system can behave as specified but still cause an accident

l Hardware failures generating spurious inputs

 Hard to anticipate in the specification

l Context-sensitive commands i.e. issuing the

right command at the wrong time

 Often the result of operator error

Unsafe reliable systems

Safety terminology

Term Definition Accident (or mishap)

An unplanned event or sequence of events which results in human death or injury, damage to property or to the environment. A computer-controlled machine injuring its operator is an example of an accident. Hazard A condition with the potential for causing or contributing to an accident. A failure of the sensor that detects an obstacle in front of a machine is an example of a hazard. Damage A measure of the loss resulting from a mishap. Damage can range from many people killed as a result of an acc ident to minor injury or property damage. Hazard severity

An assessment of the worst possible damage that could result from a particular hazard. Hazard severity can range from catastrophic where many peop le are killed to minor where only minor damage results. Hazard probability

The probability of the events occurring which create a hazard. Probability values tend to be arbitrary bu t range from probable (say 1/100 chance of a hazard occu rring) to implausible (no conceivable situations are likely wh ere the hazard could occur). Risk This is a measure of the probability that the system will cause an acc ident. The risk is assessed by considering the hazard probability, the hazard severity and the probability that a hazard will result in an accident.

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Security

l The security of a system is a system property

that reflects the system’s ability to protect

itself from accidental or deliberate external

attack

l Security is becoming increasingly important as

systems are networked so that external

access to the system through the Internet is

possible

l Security is an essential pre-requisite for

availability, reliability and safety

Fundamental security

l If a system is a networked system and is

insecure then statements about its reliability

and its safety are unreliable

l These statements depend on the executing

system and the developed system being the

same. However, intrusion can change the

executing system and/or its data

l Therefore, the reliability and safety

assurance is no longer valid

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The CIA of security

l Confidentiality – Only authorized individuals

have access to data

l Integrity – Data cannot be altered without

the knowledge of those who own it

l Availability – Data is available when needed

Security terminology

Term Definition

Exposure Possible loss or ha rm in a computing system. This can be loss or damage to data or can be a loss of time and effort if recovery is necessary after a security breach.

Vulnerability A weakness in a computer-based system that may be exploited to cause loss or ha rm.

Attack An exploitation of a system vulnerability. Generally, this is from outside the system and is a deliberate attempt to cause some damage.

Threats Circumstances that have potential to cause loss or harm. You can think of these as a sys tem vulnerability that is subjected to an attack.

Control A protective measure that reduces a system vulnerability. Encryption would be an example of a control that reduced a vulnerability of a weak access control system.