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Parker's II Philippine Corps. Defense of Bataan was hampered by the raw Filipino troops. Usually, a great portion of the Philippine Army evacuated to the rear ...
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RICE UNIVERSITY
THE EVENTS THAT LED TO THE FALL OF BATAAN AND TO THE DEATH MARCH MADE BY THE DEFENDING FILIPINO AND AMERICAN TROOPS
by
NENE SIMS
I wish to express apprecation to the following men who loaned me papers, manuscripts, or diaries they had written: Matt P. Dobrinic, Milton D. Hawes, and Edmond J. Babler,- Also, I wish to thank Jim Lopez for the unit history of the 200th Coast Artillery (AA) which he sent and the many men who sent articles. The heads of several American Ex-Prisoners of War Chapters in Texas have been helpful in distributing ques¬ tionnaires: Matt P. Dobrinic, Onnie Clem, Joseph G. Shis- ser, and Virginia Hatfield. Then there are the men who took the time and effort to fill out my questionnaire. I am extremely grateful to them. N.S
Abstract The Events That Led to' Death March .Made by the the Defending FillipinoFall of Bataan and to arid the American Troops
Nene Sims United States Armed Forces stationed in the Pacific were the first bastion the Japanese Imperial Army met in their agressive onslaught against the United States in December, 1941. This country hoped the initial Japanese onslaught would be stopped by these troops; especially, it based its hopes on those stationed in the Philippines and on the impregable island of Corrigdor. Unfortunately, its hopes were doomed to disappoint¬ ment as the onrolling Japanese combat soldiers destroyed all the opposition in its path. However, the United States Armed Forces in these islands played an important part in the early stages of the war, as it maintained a buffer between the Imperial Army and the mainland United States (through its persistent fighting) long enough for this country to pull itself to¬ gether and prepare to fight the unexpected aggressive attack. Therefore, the actions of these troops stationed in the Philippines were a vital part of the United States war effort against Japan and as such deserve to be studied. To begin the study, I found and obtained all the possible personal nar¬ ratives written about the war in the Philippines. Added to this, I based the majority of my study on a ten page questionnaire I sent out to one hundred and fifty ex^POWs of'the Japanese. I got an overwhelming response and received a reply from two-thirds of the men. After analyzing the data I began to write the thesis using the information obtained from the analysis to form the background of my paper and the personal narratives combined
with, the private papers sent to we by several of the men tg furnish specific examples, According to my findings, the United States Armed Forces in the Phil^- ippines provided the United States with the time delay it needed to pro¬ vide an effective defensive against the Japanese war effort. This achieve¬ ment, however, was due to the persistance, loyalty, and courage of the individual combat soldiers rather than to any effective government plan or the brilliant leadership of the Army’s leaders. In fact, the men of the Army stationed in the Philippines found themselves at the beginning of the war trying to deal with a lack of capable leadership, weapons, uniforms, food, medical supplies, ammunition, etc. MacArthur, the com¬ mander of this force, complicated matters by immediately and inefficiently putting into effect a defeatist defense plan created long ago. As a result, the ordinary combat soldier in the United States force found him¬ self trying to stop the prepared Japanese soldiers with literally nothing but his ingenuity. When available, weapons dating back to the first World War misfired or broke down completely. Ammunition also left over from the previous war proved to be a delightful surprise, as it either never exploded or blew up in the men's faces. Forced to retreat by their commander’s orders to the barren Bataan Peninsula, the tired retreating men found that no one had bothered to see that sufficient supplies had been moved there to accommodate them. So, for over four months, these men fought a losing battle against the Japanese using inefficient weapons and unpredictable ammunition, having little or no food and medical supplies, and literally no ordinance. It was the men then, the ordinary soldier, who held the Japanese off through sheer courage, persistance, and loyalty that won the United States the delay in time it needed to initiate an effective war effort against Japan.
(American) , and a Company of Military Police (American and Philippine Scouts). At this time all units were under strength, so an intensive recruitment program was begun.^2 Fortified islands in and around Manila Bay were defended by four regiments of coast artillery—the 59th and 60th C.A.C. (American) and the 9^st and 92nd C.A.C. (Philippine Scouts). To safeguard Philippine airspace, pursuit aviation was stationed at Nichols Field in Manila and bombardment aviation was at Clark Field in Pampanga. Other air fields were under construction throughout the islands. Watching over the sea approaches, the Navy, located at Cavite Navy Yard in Manila Bay and at Olongapo in Subic Bay, found itself with a small force of two cruisers, some destroyers, a few submarines, and a couple of flying boats used solely for patrol duty. This was the small force that the United States hoped would play a central part in successfully defending the Philippines when the imminent Japanese attack occurred. War plan Orange No. 3 (WPO-3) was a plan for the defense of the Philippine Islands. Approximately twenty years old, it dealt with the event of a successful
Japanese landing on the main island of Luzon. The Philippine Division and the Philippine Army were to counter-attack and destroy the landing forces. If this proved impossible, they were to try and stop the subse¬ quent advances made by the enemy. In the event this, too, failed, delaying actions were to be fought to final battle positions in the province of Bataan. Here a six-month stand was to be made in order to provide enough time for aid from the United States to arrive. According to Wain- wright, both he and MacArthur agreed this was a defeatist plan.^3 Dealing with supply, a section of WPO-3 arranged for the troops to be fed from a stockpile of 50,000, bushels of unthreshed rice that was to be set aside in a rice depot at Cabanatuan. According to a high quarter¬ master officer who worked on this part of the plan, the entire requirements had been met before hostilities began.
troops being fed. The Americans, who were to number 10,000, were to be given eight ounces of rice per day or a total of 900*000 pounds for the whole six-month period. As for the 6,000 Philippine Scouts, they were to receive sixteen
5 consisting of the 4th and 5th Military Districts; and Colonel William F. Sharp, the Visayan-Mindano Forces formed by the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th Military Dis¬ tricts.* Each Military District should be able to mobil¬ ize a division.^7 In October 1941, General Grunert was sent back to the United States. General MacArthur then took over command of the Philippine Department.^8 Ifirst began increment of to over-see thethe draft wastask of mobilization.inducted on Septem¬The ber 1, 1941. The next one occurred the latter part ofdraft October. early (^) in November.This was quickly Finally, followed the bylast another one was
began,inducted the^ the last^ last week group had^ in^ November.had only twoWhen weeks^ the ofwar training. Neither of the last two regiments had hadwere a (^) overtaken bychance to fire actual their combat. basic 9 weapon before they
American Army personnel in the Philippines were brought to a greater strength by the arrival of several units from the United States during the months of Septem¬ ber, October, and November. These units consisted of the 200th C.A.C., 192nd and 194th Tank Battalains and the 803rd Engineer Battalion. By the time the war began, there were 10,000 American soldiers on Luzon divided between
*See Appendix B for a listing of the Military Districts and their respective divisions.
6 General Wainwright's North Luzon Force with headquarters at Fort Stotsenberg and General Parker's South Luzon Force with headquarters in the Batangas area. Unfortunately, the majority of these men were not equipped or trained as com¬ batants, since they were engineers, signal corpsmen, quartermasters, military police and air corpsmen without planes.^10 It should be noted here that the Luzon Forces were not connected with the forces on Corregidor Island and vice versa. The two groups were separate and distinct. Since Corregidor had to perform the important task of protecting Manila Bay, it would not be able to send reinforcements to the troops on Luzon. To guard Corregidor, Major General George F. Moore, commanding the harbor defenses of Manila and Subic Bays, had units from the following: 60th Coast Artillery (A.A.), the 59th Coast Artillery (heavy gun), and the 91st and 92nd Regiments of Coast Artillery (Philippine Scouts). Beach defenses were maintained by the 4th United States Marines under Colonel Samuel Howard. Beginning the war the Philippine Scouts, part of the U.S. Army, had a maximum strength of 6,000. The pre¬ war recruitment program failed to raise the scout force to
Story (Garden*Robert City,^ Considine, New Yorks^ ed.» DoubledayGeneral^ Wainwright's and Company, Inc.,
(^2) Maj. Matt P, Dobrinic, "The Struggle for the Philippines J December 1941-10 May 1942." The Infantry AdvancedSchool^ General Officers^ Section Military History Course 1946-1947# Fort^ Committee,Benning, Georgia,
(^4) E. B. Miller, Bataan Uncensored (Long Prairie, Minnesota: The Hart Publications, Inc., 1949)» p. 73* (^5) Dobrinic, p. 5* ®Miller, p. 6. (^7) Dobrinic, p. 6. sMiller, p. 5* (^9) Dobrinic, pp. 6-8. aoAlvin C. Poweleit, USAFFE (1975)» P« 17* i;LMiller, p. 77*
8
On December 8, 1941, the armed forces stationed in the Philippines learned the United States was at war with Japan. Early that morning news about the disastrous Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor came on the radio. Exact details about the extent of the damage were unavailable. It was known that part of the Pacific Fleet was destroyed. Initially, the men of the American Forces based in the Philippines experienced shock and disbelief when they woke up and heard the stunning news (See Table A-2).- For some of them, it was unbelievable that the tiny country of Japan had dared to attack the United States with its immense size and many resources. Others who had been alerted about the possibility of war with Japan by MacArthur and Grunert were suprised about the location of the attack, since it had been anticipated that the Japanese would assault the Philippines first. 9
Fort Stotsenburg, had just learhed about Pearl Harbor with some friends when the sound of approaching planes was heard. Automatically, they assumed the planes to be American until thunderous explosions coming from Clark Field convinced them otherwise.^3 At the same time the Japanese bombers were attacking Clark Field other planes were destroying American bases throughout the Philippines. Screeching air raid sirens shattered the quiet of
medium-range bombers with the flaming rising sun of Japan on the wings flew across the city to Cavite Navy Base where they dropped their bomb load. Another formation passed over the city to Nichols Field which they pulverized with incendiary and demolition bombs. Finally, twenty-seven bombers from another squadron began leveling the city of Manilla itself in an effort to destroy the army barracks, office buildings, and ware¬ houses. This was the beginning of the continuous bombing Manilla would undergo until the Japanese entered the city. Fires-caused by the. bombing added to the‘universal
confusion and devastation in the city.^4
Americans caught off-guard by the unexpected attack rushed to defend themselves. It was at this time they began to experience the incompetence and unprepared¬ ness that was to characterize so much of this war. One group found they could not use their machine guns, since there was no belted ammunition. The base armorer explained that ammunition for the automatic weapons was belted only as it was needed for the rifle range.^5 The 200th Coast Artillery at Clark Field found itself firing blindly in the air at the Japanese planes. When it arrived in the Philippines in September, the unit left its calibrating equipment for the guns with the Ordnance Department for adjustment. The Ordnance Department did not return it until after the Japanese attack. Also, the 200th CfA. was equipped with antiquated fuses which they had until the campaigns ended. As a result of these fuses, only one shell out of every six they fired exploded.^6 The initial destruction of the military planes was the worst debacle. The Japanese managed to demolish a majority of the planes at Clark Field, Nichols Field, and Iba Field. Waiting for orders to bomb Formosa the planes at Clark Field, for example, were lined up on the runway, ready for combat.
During the first few days after the initial Japanese landings, there was little contact with the enemy other than a few minor skirmishes. This quickly changed, however, once the Japanese began their advance on Manilia. As they were pushed back again and again by the approaching enemy, it became clear that the armed forces in the Philippines could not successfully meet the threat posed by Japan's mighty army. Hindering their success was the antiquated equipment given to them for fighting and the early destruction of the planes that were to have provided air cover. Victory would be denied the American forces in the Philippines unless reinforcements arrived from the United States. Conse¬ quently, MacArthur decided on December 23» 1941» to put WPO-3 into effect. In his opinion it was the best plan of action left open, since it provided for the with¬ drawal of the armed forces to Bataan Peninsula where they could fight a delaying action until the United States sent help.^10 Wainwright tells what the initiating of
WPO-3 implied, "It was a bitter pill to swallow, for War Plan Orange No. 3 meant the last ditch: the long-ago planned desperation withdrawal to Bataan." 11
On December 25, the USAFFE staff and President Quezon and High Commissioner Sayre of the Philippines along with their personal and official families were moved to Corregidor for safety.^12 For the most part, the military troops were ordered to withdraw to Bataan. The 200th Coast Artillery (A.A.) was to protect the retreat of the Northern Luzon Force in Bataan by engaging in defensive action with the Japanese. As for the Southern Luzon Force, its withdrawal was to be secured by the 515th Coast Artillery (AA) which was formed from the 200th C.A. (AA). To prevent it from being totally devasted, Manila was declared an open city by MacArthur. Bataan was picked as the site for the withdrawal of the troops because it was believed to be the only place on Luzon that could be defended. In fact, it was ideal for defensive warfare. Bataan, which was twenty- five miles long and twenty miles wide, was heavily jungled and extremely mountainous, cut by innumerable small streams and a number of deep ravines, and had only two roads which motor vehicles could use. Two huge extinct volcanoes dominated the Bataan Peninsulas Mt. Natib in the north and the Mariveles Mountains to the
