Understanding Insider Threats and Security Protocols in Special Access Programs, Exams of Physics

A foundational overview of insider threats, security protocols, and the handling of classified information within special access programs (saps). it details key elements for identifying critical program information, managing risks to dod assets, and understanding the roles of various security agencies. The document also covers personnel security investigations, clearance processes, and the handling of classified information, making it a valuable resource for those studying national security and information protection.

Typology: Exams

2024/2025

Available from 04/22/2025

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SPēD SFPC EXAM: All Areas
Indicators of insider threats
1. Failure to report overseas travel or contact with foreign nationals
2. Seeking to gain higher clearance or expand access outside job scope
3. Engaging in classified conversations without NTK
4. Working inconsistent hours
5. Exploitable behavior traits
6. Repeated security violations
7. Unexplainable affluence/living above one's means
8. Illegal downloads of information/files
Elements that should be considered in identifying Critical Program
Information
Elements which if compromised could:
1. cause significant degradation in mission effectiveness,
2. shorten expected combat-effective life of system
3. reduce technological advantage
4. significantly alter program direction; or
5. enable adversary to defeat, counter, copy, or reverse engineer technology/capability.
Elements that security professional should consider when assessing and managing risks to DoD assets
(risk management process)
1. Assess assets
2. Assess threats
3. Assess Vulnerabilities
4. Assess risks
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SPēD SFPC EXAM: All Areas

Indicators of insider threats

  1. Failure to report overseas travel or contact with foreign nationals
  2. Seeking to gain higher clearance or expand access outside job scope
  3. Engaging in classified conversations without NTK
  4. Working inconsistent hours
  5. Exploitable behavior traits
  6. Repeated security violations
  7. Unexplainable affluence/living above one's means
  8. Illegal downloads of information/files

Elements that should be considered in identifying Critical Program

Information

Elements which if compromised could:

  1. cause significant degradation in mission effectiveness,
  2. shorten expected combat-effective life of system
  3. reduce technological advantage
  4. significantly alter program direction; or
  5. enable adversary to defeat, counter, copy, or reverse engineer technology/capability.

Elements that security professional should consider when assessing and managing risks to DoD assets (risk management process)

  1. Assess assets
  2. Assess threats
  3. Assess Vulnerabilities
  4. Assess risks
  1. Determine countermeasure options
  2. Make RM decision

The three categories of Special Access Programs

acquisition, intelligence, and operations & support

Types of threats to classified information

Insider Threat, Foreign Intelligence Entities (FIE), criminal activities, cyber threats, business competitors

The concept of an insider threat

An employee who may represent a threat to

national security. These threats encompass potential espionage, violent acts against the Government or the nation, and unauthorized disclosure of classified information

The purpose of the Foreign Visitor Program

To track and approve access by a foreign entity to information that is classified; and to approve access by a foreign entity to information that is unclassified, related to a U.S. Government contract, or plant visits covered by ITAR.

Special Access Program

A program established for a specific class of

classified information that imposes safeguarding and access requirements that exceed those normally required for information at the same classification level.

Responsibilities of the Government SAP Security Officer/Contractor Program

Security Officer (GSSO/

CPSO)

  • Possess personnel clearance and Program access at least equal to highest level of Program classified information involved.
  • Provide security administration and management for organization.
  • Ensure personnel processed for access to SAP meet prerequisite personnel clearance and/or investigative requirements specified.
  • Ensure adequate secure storage and work spaces.
  • Ensure strict adherence to the provisions of NISPOM, its supplement, and the Overprint.
  • When required, establish and oversee classified material control program for each SAP.
  • When required, conduct an annual inventory of accountable

classified material.

  • When required, establish SAPF.
  • Establish and oversee visitor control program.
  • Monitor reproduction/duplication/destruction capability of SAP information
  • Ensure adherence to special communications capabilities within SAPF.
  • Provide for initial Program indoctrination of employees after access is approved; rebrief and debrief personnel
  • Establish and oversee specialized procedures for transmission of

SAP material to and from Program elements

  • When required, ensure contractual specific security requirements are accomplished.
  • Establish security training and briefings specifically tailored to unique requirements of SAP.

The five Cognizant

Security Agencies (CSAs)

Department of Defense

(DoD), Director of National Intelligence (DNI), Department of Energy (DoE), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

Cognizant Security Agencies (CSA)s' role in the National Industrial Security Program (NISP).

Establish general industrial security programs and oversee/administer security requirements

Primary authorities governing foreign disclosure of classified military information

  1. Arms Export Control Act
  2. National Security Decision Memorandum 119
  3. National Disclosure Policy-
  4. International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR)
  5. E.O.s 12829, 13526
  6. Bilateral Security Agreements
  7. DoD 5220.22-M, "NISPOM,"

Factors for determining

whether U.S. companies are under Foreign Ownership, Control or Influence

(FOCI)

  1. Record of economic and government

espionage against the U.S. targets

  1. Record of enforcement/engagement

in unauthorized technology transfer

  1. Type and sensitivity of information that shall be accessed
  2. Source, nature and extent of FOCI
  3. Record of compliance with pertinent U.S. laws, regulations and contracts
  4. Nature of bilateral & multilateral security & information exchange agreements

"Classified National Security

Information; Final Rule"

Provides guidance to all government agencies on classification, downgrading, declassification, and safeguarding of classified national security information

Security Violation

Knowing, willful, or negligent action that results in or could be expected to result in loss, suspected compromise, or compromise of classified information

Unauthorized Disclosure

Communication or physical

transfer of classified or controlled unclassified information (CUI) to unauthorized recipient

Three classification levels

TS - grave damage to national security

S - serious damage to national security

C - damage to national security

Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI)

For military, contractors, and civilians:

· Critical/Special-Sensitive

· TS, "Q" info, war-related plans, policymaking, revenue and funds, SCI, SAPs

· Equivalent to Tier 5

Access National Agency Check with Inquiries (ANACI)

For civilians:

· Noncritical-Sensitive positions

· Confidential/Secret, "L" info, systems containing PII

· Equivalent to Tier 3

National Agency Check with Local Agency and Credit Check (NACLC)

For military and contractors:

· Noncritical-Sensitive

· Confidential/Secret clearance eligibility

· Equivalent to Tier 3

NACI

National Agency Check with Inquiries for civilians and contractors:

· Non-Sensitive positions

· Low Risk

· HSPD-12 Credentialing

National Agency Check (NAC)

The fingerprint portion of personnel security investigation (PSI)

The purpose of due process in

Personnel Security Program (PSP)

Ensures fairness by providing subject opportunity to appeal unfavorable adjudicative determination

T/F: A security clearance guarantees that any individual will be granted access to classified information.

False. Individual must also have NTK and sign a SF 312.

T/F: Any individual with an official need to know to conduct assigned duties will be granted a clearance.

False. The granting of a clearance is based on the favorable determination of an individual's integrity, loyalty, and trustworthiness by examining them against the 13 adjudicative guidelines.

T/F: Non U.S. citizens are restricted from gaining access to classified.

False. While non-U.S. citizens are restricted from receiving security clearances, they can gain limited access to classified information through a Limited Access Authorization (LAA). Only goes up to Secret level (NOT TOP SECRET).

T/F: Non-US citizens are restricted from receiving security clearances.

True.

T/F: An individual must have a need for regular access to classified or sensitive information to establish a need for a security clearance.

True.

T/F: Ease of movement within a facility is an acceptable justification for obtaining a security clearance.

False. Seeking ease of movement is not an acceptable justification for obtaining a security clearance.

DoD position sensitivity types

  1. Critical/Special Sensitive--> TS
  2. Non-Critical Sensitive--> Confidential and Secret
  3. Non-Sensitive--> not national security positions

T/F: Civilians in non-sensitive positions may receive security clearances.

False. Only individuals in sensitive positions receive security clearances.

Investigative requirement for a Critical/Special-Sensitive position

Single scope background investigation (SSBI aka T5), SSBI-PR (T5R), or PPR

Investigative requirement for a Non-Critical Sensitive position

ANACI or NACLC (T3)

Revocation

When current security clearance eligibility determination is rescinded

Denial

Initial request for security clearance eligibility is not granted

What is the purpose of the Statement of Reasons (SOR)?

Provide comprehensive and detailed written explanation of why preliminary unfavorable adjudicative determination was made. Can be appealed!

  1. Constructed of hardened steel
  2. Hung on non-removable hinge pins or with interlocking leaves.
  3. Equipped with a GSA-approved combination lock.
  4. Emergency egress hardware (deadbolt or metal bar extending across width of door).

The purpose of intrusion detection systems

To deter, detect, and document unauthorized entry into secured areas

The purpose of barriers

-Define physical limits of installation

-Channel traffic

-Impede access

-Shield activities within installation from direct observation

The purpose of an Antiterrorism Program

Protect DoD personnel, their families, installations, facilities, information, and other material resources from terrorist acts

Force Protection Condition (FPCONS) levels

Measures taken to protect personnel and assets from attack; issued by COCOMs and installation commanders/facility directors

Levels: Normal, Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta

The concept of security-in-depth

Layered and complementary security controls sufficient to deter, detect, and document unauthorized entry and movement within installation/facility.

e-QIP

System used to document personal information from Personnel Security Questionnaire

Personnel Security Investigation (PSI)

The first phase of the security clearance process; used by DoD as standard for uniform collection of relevant and important background information about individual.

JCAVS

A security manager uses this system to communicate with the DoD CAF

JAMS

This sub-system (used by adjudicators) and JCAVS make up the JPAS/DISS system

DISS

A DoD system of record for personnel security clearance information

Scattered Castles

Intelligence Community (IC) Personnel Security Database that verifies personnel security access and visit certifications.

Reinvestigation

Periodic investigation conducted at predetermined intervals; CE supplements reinvestigations of all cleared personnel

True

True or False: Special access requirements are designed to provide an additional layer of security to some of our nation's most valuable assets.

True or False: There is no difference between a threat and a vulnerability.

False. Threats and vulnerabilities are related but distinct. Threats to national security exploit vulnerabilities.

E.O. 12968

The Executive Order (E.O.) that establishes a uniform Personnel Security Program

DoD 5200.2-R

Implements and maintains the DoD personnel security policies and procedures

USD(I) Memorandum, August 30, 2006

Defines the Adjudicative Guidelines

Scope

This refers to when adjudicators must ensure that an investigation meets the minimum timeframe and element requirements before reviewing the investigation.

Administrative Judge

During due process, military and civilian personnel may request an in-person appearance before this individual.

Termination Briefing

Given employment is terminated, clearance eligibility is withdrawn, or if individual will be absent from duty 60 days or more. Also given to those inadvertently exposed to classified information.

Foreign Travel Briefing

Given to cleared personnel who plan to travel in or through foreign countries, or attend meetings attended by representatives of other countries.

Refresher Briefing

Presented annually to personnel who have access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties.

Aims of Special Access Programs (SAPs)

  1. Protect technological breakthroughs
  2. Cover exploitation of adversary vulnerabilities
  3. Protect sensitive operational plans
  4. Reduce intelligence on U.S. capabilities

Protection Level

Component-level SAP Central Offices

Manage and oversee list of SAP facilities

Exist for each military component, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and Missile Defense Agency (MDA)

Special Access Program Oversight Committee (SAPOC)

The final SAP approving body chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense; make final approval decision

Senior Review Group (SRG)

Principal working-level body executing governance process. Make unanimous recommendation which is forwarded to DepSecDef for decision

SAP Senior Working Group (SWG)

Coordinate, deconflict, and integrate SAPs

DoD Special Access Central Office (SAPCO)

"One voice to Congress"/DoD SAP legislative liaison--> notifies Congress of SAP approval decision

OSD-level SAP Central Offices

Exercise oversight for specific SAP category under their purview:

Acquisition-Office of USD for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

Intelligence-Office of USD for Intelligence

Operations & Support-Office of USD for Policy

Authorization, Appropriations, and Intelligence Congressional

Congressional committees granted SAP access

PIE-FAO

Personnel, information, equipment, facilities, activities, and operations

Antiterrorism Officer (individual involved in PHYSEC)

Responsible for antiterrorism program

CI Support (individual involved in PHYSEC)

Responsible for providing valuable information on the capabilities, intentions, and threats of adversaries

OPSEC Officer (individual involved in PHYSEC)

Analyzes threats to assets and their vulnerabilities

Physical Security Officer (individual involved in PHYSEC)

Management, implementation, and direction of all physical security programs

Law Enforcement (individual involved in PHYSEC)

Must be integrated into intelligence gathering process; part of coordinating emergency responses and criminal incidents on a Federal installation