Hume's Argument Against Belief in God Based on Testimony of Miracles, Summaries of Religion

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The argument from miracles

I think that these arguments are interesting and important. Nevertheless, I think that it is fair to say that most religious

believers throughout history have not come to believe in God on the basis of the arguments we have discussed so

far. The argument we’ll be discussing today has probably been discussed less by philosophers than the ones we have

already covered, but has probably been more influential in actually convincing people that God exists.

This is the argument from miracles. There is a long tradition in Christianity of thinking that various miracles can

provide the basis for belief in the existence of God.

For example, in Chapter 20 of the Gospel of John, after the story of Thomas, John writes:

The idea seems clearly to be that we can, and should, come to believe on the basis of John’s telling us about the

miracles performed by Christ. This idea has been widely accepted; St. Augustine, for example, is quoted as saying

that he would not be a Christian but for the miracles.

This raises the question: can the sorts of testimony that we get from St. John give us good reason for believing

in God? In our reading for today, Hume argues that this is not possible; Hume’s central claim is that we cannot

be justified in believing in God on the basis of testimony about miracles.

Over the course of the last few weeks, we have discussed versions of most of the central philosophical arguments

for the existence of God.

“Now Jesus did many other signs in the presence of (his) disciples that are

not written in this book. But these are written that you may come to believe

that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God, and that through this belief you

may have life in his name.”

Obviously, the argument is valid, so the only question is whether the premises are true. Hume’s argument focuses

on the question of whether we have any good reason to believe premise (1). But let’s focus first on premise (2).

What, exactly, is a miracle?

According to Hume, a “miracle is a violation of the laws of nature.”

But it is not a very impressive argument. Believers in miracles take there to be moments in history at which God

suspends the usual natural order. But because this suspension of the natural order has a supernatural cause, it is

natural to think that it is not simply a counterexample to the relevant laws of nature, but rather an exception which,

because of the kind of exception it is, does not falsify the law in question for cases in which there is no

supernatural intervention.

Aquinas gives a definition of a miracle which is, for our purposes, more useful. According to Aquinas,

If this is the definition of “miracle”, then premise (2) of our argument is trivially true. The remaining questions are: is

premise (1) true? and Do we have any good reason to believe that it is true?

This might seem puzzling. After all, aren’t laws of nature supposed to be universal exceptionless claims? (If we

find an exception to a supposed law of nature, it seems that the right response is to say that what we thought was

a law of nature in fact is not.) And if this is what laws of nature are, isn’t the idea of a miracle just a contradiction?

This seems to be a very quick and easy argument against the possibility of miracles.

“those things are properly called miracles which are done by

divine agency beyond the order commonly observed in nature.”

This is a good a definition of “miracle” as any, and we will take this to define the term for our purposes.

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

Aquinas gives a definition of a miracle which is, for our purposes, more useful. According to Aquinas,

If this is the definition of “miracle”, then premise (2) of our argument is trivially true. The remaining questions are: is

premise (1) true? and Do we have any good reason to believe that it is true?

“those things are properly called miracles which are done by

divine agency beyond the order commonly observed in nature.”

This is a good a definition of “miracle” as any, and we will take this to define the term for our purposes.

How could we know that premise (1) is true?

Perhaps one could know that (1) is true by witnessing a miraculous event. But let’s assume for now that none of us

have ever actually witnessed a miracle. Then it seems that our only evidence for (1) is the testimony of people that

do claim to have actually witnessed a miracle. So, it seems that to see whether we have good reason for believing

(1), we have to figure out when we are justified in believing something on the basis of testimony.

This is one of the central topics addressed by Hume. Here’s what he has to say about it:

God on testimony that miracles have occurred. He says:

“... therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can

have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any

system of religion.” (88)

This is Hume’s conclusion. We now need to understand his argument for it, which begins

with some premises about the role of perceptual evidence and testimony in the forming

of beliefs.

2.1 Testimony and evidence

Hume’s first claim is that we should base belief on the available evidence:

“A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.... He weighs

the opposite experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater

number of experiments: To that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation;

and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we

properly call probability.” (73-4)

The general moral seems to be correct: when deciding whether to believe or disbelieve

some proposition, we should weigh the evidence for and against it to see whether it makes

the proposition or its negation more probable.

How does this sort of general principle fit with our practice of basing beliefs on testimony?

Hume has a very plausible answer:

“we may observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, more

useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the

testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators.... I shall

not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe, that our assurance

in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our

observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity

of facts to the reports of witnesses.” (74)

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we

properly call probability.” (73-4)

The general moral seems to be correct: when deciding whether to believe or disbelieve

some proposition, we should weigh the evidence for and against it to see whether it makes

the proposition or its negation more probable.

How does this sort of general principle fit with our practice of basing beliefs on testimony?

Hume has a very plausible answer:

“we may observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, more

useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the

testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators.... I shall

not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe, that our assurance

in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our

observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity

of facts to the reports of witnesses.” (74)

2

Hume’s basic idea seems to be this: we believe things on the basis of testimony because, in the past, we have

found that testimony is normally correct: normally the facts conform to the testimony we receive.

Is Hume right about the fact that we have found testimony to be, usually, correct?

Does this mean that we should always believe whatever we are told?

No. Testimony is just one piece of evidence among others. And in cases in which testimony contradicts some of

our evidence, we have to determine which piece of evidence is stronger :

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

Hume’s basic idea seems to be this: we believe things on the basis of testimony because, in the past, we have

found that testimony is normally correct: normally the facts conform to the testimony we receive.

Does this mean that we should always believe whatever we are told? This can’t be right, since we are sometimes

told contradictory things. And, in any case, Hume does not think that we should always accept testimony.

Testimony is just one piece of evidence among others. And in cases in which testimony contradicts some of our

evidence, we have to determine which piece of evidence is stronger:

Pascal situates the question of miracles within (one part of) the Christian tradition. But

the question we want to answer is more general: can miracles play this kind of central

role in justifying religious belief of any sort?

We will focus on the question of whether miracles can justify the religious beliefs of people

who have not themselves witnessed miracles.

2 Hume’s argument against belief in miracles

Hume thinks that they cannot, and indeed that no rational person would base belief in

God on testimony that miracles have occurred. He says:

“... therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can

have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any

system of religion.” (88)

This is Hume’s conclusion. We now need to understand his argument for it, which begins

with some premises about the role of perceptual evidence and testimony in the forming

of beliefs.

2.1 Testimony and evidence

Hume’s first claim is that we should base belief on the available evidence:

“A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.... He weighs

the opposite experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater

number of experiments: To that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation;

and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we

properly call probability.” (73-4)

The general moral seems to be correct: when deciding whether to believe or disbelieve This suggests the following rule:

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

Hume’s basic idea seems to be this: we believe things on the basis of testimony because, in the past, we have

found that testimony is normally correct: normally the facts conform to the testimony we receive.

Testimony is just one piece of evidence among others. And in cases in which testimony contradicts some of our

evidence, we have to determine which piece of evidence is stronger :

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

Hume’s basic idea seems to be this: we believe things on the basis of testimony because, in the past, we have

found that testimony is normally correct: normally the facts conform to the testimony we receive.

Does this mean that we should always believe whatever we are told? This can’t be right, since we are sometimes

told contradictory things. And, in any case, Hume does not think that we should always accept testimony.

Testimony is just one piece of evidence among others. And in cases in which testimony contradicts some of our

evidence, we have to determine which piece of evidence is stronger:

“... therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can

have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any

system of religion.” (88)

This is Hume’s conclusion. We now need to understand his argument for it, which begins

with some premises about the role of perceptual evidence and testimony in the forming

of beliefs.

2.1 Testimony and evidence

Hume’s first claim is that we should base belief on the available evidence:

“A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.... He weighs

the opposite experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater

number of experiments: To that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation;

and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we

properly call probability.” (73-4)

The general moral seems to be correct: when deciding whether to believe or disbelieve

some proposition, we should weigh the evidence for and against it to see whether it makes

the proposition or its negation more probable.

How does this sort of general principle fit with our practice of basing beliefs on testimony?

Hume has a very plausible answer:

“we may observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, more

useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the

testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators.... I shall

not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe, that our assurance

in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our

observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity

This suggests the following rule:

We should only believe testimony about the occurrence of some event E if the

probability of the testimony being true is higher than the probability of E’s not occurring.

This suggests the following rule about when we should, and should not, believe testimony about some event

occurring:

Hume’s principle about testimony

We should not believe that M happened on the basis of

the testimony unless the following is the case:

The probability of the testimony being false < the

probability of M occurring.

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

Hume’s principle about testimony

We should not believe that M happened on the basis of

the testimony unless the following is the case:

The probability of the testimony being false < the

probability of M occurring.

Hume applies this principle explicitly to the case of miraculous events:

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

We should only believe testimony about the occurrence of some event E if the

probability of the testimony being true is higher than the probability of E’s not occurring.

This suggests the following principle about miracles:

One conclusion: testimony is one, but not the only, source of evidence which we should use

when forming a belief. Testimony is relevant because it has a (relatively) high probability

of being true. But, like any evidence, this can be overridden by other sources of evidence

(like, for example, contrary testimony) which have give a high probability to the negation

of the proposition in question.

2.2 Testimony about miracles

We now need to apply these general points about testimony and evidence to the case of

miracles. One conclusion seems to follow immediately:

“That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony

be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact,

which it endeavors to establish... ” (77)

The problem for the believer in miracles is that miracles, being departures from the laws

of nature, seem to be exactly the sorts of events which we should not expect to happen.

As Hume puts it:

“A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable

experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the

very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can

possibly be imagined... There must be a uniform experience against every

miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation.” (76-

The implied question is: could testimony ever provide strong enough evidence to override

our massive evidence in favor of nature’s following its usual course (which is also evidence

against the occurrence of the miracle)?

2.3 The relevance of religious diversity

Suppose we have testimony that some miraculous event M happened. Hume is say that we should not believe th

M happened on the basis of the testimony unless the following is the case:

The probability of the testimony being false < the probability of M occurring.

This is one plausible reading of what it would mean for the falsehood of the testimony to be “more miraculous” th

the occurrence of the relevant event.

We now want to know why Hume thinks that a principle of this sort shows that we are never justified in believing

testimony about miracles.

What it would mean for the falsehood of the testimony to be “more miraculous” than the occurrence of the

relevant event? It would mean that the probability of the testimony being false is even lower than the

probability of the event in question happening. And this is exactly what Hume’s principle about testimony

should lead us to expect.

We now want to know why Hume thinks that a principle of this sort shows that we are never justified in believing

testimony about miracles.

To do this, we need to figure out how to determine the relevant probabilities: the probability of the testimony being

false, and the probability of the relevant event not occurring. Recall the quote about evidence discussed earlier:

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

Hume’s principle about testimony.

We should not believe that M happened on the basis of th

testimony unless the following is the case:

The probability of the testimony being false < the

probability of M occurring.

We now want to know why Hume thinks that a principle of this sort shows that we are never justified in believing

testimony about miracles.

To do this, we need to figure out how to determine the relevant probabilities: of the testimony being false, and of M

not occurring. Recall the quote about evidence discussed earlier:

Pascal situates the question of miracles within (one part of) the Christian tradition. But

the question we want to answer is more general: can miracles play this kind of central

role in justifying religious belief of any sort?

We will focus on the question of whether miracles can justify the religious beliefs of people

who have not themselves witnessed miracles.

2 Hume’s argument against belief in miracles

Hume thinks that they cannot, and indeed that no rational person would base belief in

God on testimony that miracles have occurred. He says:

“... therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can

have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any

system of religion.” (88)

This is Hume’s conclusion. We now need to understand his argument for it, which begins

with some premises about the role of perceptual evidence and testimony in the forming

of beliefs.

2.1 Testimony and evidence

Hume’s first claim is that we should base belief on the available evidence:

“A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.... He weighs

the opposite experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater

number of experiments: To that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation;

and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we

properly call probability.” (73-4)

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

Hume’s principle about testimony

We should not believe that M happened on the basis of

the testimony unless the following is the case:

The probability of the testimony being false < the

probability of M occurring.

We now want to know why Hume thinks that a principle of this sort shows that we are never justified in believing

testimony about miracles.

To do this, we need to figure out how to determine the relevant probabilities: the probability of the testimony being

false, and the probability of the relevant event not occurring. Recall the quote about evidence discussed earlier:

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

Hume’s principle about testimony.

We should not believe that M happened on the basis of th

testimony unless the following is the case:

The probability of the testimony being false < the

probability of M occurring.

We now want to know why Hume thinks that a principle of this sort shows that we are never justified in believing

testimony about miracles.

To do this, we need to figure out how to determine the relevant probabilities: of the testimony being false, and of M

not occurring. Recall the quote about evidence discussed earlier:

“... therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can

have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any

system of religion.” (88)

This is Hume’s conclusion. We now need to understand his argument for it, which begins

with some premises about the role of perceptual evidence and testimony in the forming

of beliefs.

2.1 Testimony and evidence

Hume’s first claim is that we should base belief on the available evidence:

“A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence.... He weighs

the opposite experiments: He considers which side is supported by the greater

number of experiments: To that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation;

and when at last he fixes his judgement, the evidence exceeds not what we

properly call probability.” (73-4)

The general moral seems to be correct: when deciding whether to believe or disbelieve

some proposition, we should weigh the evidence for and against it to see whether it makes

the proposition or its negation more probable.

How does this sort of general principle fit with our practice of basing beliefs on testimony?

Hume has a very plausible answer:

“we may observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, more

useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the

testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators.... I shall

not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe, that our assurance

in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our

Hume’s idea seems to be this. When we are trying to figure out the probability of some event happening in certain

circumstances, we ask: in the past, how frequently as that event been observed to occur in those circumstances?

Our answer to this question will give us the probability of the relevant event.

Hume’s idea seems to be this. When we are trying to figure out the probability of some event happening in

certain circumstances, we ask: in the past, how frequently as that event been observed to occur in those

circumstances? Our answer to this question will give us the probability of the relevant event.

So, for example, to determine whether a fair coin flip will come up heads, we ask: in the past, what percentage

of fair coin flips have come up heads? We find that ½ of them have; so we take the event of the next fair coin

flip coming up head to have a probability of 50%, or 0.5.

But this, Hume thinks, is enough to show us that we ought never to believe testimony regarding miraculous

events.

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

Hume’s principle about testimony

We should not believe that M happened on the basis of

the testimony unless the following is the case:

The probability of the testimony being false < the

probability of M occurring.

Hume’s idea seems to be this. When we are trying to figure out the probability of some event happening in

certain circumstances, we ask: in the past, how frequently as that event been observed to occur in those

circumstances? Our answer to this question will give us the probability of the relevant event.

Hume’s point is that miracles are always departures from the ordinary laws of nature. But the ordinary laws of

nature are regularities which have been observed to hold 100% of the time. Of course, we have not

observed testimony to be correct 100% of the time. Hence, the probability of testimony regarding a miracle

being false will always be greater than the probability of the miraculous event; and then it follows from Hume’s

principle about testimony that we should never accept the testimony.

And this is precisely Hume’s conclusion:

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

We should not believe that M happened on the basis of the

testimony unless the following is the case:

The probability of the testimony being false < the

probability of M occurring.

Hume’s idea seems to be this. When we are trying to figure out the probability of some event happening in certain

circumstances, we ask: in the past, how frequently as that event been observed to occur in those circumstances?

Our answer to this question will give us the probability of the relevant event.

Hume’s point is that miracles are always departures from the ordinary laws of nature. But the ordinary laws of nature

are regularities which have been observed to hold 100% of the time. Of course, we have not observed testimony to

be correct 100% of the time. Hence, the probability of testimony regarding a miracle being false will always be

greater than the probability of the miraculous event; and then it follows from Hume’s principle about testimony that

we should never accept the testimony.

Hence Hume’s conclusion:

Pascal situates the question of miracles within (one part of) the Christian tradition. But

the question we want to answer is more general: can miracles play this kind of central

role in justifying religious belief of any sort?

We will focus on the question of whether miracles can justify the religious beliefs of people

who have not themselves witnessed miracles.

2 Hume’s argument against belief in miracles

Hume thinks that they cannot, and indeed that no rational person would base belief in

God on testimony that miracles have occurred. He says:

“... therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can

have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any

system of religion.” (88)

This is Hume’s conclusion. We now need to understand his argument for it, which begins

with some premises about the role of perceptual evidence and testimony in the forming

of beliefs.

2.1 Testimony and evidence

On this reading, Hume’s argument depends upon the following assumption:

The zero probability principle

If some event has never been observed to occur

before, then the probability of it occurring is 0%.

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

Hume’s principle about testimony

We should not believe that M happened on the basis of

the testimony unless the following is the case:

The probability of the testimony being false < the

probability of M occurring.

On this reading, Hume’s argument depends upon the following assumption:

The zero probability principle

If some event has never been observed to occur

before, then the probability of it occurring is 0%.

This is what enables Hume to conclude that we can never be justified in believing testimony about a miracle,

since, as he plausibly assumes, the probability of the testimony being false will always be > 0.

Interestingly, this principle also seems to be enough to establish a stronger claim: one is never justified in

believing in the existence of miracles, even if one is (or takes oneself to be) an eyewitness. Can you see why?

Perceptual experiences of the world, like testimony, don’t conform to the facts 100% of the time. So, the probability

of a miraculous event M occurring will always, given the above principle about probabilities, be less than the

probability of one’s perceptual experience being illusory, since the latter will always be > 0. Hence, it seems, one

would never be justified in believing in the existence of a miracle, even on the basis of direct perceptual experience.

This might at first seem like a good thing for Hume’s argument: it shows not just that one an never believe in miracles

on the basis of testimony, but also that one can never believe in them for any reason at all!

But in fact this brings out a problem for the zero probability principle.

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

Hume’s principle about testimony

We should not believe that M happened on the basis of

the testimony unless the following is the case:

The probability of the testimony being false < the

probability of M occurring.

The zero probability principle

If some event has never been observed to occur

before, then the probability of it occurring is 0%.

Consider the following sort of example:

You are a citizen of Pompeii in AD 79, and there is no written record of the tops of

mountains erupting and spewing forth lava. Accordingly, following the zero probability

principle, you regard the chances of such a thing happening as 0%. On the other hand,

you know that your visual experiences have been mistaken in the past, so you regard the

chances of an arbitrary visual experience being illusory as about (say) 1%. Then you have

a very surprising visual experience: black clouds and ash shooting out of nearby Mt.

Vesuvius. What is it rational for you to believe?

This sort of case seems to show that the zero probability principle is false. Other such examples involve falsification of

well-confirmed scientific theories.

So, if Hume’s argument depends on the zero probability principle, it is a failure. But this doesn’t quite mean that

Hume’s argument is a failure. Sometimes an argument relies on a false premise, but can be fixed by finding another

premise which both avoids the problems with the original one, and still delivers the intended conclusion.

So we should ask: can we come up with another principle, which would avoid these sort of counterexamples while

still delivering the result that Hume wants?

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

Hume’s principle about testimony

We should not believe that M happened on the basis of

the testimony unless the following is the case:

The probability of the testimony being false < the

probability of M occurring.

So we should ask: can we come up with another principle, which would avoid these sort of counterexamples while

still delivering the result that Hume wants?

It seems that we can. All Hume’s argument needs, it would seem, is the following trio of assumptions:

X does not have to be zero, as the zero probability principle assumes; it is enough for Hume’s argument that it be

some number which is always lower than the probability of testimony being false.

(a) If some event has never been observed to occur before, then the probability

of it occurring is at most X%.

(b) The probability of a piece of testimony being false is always at least Y%.

(c) Y>X

Suppose, for example, that the probability of an event of some type which has never before been observed is at

most 1% , and that there is always at least a 10% chance of some testimony being false. If we assume Hume’s

principle about testimony, would this be enough to deliver the conclusion that we are never justified in believing in

miracles on the basis of testimony?

No, because one can get testimony from multiple witnesses. Suppose that we have three witnesses, each of whom

are 90% reliable, and each independently reports that M has occurred. Then the probability of each witness being

wrong is 10%, but the probability of all three being wrong is only 0.1%. This, by the above measure, would be

enough to make it rational to believe that M happened on the basis of testimony.

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

Hume’s principle about testimony

We should not believe that M happened on the basis of

the testimony unless the following is the case:

The probability of the testimony being false < the

probability of M occurring.

But what if we have just one witness. In those cases, won’t Hume’s principle about testimony provide a good

argument against the rationality of believing in miracles?

This principle can sound sort of obvious; but it isn’t, as some examples show. First, what do you think that the

probability of the truth of testimony from the writers of the South Bend Tribune would be?

Let’s suppose that you think that it is quite a reliable paper, and that its testimony is true 99.9% of the time, so that the

probability of its testimony being false is 0.1%.

Now suppose that you read the following in the South Bend Tribune:

“The winning numbers for Powerball this weekend were 1-14-26-33-41-37-4.”

What are the odds of those being the winning numbers for Powerball? Well, the same as the odds of any given

combination being correct, which is 1 in 195,249,054. So the probability of the reported event occurring is

So, if Hume’s principle about testimony is correct, one is never justified in believing the lottery results reported in

the paper, or on the local news, etc. But this seems wrong: one can gain justified beliefs about the lottery from your

local paper, even if it is the South Bend Tribune.

Even this can be called into question, because there is good reason to doubt whether Hume’s principle about

testimony is itself true.

You may want to think about how, if at all, Hume’s principle could be modified to avoid these counterexamples.

1. There have been miracles.
2. If there have been miracles, God exists.

---

C. God exists.

The argument from miracles

Hume’s principle about testimony

We should not believe that M happened on the basis of

the testimony unless the following is the case:

The probability of the testimony being false < the

probability of M occurring.

You may want to think about how, if at all, Hume’s principle could be modified to avoid these counterexamples.

If it cannot be fixed, then Hume fails to show that it is never rational to believe in miracles on the basis of testimony.

This, of course, does not show that we are currently rational to believe in miracles on the basis of the sorts of

testimony we might use as evidence. To decide this question, at least three further issues would need investigation.

1. What are the rules which govern rational acceptance of testimony? If Hume’s principle about testimony is not

right, then what is?

2. How good is the evidence for events which seem to be exceptions to the usual natural order? This would involve

historical investigation into questions like the following: How many witnesses were there? How reliable were those

witnesses? Did they have anything to gain by lying? Etc.

3. When is good evidence that some event is an exception to the usual natural order also good evidence of

supernatural intervention?

These are all very difficult questions to answer. What I think the discussion of Hume shows is that to decide the

relevance of miracles to religious belief, questions like these are the important ones. There is no argument - at least

no obvious argument - of the sort Hume sought against belief in miracles.