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ADMIRALTY-SuITS AGAINST^ THE^ UNITED^ STATES-PLACE^ OF^ SurT,-The^ plain- tiff brought a libel in personam against^ the^ United^ States under^ the^ provisions^ of the Suits in Admiralty Act, Act of March 9,^ 192o^ (41^ Stat^ at^ L.^ 525)^ to^ prose- cute a^ claim^ previously enforceable^ only^ in^ rem.^ Held,^ that^ the^ action^ could^ be brought in^ any^ district^ where^ an^ action^ in^ personam^ could^ be^ brought.^ Alsberg v. United States (1922, S. D. N. Y.)^^285 Fed.^ 573. Historically the^ necessity^ of^ securing^ jurisdiction of^ the^ ship^ to^ assure^ satis- faction of^ the^ judgment^ led^ to^ the^ development^ of^ the^ libel^ in^ ren.^ I^ Select Pleas in, the Court^ of^ Admiralty^ (1894,^6 Seld.^ Soc.)^ lxxii.^ In^ this^ country, suits in rev; against government^ vessels^ were^ allowed^ by^ the^ Shipping^ Act,^ Act of September 7, 1916 (39 Stat. at L.^ 728)^ ;^ The^ Lake^ Monroe^ (1919)^^250 U.^ S. 246, 39^ Sup. Ct.^ 460.^ But^ the^ arrest^ of^ government^ vessels^ hampered^ their^ sale by the Shipping Board and led to the passage of the Suits in Admiralty Act, supra, prohibiting such arrest,^ and^ providing^ for^ suits^ against^ the^ United^ States
with a^ means^ of satisfying^ judgments.^ See^ (1920)^^59 CONG.^ REc.^ 168o,^ I685,
3630; The Caddo (1922, S. D. N.^ Y.)^285 Fed.^ 643,^ 644.^ Under^ this^ act^ it^ has been held that the action in rem still^ exists,^ only^ the^ liability^ of^ the^ government is substituted for the so-called liability of the vessel.^ The^ Isonomia^ (1922,^ C. C. A. 2d) 285 Fed. 516; Gray Harbor Co. v. United^ States^ (1923,^ W.^ D.^ Wash.) 286 Fed. 444. But such language is open to the^ objection^ that^ the^ suit^ and^ judg- ment against the^ government^ unlike^ those^ in^ rem^ are^ wholly^ without^ effect^ on any proprietary interest in the^ vessel.^ See^ Hohfeld,^ FundamentalLegal^ Concep- tions (1923) io8, 1O9. And the statute gives the^ judgment^ creditor^ no rights^ to the proceeds of the sale of the vessel, nor to any specific money of the govern- ment. Thus an analysis of this statutory libel shows that^ the^ judgment,^ the^ action, and the proceedings are essentially in personam. See Cook, Powers of^ Courts
of Equity: I "In Rein" and "In Personam." (I915) 15 COL. L.^ REv.^ 37.^ There
is some practical convenience in having the trial in the district where the ship is found, as the evidence is likely to be close at^ hand^ and^ the^ witnesses^ are available. But it is equally desirable that the plaintiff be able to sue at his residence. Furthermore, the doctrine of the immunity of the government from suit for its civil wrongs arising from the conduct of business, already the object of much sound criticism, should^ not^ be^ extended.^ Bank^ of^ United^ States^ v. Planters' Bank (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. 9o4; Laski, The Responsibility of the State in England^ (1919)^^32 HARv.^ L.^ REv.^ 447;^ Weston,^ Actions^ against^ the. Property of Sovereigns (1919) 32 ibid. 266, 269; NOTES (1922) 70 U. PA. L. REv. 322, 326. The decision^ of^ the^ instant^ case^ adopting^ all^ the^ incidents^ of^ the action in personam, including venue, is^ a^ desirable^ interpretation^ of^ the^ statute.
Lord, Admiralty Claims Against the^ Government^ (1919)^^19 COL.^ L.^ RIv.^ 467;
COMMENTS (1923) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 879.
ADVERSE PossEssio-CoNsBuc=v ADVERS E POSSESSION OF^ TRACTS^ SEPAR- ATELY DESCRIBED IN A VoI DEED.-Claiming under a^ void^ deed,^ which^ purported to convey several separately described tracts of land, the plaintiff occupied one of such tracts for the statutory period. He sued to recover another tract which he did not occupy. Held, that he could not^ recover.^ Georgia^ Minerals^ Co.^ v.^ Cox (1923, Ga.) 115 S. E. 770. Adverse occupation of^ part^ of^ a^ tract^ claimed^ under^ color^ of^ title^ generally is equivalent to possession of the whole tract.^ Jones^ v.^ Pond^ &^ Decker^ M'fg. Co. (i9o6) 79 Ark. 194, 96 S. W. 756. This rule has been made^ statutory^ in^ some [839]
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jurisdictions. Herbst v. Merrifield (1896)^133 Mo.^ 267,^^34 S.^ W.^^571 ;^ Scaife^ v. Western North CarolinaLand^ Co.^ (1898,^ C. C.^ A.^ 4th)^ go^ Fed.^ 238;^ see^ Barber v. Shaffer (i886) 76 Ga. 285. But^ adverse^ possession^ of^ one^ of^ several^ non- contiguous tracts separately described in^ an^ invalid^ deed^ of^ conveyance^ will not be effective as to the others. Stephenson v. Doe' (1847, Ind.) 8 Blackf. 5o8; Dow v. Dow (1923, Mass.) 137 N. E. 746.^ The^ same^ is^ true^ even^ though^ the tracts are contiguous, if separately described in a deed. Loftin v. Cobb (854) 46 N. C. 4o6; Hornblower v.^ Banton^ (1907)^ 03'^ Me.^ 375,^^69 Atl.^ 568;^ contra: Parsons v. Dills (1914) i59 Ky. 471, 167 S. W.^ 415;^ Brougher^ v.^ Stone^ (1895) 72 Miss. 647, 17 So. 5o9; cf. Overton v. Perry (19o8) 129 Ky. 415, 111 S. W. 369. But where the invalid instrument purports to^ convey^ a^ single^ body^ of^ land,^ and describes it as composed of several lots or parcels, actual occupation of a single lot is effective as to all. Johnson v. Stinerly (i892) 90 Ga. 612, I6 S. E. 951; Webb v. Richardson (i869) 42 Vt. 465. This fiction of^ constructive^ adverse possession is based on the idea that the paper title is evidence of^ the^ extent^ of the claim made by the actual occupancy. It seems reasonable, however,^ to^ limit the application of the rule to cases where the actual occupation^ is^ not^ only under color of title, but also notorious, as regards all of the land. See (I909) 23 H.^ v. L. Rav. 56.
AmENS-CITIZENSHIP--WoMAN'S MAMIAGt To ALzN.-An unmarried female alien, who was ordered deported as a feeble-minded person, was allowed, under bond, to land for six months to visit relatives. Within that period she was married in good faith to a citizen of the United States. Her mental condition remained unchanged, and her deportation was ordered. A petition was filed for a writ of habeas corpus. Held, that she had acquired American citizenship and thus was not subject to deportation under the immigration laws. United States, ex rel. Sejneusky, v. Tod (1922, C. C. A. 2d) 285 Fed. 523. At common law, marriage had no effect on the nationality of a woman. I Piggott, Nationality (1907) 57; Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad (1915) 593. But a woman married to a citizen of the United States was deemed to be a citizen by statute. Act of Feb. 10, 1855 (IO Stat. at L. 604) ; U. S. Rev. Sts. 1878, sec. 1994; U. S. Comp. Sts. I916, sec. 3948. As the statute was construed after i9IO, she could no longer be excluded under the immigration laws. Hopkins v. Fachant (I9o4, C. C. A. 9th) 130,Fed. 839; In re Nicola (i9II, C. C. A. 2d) 184 Fed. 322; contra: Ex parte Kaprielian (I9io, D. Mass.) 188 Fed. 694. Before September 22, 1922, the status of the wife followed that of her husband, and any American woman who married a foreigner thereby took his nationality. Act of Mar. 2, 1907 (34 Stat at L. 1228). Mackenzie v. Hare (915) 239 U. S. 299, 36 Sup. Ct. xo6; Borchard, op. cit. 598, 685. The instant case is then unquestionably sound. The national status of a married woman was, however, changed by the Act of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021) providing that she shall not become a citizen of the United States by reason of marriage; nor cease to be a citizen thereby, unless she marries an alien ineligible to citizenship. As to expatriation, this seems to be a reversion to her status' prior to the Act of i9o7, when she lost her nationality only by marrying and removing with (^) an alien to his country. Shanks v. Dupont (830, U. S.) 3 Pet. 242; Comitis v. Parkerson (1893, E. D. La.) 56 Fed. 556; Ruckgaber v. Moore (I9OO, E. D. N. Y.) 104 Fed. 947. But while, under the Act of 1907, an Ameri- can woman regained her citizenship through her husband's naturalization, under the present act it seems that she may be regarded as an alien, while her foreign born husband possesses the privileges of citizenship. The present Act leaves unremedied the possibility of statelessness of an American woman who follows her husband, where, as in Brazil, his country does not confer his nationality upon her; and creates the possibility of a similar result for the alien woman
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the court charged that^ the^ defendant^ was^ required^ to^ exercise^ the^ highest^ degree of care and skill which^ may^ reasonably^ be^ expected^ of^ persons^ engaged^ in^ that business. Held, that since^ the^ defendant^ was^ not^ a^ common^ carrier, the^ charge was error. Firszt v.^ Capitol^ Park^ Realty^ Co.^ (1923,^ Conn.)^ i2o^ At.^ 300. Although the cases are^ in^ conflict,^ the^ weight^ of^ authority^ seems^ to^ be^ that^ the proprietor of an amusement device^ is^ not a^ common^ carrier,^ and,^ therefore,^ he^ is not held to the standard of^ the^ highest^ degree of^ care^ generally^ required^ of^ such a carrier. So, the proprietor^ of^ an undulating^ floor^ known^ as^ an^ "ocean^ wave!' has been held to the standard^ of^ only^ ordinary^ care.^ Carlin^ v. Krout^ (1923, Md.) 12o Atl. 232; contra: Tenn.^ State^ Fair^ Ass'nt.^ v.^ Hartmnan^ (1916)^134 Tenn. 149, 183 S.^ W.^ 735.^ But^ the^ proprietor^ of^ a^ scenic^ railway^ has^ been^ con- sidered a common carrier.^ O'Callaghan^ v.^ Dellwood^ Park^ Co.^ (igog)^^242 Ill. 336, 89 N. E. 1OO5; Best Park^ &^ Amusement^ Co.^ v.^ Rollins^ (x915)^192 Ala.^ 534, 68 So. 417; but see contra:^ Linsdean^ v.^ Thompson,^ Scenic^ Ry.^ Co.^ (1909)^ I3o App. Div. 209,^114 N.^ Y.^ Supp.^ 421;^ Pointer^ v.^ Mountain^ Ry. Construction^ Co. (1916) 269 Mo. io4,^189 S.^ W.^ 805;^ Linthicum^ v.^ Truitt^ (1911,^ Del.)^^2 Boyce, 338, 8o Atl.^245 (merry-go-round);^ Meisner^ v.^ Detroit Ferry^ Co.^ (19o8)^^154 Mich. 545, 118 N. W.^ 14;^26 L.^ R.^ A.^ (N.^ s.)^ 1054,^ note;^ Ann.^ Cas.^ 1I5B,^ 546, note. The distinction,^ according^ to^ the^ principal^ case,^ is^ not^ in the^ nature^ of^ the instrumentality but in^ the^ occasion^ for^ its^ use-transportation^ as^ distinguished from amusement. But^ such^ a^ distinction^ is^ difficult^ of^ application^ to such^ cases as the sight-seeing bus^ or^ the^ observation^ train^ at^ a boat^ race.^ See^ Hinds^ v. Steere (1911) 209 Mass.^ 442,^^95 N.^ E.^ 844.^ Historically^ the^ distinction may^ be sound as the law of^ passenger^ carriers^ developed^ by^ analogy^ from the^ law^ of carriers of goods where^ a^ "holding^ out"^ to^ the^ public^ was^ the^ test^ of^ its^ "com- mon" character. Fish^ v.^ Chapman^ (1847)^2 Ga.^ 349;^ ef.^ Central^ Ry.^ v.^ Lippman (19oo) no Ga. 665, 36 S.^ E.^ 202.^ On^ policy^ it^ seems^ desirable, however,^ to require a high degree of^ care^ from^ the^ proprietor^ of^ a^ dangerous^ instrumentality. The attempt to differentiate^ between^ those^ cases^ would^ have^ been^ unnecessary had the courts not attempted^ to distinguish^ beween^ degrees^ of^ care.^ Such^ dis- tinction has been often^ criticized.^ Steamboat^ New^ World^ v. King^ (853,^ U.^ S.) 16 How. 469, 474; Dickerson^ v.^ Conn.^ Co.^ (1922)^^98 Conn.^ 87,^ ii8^ Atl.^ S18; but see Astin v. Chicago Ry.^ (igio)^143 Wis.^ 477,^128 N.^ W.^ 265;^ see^ (1922) 31 YA LA^ w^ JoURNAL,^ 555.^ A^ few^ courts^ have^ even^ held^ erroneous^ instruc- tions which require of^ a^ common^ carrier the^ "highest^ degree^ of^ care."^ Union Traction Co. v. Berry (igig)^188 Ind.^ 514,^^121 N.^ E.^ 655;^ O'Brien^ v.^ New^ York Rys. (1919)^^185 App.^ Div.^ 867,^174 N.^ Y.^ Supp.^ 116;^ see^ Kelleher^ v.^ Atkinson (1922) 201 App. Div. 876,^193 N.^ Y.^ Supp. 939;^ (i919)^ ig^ Co.^ L.^ REv.^ 166.^ It seems that the rule^ of^ due^ care,^ or^ care^ proportioned^ to^ the^ danger,^ should apply even to common^ carriers.^ The^ elusive^ nature^ of^ any^ distinctions^ between^ degrees of care is indicated^ in^ the^ instant^ case,^ for^ the^ court^ says^ that^ the^ jury^ should^ be instructed that^ as^ to^ the^ device^ in^ question^ ordinary^ care^ required^ more^ super- vision of its use than in^ the^ case^ of^ a^ device^ with^ little^ or^ no^ danger.
CONFLICT OF^ LAWS-RcOGNITION^ OF^ DIVORcE^ GRANTED^ IN^ FOREIGN^ COUN- TRy.-After marriage^ the^ plaintiff^ and the^ defendant^ became domiciled in^ New York. Subsequently^ they^ resided^ in^ France^ for^ several years,^ but retained^ their original domicile.^ The^ defendant^ procured^ a^ divorce in^ a French court^ on^ the ground of adultery,^ the^ plaintiff^ in^ the^ same^ action asking^ for^ affirmative^ relief. Later the^ plaintiff^ brought^ this suit^ for^ divorce.^ Held,^ that^ the^ French^ decree was a^ bar^ to^ the^ action.^ Gould^ v.^ Gould^ (1923,^ N.^ Y.)^138 N.^ E.^ 490. A divorce^ granted^ by^ one^ state^ having^ jurisdiction^ is^ binding^ upon^ a^ sister state by^ virtue^ of^ the^ full^ faith and credit^ clause.^ Haddock^ v.^ Haddock^ (19o6) 201 U. S. 562,^^26 Sup.^ Ct^ 525;^ Thompson^ v.^ Thompson^ (1913)^226 U.^ S.^ 55I, 33 Sup. Ct. 129; see COMMENTS (1917)^^26 YALE^ LAW^ JOURNAL,^ 319.^ But^ the
RECENT CASE NOTES
validity of such a decree by^ the court^ of^ a^ foreign^ nation^ is^ to^ be^ decided^ by^ each state for itself upon principles^ of^ comity.^ Minor,^ Conflict^ of^ Laws^ (igoI)^ sec.
4. However, divorces granted^ in^ the^ country^ in^ which^ both parties^ were^ domi- ciled are universally recognized. Kapigan v. Der Minassin (1912) 212 Mass. 412, 99 N. E. 264 (Mohammedan); Miller^ v. Miller^ (igi,^ Sup.^ Ct.)^ 7o^ Misc.^ 368, 128 N. Y. Supp. 787 (rabbinical) ; Wall^ v.^ Williamson^ (1845)^^8 Ala.^48 (Indian tribal). In Anglo-American law,^ jurisdiction^ over^ the^ res,^ the^ marital^ status, depends upon domicile. Minor, op. cit.^ sec.^ 88.^ And,^ as^ a^ rule, the^ domicile^ of either spouse has sufficient jurisdiction for a^ decree^ of^ its courts^ to^ be^ recog- nized in other countries. Cheever v. Wilson (1869,^ U.^ S.)^9 Wall.^ io8;^ Lie^ v. Lie (igi6, Sup. Ct.) 96 Misc. 3, I59 N. Y. Supp.^ 748.^ But^ a^ dissolution^ of^ mar- riage in a nation where neither spouse is domiciled^ is^ not^ accorded^ extra-terri- torial validity. Sure v. Lindefelt (1892) 82 Wis. 346,^52 N.^ W.^ 308.^ And^ the consent of^ the^ parties^ in^ submitting^ to^ a^ foreign^ court^ is^ held^ not^ to^ give^ juris- diction over their status. Andrews v. Andrews (1903) 188 U. S. 14,^^23 Sup.^ Ct. 237. The party invoking a foreign jurisdiction, however, may be personally estopped to deny its competency. Starbuck v. Starbuck (19o3) 173 N. Y. 503, 66 N. E. 193. But the decree may usually be attacked by third parties. Andrews v. Andrews, supra (second wife) ; German Savings and Loan Society v. Do- mitzer (i9o4)^192 U.^ S.^ 125,^24 Sup. Ct.^^221 (heirs);^ see^ CoMrNTs^ (i9i) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 821. In view of the absence of domicile the liberal recognition of the foreign divorce decree by the court in the instant case may be supported on the ground of estoppel. Furthermore it seems desirable for the forum to concede its sovereignty when its own laws are not eluded or its local policy offended.
CONTEMPT-CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEmPT-CLAYTON ACT PRovIsION FOR JURY TRi.-The defendants, members of an organization enjoined from committing certain acts, were ordered to show cause in contempt proceedings for violation of the injunction. The defendants denied the alleged acts and demanded a jury trial, under sections^21 and^^22 of the^ Clayton^ Act.^ Act^ of^ Oct.^ 15,^^1914 ( Stat at L. 730, 738). Held, that even if the Act applied to the facts in this case, the jury trial provision was unconstitutional. In re Atchison (1922, S. D. Fla.) 284 Fed. 604. Acts in derogation of the authority of a court, resulting in punitive proceed- ings, constitute criminal contempts; those resulting in proceedings to right civil wrongs constitute civil^ contempt.^ Gompers^ v.^ Buck Stove^ &^ R.^ Co.^ (1911)^221 U. S. 418, 441, 31 Sup. Ct 492, 498. Procedural differences and a lack of power in executive departments to pardon for civil contempt make this classification important. Beale, Contempt of Court,^ Crminal^ and^ Civil^ (198o)^^21 HARv.^ L. REV. 16i; NOTES (1912) 25 ibid. 375; NOTES (92)^5 MlINNQ.^ L.^ REv.^ 459;^ (1923) 36 HARv. L. REV. 617 (pardoning power). Direct^ contempts^ necessitate^ the^ use of summary proceedings; statutory provisions for jury trial where they exist^ at all in this^ relation^ deal^ oily^ with^ constructive^ contempts.^ I^ Ga.^ Code,^ 1911, 1o95, io96; I Bunn's Okla. Comp. Sts. 1921, 121 (constitutional provision)^ ;^ see Cheney, Jury Trials in Contempt Cases^ (1914)^78 CENT.^ L.^ JouR. 183;^ see^ Beale, op. cit. 172, 173. The power to punish for contempt is less subject to^ interfer- ence by legislatures in the case of courts created by^ a^ constitution^ than^ in^ courts of legislative creation. Cf. Ex Parte Robinson (1873, U. S.) i Wall. 505, 510; Rapalje, Contempts (1884)^ 12;^^16 Ann.^ Cas.^ 759,^ note.^ Legislative^ attempts^ to provide for jury trials of persons accused of contempt in constitutionally created courts have been held invalid. Carter's Case (1899) 96 Va. 791, 32 S. E. 78o; Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney (192o) 236 Mass. 310, 128 N. E. 429; see NoTEs and COMMzENT (1921) 6 CoRN. L. QUART. 329. A jury trial of a contempt charge
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PARTNERSHIP--INTEREST OF (^) PARTNER IN SPECIFIC Fn~m REAL ESTATE-A part- nership purchased (^) real estate for resale, taking (^) the conveyance in the individual names of the (^) two partners. On the decease (^) of one of the partners (^) the survivor, having contracted (^) to sell the property in administering the firm business, (^) brought a bill (^) in equity to test whether (^) the heirs of the deceased had (^) an interest in the specific property (^) that had been purchased. (^) Held, that under the (^) Uniform Part- nership (^) Act, sec. 26, the heirs had (^) no interest in the specific (^) property, but only the deceased's (^) interest in the partnership, (^) which was personalty. (^) Wharf v. Wharf (^) (i922, Il) 137 N. E. 446. Partners may (^) own real estate in their (^) partnership right, even (^) though the deed to the property is in (^) their individual names. (^) McKleroy v. Musgrove (^) (I919) 203 Ala. 603, (^84) So. 280; Burdick, Partiership (^) (i9g7) ior. There (^) is a conflict, how- ever, as to whether (^) a partner's interest in (^) firm real estate is specific (^) and subject to (^) the law of real property. (^) In the case of personal (^) property, the partner's inter- est is undivided (^) and relates to the partnership (^) assets as a whole. (^) Tensen v. Wiersma (i919) (^185) Iowa, 551, i7o N. W. (^) 780; see 4 A. L. R. 3oo, (^) note. The English courts have long (^) held to the same rule (^) in regard to partnership (^) real estate, treating (^) such property as equitably (^) converted into personalty (^) and so entirely merged (^) into the partnership fund. (^) Darby v. Darby (^) (1856, Ch.) 3 Drewry, (^) 495. This result (^) is now statutory. (189o) (^) 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, sec. (^) 22. By the majority American (^) rule, in the absence (^) of governing stipulations (^) between the parties, partnership real estate is treated as personalty (^) only to the extent (^) that it is needed (^) to pay partnership debts. (^) Priestley v. Treas. and (^) Receiver General (i918) (^) 230 Mass. 452, (^120) N. E. 100; 37 L. R. A. (^) (x. s.) 90, note. So (^) the widow of a deceased (^) partner is entitled (^) to dower in that part of (^) the real estate not needed (^) to pay such debts. Woodward-Holmes (^) Co. v. Nudd (^) (894) 58 Minn. 236, 59 N. W. (^) Ioio; 27 L. R. A. 34o, (^) note. Ard where the personal (^) property is sufficient (^) to pay firm debts, the interest of the deceased (^) partner in the specific realty passes directly (^) to his heirs according (^) to the laws of real estate (^) succession. Weitz v. Weitz (^) (i92i) i5 Ohio App. (^) 134. But even by the American rule, real estate purchased (^) by a partnership for (^) resale is treated as personalty (^) between the (^) partners. Parish v. Bainum (^) (1920) 291 Ill. 374, (^126) N. E. 129 (dissolution of partnership (^) and distribution (^) of assets); (i92o) (^) i5 ILL. L. REV. 122. The Uniform Partnership Act, (^) adopted in 14 states, (^) was intended to embody (^) the English rule (^) under section 26. Lewis, (^) The Uniform Partnership (^) Act (915) 24 YALE LA w (^) JoURNAL, 617, 637. The (^) instant case, decided under (^) this act, changes the previous (^) Illinois rule. Galbraith v. (^) Tracy (894) 153 Ill. 54, 38 N. E. 937. The result (^) reached is desirable, inasmuch (^) as it effects a simpler (^) administration of partnership (^) assets by overcoming the practical difficulty of assigning (^) specific property (^) to the individual partners (^) or their heirs.
SALES-BREACH (^) OF IMPLIED WARRANTY-EFFECT (^) OF PROVISION (^) FOR RETURN.- The plaintiff (^) contracted to sell the (^) defendant a quantity (^) of silk thread. The contract (^) provided that all shipments (^) should be tested (^) by the buyer and returned within fifteen (^) days if unsatisfactory. (^) The thread was on spools (^) and the defects were not discovered until (^) it was unwound and made (^) into fabric. In a suit (^) for the price, (^) the buyer counterclaimed (^) for damages. Held, (^) (one judge dissenting) (^) that it was a question for the (^) jury whether the parties (^) intended by the contract (^) to negative (^) the implied warranty under Personal Property (^) Law (N. Y. Cons. Laws, igo9, ch. (^41) as amended by Laws, 191, (^) ch. 571, sec. 96; Uniform (^) Sales Act, sec. "5). Wilbur-Dolson (^) Silk Co., Inc. v. (^) William Wallach Co., Inc. (^) (1923, Sup. Ct.) 120 Misc. (^) 340, 198 N. Y. Supp. 243. The 'Seller's liability for the (^) breach of an implied (^) warranty of quality generally survives (^) acceptance, where the (^) defects are latent and (^) undiscoverable by inspec- tion. (^) Uniform Sales Act, (^) sec. 49; Preist v. Last (^) [19o3, C. A.] 2 K. B. (^) 148;
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see Carleton^ v.^ Lombard,^ Ayres^ &^ Co.^ (I896)^^149 N.^ Y.^ 137,^43 N.^ E.^ 422;
Williston, Sales^ (igog)^ secs.^ 232,^ 234.^ By^ the^ better^ view,^ these^ implied^ warran-
ties remain^ effective^ unless^ inconsistent^ with^ the^ warranties^ expressed^ in the contract of^ sale.^ Hansnann^ v.^ Pollard^ (Igi)^^113 Minn.^ 429,^129 N.^ W.^ 848; Uniform Sales Act, sec.^15 (6).^ But^ at^ common law^ it^ is^ generally held^ that^ an express warranty excludes^ an^ implied^ warranty^ of^ quality^ where^ both^ cover^ the same or closely^ related^ subjects.^ Somerville^ v.^ Gullett^ Gin^ Co.^ (1917)^^137 Tenn. 509, 194 S.^ W.^ 576;^ Monroe^ v.^ Hickox^ Co.^ (I9o6)^ I44^ Mich.^ 30,^ io7 N. W.
7IO; but see Mich.^ Comp.^ Laws,^ 1915,^ ch.^^228 (Sales^ Act),^ sec. 15 (6). Many courts extend this^ rule,^ and^ hold^ that^ an^ express^ warranty^ of^ quality^ excludes any implied warranty^ of^ merchantability^ or^ fitness.^ DeWitt v.^ Berry^ (I8go)^134 U. S.^ 3o6,^ io^ Sup.^ Ct.^ 536;^ but^ see^ Guhy^ v.^ Nichols^ &^ Shepherd^ Co.^ (I9O8)^
Ky. L. Rep.^ 237,^109 S.^ W.^^1190 (express^ warranty^ held to^ exclude^ all^ implied warranties). The^ parties^ may^ clearly^ nullify^ any^ or^ all^ implied^ warranties^ by express provisions^ in^ the^ contract.^ Burntisland^ Shipbuilding^ Co.^ v.^ Barde^ Steel Products Corporation^ (1922,^ D.^ Del.)^278 Fed.^ 552;^ Uniform^ Sales^ Act,^ sec.^ 71; Sale of Goods^ Act^ (1894)^^56 &^^57 Vict.^ c.^ 71,^ sec.^ 55.^ But^ even^ in^ such^ a case it^ has^ been^ held^ that^ the^ buyer^ may recover^ for^ non-compliance^ with^ descrip- tion where^ the^ defects^ are^ not^ discoverable^ by^ inspection.^ Wallis^ v.^ Pratt^ [igi1, H. L.] A. C. 394; contra: Leonard^ Seed^ Co.^ v.^ Crary^ Canning^ Co.^ (1911)^^147 Wis. 166,^132 N.^ W.^ 902;^37 L.^ R.^ A.^ (N.^ s.)^ 79,^ note;^ Kibbe^ v.^ Woodruff^ (i92o) 94 Conn. 443, io9 Atl. 169.^ The^ same^ rule^ is^ applicable where^ the^ contract^ by its terms limits the remedies^ of^ the^ buyer^ to^ a^ return^ of^ the^ goods.^ Elgin Jewelry Co.^ v.^ Estes^ and^ Dozier^ (i9o5)^ I22^ Ga.^ 8o7,^^50 S.^ E.^ 939;^ Main^ v. Dearing and Wallace (19o5)^73 Ark.^ 470,^84 S.^ W.^ 64o.^ The^ reasoning^ is^ that the effectiveness of the limitation^ is^ itself^ conditional^ on^ compliance^ with^ the description. Cf. (1923)^32 YALE^ LAW^ JOURNAL,^ 739.^ It^ often^ seems^ desirable, however, to consider the intention^ of^ the^ parties^ as^ a^ question^ of^ fact rather than to construe the contract^ by^ applying^ fixed^ rules^ of^ law.^ Pennsylvania^ has enacted the rule of the instant^ case^ in^ interpreting^ all^ contracts^ of^ sale^ purporting to vary or negative implied^ obligations.^ Uniform^ Sales^ Act,^ sec.^ 71,^ as^ modified by Pa.^ Laws,^ 1915,^ No.^ 241,^ sec.^ 71.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANE-PAROL CONTRACT^ VITHIN^ STATUTE^ OF^ FRAuDS-
POSSESSION AS SUFFICIENT^ PART^ PERFORMaANcE.-In^ the^ ejectment^ action^ the defendant counterclaimed for^ specific^ performance^ of^ the oral contract^ of^ pur- chase under which she^ had^ taken^ possession^ of^ the^ premises^ and^ occupied^ with- out payment of rent for^ two years.^ Held,^ that^ the^ defendant^ could^ have^ specific
performance. Bradley^ v.^ Loveday^ (1922)^^98 Conn.^ 315,^ iig^ At.^ 147.
The English doctrine that^ possession^ alone^ is^ sufficient^ part^ performance^ to take an oral contract out^ of^ the^ Statute^ of^ Frauds^ has^ some-^ standing^ in^ America by reason of numerous dicta^ accepted^ by^ commentators.^ Butcher^ v.^ Stapely (1685, Ch.) I Vern. 363;^ Wharton^ v.^ Stoutenburgh^ (1882)^^35 N.^ J.^ Eq.^ 266; Eaton v. Whitaker (1846) IS^ Conn.^ 222;^ I^ Ames,^ Cases^ in^ Equity Jurisdiction (19o4) 279, note I;^ Pomeroy,^ Specific^ Performance^ (2d^ ed.^ 1897)^ sec.^ 96; (192o) 29 YALE LAW^ JOURNAL,^ 462.^ In^ some^ states,^ it^ has^ been^ expressly repudiated. Baldridge v.^ Centgraf^ (1910)^82 Kan.^ 240,^ io8^ Pac.^ 83;^ Glass^ v. Hulbert (1869)^102 Mass.^ 24-^ Whether^ possession^ alone^ is^ a^ sufficient^ part performance seems^ to^ depend^ on^ the^ theory^ upon^ which^ the^ court^ bases^ its willingness to act.^ Some^ courts^ enforce^ the^ parol^ agreement^ where^ it^ would be a "virtual fraud" on^ the^ vendee^ to^ permit^ the^ vendor^ to^ set^ up^ the^ Statute of Frauds after he^ had^ allowed^ acts^ to^ be^ done^ in^ reliance^ on^ the^ contract. Pomeroy, op.^ cit.^ sec.^ 1O4;^ Miller^ v.^ Ball^ (1876)^^64 N.^ Y.^ 286;^ COMMENTS (1915) 24 YALE LAW^ JOURNAL,^ 426.^ Under^ this^ theory^ it^ seems^ that^ possession alone would^ not^ put the^ vendee^ in^ a^ position^ of^ material hardship.^ See^ Glad-
YALE LAW JOURNAL
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DEPENDENCY OF^ CHILDREN^ AFTER^ Divo^ CE DEcRE-In a decree of divorce^ awarding^ custody to^ the^ mother,^ the^ father^ was ordered to pay^ three^ dollars^ a^ week^ for^ the^ support of^ the^ child.^ Subsequently the father was^ accidentally killed^ and^ the^ child^ brought^ action^ under^ the^ Work- men's Compensation Act, which provided^ that^ children^ under^ the^ age^ of sixteen years "shall^ be^ conclusively^ presumed^ to^ be^ wholly^ dependent.^.^.^ upon^ a^ parent who was^ at^ the^ time^ of^ his death^ legally^ bound^ to^ support^ although^ living^ apart from such^ child^ or^ children."^ Mass.^ Gen.^ Laws,^ 1921,^ ch.^ 152,^ sec.^ 32.^ Held, that this conclusive^ presumption^ of^ dependency^ did^ not^ apply^ to^ a^ child whose custody had^ been^ taken^ away^ from the^ deceased^ by^ a^ divorce^ decree.^ Miller's Case (1923,^ Mass.)^138 N.^ E.^ 254. Actual dependency of a child upon a^ parent^ will^ support^ a^ claim^ under^ work- men's compensation acts. Johnson^ Coffee^ Co.^ v.^ McDonald^ (192o)^^143 Tenn. 505, 226 S. W. 215; Harper, The Law^ of^ Workmen's^ Compensation^ (2d^ ed. i92o) sec. 138. The acts often provide for^ "conclusive^ presumptions"^ of^ depend- ency. Ninneman v. Industrial Commission of^ Wisconsin^ (1920)^171 Wis.^ 190, 176 N. W. go9;^ Pacific^ Gold^ Dredging^ Co.^ v.^ Industrial^ Accident^ Commission (1920) 184 Calif. 462, 194 Pac.^ i;^ Conn.^ Pub.^ Acts,^ 1921,^ ch.^ 305,^ sec.^ 5.^ So under some statutes where the child is^ under^ a^ certain^ age.^ Johnson^ Coffee^ Co. v. McDonald, supra;^ Tenn.^ Pub.^ Acts,^ 1919,^ ch.^ 123,^ sec.^ 30.^ In^ others where a child under a certain age is living with^ its^ parent.^ Me.^ Laws,^ 1919,^ ch.^ 238, sec. i; Mich. Comp. Laws, 1922, sec. 5436; R.^ I.^ Acts,^ 1912,^ ch.^ 831,^ art.^ II, sec. 7. Several statutes, as^ in^ the^ instant^ case,^ also provide^ for^ such^ a^ "conclu- sive presumption" if the parent was^ legally^ bound^ to^ support^ the^ child.^ Stephens v. Stephens (1921, Ind. App.) 132 N.^ E.^747 ("upon^ whom^ the^ laws^ of^ the^ state impose the obligation to support") ;^ Sherer^ &^ Co.^ v.^ Industrial^ Accident^ Com- mission (1920) 182 Calif. 488,^188 Pac.^^798 ("legally liable"^ for^ maintenance); Calif. Gen. Laws, 1915, act 2144 a, sec.^ 19;^ Harper,^ op.^ cit.^ sec.^ 129.^ The expression "duty to support ' (^) is used in connection with children in a variety of different senses. COMMENTS (1923)^^32 YALE^ LAv^ JOURNAL,^ 825.^ "Duty^ to support" in the sense of duty^ to pay^ for^ necessaries^ furnished^ the^ child by^ third parties has been held in Massachusetts to^ depend^ upon^ the^ right^ to^ custody. Brow v. Brightman (1883) 136 Mass.^ 187.^ From^ this^ the^ court^ reasons^ that there is no duty of support^ and^ therefore^ no^ "conclusive^ presumption"^ of dependency in the instant case. But in^ this^ same sense^ there^ is^ no^ "duty^ of support" where the father is^ actually^ supporting^ the^ child,^ although^ dependency in such a case is obvious. 4 Ann. Cas.^ 1188,^ 1189,^ note;^ see^ Lufkin^ v.^ Harvey (1915) 131 Minn.^ 238,^ 239,^^154 N.^ W.^ 1O97.^ It^ seems^ that^ the^ divorce decree^ in the instant case created a clear "duty to^ support."^ The^ decision^ may^ be^ justified, however, on the ground that the child does not^ come^ within^ the^ "conclusive presumption" of total dependency,^ since^ the^ award^ itself^ was^ admittedly^ insuffi- cient for complete support.^ See^ Sherer^ &^ Co.^ v.^ IndustrialAccident^ Commission, supra, at p.^ 4.9o,^188 Pac.^ at^ p.^ 799.^ Viewed^ in^ any^ other^ light^ the^ decision^ is^ at variance with^ the^ clear^ policy^ of^ the Act.^ See^ Schouler,^ Domestic^ Relations^ (6th ed. 1921) sec. 796;^ Winner^ v.^ Shucart^ (1919)^^202 Mo.^ App.^ 176,^215 S. W.^^905 (recovery by mother for child's support^ though^ father^ had^ no^ custody) ;^ Panther Creek Mines v. Industrial Commission (1921)^^296 Ill.^ 565,^ 13o^ N.^ E.^^321 (same under Workmen's^ Compensation^ Act);^ Industrial^ Commission^ v.^ Drake^ (1921, Ohio) 134 N. E. 465 (same) ; Sherer & Co. v.^ Industrial^ Accident^ Commission, supra (same); Western &^ A.^ Ry.^ v.^ Williams^ (1918)^22 Ga.^ App.^ 192,^^95 S.E. 738 (father under duty to support after^ a^ divorce^ decree)^ ;^ Continental^ Casualty Co. v. Pillsbury (1919) 181 Calif.^ 389,^184 Pac.^658 (a^ legal^ duty^ of^ support after a decree of maintenance).
