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C H A P T E R
Magical Thinking
Karl S. Rosengren and Jason A. French
Every day we are confronted with a variety of events for which we clearly know the cause. We’re hungry because we were in a hurry and missed break- fast. Sue realizes that John is mad at her because she forgot to meet him after work. But for other events the causes are less evident. Why does the house creak at night? Is it because of changes in the weather con- ditions, strong winds, or some other cause? Could it be a ghost? Why did the streetlight go off just as we walked by? Was it because of a burned out bulb, faulty wiring, or is it caused in some way by our physical presence? How do we explain the myriad of events that we witness on a daily basis, especially those for which no discernable cause is observed? Th is search for causality in everyday life, for both mundane and mysterious events, seems to be a uni- versal cognitive process. How particular individuals reason about different events and make reference to diff erent types of explanation seems to depend on
Abstract This chapter examines the concept of magical thinking and how this form of thought develops over the course of childhood and is maintained in adulthood. Rather than assuming magical thinking to be a remnant of childhood and an immature mind, it is suggested that a number of universal cognitive processes lead to the emergence of magical thinking in early childhood and its maintenance into adulthood. This chapter suggests that magical thinking reaches a peak in childhood partly because of the emergence of pretense and imagination as well as substantial cultural support for magical beliefs in children. Although this form of thinking declines somewhat in later childhood and adulthood, unconscious cognitive processes serve to maintain magical thinking throughout the life span. The chapter also explores the relation between magical thinking and religious thoughts and beliefs, superstition, and other forms of strange beliefs in adulthood. Key Words: cognitive biases, cognitive development, essentialism, magical belief, magical thinking, similarity and contagion
a variety of factors, including innate biases, socio- cultural support for particular types of explana- tions, and individual differences in the willingness to accept one or more possible explanations (see chapters 3 and 22). Our goal in the current chapter is to provide a review of the literature on the devel- opment of one form of reasoning, magical think- ing, a form of reasoning that takes a nonscientific perspective with respect to mysterious and anoma- lous events. In doing so, we relate magical thinking to other forms of cognition and explore the situa- tions and contexts that appear to activate magical thinking. Why is it for example that individuals feel uncomfortable handling the clothes of a dead person, especially, if the individual performed some heinous crime? Why is it that we tend to avoid loca- tions where some bad event has occurred, such as a murder? And why is it that we take causal credit for the occurrence of seemingly random events? Many
Rosengren, French 43
magical thinking, in terms of illogical and irratio- nal thought, is considered a general characteristic of young children (Rosengren, Miller, Gutierrez, & Schein, in press). Others, such as Joan Didion, have used the term to describe seemingly irrational thoughts and behaviors that in her case dominated her days following the sudden and unexpected death of her husband (Didion, 2005). But these uses of magic generally go beyond merely thinking or act- ing irrationally. That is, they seem at some level to connect to a set of beliefs that treat certain individu- als, events, or occurrences as “special” and “out of the ordinary.” We will return to this issue shortly. Similar uses of the term magical thinking are found in the fi elds of anthropology and psychol- ogy, although there is quite a lot of variation in how this term has been used. As Mayr (1982, p. 44) has pointed out, many of the controversies in the his- tory of science can be attributed to scientists in dif- ferent, opposing camps using the same term for very different concepts. Much of the early research exam- ining magical thinking characterized the thought processes of preindustrialized “primitive” cultures (Frazer, 1911) and children (Piaget, 1929) as magi- cal, dominated by illogical, irrational thoughts and beliefs (Rosengren & Hickling, 2000). By this definition any thought process that is not logical, systematic, or scientific might be characterized as magical. This is not that dissimilar to the definition provided by Eckblad and Chapman (1983, p. 215), who suggested that magical thinking involves “belief in forms of causation that by conventional standards are invalid.” In our view there are a number of problems with this definition of magical thinking. First, this per- spective uses magical thinking as a pejorative label for thinking that differs either from that of educated adults in technologically advanced societies or the majority of society in general. This pejorative view was quite common in the study of magic from an anthropological perspective before the 1970s. With an increase in more relativistic cultural accounts, such as situated cultural cognition, and distancing from notions of primitivism, the study of magic in different cultures declined substantially (Sorensen, 2007). Second, this definition ignores the fact that even in technological advanced societies many deci- sions are not based on rational and logical thought (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1979). For example, when gam- bling, people often place too much importance on one aspect of an event, which produces an error in predicting future outcomes of that event. These
researchers attribute the feelings, thoughts, and behaviors associated with these types of events to magical thinking. But what really is magical thinking? Although magical thinking has been the focus of both anthro- pological (L é vy-Bruhl, 1948; 1966; Malinowski, 1954; Tambiah, 1990) and psychological (Piaget, 1929, 1930; Subbotsky, 1985, 1992, 2004) inqui- ries for many years, there is no clearly agreed upon defi nition of what is meant by the term. For this reason we begin our review with an exploration of both traditional and more current perspectives on magical thinking and then offer our own perspec- tive on how this particular term should be defined. Afterward we consider whether magical thinking is still a commonplace activity in the everyday lives of both children and adults. We then explore the research on the development of magical thinking in children. Although never quite a main focus of developmental psychologists, this topic was exten- sively explored by Piaget (1929, 1930), and research in this area has recently seen resurgence. In this sec- tion we also examine the relation between magical thinking and the emergence of pretense and the imagination in childhood. We suggest that these three behaviors—magical thinking, imagination, and pretense—appear to emerge in concert in late infancy and early childhood and provide a mutually supportive environment enabling each to flourish in their own right. We also examine how magical thinking might be related to other forms of think- ing. Specifi cally, we explore the relation among magical thinking, pretense, and imagination and creativity; between magical and religious thinking; between magical thinking and superstition; and last the relation between magical thinking and psycho- pathology. We end the chapter with a summary and some thoughts on future directions for research in this area.
Magical Thinking Defined
On the surface, the term magical thinking seems quite easy to define. It is a phrase that is used in both common everyday language and more esoteric academic discussions. In common usage the term magic is tied to a wide range of events, from a beau- tiful sunset or rainbow to seemingly unexplainable phenomena or events. The label is also used for par- ticular individuals who think or behave in certain ways. Magic has also been used to label thinking that is characterized to be illogical or irrational. Indeed, for many preschool teachers, especially those schooled in a Piagetian view of development,
Rosengren, French 45
that in many circumstances a young child’s belief in the reality of certain fantasy figures (e.g., Santa Claus, the Tooth Fairy) and their actions brought about by atypical forms of causality could be char- acterized as involving magical thinking. It is not clear that belief in these figures or in their special powers necessarily follows the principles of similar- ity and contagion. We explore the concepts of simi- larity and contagion in more detail in a later section. We also explore the notion of essences, as we sug- gest that this concept deserves particular focus, as a belief in essences is likely an unconscious process that may serve as a “built-in bias” in human reason- ing more generally.
Our View of Magical Thinking
To summarize our view of magical thinking, if a child merely lacks particular knowledge, is con- fused, or incorrect about some event or situation, we should refrain from labeling his or her think- ing as magical. An individual’s thinking can’t merely be wrong, confused, irrational, driven by emotions, based on inaccurate knowledge, or different from our own or the conventional wisdom to be labeled magical thinking. If this were sufficient, the thought processes of many consumers and theoretical physi- cists would need to be labeled as magical. Rather, we suggest that for thought to be labeled as magical an individual must (1) realize that objects and events in the world generally follow a certain pattern or order governed by the laws of nature (or physics); (2) realize that the observed object or event in some way “violates” or “contradicts” the normal order of things in the world; and (3) hold a belief in some form of supernatural or alternative form of causality that extends beyond those that govern the natural world. An important point is that the belief need not be conscious for thinking to be labeled “magi- cal.” In fact, some researchers, such as Subbotsky (2000a,b,c), argue that magical thinking in most cases is not under conscious control. Our definition of magical thinking removes the pejorative aspect of many past views of this behavior and provides a clearer demarcation between magical thinking and other forms of thought. We explore particular links to other forms of cognition in later sections of the chapter.
Relation Between Magical Thinking and
Magical Belief
Earlier we suggested that part of the require- ments for characterizing thought as magical was an accompanying belief in the idea that some sort of
An essential aspect of Piaget’s notions of partici- pation is the idea that children hold a belief that the participatory relation is causal. A number of other researchers have also cited the importance of belief in some sort of underlying causality. For example, Pronin and colleagues have suggested that magi- cal thinking is the “belief in the ability to influence events at a distance with no known physical expla- nation” (Pronin, Wegner, McCarthy, & Rodriguez, 2006, p. 218). This view is very similar to Piaget’s fi rst form of participation. We suggest that belief in the efficacy of a nontypical causal link is central to classifying a thought as magical. But it does not go far enough. Rather, we argue that it is a particular type of belief, a belief in the existence of alterna- tive forms of causality operating in the world, which works to bring about events that violate the normal causal order of the world. This belief constraint on the definition removes from the magical thinking category most instances of decision making based on emotion, or “reasoning without knowledge of, or on the basis of some sort of misconception about causality, or about natural laws more generally” (Woolley, 1997, p. 991). Rather, as Woolley con- tinues, we need to consider “... belief in an entity or process that is unsupported by what we gener- ally consider to be the principles of nature... Thus one might think of these phenomena as violating, or at least being inconsistent with our na ï ve theories of the world” (p. 991). Here the notion of “belief ” goes beyond the idea that the two random events are connected causally and extends to a particular type of “belief ” in alternative forms of causality.
Nemeroff and Rozin’s View of
Magical Thinking
Belief is also central to the definition of magical thinking provided by Nemeroff and Rozin (2000), who have presented one of the more detailed defini- tions of magical thinking to date. They suggest that magical thinking should be viewed as “.... the cog- nitive intuition or belief in the existence of imper- ceptible forces or essences that transcend the usual boundary between the mental/symbolic and physi- cal/material realities, in a way [that] (1) diverges from the received wisdom of the technocratic elite, (2) serves important functions, and (3) follows the principles of similarity and contagion” (p. 5). Although we find many aspects of this definition compelling, we feel that not all cases of magical thinking necessarily serve a clear function for the individual, nor do they always involve principles of similarity and contagion. For example, we suggest
46 Magical Thinking
similarity
Th e law of similarity specifies that objects that resemble one another share certain fundamental properties that are sufficient to link the objects causally. This causal link is thought to take the form of an underlying essence that gives rise to the over- all similarity of the two entities. With the law of similarity, appearance equates reality in a proximal/ distal relationship with deep roots in humans’ past. Evaluating each plant for poisonous content is far more dangerous than classifying all plants as poi- sonous that resemble one known to be dangerous. Th is is not to relegate and overgeneralize the law of similarity as an ancient heuristic, as we shall see, but instead to identify it as a useful magical law for establishing causal inferences that has deep evolu- tionary roots.
contagion
The law of contagion also involves the notion of an underlying essence, but this law concerns the transfer of physical, moral, or behavioral proper- ties from source to recipient through some form of contact, direct or indirect (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1992, 2000; Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986). It is this law that is thought to influence one’s reluctance to don the sweater previously owned by some despised, diseased, or mentally ill individual. This law also is thought to operate indirectly, as in the case of action performed on a voodoo doll. Here the action is believed to be magically trans- ferred from source to recipient. However, the law of contagion is slightly more complex in that phys- ical contact between the source and recipient also establishes a continual link or contract between the two through which further essence can be transmitted. In addition, contagious contact may be made through intermediary and even twice-removed objects, such as a pair of gloves instead of direct essence transmission between source and recipient. Th is transmission is more commonly exemplified by the aversion of Westerners to wearing second-hand clothing from stores, despite more attractive prices than found in first-hand stores (Rozin, Markwith, & McCauley, 1994). Here, the aversion to essence manifests in a quantifiable price gap. This aversion remains, even after thorough washing or steriliza- tion of the “offending” garment or object. Together, the laws of sympathetic magic form a highly intui- tive concept that can permeate even pronounced and thorough scientific training (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1992).
alternative form of causality was possible. By alter- native form of causality we mean one that is not part of accepted scientific explanations and one that is generally not used to describe everyday phenom- ena in the world. Zusne and Jones (1989, p. 229) suggest that beliefs are cognitions that refer to what an individual regards as true or false, and the beliefs serve to help the individual make sense of the world around him or her. That is, these beliefs guide inter- pretations and help remove ambiguity. One’s beliefs can often be viewed negatively as irrational or illogi- cal because they are personal, and generally oper- ate without any type of external validation (Zusne & Jones, 1989). Although beliefs can be explicit in nature, as in a stated “belief in God,” many beliefs, especially magical ones, are intuitive and implicit (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994). It is these intuitive magical beliefs, such as those that operate with the laws of contagion and similarity that we suggest are at the core of magical thinking and are discussed in the next section.
Magical Thinking in Everyday Life
To what extent is magical thinking present in the everyday life of children and adults? In this section, we present a brief overview of sympa- thetic magic, one form of magical thinking that is thought to be ubiquitous in the thought of both children and adults. We also discuss the role of this form of magical thinking to everyday life. In particular, we examine how it influences feelings of disgust in American culture and general eating preferences.
Sympathetic Magic: Similarity and the
Contagion Concept in Magical Thinking
Sympathetic magic is comprised of the laws of similarity, opposites, and contagion, with the sec- ond considered a subset of the first (Frazer, 1911; Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000). Importantly, these laws continue to operate and influence one another throughout the life span, regardless of scientific training that should eliminate some of their most salient and tangible effects. Similarity and contagion are central to the magical beliefs of various diver- gent cultures and ethnic groups and are considered the basis for universal primitive human thought. Th at is, these forms of magical thinking have been hypothesized to provide useful heuristics that guide individuals’ behaviors in ways that promote the evo- lutionary value for survival (Boden & Berenbaum, 2004; Frazer, 1911; Mauss, 1972; see Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994, for cultural details).
48 Magical Thinking
as children’s cognitive structures matured in inter- action with experiences via the processes of assimi- lation, accommodation, and equilibration. In this replacement model, children’s thinking was trans- formed in a stagelike fashion. With each major developmental step magical thinking is driven far- ther and farther out of the child’s mind until she reaches the rational, logical level of adults. This accomplishment was thought to occur sometime around age 12 with the onset of formal operational thinking (Piaget, 1929). Piaget also referred to a different type of magi- cal thinking, mainly culturally supported magi- cal beliefs. These include beliefs in entities such as Santa Claus, the Tooth Fairy, witches, ghosts, and goblins (see chapter 5). Because much of his focus was on uncovering universals in cognitive develop- ment, he was much less interested in these beliefs, which he viewed as culturally dependent. For this reason he did not devote any time explicitly exam- ining children’s beliefs in these magical entities.
the secular hypothesis
In many ways, Piaget’s theory captures at the individual level what the secular hypothesis cap- tures at the level of culture. Specifically, one of the main ideas behind the secular hypothesis (Norris & Inglehart, 2004) is that as cultures become more scientifically and technologically advanced, scien- tifi c thought and rationality eventually drive out and replace all magical or illogical thought. Indeed, much of the early research on superstitious beliefs and behaviors was conducted under the assumption that these beliefs were caused by failures in educa- tion. With expanded access and training in science and mathematics education, it was thought that these beliefs and behaviors would fade from exis- tence (Zusne & Jones, 1989, p. 231). There does appear to be some evidence supporting the notion that traditional superstitious beliefs have decreased over the years (Zusne & Jones, 1989). That is, fewer people today seem to believe in the efficacy of lucky numbers, rubbing a rabbit’s foot, or the dangers of a black cat crossing one’s path. At the same time as this decrease, however, they suggest that there has been a complementary increase in more cog- nitively complex beliefs (Zusne & Jones, 1989). Th ese more complex beliefs, such as those in extra- sensory perception (ESP) or auras, often have the illusion of scientific support, or individuals hold- ing such beliefs have the expectation that science will eventually provide either a natural (e.g., more evolved minds in the case of ESP) or supernatural
these fi ndings suggest is that physical sources tend to follow the contagion model, whereas interpersonal sources of contagion tended to invoke reactions more in accordance with the law of similarity. Also, responses indicated that individuals act as if there is a personal–soul–essence concept. The research- ers suggest that physical-substance contagion effects that remain after cleansing may be symbolic in part. Th is symbolic aspect of contagion, in which a word or idea carries the “essence,” also suggests that the boundary between physical and interpersonal con- tagion may not be clear-cut, and these two forms of contagion may both operate across different domains. Clearly, contagion continues to operate in our thinking even in the modern world because of its survival value in some instances. Implicit models of this can be found in studies of disgust. Rozin et al. (1986, 1989) have extensively explored contagion in the interpersonal domain among college stu- dents. They found that evidence of magical thinking remains despite high levels of education and scien- tific training. Th ese results provide further evidence that magical thinking does not stem from irrational or uneducated individuals. Rather, it suggests that implicit models of contagion appear to be a common aspect of cognition even in highly educated, scien- tifically trained adults. It should also be noted that germ theory, a scientifically valid notion of illness contagion, could be classified as an example of an explicit exemplification of interpersonal-contagion, lending further support to the idea that magical contagion may have both evolutionary roots and improve one’s chances for survival.
Th e Development of Magical Thinking
How does magical thinking develop? Where does it come from? Is it a universal aspect of human behavior? Obviously the answers to these questions depend on one’s definition of magical thinking. We begin this section with some of the traditional per- spectives on the development of magical thinking and then provide our own account that attempts to integrate ideas from diverse aspects of development and culture describe of the origins and development of magical thinking.
Piaget’s View of the Development of
Magical Thinking
Piaget viewed magical thinking as a univer- sal aspect of young children’s cognition. For him, children’s early magical thinking was gradually replaced with more logical, even scientific thinking
Rosengren, French 49
indicating that magical thinking never is completely driven out of the human mind. This conclusion is supported by many adult’s justification expressing credulity regarding the existence of magical processes in the world following experimental manipulation. Subbotsky’s view on magical thinking and its development is shared to a large extent by Woolley and her colleagues (Woolley, 1997; Woolley, Browne, & Boerger, 2006), who suggest that magi- cal thinking remains abundant in today’s culture in the minds of both children and adults. She and her colleagues have argued that certain factors influ- ence the dominance of both magical thoughts and beliefs, including the particular context and social cost of either believing or not believing. They have also found that children with a greater fantasy ori- entation are more likely to adopt a belief in a novel fantasy entity (the Candy Witch; Woolly, Boerger, & Markman, 2004). One implication of these results is that both context, especially the current social situation, and particular individual differences, may infl uence the occurrence of different forms of magi- cal thinking. Thus, one should perhaps not think of magical thinking as a general orientation toward the world, as Piaget thought, but as a type of thought that varies in likelihood as a function of age, as well as individual and situational factors.
An Integrated Account of the Development
of Magical Thinking
Our own view is that magical thinking arises out of a number of universal cognitive processes. This view is not all that different than Zusne and Jones’ (1989, p. 250) view that magical thinking stems from the nature of the human cognitive architec- ture and thus is a universal cognitive process. In par- ticular, they have suggested that magical thinking arises from the misattribution of causal factors to a particular event when in fact the attributed causes play no role in the actual event. They also think that magical thinking stems from a universal cognitive process that involves what they refer to as the “reifi- cation of the subjective.” This idea is tied historically to notions of magic that place a large emphasis on symbolic thought. The notion is that the ability to experience subjective experiences arises from sym- bolic thought, which in turn enables an individual to think of oneself as separate and distinct from the world. It is this separate sense of self that is thought to open up the realm of reality to extend the self out into the world in dreams, spirits, or transformed bodies. Zusne and Jones suggest that magical think- ing involves endowing the subjective self with the
explanation (e.g., find that ghosts really do exist). At present, the data seem to suggest that magical and even irrational thought seem to be quite resistant to replacement or extinction. Magic does not seem to be something relegated to our or others “primitive” past or thought, but appears to be relatively ubiqui- tous in all historical periods, cultural settings, and even modern society (Luhrman, 1989; Sorenson, 2007). In our view this provides further evidence in support of the idea that aspects of magical think- ing operate as unconscious biases that are universal aspects of human cognition.
Subbotsky’s Coexistence View of the
Development of Magical Thinking
A more recent account of the development of magical thinking is that of Subbotsky (2010). His starting point is a Piagetian view of magical think- ing, defi ned as involving sympathetic magic and notions of participation. However, rather than sug- gesting that magical thinking is replaced by scientific thought, Subbotsky argues strongly that magical thinking is merely driven underground by social and cultural pressures that place a greater value on science, logic, and rational thought. Specifically, he suggests that in late childhood, magical thinking becomes suppressed but never extinguished. In a series of clever experiments Subbotsky shows that both children and adults, given the right context or situation, can be shown to act as if they believe magic is real. For example, in a number of studies, Subbotsky (1994, 1996, 1997) primed his participants with either a story or an example of magical events, produced a seemingly impossible outcome, and then placed the participants in a situ- ation in which they could exhibit behavior indica- tive of magical beliefs. In one such study, Subbotsky presented children with a story about a magical box that could cut a postage stamp in half when a par- ticular magic word was uttered. He then showed the children an actual box and told them it was the box in the story. He then left the room and observed surreptitiously whether children would utter the magic word. Many six- to nine-year-olds did exactly that in an attempt to test the magic of the box. In later studies Subbotsky found that both chil- dren and adults were generally unwilling to place a valued object in the box after being shown that it could “magically” destroy objects when a magic word was uttered. This behavior, the reluctance to utter a magic word or allow the experimenter to place a valued object (one’s driver’s license) into the “magical box,” has been interpreted by Subbotsky as
Rosengren, French 51
be convinced that a machine can physically shrink objects or even an entire room (DeLoache, Miller, & Rosengren, 1997). The work by Rosengren and Hickling (2000) suggests that as children gain more knowledge about the physical world they begin to distinguish particular events that violate their expec- tations of how things normally function. Parents, teachers, or other adults often label these events as “magic,” leading to the emergence of a special cate- gory of “magic” somewhere around the age of three. Support for magic by parents and the larger culture coupled with increasing developments in the realm of the imagination help this magical category grow and become more well defined. For this reason, there appears to be a peak in the magical beliefs of children between the ages of three and six. Even in children of this age range, however, magical think- ing is neither ubiquitous nor the dominant form of cognitive interaction with the world, as Piaget had thought. Rather, research suggests that in most situ- ations children’s default form of reasoning is based on natural and physical causality that conforms to what is normally considered possible and typical in the world. It is only when children’s everyday causal expectations are violated or cultural support is pro- vided, that magical thinking prevails (Rosengren & Hickling, 1994, 2000). For most children in the mainstream cul- ture of the United States, belief in magic changes into the understanding that what appears to be magic is brought about by tricks and deception (Rosengren & Hickling, 2000; Woolley, 1994). But as both Subbotsky and Woolley suggest, magical thinking does not appear to be extinguished, even if magical entities such as magicians, Santa Claus, and the Tooth Fairy are demoted from the realm of reality to the realm of pretense and the imagi- nation. Rather, the magical principles of similarity and contagion coupled with the search for cau- sality (even when there is no causal link) and the tendency to essentialize maintain a certain level of magical thinking in older children and adults. We suggest that this later type of magical thinking is present throughout the life span, lurking under the surface in even the most rational of minds. Magical thinking can be brought back to the surface in a variety of different ways (Subbotsky, 2010).
Magical Thinking and Its Relation to Other
Cognitive Processes
In this section we explore how magical thinking relates to other forms of cognition, including pre- tense and the imagination. We also briefly explore
or feelings to nonbiological or psychological entities we shouldn’t label them as thinking magically. To gain the label of magical thinking, children must know something about the physical, biological, and psychological worlds and treat events as somehow transcending the rules of normal physics, psychol- ogy, or biology. With age and experience, children acquire greater knowledge of the physical, natural, and psy- chological worlds and become keenly aware of per- ceived violations. Th ese violations may arise at the boundaries—where misattributing animacy may have some survival value (Guthrie, 1993), from the interaction of the processes discussed in the preced- ing section (causality, essentialism), or from the observation of strange (an insect that looks like a stick) or wonderful (a rainbow) events that appear to defy everyday reasoning.
cultural support for magical thinking
An additional process involved in the develop- ment and maintenance of magical thinking involves cultural support for an alternative belief system that transcends everyday reasoning in the foundational domains. For children growing up in the dominant culture in the United States, cultural support for a variety of magical beliefs is quite common. Parents actively support beliefs in magic and magical entities (Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Rosengren, Hickling, Kalish, & Gelman, 1994), and young preschool children appear surprisingly open to the acquisition of new magical characters, such as the Candy Witch (Woolley, Boerger, & Markman, 2004). Research by Rosengren et al. (Rosengren & Hickling, 1994; Rosengren et al., 1994) has shown that in the United States, middle class parents tend to actively support beliefs in magic in children younger than five. Once children enter formal schooling, the family and cul- tural support for magic declines and parents either turn back the child’s questions regarding magic (e.g., “What do you think, is magic real?” Rosengren & Hickling, 2000) or begin to actively deny the exis- tence of magic in the real world (e.g., “There is no such thing as real magic, it’s just a trick.”). Th e period of greatest cultural support for magi- cal beliefs, ages three to five or six in the United States, occurs at the same time children are acquir- ing a lot of new information about the world. Before age three, children often lack the knowledge of what is and is not possible in the real world. This is one reason why professional magicians generally do not like to perform in front of children under the age of three and why children under the age of the three can
52 Magical Thinking
Subbotsky (2010) suggests that “ancient forms of the magical thinking live on in dreams and imagi- nation,” and he suggests that magical thinking plays a central role in the creativity that is pres- ent in literature, the arts, and movies. Indeed, he views magical thinking as opening up the realm of what is possible, and by doing so magical thinking serves to stimulate and foster creativity. Recently, he tested this idea by presenting children with scenes of magic from movies and examining whether chil- dren exposed to magical ideas in movies express greater creativity than children who observed non- magical scenes from the same movies. This research appears to support the idea that magical thinking may serve to increase creativity, but more research is needed in this area. At issue here is whether it is actually magical thinking that stimulates creativity or whether it is imagination involving some magical elements that actually fosters creativity. The general idea is that considering alternative forms of causal- ity may enable individuals to broaden the perspec- tive and hence respond on a given task in a more creative manner.
Magical Thinking and Religion
Many psychologists and anthropologists include religious thoughts and beliefs in the realm of magi- cal thinking (see chapter 3). Indeed, a wide range of scholars has examined the relation between magic and religion across a variety of disciplines (i.e., Boyer, 1994; Kieckhefer, 1989; Neusner, Ferichs, & Flesner, 1989; Sorensen, 2007). Clearly, belief in the existence of God, angels, and miracles fi ts the definition of magical think- ing outlined in a previous section. Neusner et al. point out that the term magic, as used in the context of religion, is often meant in a pejorative sense, in which it is used to label the religious leaders of some other group “magicians.” Similarly, many psycholo- gists and scientists more generally treat religion as a form of magical thinking, suggesting that to embrace religious beliefs is irrational, illogical, and nonscientific. Here we briefly review a number of different views on the relation between magic and religion.
similarities between religious and
magical thinking
Boyer and Walker (2000) have suggested that magic and religion share similar fundamental ontol- ogies. Th ey suggest that these two forms of think- ing may start out as one single form. With age and experience, undifferentiated magical beliefs separate
the role of magical thinking in creativity. We then examine possible links between magical thinking and religious thought. Finally, we explore possible links between magical thinking in adulthood to superstitious beliefs and psychopathology.
Magic, Pretense, and the Imagination
How does magical thinking relate to pretense and the imagination? There are a number of simi- larities between these different cognitive processes. In particular, each of these processes tends to open up the realm of what is possible. In magical think- ing, impossible causal connections or mechanisms are thought to be possible. In pretense, one object is symbolically transformed into another. In the imagination, reality may be extended in a myriad of ways beyond the physical, biological, or psycho- logical world. Each of these processes appears to emerge in the minds of children around the same time, although pretense and imagination may pre- date the emergence of a clear conceptualization of magic. Each of these processes also likely stems from some of the other cognitive processes discussed ear- lier, as well as alongside the emergence of symbolic thought (see chapter 12). We suggest that these different cognitive processes serve to mutually support and enhance one another. For most children, the boundaries between the real and pretend or the real and imagined are well defined. For example, by age two, children appear to be able to distinguish a pretend entity from a real one (Leslie, 1987). By age three, there is evidence that children can distinguish real from imagined (Wellman & Estes, 1986). Leslie has suggested that children serve to cordon off pretense from reality, enabling them to reason about the pretend and real world separately with few misattributions from pretense into reality. It appears that the same occurs in the realms of the imagination and magic. That is, children appear to cordon off magical events from typical ones, just as they appear to cordon off pretense from reality, and the imagined from the real. What is different from magical thinking is that for children between the ages of about three and six (in the United States and likely in some other cultures), magical causes are a part of reality (although they are not typical). That is, with magic, certain events are treated as distinct, separate, or special, and are included in the realm of what it possible, just not what is typical.
Magical Thinking and Creativity
Throughout the life span it is likely that magical thinking serves to foster imagination and creativity.
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provide a general feeling of control in chaotic or unpredictable situations (Keinan, 2002; Schippers & Van Lange, 2006; Womack, 1992). Subbotsky (personal communication) has argued that these same conditions foster magical thinking more gen- erally. There is some indication that in particular task situations, superstitious behavior may actually benefi t performance. For example, Buhrman and Zaugg (1981) found that in competitive basket- ball, the teams that perform the best exhibit more superstitious behaviors than less competitive teams. Likewise, superior players on those superior teams also exhibit greater superstitious behaviors than their teammates. Although routine, ritual move- ments before performance does appear to improve overall levels of motor performance in tasks such as a basketball free throw (Lobmeyer & Wasserman, 1986), superstitious behaviors are thought to pro- vide added benefits through their magical connec- tion (Damisch, Stoberock, & Mussweiler, 2010). Damisch et al. have shown that activation of superstitions related to luck (e.g., providing some- one with a “lucky” golf ball or having a personal good luck charm present) improves success at a put- ting task, a motor dexterity task, and a memory task. Th ese researchers suggest that superstitious behav- iors lead to an increase in perceived self-efficacy, which in turn leads to greater persistence in the task. Although these results are intriguing, this research was generally conducted with individu- als who hold relatively strong superstitious beliefs. For individuals who profess not to be superstitious, activation of these types of beliefs might serve to decrease the overall levels of performance. This sug- gests that examining the role of implicit and explicit superstitious beliefs might be an interesting area of further investigation. It also suggests that it might be interesting to determine whether magical think- ing in general leads to performance benefits in situ- ations in which magical thinking might enhance the perception of control.
Magical Thinking and Peculiar Beliefs
Magical thinking and superstition have also been linked with peculiar thoughts and beliefs in adults more generally (Berenbaum, Boden, & Baker, 2009; Boden & Berenbaum, 2004). Peculiar beliefs have been defined as those beliefs that the established scientific community do not view to be veridical (Berenbaum, Kerns, & Raghavan, 2000). Generally, paranormal beliefs fit within this category. As with many beliefs, a spectrum of intensity exists. In one form, peculiar beliefs can result in
Superstitious behavior can be readily observed in many situations. For example, in many athletic events, especially those in which highly skilled per- formance can be viewed as only slightly better than chance, athletes engage in a variety of superstitious behaviors (Vyse, 1997). Often athletes will only wear certain clothes on a game day, refuse to wash certain items of clothing during a particular streak of good performance, or perform rituals before a game or particular event within a game. All of these behaviors are done with the notion that they might potentially influence the outcome. Each of these behaviors involves a number of characteristics we have described with respect to magical thinking. First, they often involve aspects of similarity and contagion. Either individuals perform a ritual that in some way connects them to a higher power (e.g., a batter performing the sign of the cross before step- ping up to the plate in a baseball game) or they pre- serve the “essence” of their recent good performance by refusing to wash a particular garment until the winning streak is broken. These behaviors also per- petuate the belief that some alternative form of cau- sality might influence the outcome of the event. Superstitious reasoning is not reserved for sport- ing events, but appears to be quite common in the everyday lives of children and adults. Children may avoid cracks on the sidewalks for fear of influencing their mother’s health, avoid black cats because they might bring bad luck, or carry lucky charms to help them in particular situations. Many of these behav- iors share an important aspect of cultural transmis- sion that we suggest is a key process in the emergence of magical thinking more generally. But other super- stitious behaviors seem highly idiosyncratic (Vyse, 1997), suggesting that many of these behaviors and practices stem from the unconscious cognitive pro- cesses involved in magical thinking more generally. For example, we recently encountered a student who insisted on taking every exam with a particular pen that he used to take notes in class and he used as he studied for the exam. It was as if the pen carried the essence of the information from learning and studying into the exam. Idiosyncratic superstitions are also likely to occur when incomplete meanings of rituals are passed down from parents and adults within a culture to children. Researchers have also shown that individuals engage in superstitious behaviors under conditions of high stress and/or uncertainty and low levels of perceived control (Keinan, 1994; Malinowski, 1954; Whitson, & Gallinsky, 2008). Superstitions are thought to regulate stress and uncertainty and
Rosengren, French 55
ESP, have been linked to a variety of forms of psy- chopathology (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). For example, magical thinking in the form of thought–action fusion has been related to anxi- ety disorders and obsessive–compulsive disorders (Berle & Starcevic, 2005; Muris, Meesters, Rassin, Merckelbach, & Campbell, 2001). Thought– action fusion is a cognitive distortion that results in the belief that certain negative events are brought about by intrusive thoughts (Rachman & Shafran, 1999). These researchers report on one young woman who was afraid that her unwanted thoughts about her parents dying could cause a car accident through magical “vibes” (p. 82). Other researchers have found that individuals with an excessive focus on weight and body shape sometimes hold simi- lar magical beliefs about food (Garner & Bemis, 1992). Magical thinking has also been associated with schizophrenia (Claridge & Broks, 1984; Hewitt & Claridge, 1989; Lee, Cougle, & Telch, 2005). Claridge and Broks (1984) found magical thinking to be one of three primary factors resulting from a factor analysis of the Schizotypal Personality Scale along with factors related to paranoid ideation and unusual perceptual experiences. Similar results have been found by other researchers looking at adults (Joseph & Peters, 1995; Wolfradt & Straube, 1998), although some researchers have identified additional factors (Rawlings, Claridge, & Freeman, 2001). Th e majority of research examining magical thinking and psychopathology has been conducted with adults. One of the few studies to examine this relationship in children and adolescents was conducted by Bolton, Dearsley, Madronal-Luque, and Baron-Cohen (2002). Th ey used the a Magical Th inking Questionnaire adapted from an earlier questionnaire designed to assess thought–action fusion (Muris, Meesters, Rassin, Merckelbach, & Campbell, 2001) and found that in children and adolescents’ obsessive–compulsive thoughts and actions were associated with magical thinking. Th ese researchers found that this relation did not change from childhood to adolescence, suggesting that there may be continuity from childhood to adulthood in magical thinking, at least in popula- tions diagnosed with a psychological disorder. Clearly, the research indicates that certain forms of psychopathology appear to involve magical thinking to some extent. However, this conclusion must be tempered a bit, as magical thinking is often part of the diagnostic criteria for determining the existence of a particular disorder. In addition, the
paranormal beliefs, such as belief in ghosts, the exis- tence of extra terrestrials, alien abductions, and ESP. Like magical thinking, these beliefs are not con- sistent with current empirical observations in the world—and are thought to be unscientific. However, although some of these beliefs and thoughts can be viewed as magical, in our view others do not meet the criteria for magical thinking. That is, we sug- gest that certain paranormal beliefs typically asso- ciated with parapsychology, such as psychokinesis and ESP, are substantially different from magical beliefs in that individuals who hold these particular beliefs often think that these phenomena do exist in the natural world, and believe that they can be explained by some natural explanation. For exam- ple, believers in the notion that individuals can move or alter objects with their minds (psychoki- nesis) or read others’ thoughts (ESP) often suggest that these behaviors stem from a highly evolved mind, rather than some supernatural form of cau- sality. Interestingly, psychologists are the least likely to advocate the reality of these extraordinary pow- ers (Zusne & Jones, 1989), and tend to treat them in a pejorative fashion. Likewise, many individuals who advocate the existence of aliens or report alien abductions do not treat these events as supernatural, but within the realm of possibility based on the idea that because humans evolved on this planet, other beings might have evolved in a different form on other distant planets. Th e notion that scientific investigation could one day show that individuals have greater mental powers than has been assumed or that aliens exist extend the normal views of mental and biological processes, but they do not necessarily embrace the same type of belief in an alternative form of causality that we suggest is at the heart of magical thinking. Indeed, although the majority of evidence does not support the existence of either psi (anomalous pro- cesses of information or energy transfer) or aliens, researchers continue to use the scientific method to investigate their possible existence in psychol- ogy (Bem & Honorton, 1994) and in the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) project in astronomy (Tarter, 2001).
Magical Thinking and Psychopathology
In more extreme forms, magical and peculiar beliefs may be labeled as delusional (Berenbaum,
- and have been linked to various forms of pathology (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983). But even in less extreme forms, these beliefs, including belief in such things as ghosts, good luck charms, and
AQ: Th ere is a mismatch in the reference” Garner & Bemis, 1982”. Th e date is 1992 in the citation where as in the list it is 1982. Kindly check.
Rosengren, French 57
potential benefits to thinking magically? Like the magical thought involved in superstition, does mag- ical thinking sometimes enhance performance? And are there individuals or situations in which thinking magically leads to decreases in performance? Does too much stimulation of magical thinking lead to strange beliefs that negatively affect one’s ability to function in the real world?
Further Readings
Hood , B. M. ( 2009 ). Supersense: Why we believe in the unbeliev- able. New York : HarperCollins. Rosengren, K. S., Johnson, C. N., & Harris, P. L. (2000). Imagining the impossible: Magical, scientific, and religious thinking in chil- dren. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Subbotsky, E. ( 2010 ). The magic of today: Mechanisms, functions and development of magical thinking and behavior. Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press. Vyse , S. A. ( 1997 ). Believing in magic. The psychology of supersti- tion. New York : Oxford University Press.
References
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to agree on how magical thinking should be defined. As we have suggested, magic as a pejorative label for individuals who think “differently” should be avoided and the belief in some form of alternative form of causality outside the domain of scientific inquiry should be central to this definition. We hope our definition of magical thinking prevails because it removes the pejorative aspect of the magical label and more clearly defines what should or should not be characterized as magical. Our definition also serves to redefi ne magic as situated in the particu- lar beliefs of a culture. As more and more research shows that cognition is highly influenced by culture (e.g., Nisbett, 2003) it is even more important to clarify the definition of magical thinking. Clearly, culture infl uences the beliefs that are considered to be natural and supernatural. Thus, what may be magical thought in one culture may not in fact be magical in another. Being sensitive to cultural differences, rather than labeling these dif- ferences as magical in the pejorative sense, will help us to understand more clearly how and when magi- cal thinking might aid or hinder performance in a given task or situation. Thus, an additional direction for future work would be to explore cultural varia- tion in magical thinking. We suggest that it would be fruitful to reopen this area of research with a goal of understanding how culture shapes cognition in important ways and explicitly explore the social transmission of aspects of magical thinking. Another interesting direction for future research would be to explore the relation between magical and other forms of thinking. In particular, magical and scientific thinking are often thought of as incom- patible. Recent research suggests that different types of explanation (magical, religious, scientific) can be used to reason about the same phenomena (Evans, Legare, & Rosengren, 2011). This use of multiple explanations appears to be evident in the think- ing about illness (Legare & Gelman, 2008), the origins of life (Evans, 2000), and death (Harris & Giménez, 2005; Rosengren, Miller, Gutierrez, Chow, Schein, & Anderson, in preparation). What is not at all clear is how children and adults choose a particular form of explanation in a given situation, and under what conditions these different types of explanations are combined to form some kind of blended or synthetic explanation. Finally, the role of magical thinking in support- ing creativity and imagination should be investi- gated more fully. Does thinking magically enable individuals to be more creative? If so, what best ways to stimulate this connection? Are there other
AQ: Please note that the citation for reference Boyer, P., & Bergstrom, B. (2008) is missing.
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