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Medium, Subject Matter And Representation
John Dilworth [ Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):45-62 (2003)] I argue that the physical marks on a canvas resulting from an artist's intentional, stylistic and expressive acts cannot themselves be the artist's expression, but instead they serve to signify or indicate those acts. Thus there is a kind of indicative content associated with a picture that is distinct from its subject matter (or 'representational content'). I also argue that this kind of indicative content is closely associated with the specific artistic medium chosen by the artist as her expressive medium, for which reason I call this kind of content medium content (or medium-related content). I further argue that medium content is distinguished from subject matter by the differing functional roles that each plays in a picture. Medium content, broadly speaking, expresses an artist's interpretation of , or commentary on , the subject matter of the picture, while correspondingly the subject matter or 'subject content' functions as that which is interpreted or commented on by the medium content. As for the nature and identity of a picture itself, I first argue that the medium content in a picture itself represents its subject matter, and then argue that a theoretical simplification is needed, in which a picture is identified with its medium content. Thus an overall interpretive theory results in which a physical artifact (such as a physical painting) indicates the picture itself (which picture is an organized collection of medium content), which in turn interpretively represents its subject matter. It is a truism about art that each art form, or art medium, provides a characteristic language, or set of methods and procedures, which artists may use to express themselves or their ideas about certain topics or subject matters. But exactly how is an art medium related to the ideas, etc. which it may be used to express about some subject matter? Clearly, representational artworks 1 such as pictures are typically created through use of some recognizable traditional art medium, including painting, drawing, film, literature or dance, and each medium is associated with its own characteristic kinds of expressive
possibilities and artistic meaning. But the nature of a medium itself, as thus used to represent some subject matter in characteristic, medium specific ways, is little understood, beyond our general assent to the opening truism. 2 Also little understood are the ways in which the intentions, 3 expressions and styles of individual artists are somehow associated with, or present in (or exhibited or expressed by), their individual works of art--as distinguishable from, yet nevertheless integrally connected with, the subject matters of those representational works. I shall try to mutually illuminate these obscure topics--of the nature of a medium when used representationally, and the nature of expressive, stylistic and intentional aspects of representational art--by arguing that one central strand in the concept of a medium is of a distinctive kind of meaningful content associated with an artwork, that is distinct from its subject matter or representational content, and which content is also the locus for a work's expressive, stylistic and intentional aspects. Thus in broader terms I shall be attempting to distinguish two different kinds of meaning or content associated with representational artworks: first, their referential meaning, concerning their subject matter or representational content (or what the work is about )-- which meaning or content is relatively well understood already 4 --and secondly their medium specific meaning or content, which I shall describe as medium content (or medium-related content).
photographs in turn will have their own characteristic differences). But in what do these characteristic differences consist? An initial reply might be that each work represents the same subject matter or scene, but that each does so using characteristically different physical materials --paint in the case of a painting, charcoal or graphite in a drawing, and typically (colored or uncolored) silver compounds and gelatin in the case of the (black and white or color) photographs. But at best this account is incomplete, in that arguably an artistic medium cannot adequately be characterized merely in terms of the physical materials used by artists in the medium. For example, for much of the history of photography a 'photograph' consisted of a paper backing rendered light-sensitive by a layer of silver salts and gelatin on its surface, which, after exposure to light (and subsequent development and fixing) would be chemically changed into other more light-resistant silver compounds. However, increasingly photographers are now using quite different methods and materials to achieve original artistic photographs, including digital, filmless cameras (or digital scanning of negatives produced from traditional cameras), and direct printing onto a substrate using jets of ink in place of the familiar traditional darkroom technology. Yet the result of such a process is now generally regarded as being just as much a photograph (that is, a work produced squarely within the medium of photography) as is any more traditionally produced photograph. 7
More broadly, the general availability of computer technology, along with specialized software and appropriate printing methods, means that virtually any artistic effects associated with traditional media, from drawings, watercolor or pastel to the appearances of prominent brush or palette knife strokes in heavy paint impasto, can be produced by use of such computer-based methods—which thus could collectively be thought of as providing the material basis for a new kind of general-purpose visual art medium, by means of which the artistic effects of any traditional medium can readily be obtained. However, some caution is required in interpreting this result. Skeptics are likely to object that it merely shows that it is now possible to simulate (or copy, or reproduce) artworks executed in traditional media--or to simulate the effects of traditional media--using computer technology, so that the result does not immediately demonstrate that such works could be genuine instances of works executed in traditional media, rather than merely being copies or simulations of such works (or of effects associated with such works). In reply, at least in the case of digitally produced photographs their status as genuine photographs seems to be already secure, in that they are no longer regarded as merely providing an inexpensive means of reproducing other more traditional photographs (though of course either variety of photograph could be used for merely reproductive purposes).
To sum up the discussion so far, particular media have at least initially been distinguished from the physical materials and properties associated with them, so that the initial ‘presumption of physicality’ for media has been weakened: it is now at least a logical possibility , in that it is no longer logically ruled out , that an art medium might be closely associated with some kind of characteristic, non-physical meaningful content. I turn next to more specific arguments in favor of such a possibility.
2. A 'Meaning Non-Transmission' Argument
In this Section I shall develop a 'meaning non-transmission ' argument, to the effect that artists cannot directly transmit meaning to their artworks, and therefore must do so indirectly instead. To begin, the only means available for an artist to expressively carry out her artistic intentions, using her own unique style, is through the physical manipulation, in various appropriate ways, of some specific artistic materials associated with her chosen medium. Thus any artistic meaning^8 that an artist wishes to be associated with her artwork must somehow be initially embodied by the artist in her actions or activities of working with those materials in producing her artwork. Second, those physical artistic actions are logically distinct from the resultant causal effects of those actions upon the developing artwork itself,^9 just as any physical group of causes are distinct from their physical effects on other objects. Thus for instance, a
certain movement of the artist's arm, while holding a stick of charcoal in contact with a sheet of paper, would result in her depositing some charcoal in a certain configuration on the paper; but that intentional, stylistically expressive action of hers--of a specific kind of 'charcoal-deposition'--cannot be identical with the resultant charcoal configuration itself on the paper. Thus any (successful) drawing or painting activity by an artist will include (at some stage) the actual depositing of some kind of pigment on a suitable surface. Now it is easy to confuse the deposit ing of the pigment with the deposit ed pigment itself; but the artist's action or activity of deposit ing that pigment (which activity expresses her intentions and style) is all that the artist herself is able to do; the deposit ed pigment itself is no more than a trace or record of her artistic activity in so deposit ing the pigment^10 --which fact is already recognized in connection with the work of 'action painters' such as de Kooning, in that it may even be claimed that their whole works are in some sense no more than such a trace or record of their meaningful painterly actions in producing them. 11 The point being made here is a completely general one, which applies not only to drawings or paintings but also to sculptures (molded or carved), films, literary or musical manuscripts, and so on: in all cases, the artist’s actions in working on those artifacts must be distinguished from the causal results of those actions, which at best can merely provide a trace of the relevant actions.
wet, this provides a generally reliable indication that it had previously rained—one can thus acquire information about the likely causes of the current wetness results that one is observing. Similarly, in observing a finished watercolor picture, one can acquire information about the likely artistic actions that resulted in the picture having the features that it now has. Thus on this account the meaning in artworks is provided in a broadly symbolic or significatory way: artworks do not, strictly speaking, themselves literally possess meaning, but instead they symbolize or indicate or provide information about the relevant artistic actions that did literally possess the relevant kinds of meaning. Thus on this view, artistic meaning is associated with a species of symbolic or indicative content —though a kind of content (to be called ‘medium content’ , as initially mentioned) distinct from the usual referential or representational content or subject matter of an artwork But where, it might be asked, does the concept of a medium come into all of this? Here is the crucial connection: that insofar as the meaning of artworks is related to their broadly symbolic functions, the concept of a medium provides the structure and details of the language in which an artwork is able to symbolize the relevant artistic activities. Thus the medium of watercolor, or of painting, and so on provides a necessary structure of artistic conventions that enables a suitably informed viewer of an artwork in a given medium to understand, on the basis of her perceptions of the artwork, precisely which medium-specific artistic actions —and with which features--are symbolized or indicated by the work.
Otherwise put, without art media any artwork would symbolize too indefinitely -- symbolizing anything, or nothing. Artists avoid this problem by constraining themselves to work within a specific medium on a given project, so that viewers of their works can have legitimate or correct expectations and receive reliable indications from the work as to which medium-specific meaningful actions of the artist were involved in its creation. 12 As an example showing the importance of correct medium expectations, and hence the indispensability of the language provided by a specific medium in understanding artworks, consider the medium of engraving , which makes much use of cross-hatching and repeated lines to achieve its effects. Thus an engraving of a woman, as normally perceived, would typically represent the outlines of and modeling in her features by use of such linear, engraving-related methods. However, it is quite possible that someone unfamiliar with the medium of engraving might instead mistakenly see such an engraving as a picture of a woman with lines , or a variegated mesh , covering her face. 13 In such a case, what has gone wrong? An explanation can be extracted from an account of each case—of perception of the engraving with correct versus incorrect expectations-- as follows. Each case involves a different perceptual interpretation of the engraving, in the first of which it is interpreted in the normal way, such that the lines and cross- hatching are seen correctly as an 'engraving' kind of medium-related content, which in turn represents the woman's features as its subject matter.
4. Objections
It might be objected that the above account of artistic meaning has things backwards. Artists intend to produce certain artistic results , and their actions are focused on achieving such results, so that any meaning they intend to produce in the artwork is ‘ result-oriented ’ meaning or content. But on my account, the objection charges, the meaningful content of those results is instead ‘ action-oriented ’ content, in that it is a kind of symbolic or indicative content that symbolizes or indicates only the artist’s actions , rather than her intended results. 14 However, this objection fails in at least two ways. First, it fails to recognize the force of the metaphysical fact that one cannot literally endow physical resulting objects (and their non-artistic properties) with meaning of any kind, whether action-oriented or result- oriented meaning: all one can do is to cause them to be certain ways, that is, to be in a certain physical state with certain physical properties, which state and properties may then more or less reliably indicate the meaningful actions (and their features) that produced them. Thus any intuitions we may have about the nature of ‘result-oriented meaning’ must themselves be accommodated to this unavoidable metaphysical fact. The second failing of the objection is that it conflates indication of an artist’s actions with indication of certain properties of those actions—in particular, their property of expressing certain result-oriented meanings. Just because it is inevitable, metaphysically speaking, that artworks can only indicate actions (and their properties) rather than results,
it does not follow that therefore they can indicate only ‘action-oriented’ content in so doing. For, as with any indication or representation, resultant art objects can indicate both concrete entities or events —such as the artistic actions that caused them—and also properties of those concrete events, such as their property of expressing certain result- oriented meanings. Thus artworks can acquire ‘indicative content’ that indicates, or is indicative of, both artistic actions and their properties of expressing intentional, expressive and stylistic kinds of result-oriented meaning.^15 Thus the indicated, meaning-related properties are complex —such as a property of expressing a certain intention —rather than simple, such as an indication of ‘an intention’ simpliciter. This feature is needed (among other things) to satisfy the intuitive requirement that artworks can, via their indicative powers, express intentions (just as do actions) instead of merely ‘having’ intentions. However, an objector might try to reply to the above account with a kind of ‘excessive complexity’ objection: that since one can simply see the both the subject matter and expressive etc. properties of an artwork in most cases, this simple basic phenomenology cannot be adequately explained by the kind of ‘indirect meaning’ analysis I have given, which involves at least the following cognitive stages. First, an art object and its properties must be identified. And second, one must use one’s general knowledge as to the most likely causes of the observed physical properties to identify a package of ‘informational content’ associated with the artwork, each item of which must be seen as resulting from the object’s indicating of some feature or property of the relevant causes--
any indications that would draw attention specifically to various physical properties of an artist’s actions, such as the amount of pressure she applied to a brush in making a brushstroke, or the speed or momentum of the movement of her arm in depositing pigment in a given area of the work—hence the truism that typically the best art is ‘art that conceals art’, i.e. that does not obtrusively indicate such physical efforts, or associated craft-like techniques, that may have been used by the artist. Thus by and large an artist should construct her artwork in such a way that a viewer is free to concentrate on the indicated expressive, stylistic and intentional properties of an artist’s actions, without any discordant or complicating indications of their specifically physical attributes, in spite of the fact that medium content is, of metaphysical necessity, 'backward-looking' content--looking or indicating back to the actions that caused its physical basis (namely the resultant artifact) to have the physical properties that it does.
5. Medium Content Versus Representational Content
It is time to reintroduce the referential or subject matter content that is also present in any case of representational art. Such representational content could be described as 'outward-looking' , in that such works in typical cases^18 at least purport^19 to represent something external to the artwork itself. However, as already noted in the initial exposition, referential content must also (as with medium content) be initially acquired through a process of backward-looking or indirect indication of actions and their features,
since a work cannot be directly endowed with any kind of content, including referential content. Nevertheless referential content, once thus validated or established indirectly through action indication of an artist's subject matter intentions as expressed through her actions,^20 may also then take on a more primary indicative or symbolic role as specifically representational (outward-looking) content--perhaps for some of the familiar traditional reasons, such as resemblance to some actual subject. 21 Clearly then a discussion of the differing functional roles of both representational content and medium content is needed, for it is a natural, derivative thesis of this paper that in order to understand representational art one has to understand the contributions of both primarily outward-looking (representational) content and primarily backward-looking (medium) content to the total meaningfulness or informativeness of any given work. In terms of C. S. Peirce's tripartite classification of signs^22 as icons (which resemble their subjects), indices (which typically point to some actual entity) and symbols (which conventionally signify something), an artwork is a sign that is usually primarily iconic with respect to its representational content, in that it typically resembles some actual entity of the kind represented, whereas with respect to its medium content, though some iconic elements may be involved,^23 it is also significantly indexical (referring back to the actions that brought it about) and symbolic (in that it makes use of standard artistic conventions as to how elements in the relevant medium should be used and interpreted). 24
To be sure, these are points of great generality, but the completely natural way in which our two kinds of truism dovetail with each other--first a point about a medium (in the form of medium content) as providing a language for expression of meaning, and second a point about its also providing, in specific uses of medium content by an artist, a commentary on or interpretation of the relevant subject matter--strongly suggest a central and perhaps even indispensable role for a concept of medium content in any fully adequate analysis of representational artworks.
6. The Possible Indispensability of Medium Content
It might seem unduly provocative to claim (as I just did) that the concept of medium content may be indispensable in analyzing representational artworks. As a brief defense of this claim, consider two well-known and quite different accounts of the meaning of artworks, namely those of Arthur Danto and Kendall Walton.^25 Danto has argued that suitable physical objects become meaningful artworks by being appropriately interpreted by viewers, while Walton instead regards artworks as props in games of make-believe engaged in by their viewers. Both of these accounts of the meaning of artworks may seem remote from mine, but my claim is that neither approach can by itself explain the genesis of meaning, that is, how artworks initially acquire their meaning--or more precisely in the case of these authors, how artworks acquire
appropriate dispositional meaning properties, such that acts of interpretation can be both appropriate and successful when applied to them (in the case of Danto), or such that appropriate games of make-believe are licensed or mandated by a work (in the case of Walton). My most basic claim is that backward indication of actions and their properties--which defines, among other things, the medium content of a work--is metaphysically the only possible way in which a work itself can acquire any (relatively) objective, viewer- independent meaning,^26 no matter how much theories of representational art may otherwise differ as to the subsequent nature of viewer involvements (whether interpretive, imaginative game-playing, and so on) with art objects having such viewer-independent meanings. Thus at least backward-looking meaningful content , no matter how described, is an unavoidable postulate of any theory of representational art. Then my additional claims are that such meaningful content would not be possible without the resources of specific art media (so that specifically the content must be medium-related content), and also that such content is in addition inevitably in the form of a commentary , since that is the appropriate general category to which intentional, expressive and stylistic kinds of meaning belong.
