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In this game-based problem, you are tasked with determining the optimal base salary and bonus structure for outsourcing research projects to external r&d facilities. As the owner of a large pharmaceutical company, you must offer the same terms to all facilities, but cannot directly monitor their effort levels. The facilities can choose between routine or high effort, which affects the project's success rate and potential profit. This problem explores the principles of mechanism design and principal-agent relationships.
Typology: Exercises
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Game 7: A mechanism design (principal agent) problem In this timed game, you are the owner of a large pharmaceutical company looking to subcontract out a number of research projects, each with uncertain outcome, to outside R&D facilities. Each research facility, once hired, can choose either to put in routine effort (assign a normal staff to the project) or high effort (assigning its best researchers). Its choice will affect how likely the project is to succeed and earn a profit. You cannot monitor a facility's effort directly; all that you know is whether or not its project succeeds. You must offer all research facilities the same offer consisting of a base salary and bonus if the project is a success. What salary and bonus do you wish to offer?