The Public Authority: History, Nature, Advantages, and Disadvantages, Lecture notes of Law

The history and nature of public authorities, their advantages and disadvantages, and suggests areas of appropriate usage. Public authorities are corporate bodies authorized by legislative action to finance, construct, and operate revenue-producing enterprises outside of the regular government structure. the creation of authorities, their impact, and their functions in financing, management, and planning.

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19571
THE
PUBLIC
AUTHORITY
Jerome
J.
Shestackt
If
there is
one
area
of
agreement
between
the
proponents
and
op-
ponents
of
the
public
authority,
it
is
that
the
authority
is
one of
the
most
significant
and
widespread
developments
in
state
and
local
govern-
ment
in
the past
quarter
of
a
century.'
Today,
state
and
local
govern-
ments
employ
authorities
for
such
varied
purposes
as
the
construction
and
operation
of
transportation
services,
marketing
facilities,
recrea-
tion
centers,
public
utilities,
schools,
airports,
bridges and turnpikes.2
Authorities
now
represent
several
billions
of
dollars
in
capitalization
and
their
obligations
are
significant on
the
investment
market.
3
The
rapid
growth
of
the
authority
and
the
increased
reliance
upon
its
use
has raised
challenging
questions concerning
its
appropriateness
as
an
instrument
of
government.
4
The
purpose
of
this
article
is
to
dis-
cuss
briefly
the history
and
nature
of
the
public
authority,
to
examine
its
advantages
and
disadvantages
and
to
suggest areas in
which
the
authority
may
be
most
appropriately
utilized.
NATURE
AND
HISTORY
OF
THE PUBLIC
AUTHORITY
Briefly,
a
public
authority
is
a corporate
body
authorized
by
legislative
action
to
function
outside
of
the
regular structure
of
state
or
local
government
in
order to
finance,
construct and
usually
to
operate revenue-producing
enterprises.
The
states have
provided
for
the
creation
of
authorities
in
various
ways.
In
most jurisdictions, authorities,
especially
on
the
state
level,
t
Member, Philadelphia
Bar.
Formerly
First
Deputy City
Solicitor,
City
of
Phila-
delphia.
A.B.,
1943,
University of Pennsylvania;
LL.B.,
1949,
Harvard
University.
1.
COUNCIL
OF
STATE
GOVERNMENTS,
PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES
IN
THE
STATES,
For-
ward
(1953);
FORDHAM,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW
25
(1949);
TEMPORARY
STATE
COMmSSION
ON
COORDINATION
OF
STATE ACTIVITIES,
FIRST
INTERIM
STAFF
REPORT
ON
PUBLIC
AUTHORITIES
UNDER
NEW
YORK
STATE
23
(1954).
2.
A list
of
the
major
road, bridge and
tunnel
authorities,
port
dock
and
terminal
authorities,
state
building
authorities,
and
water
and
power
authorities
is
contained
in
COUNCIL
OF
STATE GOVERNMrNTS,
op.
cit.
supra
note
1,
at
30-35.
3.
See
The
State
and
Municipal
Hundred
Million
Club,
The
Bond
Buyer,
Dec.
10,
1956,
p.
68.
4.
Concern
at
the
ramifications of
the
increase of
authorities
has
been
expressed
by
the
Governors'
Conference,
by
the
President's
Committee
on
Administrative
Man-
agement, by
the Hoover
Commission
and
by
many
others.
See,
e.g.,
COUNCIL
OF
STATE
GOVERNMENTS,
op.
cit.
supra
note
1,
Foreward;
FORDHAM,
A
LARGER
CONCEPT OF
COM-
MUNITY
23-25
(1956);
T
MPORARY
STATE
COMMISSION
ON COORDINATION
OF
STATE
AcrivrTris,
op.
cit. supra
note
1,
at
24.
(553)
pf3
pf4
pf5
pf8
pf9
pfa
pfd
pfe
pff

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19571

THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY

Jerome J. Shestackt

If there is one area of agreement between the proponents and op- ponents of the public authority, it is that the authority is one of the most significant and widespread developments in state and local govern- ment in the past quarter of a century.' Today, state and local govern- ments employ authorities for such varied purposes as the construction and operation of transportation services, marketing facilities, recrea- tion centers, public utilities, schools, airports, bridges and turnpikes. 2 Authorities now represent several billions of dollars in capitalization and their obligations are significant on the investment market.^3 The rapid growth of the authority and the increased reliance upon its use has raised challenging questions concerning its appropriateness as an instrument of government. 4 The purpose of this article is to dis- cuss briefly the history and nature of the public authority, to examine its advantages and disadvantages and to suggest areas in which the authority may be most appropriately utilized.

NATURE AND HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY

Briefly, a public authority is a corporate body authorized by legislative action to function outside of the regular structure of state or local government in order to finance, construct and usually to operate revenue-producing enterprises. The states have provided for the creation of authorities in various ways. In most jurisdictions, authorities, especially on the state level,

t Member, Philadelphia Bar. Formerly First Deputy City Solicitor, City of Phila- delphia. A.B., 1943, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1949, Harvard University.

1. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN THE STATES, For- ward (1953); FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 25 (1949); TEMPORARY STATE COMmSSION ON COORDINATION OF STATE ACTIVITIES, FIRST INTERIM STAFF REPORT ON PUBLIC AUTHORITIES UNDER NEW YORK STATE 23 (1954).

  1. A list of the major road, bridge and tunnel authorities, port dock and terminal authorities, state building authorities, and water and power authorities is contained in COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMrNTS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 30-35.
  2. See The State and Municipal Hundred Million Club, The Bond Buyer, Dec. 10, 1956, p. 68.
  3. Concern at the ramifications of the increase of authorities has been expressed by the Governors' Conference, by the President's Committee on Administrative Man- agement, by the Hoover Commission and by many others. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, op. cit. supra note 1, Foreward; FORDHAM, A LARGER CONCEPT OF COM- MUNITY 23-25 (1956); T MPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON COORDINATION OF STATE AcrivrTris, op. cit. supra note 1, at 24.

(553)

554 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105

are created by special acts of the legislature. Such, for example, is the pattern in New York.^5 Other states authorize the creation of public authorities under general enabling acts. The outstanding example is Pennsylvania which, under The Municipality Authorities Act of 1945,' enables local governments to create local authorities to operate a broad variety of projects. Some states such as Alabama and Michigan permit the establishment of authorities for limited purposes, such as the con- struction of industrial and commercial buildings for rental to private business 7 or the construction of off-street parking facilities. In general, the^ authority^ has the^ status^ of^ a^ public^ corporation^

8

and may make contracts, acquire and dispose of real and personal property, sue and be sued, borrow money and issue evidences of in- debtedness, fix rates and collect fees or charges for the use of facilities, and hire personnel.' The authority is usually managed by a board or commission which determines policy within the framework of the authority's jurisdiction and approves, modifies or rejects actions suggested by a full-time employee who serves as the principal executive officer of the board. The members of the authority are generally appointed-by the gover- nor, in the case of a state authority, and by the mayor or city council, in the case of a local authority-and often serve without salary."^0 Fre-

  1. In 1938, following the recommendations of The Moffat Committee, a constitu- tional amendment was passed in New York requiring that all authorities be created by special act of the legislature. See Joint Legislative Committee on State Fiscal Policies, Report, N.Y. LEo. Doc. No. 41, C. 8 (1938). 6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 29002-5 (Purdon Supp. 1955) provides: "A. Every Authority incorporated under this act... shall be for the purpose of acquiring, hold- ing, constructing, improving, maintaining and operating, owning, leasing, either in the capacity of lessor or lessee, projects of the following kind and character, buildings to be devoted wholly or partially for public uses, (^) including public school buildings, and for revenue-producing purposes; transportation, marketing, shopping, terminals, bridges, tunnels, flood control projects, highways, parkways, traffic distribution centers, parking spaces, airports and all facilities necessary or incident thereto, parks, recrea- tion grounds and facilities, sewers, sewer systems or parts thereof, sewage treatment works, including works for treating and disposing of industrial waste,... steam heat- ing plants and distribution systems, incinerator plants, waterworks, water supply works, water distribution systems, swimming pools, playgrounds, lakes, low head dams, hos- pitals, motor buses (^) for public use, when such motor buses are to be used within any municipality, and subways... ." Under this broad grant, authorities at the local level have had their greatest prevalence in Pennsylvania. See Lindsay, The Municipal Au- thority in Pennsylvania, Pa. Dep't of Internal Affairs Monthly Bull., Aug. 1951, p. 16; The Bond Buyer, March 21, 1953.
  2. COUNCIL OF STATE GovERNMENTS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 36. 8. In some cases, an authority may lack corporate status, although it possesses many corporate attributes; examples are the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, the State Bridge Commission of Ohio, the Washington Toll Bridge Authority and the West Virginia Turnpike Commission. 9. See Nehemkis, The Public Authority: Some Legal and Practical Aspects, 47 YALE L.J. 14 (1937).
  3. For a survey of the tenure compensation and other incidents of membership some typical authorities, see COUNCIL ov STA r GovZRNMXNTS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 40-49.

556 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105

a need to develop an effective agency to handle interstate and inter- community problems.' Although public authorities appeared (^) in this country ' 6 as early as the 1890's," the first major impetus to the authority movement took place with the establishment of the Port of New York Authority in 1921.'" Within the five year period between 1926 and 1931, the Au- thority had marketed $142,000,000 in bonds secured by the revenues of bridges, tunnels and other authority projects." That body, (^) with its striking record, was the star that the coming galaxy of authorities sought to emulate. The depression, which brought about an increase in public work construction as a means of stimulating recovery, also brought about a shrinkage in the assessed valuation of taxable property and hence a reduction in borrowing power. This accentuated the need for revenue bond financing and proved a stimulus to the growth of public au- thorities. 9 Encouragement came also from the federal government through such measures (^) as the power of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to lend funds for self-liquidating (^) projects of public bodies, the letter in 1934 from President Roosevelt to the governors of (^) the states suggesting the adoption of legislation that would authorize revenue bond financing and the creation of public authorities,^2 " and the financial assistance (^) provided by the United States Housing Act of

  1. As a result, between 1933 and 1939 there were (^) widespread enactments of revenue (^) bond legislation and of statutes authorizing local governments to^ establish^ authorities^ for^ a^ variety^ of^ purposes.^

(^2 )

  1. See generally CouNcIL or STATn GOVXRNM NTS, op. cit. (^) supra note 1, at 22-28; Nehemkis, supra note 9. 15. The authority, of course, is not (^) indigenous to the United States. See, e.g., WBR, STATUTORY AUTHORITrIES FOR SPECIAL PURosas 17 (1922). 16. For example, the Kennebeck District in Maine with many of the incidents of the modern authority was created in 1899. See KNAPPN, op. cit. supra note 12, at 227. 17. For an excellent brief history of the New York Port Authorities, see Gold- stein, Metropolitan (^) Area Government-A Functional Approach, the Authority Role, The Bond Buyer, Sept. 8, 1956, p. 3. See also BARD, THI PoRT OP THX NtW YORK AUTHORITY (1939) ; BiRD, A STUDY OF THE NEW YORK PORT AUTHORITY (1949).
  2. (^) Netherton, Area-Development Authorities: A New Form of Government by Proclamation, 8 VAND. L. Rtv. 678, 680 (1955). Among the facilities (^) of the New York Port Authority are the Bayonne (^) Bridge, George Washington Bridge, Goethals Bridge, Holland Tunnel, Lincoln Tunnel, New York Truck Terminal, Newark Truck Ter- minal, Port Authority Bus Building, La Guardia Airport, Newark Airport and (^) New York International Airport.
  3. For a concise summary (^) of the development of revenue bond financing, see Fordham, Revenue Bond Sanctions, 42 CoLum. L. Rav. 395, 400-01 (1942).
  4. Discussed in Foley, Revenue Financing of (^) Public Enterprises, 35 Mica. L. Rsv. 1, 5 (1936).
  5. At least nineteen states (^) enacted statutes creating authorities for financing rev- enue producing projects between 1933 and 1936. An appendix to Foley, supra note 20, at 30-39 contains a useful index of the early legislation. The bulk of the housing au- thority legislation was enacted between 1936 and 1941.

THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY

World War II brought a halt to state and local construction pro- grams and hence witnessed the creation of relatively few authorities. In the postwar era, however, the demand for public improvements grew apace. Authorities, popularized as a quick means of realizing new facilities, have not only multiplied with vigor but have found use in new areas such as toll road operation, port development and govern- ment building. With this brief background, the advantages and disadvantages of the authority may perhaps be best assessed by examining its functions in the following areas: (1) financing; (2) management; and (3) planning and responsibility.2 2

FINANCING

One of the primary advantages claimed for the authority is that it permits the financing of improvements outside state constitutional debt limitations.^2 " The states whose constitutions do not restrict public borrowing are few.2 4^ Most state constitutions either prescribe that public borrow- ing may take place only where approval is received by popular refer-

endum 2 ' or proscribe any debt (with minor exceptions) beyond an

amount which most of these states long ago reached.2 6^ Local govern- ment debt is also restricted, generally by the limitation based on the "debt-to-property" ratio under which indebtedness is limited to a fixed percentage of^ taxable^ property^ in^ the^ local^ government^ unit.

27

With the path to constitutional amendment of debt limitations generally blocked by vociferous and articulate advocates of govern- mental economy, as well as by the complications of the amending

  1. Manifestly, variations in the authority operation are numerous and hence ex- ceptions will be found to almost any general statement made. The discussion that fol- lows, however, is based on the prevailing pattern of authority operation. 23. TSMPORARY STAT4 COMMISSION ON COORDINATION op STATS ACTIVI s, op. cit. supra note 1, at 34; WINTRAUB & PATT4RSON, THn 'AUTHORITY' IN (^) PENNSYLVA- E.A, PRO AND CON 3 (Bureau of Municipal Research of Philadelphia 1949).
  2. In the following states, the legislature for all practical purposes has control over borrowing: Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Tennessee and Vermont. CouNcIl- ov STATS GOVmRNMSNTS, op. cit. supra note 1, at 17. A table showing the various state limitations on borrowing appears in id. at 15.
  3. States in this category are: Arkansas, California, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kan- sas, Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming. Id. at 17.
  4. States in this category are: Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Ibid. 27. The lack of a current rational basis in such limitations is concisely set forth in CHERmAx, THE LAW OF REVENuE BoNms 85-86 (1954).

19571

THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY

as license fees and^ cigarette^ taxes.^ Even^ some^ states^ which^ accepted the special fund doctrine held^ that^ such issues^ fell^ directly^ within^ the purpose of the debt limitation, since the improvements^ were^ not^ self- liquidating in that the revenues were not^ earned^ by the^ structures financed by the bonds. 4 It was not surprising, therefore, particularly^ in those^ states^ in which courts rejected or restricted the special fund doctrine, that wary legislators should seek to meet financing needs through the authority device. For one, the device proved^ a^ means^ to^ approach^ the^ court with a new conception; for another,^ it^ was^ thought^ to^ be^ a^ more^ subtle subterfuge, since "independence" from the^ state^ governmental^ structure was an additional argument on which to base exemption from state debt limitations. It is not entirely clear why certain courts should have found it easier to appreciate that the pledge of revenues of authority facilities is less a debt within the constitutional sense than^ the^ pledge^ of^ a^ munic- ipality of^ the^ revenues^ from^ improvements.^ Nevertheless,^ whether through subtlety or sophistry, it was the authority that demonstrated the victory of indirection, and won significant support in such cases as Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority3 5^ and Robertson v. Zimmer- man.3 8^ Subsequent^ decisions^ sanctioned^ authority^ bond financing^ even for non-revenue producing facilities, 7 and set a pattern^ for^ expanded use of the^ authority^ in^ those^ states^ 3 8^ as^ well^ as^ in^ others.

3 9

  1. State ex^ rel.^ Fletcher^ v.^ Executive^ Council,^^207 Iowa^ 923,^223 N.W.^^737 (1929); Boswell v. State, 181 Okla. 435, 74 P.2d 940 (1937). 35. 316 Pa. 65, 173 Atl. 289 (1934). To the argument that Lesser v. Warren Bor- ough, 237 Pa. 501, 85 Atl. 839 (1912) had held that the state constitutional debt limits cannot be indirectly evaded by means of the authority device, the court said: "It is never an illegal evasion to accomplish a desired result, lawful in itself, by discovering a legal way to do^ it."^316 Pa.^ at^ 84-85,^173 AtI.^ at^ 298-99.^ Lesser^ v.^ Warren^ Borough, supra, was distinguished on the ground that there the borough's bonds were to be^ se- cured not alone by the revenue from the waterworks proposed to be purchased, but by the waterworks itself. 36. 268 N.Y. 52, 196 N.E. 740 (1935). See Williams & Nehemkis, supra note 13, at 206. 37. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, for example, in an agonizing reappraisal and reversal of a decision a year earlier, Kelley v. Earle, 320 Pa. 449, 182 Atl. 501 (1936), held safe from constitutional attack a scheme whereby an authority used the proceeds of bonds to build a structure, leased it to the regular governmental unit and retired the bonds from the rental on the lease. Kelley v. Earle,^325 Pa.^ 337, 190^ At.^ 140(1937).
  2. Greenhalgh v. Woolworth,^361 Pa.^ 543,^^64 A.2d^^659 (1949)^ held^ that^ a^ school building constructed by the State Public Authority was "self-liquidating" where the annual rentals used to discharge debt and interest charges were payable out^ of^ current revenues drawn in part from the local school tax levy and part from funds allocated by the state. See also Datweder v. Hatfield Borough School District, 376 Pa. 555, 104 A.2d 110 (1954).
  3. E.g., Becker v. Albion^ Jefferson^ School^ Corp.,^132 N.E.2d^^269 (Ind.^ 1956); Book v. Indianapolis-Marion Bldg. Authority, 126 N.E.2d 5 (Ind. 1955); Walinske v. Detroit-Wayne Joint Bldg. Authority, 325 Mich. 562, 39 N.W.2d 73 (1949) (author- ity to finance construction of joint county and city building approved, relying largely on Kelley v. Earle, 325 Pa. 337, 190 Atl. 140 (1937)), 34 MiNN. L. Rtv. 360 (1950). But see Curlin v. Wetherby, 275 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. 1955); State ex rel. Washington State Bldg. Financing Authority v. Yelle, 47 Wash. 2d 705, 289 P.2d 355 (1955).

560 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105

But the field of municipal finance has not remained static. Granted that in some jurisdictions restrictions on state and municipal (^) borrowing once presented a compelling (^) reason for the use of authorities, that com- pulsion now appears largely non-existent, at least in the case of revenue- producing facilities. (^) Today most courts, more sophisticated in the necessities of municipal finance and less sympathetic with archaic con- stitutional restrictions, have granted considerable leeway to local (^) gov- ernments, and their revenue financing is on terms equal with (^) those of authorities. The special fund doctrine, under which an (^) obligation payable wholly out of the net operating revenues of the enterprise which it finances is excluded from constitutional debt limitations, has won ap- proval in almost all of the states having constitutional municipal-debt limits."^0 There (^) has also been wide acceptance of the "expanded special fund theory" under which the state or local (^) government may pledge the revenues of any existing revenue-producing (^) utility for the purpose of constructing or acquiring a different type of utility.^4 ' Likewise, in many states, the financing even of non-revenue producing structures and (^) services has withstood the confinement of constitutional clauses without resort to the authority device. For ex- ample, in the case of educational facilities, approval has been given to the construction of dormitories financed by revenue bonds secured (^) by the pledge of such revenues as earnings of the university press 4 and fees from other halls; ' in the case of a state hospital, the pledge of con- tributions made by counties for services rendered to their residents has been found acceptable; (^) 44 and in recreational facilities, the pledge of excess revenues of an electric plant supported the construction (^) of an auditorium, field^ house^ and swimming^ pool.^45

  1. Decisions in the following twenty-seven states prescribe to the special fund doctrine: Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ken- tucky, (^) Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, (^) Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Cases are cited in Annot., 146 A.L.R. 604 (1943). In Connecticut, Delaware, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Tennessee and (^) Vermont, there are no constitutional municipal debt limits. In four states, the au- thority to issue revenue bonds independent of the special fund doctrine is in the consti- tution: GA. CoNsT. art VII, § 2-6005; PA. CONST. art. IX, § 8; VA. CoNST. § (^) 127.
  2. The question of whether a municipality may secure the payment of the bonds by a mortgage, not only upon the newly-acquired properties but (^) also upon properties which it had previously owned is a much disputed one. See discussion in WooD, LEOAL PROBLEMS (^) INCIDENT TO RE ENUE BOND FINANCING 8-9 (National Institute of Muni- cipal Law Officers Report No. 112, 1945).
  3. Fanning v. University of Minnesota, 183 Minn. 222, 236 N.W. 217 (1931).
  4. Barbour v. State Board of Education, 92 Mont. 321, 13 P.2d 225 (1932).
  5. State ex rel. Hawkins v. State Board (^) of Examiners, 97 Mont. 441, 35 P.2d 116 (1934).
  6. McKinney v. Owensboro, (^) 305 Ky. 254,. 203 S.W.2d 24 (1947). See generally C31RMAIK, (^) op. cit. supra, note 12, at 100-24; Stamps, Municipal Financing of the Changing Southland, The Bond Buyer, Nov. 30, 1953, pp. 26-27.

562 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.^105

financing without the necessity of using the authority device.^ Accord- ingly, relief from constitutional debt limitations does not, in most states, provide an adequate ground for authority financing. If the authority is to be justified, it^ must^ be^ on^ another^ basis."'

MANAGEMENT Another frequently heard advantage claimed for the authority is that it brings to public functions the characteristics of business enter- prises, and thus enhances the efficiency of government in achieving its objective. 3 As a primary demonstration of this thesis, it is contended that the public authority is managed by more capable men than are regular government offices. Since members of the authority generally are not paid and because the authority is largely independent of the state or municipal government, it is thought that the authority will attract suc- cessful and public-minded businessmen who will run it with the same initiative and success^ demonstrated in^ their^ private^ business." As further demonstration of the advantages of authority opera- tion, there is cited its independence and freedom from the inflexibility and red tape of traditional governmental in^ such^ matters^ as^ the^ hiring of personnel, purchasing and other managerial controls. This thesis, if sound, is an alarming one. As Dean Fordham has observed:

"Local government of any size is^ big^ business,^ and^ we^ need good management and efficiency throughout. If we cannot substantially achieve them, short of diffusing various functions among a variety of ad hoc units, we are^ indeed^ in^ a^ bad plight."^ "

But, along with Dean Fordham, the writer believes that it is the thesis, rather than the plight, that requires examination. In apprais-

tion, 89 Pa. D. & C. 189 (1954) (improvements to water and sewer systems and to transit facilities). Nevertheless, in 1954 Philadelphia^ created^ a^ municipal^ airport^ au- thority for self-sustaining projects at the city's airport. On more mature reflection, the city fathers have kept the authority largely inactive and have financed its^ airport^ proj- ects through regular city channels.

52. Aside from lack of advantage, there are disadvantages to authority financing. These go largely to the question of responsibility and are discussed at pp. 568-69 infra. 53. See Toll Roads^ and^ Toll^ Authorities,^^26 STiATs^ Gov'T^ 157,^167 (1953).

  1. "The entire nature and purpose of the authority requires that its board members possess considerable freedom and independence, that they be experienced in the technique of corporate management, that they have a high service^ of^ public^ responsibility, and^ that they be willing to give the benefit^ of^ their^ judgment^ and^ experience^ as^ a^ matter^ of public duty... .The high calibre of men selected to serve on authority boards^ is...a tribute to the fine record of performance achieved by those^ authorities. And^ in^ turn, with top flight commissioners being^ appointed,^ the^ continuance^ of^ successful^ authority operation is assured. It's sort of a continuous, kindly cycle." Kurshan, Authorities as a Governmental Technique, 11 The Authority, Winter 1953, pp. 11-12. 55. FORDHAm, A LARGF.R CONCZPT OV COMMUNilY 24 (1956).

THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY

ing authority management, a magic aura of success has been attrib- uted to the fact that authorities are self-supporting. But to be self- supporting means only that the authority's charges^ are^ no^ less^ than^ its expenditures; it is no guarantee of efficient operation at low cost, especially where the authority operates under monopoly or semi- monopoly conditions, and where there has been a pooling of profitable facilities with unprofitable ones. That authorities are self-supporting does not mean, therefore, that the cost to the consumer will be reduced.- 6 On the other hand, it is no proof of inefficient municipal management merely because services are not self-supporting or that a city's budget does not balance. Comparison of the relative efficiency of regular government and the authority, if it is to be meaningful, must take place on the plane of costs and services. That comparison does not seem to have been made to an extent sufficient to draw general conclusions. Apart from costs, it is not clear that the authority has an^ advantage over the regular government on the basis of quality and independence of membership and flexibility of managerial controls. In terms of political independence, it must be remembered that authority members, like many other government officials, are appointed by the mayor or governor.^57 An appointing official^ who^ is^ politically minded is not likely to immunize himself from political considerations in selecting authority members." Even when businessmen are chosen, their appointment frequently is the result of their political rather than their business activity. On the other hand, the mayor or governor who supports merit appointments should attract qualified men for service within the regular governmental framework as^ well^ as^ within the authority.^59 There is also the question of whether the board-of-directors type of management, which is^ typical^ of^ the^ authority,"'^ is^ the^ most^ desirable

56. See Address by Lennox L. Moak, Thirteenth Annual Conference of Penn- sylvania Municipal^ Authorities,^ Oct.^ 25,^ 1955,^ p.^3 (Bureau of^ Municipal^ Research^ of Philadelphia mimeo.)

  1. There are a few exceptions; e.g., in Pennsylvania, one member of the Gen- eral State Authority is appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and one by the President pro tempore of the Senate;^ in^ Nebraska,^ the^ directors^ of^ the power districts are chosen through popular elections; in New York, market authorities are named by county officials.
  2. It is true that terms of authority members may overlap the term of the appointing official. But that is more of an aid to bipartisanship than non-partisanship.
  3. In Philadelphia, for example, in recent years, there has been no dearth of capable businessmen, professional men and academicians serving on city departments, boards and commissions.
  4. Boards and commissions, of course, may exist within the regular governmental unit. When they do, however, they are generally subject to controls from the city's executive officers. Moreover, the tendency in state and city government in recent years has been to diminish the number of such boards.

1957]

THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY

it should not hold good for the authority. The authority is not immune to the demands of politicians for patronage; indeed, in some cities where civil service is extensive, the authority is perhaps the last refuge of the patronage seeker.es Similarly, if competitive bidding procedures are desirable for the municipal government, why should they not be desirable for the author- ity? " Authorities are not immune from favoritism and politics in their contracts, and the public trust can be abused by part-time mem- bers as well as by regular government officials. The need for flexibility of controls should not be confused with abdication of controls. The fact that bidding and purchasing requirements in many municipalities may be outmoded points to their revision, 7 not their rejection. It is significant that the trend in legislation dealing with authori- ties has been to impose requirements of merit selection, competitive bidding, budgeting and accounting and other controls found in normal municipal operation.^6 The experience of public administration indi- cates that, as more abuses are discovered in authority operation, more controls are imposed. In sum, the managerial superiority of the authority does not seem to have been demonstrated, while its freedom from controls does not appear to be entirely desirable. If municipal governments continue to revise their managerial controls to conform to modern concepts of governmental administration, there would appear to be little need to establish authorities for management reasons alone.

PLANNING AND RESPONSIBILITY An authority that exercises its functions within the geographical limits of one general function unit 6 9^ invariably poses problems for the state or city planners. Most state and local authorities have been conceived for a single or limited purpose job. Even if more than one project

65. In Philadelphia, for example, it is no secret that prospective employees of most of the local authorities obtain political clearance before they are employed, a situation that does not exist in the case of regular city employers who are under a board civil service system. PHILADELPHIA HomE RULE CHARTER § 7-401. 66. The purpose of competitive bidding is to obtain "the best results at the lowest price and to forestall fraud, favoritism and corruption in the issuing of contracts." RHYNE, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CONTRACTS WITH ANNOTATED MODEL FoRMus 35 (1952) and cases cited therein. 67. See FIELD, SIxES & STONER, op. cit. supra note 64, at 351; RHYNE, op. cit. supra note 66, at 21-24.

  1. CouNCiL or STATE GovmxnmSS, PUBLIC AUTHORITMS IN THS STAMS 80-88, 106-109 (1953). 69. A general function unit refers to the regular governmental body operating in all areas of government, viz., a township, city, county and state.

566 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105

is involved, the projects generally fall within a single area such as transportation, sewage, port facilities or the like. Planning by the authority, even where sufficiently developed, is inevitably centered around its area of operation. Municipal and state planning, however, cannot be as single- minded.^70 The development of playgrounds, for example, is related to the planning of residential developments; the desirability of airport locations may depend on the question of planned industrial develop- ments. In this broad framework the authority is often a single trader pursuing its own projects without participation in the-over-all planning program. The Joint Committee on Urban Traffic Congestion of the Ameri- can Bar Association has expressed the point in the context of parking authorities as follows:

"The main disadvantage of a parking authority appears to to be the use of an ad hoc governmental unit in an area where integrated planning is of the utmost importance. The provision of parking facilities is only one aspect of any urban traffic problem. Closely related are the problems of street use, encouragement of mass transportation, encouragement of private enterprise solu- tions, and other aspects of city planning development. The park- ing authority frequently proceeds to provide parking facilities be- fore the relationship of these facilities to the whole traffic problem has been thought out and a fully integrated program decided upon. The initiative and spirit demonstrated by parking au- thority projects moving at a rapid pace in a manner stimulating private development, may seem commendable at the time but the projects may eventually prove unsound and unrelated (^) to the city's overall plan^ to^ solve^ its^ traffic problems."^ 7'

The legislature can, of course, require the authority to obtain the clearance of the appropriate planning body. 72 But such requirement would not appear to provide an adequate solution to the problem. An example drawn from the writer's experience will help to illustrate. A few years ago the parking authority of a large eastern city selected a particular area for the construction of a parking garage. Plans were prepared for submission to the city's planning commission. At the meeting of the planning commission, the most prominent mem-

  1. See PUBLIC ADmiNISTRATION SERVICE No. 86; ACTION FOR CITIEs, A GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY PLANNING 1-3 (1945); MACDONALD, op. cit. supra note 61, at 407-15; FORDH3Am, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 695-96 (1949). 71. ENO FOUNDATION FOR HIGHWAY TRAFFIC CONTROL, PARKING; LEGAL, FINAN- cIAL, ADImisTRA~rV 88 (1956).
  2. Such a requirement, however, does not appear to be typical in the case of most authorities at the present time.

568 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105

need of a broader planning base that will encompass and direct the work of all of the authorities in a particular region." The merits and demerits of the state and local authority must also be evaluated in the area of political philosophy. It is a tenet, if not an axiom, of^ democratic^ society^ that^ government^ be^ politically^ responsible to the electorate.^7 "^ If^ we^ are^ to^ divorce^ a^ governmental^ body^ from direct control of politically responsible officers, it seems fair to ask that the reasons for such divorcement be compelling ones. Proponents of the authority have^ offered^ justification^ in^ the^ claim that certain types of entrepreneurial action can be more efficiently man- aged if made independent^ of^ the^ regular^ channels^ of^ government.^

77

Such justification (if factually correct), might be adequate if use of the authority meant only the choice of a management device. Invari- ably, however, use of the authority cannot be insulated from questions of broad and significant governmental policy. For example, one of the significant questions facing state and local governments is the extent to which "benefit received" principles should be the yardstick for public improvements. Under the "benefit re- ceived" concept, improvements are^ paid by charges upon^ users.^ The advantages claimed for this concept are that it avoids the necessity of heavier tax burdens, it provides the consumer with concrete evi- dence of the value of his payments, and it serves as a^ measure^ for the determination of the extent of need and of popular demand. 8 On the other hand, traditionally in a democratic society the creation of governmental services has not depended on the potential ability of the using public to pay for the service, but upon such tests as the general welfare of the community, the development of^ an^ area^ and^ a^ standard of the minimum level of services.

75. This is not a suggestion that regional general function units should be estab- lished. However, for some possible developments along interstate lines, see FORDHAM, A LARGER CoNc-rv OF COMMUNITY c. 2 (1956) ; Edelstein, supra note 73, at 190.

  1. It is a generally accepted principle of political organization that responsibility is weakened by the diffusion of governmental functions among numerous plural-headed agencies. The trend in political reorganizations of local and state governments has been toward integration or centralization of^ executive^ authority.^ See^ COMMISSION^ ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE CoNGREss 44-45 (1955); COUNCIL OV STATs GOVERNmiNTs, THE ADmINISTRATIVS ORGANIZATION or STATE GOVmNMXNT 4-7 (1950); Bucx, THs REORGANIZATION o STATS GOVRNM NTS IN THE UNITED STATS 14-28 (National Municipal League 1938).
  2. See discussion at pp. 562-65 supra.
  3. An evaluation of the "benefit received" doctrine is found in TzmPoRARY STATE COMMISSION ON COORDINATION OP STATS AcTMTlmS, FIRST^ INTERIM^ STAVV^ REPoRT ON PUBLIC AuTHoRITIEs UNDER NEw YORE STATE 25-30 (1954).^ In^ practice,^ the advantages are not always realized; for^ example,^ the^ claim^ that^ projects^ serve^ as^ an objective criteria of need loses force where, as is often the case, there is a poolingjof profitable and unprofitable projects, or where projects receive subsidization in the form of direct grants, use of government facilities, tax exemptions and other means.

THE PUBLIC AUTHORITY

The choice between^ following^ benefit-received^ principles^ and^ the traditional criteria appears to be the kind of policy decision elected officials should properly make and be responsible for, not only initially but on a continuing basis. That decisional process for each project is largely lost^ by^ use^ of^ the authority^ device^ which,^ by^ its nature,^ is committed to benefit-received principles in the operation of its projects. 79 Similarly, whether users of a profitable project should support nonprofitable projects, or what priority should be assigned to given projects, or what the comparative merits are, in the case of each project, of financing from tax revenues, general obligation issues or revenue bonds, are all questions involving basic governmental policy.^ To^ re- move such questions from the regular orbit of governmental control is to remove them from responsibility to the electorate.' The benefits that accrue^ from the^ authority^ do^ not^ appear^ sufficient^ to justify^ such departure from our governmental philosophy.

CONCLUSION The need for the authority appears greatest on the bi-state or re- gional level as a means of handling problems that cross jurisdictional lines. On a state and local level, however, the authority does not appear as attractive^ an^ instrument^ as^ has^ been^ commonly supposed.^ Its^ finan- cing devices are now available in most jurisdictions to^ municipal^ and state governments. Its management advantages are largely unproved. In the planning area, it may prove disruptive of efforts to^ integrate community efforts along the lines of a comprehensive plan. And on the level of political responsibility it presents a^ departure from^ dem- ocratic traditions unwarranted by need or experience.

  1. Apart from the difference in governmental philosophy represented by the two approaches, it should be remembered that the cost of authority financing is significantly higher than the cost of general obligation issues. See^ survey^ by^ CouNcIL^ or^ STATE GOvERNMXNTS, PuBLic AuToRIES IN^ THE.^ STATEs^ 70-75^ (1953).^ The^ cost^ factor would also seem to be an element that should be reviewed on a continuing basis by politically responsible officials. 80. See Nzv YORK^ ST.ATE^ CONSTITUTIONAL^ CONVENTIoN^ CommirTE,^ LocAL GOVERNMENT AND^ HOME^ RULE^244 (1938);^ Moak,^ Let^ Us^ Serve^ the^ Public,^^14 The Authority, Sept. 1956, pp. 18-19. The discussion here^ has^ related^ chiefly^ to^ the local and state authority; however, lack of democratic responsibility in the case of the bi-state authority is also a serious problem, as has been ably discussed in Netherton, Area-Development Authorities: A New Form of Government by Proclamation, 8 VAND. L. REv. 678,^ 691-97^ (1955).^ On the bi-state^ level,^ however,^ the^ alternatives^ to authority operation are not as available as they are on the state and municipal level.

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