Japanese Occupation of the Philippines: Filipino Attitudes and Resistance, Essays (university) of History

The Filipino attitudes towards Japanese occupation during World War II, despite Japanese propaganda efforts and military prowess. Filipinos remained convinced of American invincibility and did not associate themselves with Japanese objectives. The document also discusses Japanese repression and the resistance movements, including the Huks, who initially pledged loyalty to the Commonwealth and the US but shifted to armed struggle due to American fascist methods. The US post-war policy and Recto's crusade for nationalism are also touched upon.

Typology: Essays (university)

2020/2021

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Chapter 1 - Philippine Colonial Set Up On the Eve of WW II
American Plan for Neo-Colonialism
Filipinos had national identity but with a steadily eroded sense of national consciousness
because:
(1) of massive campaign of acculturation;
(2) of the process of miseducation;
(3) of the implantation of American political institutions and customs in the evolving colonial society.
The set up that allowed the Americans to establish a colonial economy suited to their imperialist
motives with minimal objection from Filipinos who had little understanding of the operations of
imperialist exploitation and whose attention was in any case adroitly drawn to the prospect of
gradual expansion of their political autonomy:
(1) The 1896 Revolution against Spanish colonialism had given the Filipino people
insufficient experience to cope with the more subtle techniques of American
imperialism;
(2) Although the anti-Spanish struggle was rooted in economic exploitation, the
personal abuses committed by the Spaniards and their blatant denial of basic political
and civil rights became the principal subjects of ilustradoI articulation;
(3) Andres Bonifacio and his group of revolutionarios did not go much beyond general
formulations for a more egalitarian society to be established after the Spaniards were
expelled;
(4) The attention of the people was only focused primarily on the attainment of political
independence.
Factors and impeded a correct understanding of colonial reality:
1. Miseducation;
2. Public School system;
3. The fairly rapid Fililpinization of the bureaucracy.
An understanding of imperialism which is seen on the peoples’ awareness of the interrelation
between mass poverty and the colonial economy are evidenced by the slogans, programs of
action and demands by:
1.The Sakdal movement of the mid-1930s;
2. The labor unions of Central Luzon which came under the influence of both the
socialist movement of Pedro Abad Santos and the newly-established Communist Party
Factors that impeded a correct understanding of colonial reality:
1. Miseducation;
2. American-oriented media; and,
3. Colonial politics.
American economic policies, particularly free trade, had developed an economy based on
agricultural exports to the US and imports of manufactured goods which came overwhelmingly
from the same sourceresults:
1. Filipino landowners grew rich from the export of their sugar, copra, hemp and other
products to the US;
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Chapter 1 - Philippine Colonial Set Up On the Eve of WW II American Plan for Neo-Colonialism

  • Filipinos had national identity but with a steadily eroded sense of national consciousness because:
  • (1) of massive campaign of acculturation; (2) of the process of miseducation; (3) of the implantation of American political institutions and customs in the evolving colonial society.
  • The set up that allowed the Americans to establish a colonial economy suited to their imperialist motives with minimal objection from Filipinos who had little understanding of the operations of imperialist exploitation and whose attention was in any case adroitly drawn to the prospect of gradual expansion of their political autonomy:
  • (1) The 1896 Revolution against Spanish colonialism had given the Filipino people insufficient experience to cope with the more subtle techniques of American imperialism;
  • (2) Although the anti-Spanish struggle was rooted in economic exploitation, the personal abuses committed by the Spaniards and their blatant denial of basic political and civil rights became the principal subjects of ilustradoI articulation;
  • (3) Andres Bonifacio and his group of revolutionarios did not go much beyond general formulations for a more egalitarian society to be established after the Spaniards were expelled;
  • (4) The attention of the people was only focused primarily on the attainment of political independence.
  • Factors and impeded a correct understanding of colonial reality:
    1. Miseducation;
    1. Public School system;
    1. The fairly rapid Fililpinization of the bureaucracy.
  • An understanding of imperialism which is seen on the peoples’ awareness of the interrelation between mass poverty and the colonial economy are evidenced by the slogans, programs of action and demands by:
  • 1 .The Sakdal movement of the mid-1930s;
    1. The labor unions of Central Luzon which came under the influence of both the socialist movement of Pedro Abad Santos and the newly-established Communist Party
  • Factors that impeded a correct understanding of colonial reality:
    1. Miseducation;
    1. American-oriented media; and,
    1. Colonial politics.
  • American economic policies, particularly free trade, had developed an economy based on agricultural exports to the US and imports of manufactured goods which came overwhelmingly from the same source—results:
    1. Filipino landowners grew rich from the export of their sugar, copra, hemp and other products to the US;
    1. Filipino capital was predominantly in agriculture and in trade with only a minimal amount invested in small manufacturing enterprises, so tha—between 1936 to 1940, 72.6 % of Philippine trade was with the US, 7.9% with Japan—American interests accounted for 60% of all foreign investments. Philippine State of Economy Prior to World War II
    1. No manufacturing industry to speak of;
    1. A completely agricultural economy;
    1. Importing virtually all finished goods while paying for these with the export earnings of the agriculture crops;
    1. No motor vehicle, fuel and tire industry that could keep an army mobile and moving;
    1. No munitions and weapons industry that could equip it with arms and the logistics it required;
    1. No pharmaceutical industry that could provide its sick and wounded with drugs and medicines;
    1. No textile industry that could clothe it;
    1. No electronics and telecommunications industry that could enable it to communicate;
    1. No food industry that could supply it with canned goods;
    1. No watch industry that would enable it to keep time;
    1. No chemical or steel industry.
    1. No capabilities to produce bicycles, flashlights and batteries. Filipino Indifference to Fascist Aggression Except Action by Japan
    1. In the 1930s, newspapers reported the Spanish civil war, the Italian adventure in Abyssinia and the Japanese campaigns in China.
    1. 1938 Hitler’s successive annexations of Austria and Czechoslovakia, the 1939 invasion of Poland leading to the British and French declarations of war on Germany on Sept. of that year.
    1. Blitzkrieg tactics to overrun Norway, Denmark and the Low Countries in 1940 by the Germans to be followed on France which surrendered in June 1940.
    1. “Big Berta” bombing of Great Britain.
    1. War spreading to Libya in North Africa, to the Middle East, and to the high seas.
    1. June 1941 Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union beginning in the Balkans.
    1. Japan took advantage of Vichy France to occupy Indochina.
    1. By mid-1941, the American government responded by freezing Japanese assets and credits in the US and instituting an embargo particularly on oil.
    1. Britain renounced her commercial treaties with Japan with the Netherlands following suit. Temporary Alliance Between the Communists and the Imperialists
    1. When the US and the USSR became allies in an anti-fascist coalition, communist parties all over the world began to implement in their respective countries the Comintern directive to organize a united front against fascism.
    1. Filipino Communist Party leaders who had been pardoned and released from jail in December 1936 exerted great efforts to establish an anti-fascist united front with various sectors of society.
    1. Filipino professionals of liberal orientation joined workers an peasants in a broad anti-fascist coalition.
    1. The Japanese also practically controlled the deep-sea fishing industry.
    1. Through the use of Filipino dummies, fishing licenses were obtained.
    1. The Japanese government, through the Bank of Taiwan, financially aided its nationals in the fishing industry and it had supported the Davao agricultural corporations.
    1. Through Filipino dummies, the Japanese invested in lumber concessions, in chrome, iron and manganese mines.
    1. Manufacturing firms were subsidiaries of Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo interests.
    1. The Japanese also established a retail trade network of hundreds of bazaars all over the country. Japanese Intelligence Gathering
    1. Despite the Anti-Dummy Law passed on October 30, 1936 and the Philippine Immigration Law limiting Japanese entry to 500 a year, Japanese immigration accelerated and many of these were men of military age, some of them known to be reserve officers and were usually employed as truck drivers by a Japanese hemp and copra corporation, the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, and they stayed in an average of two to three months.
    1. Terrain familiarization and mapping and photographing missions were also carried out by Japanese who established themselves in small towns as photographers and by Navy men who served on the crews of Japanese fishing vessels.
    1. Bazaar keepers were also engaged in data gathering and espionage, as were commercial agents, plantation owners, and lumber concessionaires.
    1. Certain installations for future military use were constructed like a concrete wharf and an electrical plant in Davao by the Furukawa Plantation Co.—to be used during the invasion. Japanese Propaganda
    1. In Davao, the Japanese insured that children of mixed Japanese and Filipino parentage would grow up emotionally loyal to Japan by giving them a Japanese education that was supervised by the Ministry of Education in Tokyo.
    1. They built monuments to honor Japanese leaders whom they proclaimed as the “builders of Davao.”
    1. They would build shrines to their war dead in the lands they conquered.
    1. Associations were formed to disseminate Japanese culture and teach Japanese language to Filipinos.
    1. In 1941, Japanese corporations even financed a newspaper, the Davao Nichi Nichi.
  • 6.Prominent civil officials and military men were often sent to Davao to bolster the morale of their countrymen and draw them closer to the fatherland.
    1. They formed ostensibly non-political associations such as the Society for International Cultural Association, the Japanese Association of Manila, the Asia Club, etc.
    1. They published various magazines and sponsored a radio program called “Land of Cherry Blossoms.”
    1. Japanese university professors and other propagandists arrived to conduct lecture tours, and delegations of Filipino businessmen, newspapermen, and legislators were invited to Japan to exchange views with their counterparts.
    1. Summer tours for Filipino student groups were also organized.
    1. These propaganda activities are meant: (a) to wean the Filipinos away from their American mentors; and (b) to convince them ultimately to transfer their loyalties to Japan as the leader of Asia.
    1. To accomplish the first objective, Japanese propagandists rallied the nationalist sentiments of the Filipinos with glowing articles on the achievements of Philippine heroes who fought the Spaniards as the Americans.
    1. Their periodicals also featured tirades on US imperialism and American racism—for this purpose, they encouraged Gen. Artemio Ricarte, then living in exile in Yokohama, to write books and pamphlets on the Philippine Revolution and on how the Americans persecuted him for refusing to take oath of allegiance to the US.
    1. Another pro-Japanese, Pio Duran, wrote a book critical of American imperialism, printed in Tokyo.
    1. Another frequent theme was the decadence of Western civilization which was responsible for the weakened moral fiber of those Asian peoples infected by this alien culture.
    1. To counteract the stories about Japanese atrocities in the Western press, Japanese propagandists described the salutary results of Japan’s benevolence in China and Manchuria.
    1. Periodicals and radio programs featured beautiful Japan and its strong, proud people and its geographical proximity to the Philippines for Asian unity, Japan’s role. Filipino Attitudes
  • Despite—(1) efforts expended on presenting the superior culture of Japan and its economic progress; (2) counteracting the stories about Japanese atrocities in the Western where Japanese propagandists described the salutary results of Japan’s benevolence in China and Manchuria; (3) the periodicals and radio programs featuring beautiful Japan and its strong, proud people; (4) reminding the Filipino people of the geographical proximity of the two countries and of their common oriental origins; and, (50) the suggestion frequently made that Asians should unite to drive the white man from Asia so that under the leadership of Japan, we could all attain prosperity—only a few were influenced by Japanese propaganda appeal.
    1. Filipinos had become almost completely Westernized and they regarded themselves as superior to the Japanese.
    1. We did not even feel they we were a part of Asia.
    1. Filipinos, at that time, expected to become free and sovereign nation in a few more years.
    1. Very few of them understood the real limitations to their freedom that a colonial economy and their Americanized consciousness would impose.
    1. As the war loomed ominously near, the Filipinos continued more or less placidly to conduct their daily affairs within the protective shell of American colonialism.
    1. Filipinos were so convinced of American invincibility that they did not consider the possibility of Japanese occupation.
    1. Filipinos belittled Japanese military power considering them as upstarts and no match for the Americans.
    1. Some Filipinos thought Japan would not dare attack and if she was foolish enough to do so, the threat would be quickly disposed of.
  • “I don’t think that the Philippine can defend themselves. I known they (the US) can. We cannot just turn around and leave your alone…” (yet he will abandon the Philippines later with a promise of “I shall return.”)
    1. MacArthur’s confident statement ignored realities but it was most encouraging to Quezon.
    1. MacArthur craved for the position of high commissioner without his having to resign his army commission but US President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed Frank Murphy to the position.
    1. MacArthur had the double position of major general in the US Army and as military adviser to the Philippine government with the title of field marshal as provided for in the National Defense Act passed by the Philippine National Assembly soon after the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on Nov. 15, 1935.
    1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, then MacArthur’s chief of staff had tried ‘to persuade MacArthur to refuse the title since it was pompous and rather ridiculous to be field marshal of a virtually non- existing army.’
    1. MacArthur then insisted to be paid by the Philippine government--$18,000 per annum plus another $15,000 as yearly allowance—this of course in addition to his army pay (from the US government).
    1. He also demanded quarters comparable to those of the governor general and the Philippine government complied by transforming the huge penthouse of the Manila Hotel into sumptuous air-conditioned quarters for his use. (To solve this bureaucratic problem of assigning the penthouse to MacArthur, he was appointed chairman of the board of the Manila Hotel Company.)
    1. MacArthur invested $35,000 to Lepanto Mining shares.
    1. Quezon boasted of having secured the services of no less than a former US chief of staff. MacArthur’s Sham Defense Plan
    1. MacAarthur’s defense plan called for a large reserve force of citizen-soldiers to supplement a small professional army.
    1. All Filipino boys were required to undergo military training and at age twenty to serve for five and a half months in the Philippine Army.
    1. Unlike War Plan Orange, his plan envisioned the defense of the entire archipelago; therefore, military units were to be stationed in all military districts.
    1. For his defense program, he asked for 16,000,000 pesos a year for the next ten years.
    1. It is difficult to understand how he could have expected to finance with such a small budget a regular force of 11,000 men, the training of 40,000 reserves for five and a half months each year, the acquisition and maintenance of fifty torpedo boats and 250 planes.
    1. In addition, these funds were also supposed to take of the construction and maintenance of a military academy, other service schools, and over 120 training camps.
    1. After barely six months, he issued a progress report in which he made the extravagant claim of having a formidable army which was actuarlly non-existent. The Real Situation
    1. The defense preparations were beset by many difficulties, among them the problems posed by the illiteracy and ignorance of many trainees, the variety of dialects which hindered

communication, the serious lack of everything, from funds to officers, to weapons, and even such rudimentary supplies as shoes and tents.

    1. As a consequence, the men who went through their required training period emerged hardly ready for combat since a serious lack of guns and ammunitions gave them very little firing experience.
    1. Training was inefficient, morale was low, discipline poor—partly due to inadequate food and large discrepancies in pay between Filipinos and Americans.
    1. A US Army private received $30 a month, a Filipino $7; an American sergeant was paid $126, his Filipino counterpart $22.50; and the Philippine Army’s chief of staff received a salary equivalent to that a new American colonel. Quezon’s Disillusionment of Macarthur, Alternative Plans
    1. Quezon’s mercurial temper and MacArthur’s arrogance plus the former’s realization that material American support did not come with MacArthur led to the latter’s falling out.
    1. In 1938, Quezon got the National Assembly to pass an Act separating the Constabulary from the Philippine Army.
    1. This seriously depleted the number and quality of training officers since MacArthur had been drawing on Constabulary experience.
    1. Vice-president Sergio Osmena argued from the beginning that MacArthur’s program was only giving the country’s false illusion of security.
    1. As an alternative to protect the country, Quezon, in June 1938, made a secret trip to Japan during which he allegedly attempted to secure a guarantee that Japan would respect the neutrality of an independent Philippines.
    1. In May 1939, the National Assembly established the Department of National Defense, a move intended to further constrict MacArthur’s authority.
  • 7, Without the approval of Quezon or of the Secretary of National Defense, MacArthur could no longer order munitions, enroll trainees, or enter into ontracts for the construction of military facilities.
    1. Quezon publicly stated that it was futile to go on spending money to defend the country from foreign aggression.
    1. The possibility of relieving the military adviser is even considered. Quezon’s Alternative Plans
    1. The defense budget was cut back for 1940 and 1941.
    1. The 1941 budget provided that the number of trainees be cut in half and military construction and armaments acquisitions disallowed—a reflection of Quezon’s dissatisfaction with the defense program, falling out with MacArthur, and the desire not to offend Japan—also believing that the defense of the country was principally the responsibility of the US.
    1. On Aug. 19, 1940, Quezon declared a limited state of national emergency and some later created the Civilian Emergency Administration.
    1. The US was not even adequately supplying its own troops in the Philippines, let alone the Philippine Army.
    1. In fact, the Philippine Department commander complained that he had only enough ammunition for “ three or four days of fire per weapon.”

Reasons Behind US Support for Japan

    1. Under the leadership of the US, Japan is rehabilitated and aided with the intension of using her as the outpost of American capitalism in Asia.
    1. The cold war (believed to be between the capitalist West and the Communist block) that started with the dropping of the bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki is given rationale by: (a) the rise of the left in Europe; (b) the various anti-colonial struggles; (c) the Berlin crisis; (d) the victory of the Chinese communists; and, (e) the Korean war (1950- 195 3). Reorienting the Definition of “Nationalism”
    1. Because the Filipinos bear the brunt of an iniquitous order imposed by neocolonialism, we have become the principal beneficiaries of a nationalist movement.
    1. The Filipinos who achieved nationhood in an anti-colonial struggle only to have our revolutionary consciousness eroded by imperialist blandishments need a nationalist framework within which to view the world and to plan for the future.
    1. Nationalism supplies the ideological underpinnings for the people’s struggle to complete their independence.
    1. It is the expression of a people’s aspiration to be liberated from foreign control, over or covert.
    1. Nationalism is also the initial step in the long fight to liberate mass consciousness from colonial conditioning.
    1. Therefore, one of its primary objectives is to develop an anti-imperialist attitudes in the people.
    1. Along this line, the motivations of all nations involved in the war and the need to distinguish the Filipino interest from those of other countries must be seen to avert the danger of accepting uncritically the US’ war version. Why Japan Must Be Imperialist & Engage in War
    1. Japan, as late comer in the imperialist stage, developed her capitalism in a world already dominated by Western imperialism.
    1. The Japanese government must orchestrate her imperialist career in order to solve internal contradictions: (a) the power of the ruling class composed of economic, political, and military needs the state to repress; (b) the masses—plus its role as mediator on the differences of the two.
    1. The Meiji restoration of 1868 did not change the social dynamics in Japan—the old feudal families continue to run the system—the powerful Osaka rice merchants will become the zaibatsu who need to maintain power and at the same time expand territorially but in order to do so must have the strong military component.
    1. The nature of the ruling oligarchy—feudal lords ( daimyo ) and the rising bourgeoisie— produced a fundamental pressure for expansion.
    1. The presence of the feudal sector in the leadership meant that the new capitalists could not liquidate feudal agriculture.
    1. But peasants, highly exploited, could not buy the goods that capitalists produced—hence, consumer market at home is not feasible to be developed.
    1. Manufacturers had to orient their operations toward export—this needs territorial expansion.
    1. Japan, unlike other capitalists-imperialists who only became expansionists after the full development of their industrial complexes and the saturation of their home markets, had to expand in order to complete her industrialization.
    1. Japan did not have much investment capital as the older imperialist and, hence, could not hope to compete with the latter on equal footing.
    1. Besides, Japan was a poor nation in terms of resources and desperately needed raw materials for her industries—importing phosphates, bauxite, nickel, crude rubber, a portion of commercial fertilizer and coal needs.
    1. Heavy industry was geared principally to produce the needs of the military machine..
    1. Thus Japan: (a) warred on China in 1894; (b) on Russia in 1905; and, (c) seized more Chinese territory during the First World War.
    1. But despite Japan’s military successes, she was still a dependent imperialist—since: (a) her territorial adventures were on the sufferance of other well-established imperialists who were preoccupied with affairs in other parts of the world; (b) she still had to import some vital raw materials from these same powers or from their colonies.
    1. This dependence would be an important factor in Japan’s decision to go to war. Triple Cooperation for War, Imperialism, Economic Expansion
    1. Japan’s expansionist program was planned and executed by the military, the state bureaucracy, and the big business combines—the zaibatsu —working close together.
    1. The zaibatsu expanded during the depression of the 1930s as they bought out, took over, or absorbed floundering small and medium firms.
    1. The state promoted this process of concentration with subsidies to induce mergers on the ground that big firms, particularly in banking and credit and the arms industries, could efficiently supply the needs of the state in time of war—so that Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda gobbled up most of the big contracts connected with the military expansion program although a few new companies with close military connections also participated.
    1. Severe exploitation of the Japanese people was made possible through: (a) repression; (b) the mythology of emperor worship; (c) a propaganda drive for discipline; and (d) the sacrifice of self to the glory of a powerful state. Why Japan Must Attack Pearl Harbor
  • A. Japan joined Germany and Italy in the war against the Allied Powers because her expansionist ambitions in Asia were being thwarted by the US and Great Britain.
  • B. The crippling economic blockade in Singapore and Hongkong due to Great Britain’s strategic interest in Asia.
  • C. The succession of economic restrictions on trade with Japan imposed by the US: (1) on July 1939, the US notified Japan that it would not renew the 1911 Commercial Treaty and subsequently imposed more and more restrictions on American raw materials export to Japan; (3) by July 1940, US instituted a licensing system for selected American export to Japan: (4) when with the consent of Vichy France, Japan entered Indochina in September, US quickly reacted by including crude oil and scrap iron, both of crucial military importance to Japan, in the list of US exports requiring government license; (5) US tolerance ended when Japan occupied Indochina as a staging area for southward expansion perhaps down to the Dutch East Indies; (6)
  • Politically, its plan envisioned three categories: First, full independence for Burma, the Philippines and Annam-Cambodia; second, protectorates for Laos, Java, and a new state uniting Sumatra and Malaysia; and, third, Japanese colonies, namely Singapore, Penang and Hongkong.
  • The truth was something else: Japan did liberate the colonized peoples of Asia from Western imperialism but only because she wanted to take the place of their former masters.
  • Many of her strictures against cultural Westernization were valid but her interest was not so much in the resurgence of native culture as such.
  • Her advocacy of a return to Asian culture was a many-sided propaganda weapon: to please the people, to belie Western claims to cultural superiority, and, by encouraging Asianization, to open the way for the inculcation of Japanese culture so as to facilitate the integration of the occupied countries into her empire.
  • Most Asian leaders in Southeast Asian countries were initially deeply impressed with the magnitude and swiftness of the Japanese victories
  • This demonstration of Japanese military prowess plus the fact that their former colonial masters, Holland, France and Britain, were either occupied, satellized, or besieged by Germany, convinced these leaders that Japan had won the war or, at the very least, that any future political negotiations among the combatants would have to recognize Asia as Japanese sphere of interest besides having no feeling of loyalty towards the Western powers.
  • Nationalist leaders were therefore inclined to cooperate with the Japanese in the hope of winning recognition of their aspirations for independence, even if such freedom would be circumscribed by Japanese protection.
  • For most of the nationalist politicians who had in the past opposed colonization, collaboration was a matter of tactics.
  • They did not associate themselves with Japanese objectives or approve of Japanese methods but they saw in the occupation, in their active participation in government administration, and in the Japanese-sponsored political organization, opportunities to pursue their own goals of political freedom.
  • This was the objective of Ba Maw in Burma, who in exchange for Burmese cooperation with Japan pressed the latter to guarantee a Burma for the Burmese.
  • Another example was Sukarno of Indonesia who collaborated for a similar reason and used his collaboration as a cover for his political activities.
  • The Japanese for their part wanted to associate themselves with indigenous leaders as a means of attracting and controlling the population.
  • The Japanese organized a monolithic mass organization which fostered on the people a stronger feeling of unity and gave them valuable organizational experience which they eventually used against their returning masters after the defeat of the Japanese.
  • But the early attitudes towards the Japanese—ranging from active assistance by nationalist armed forces as in Burma, to collaboration for tactical reasons as in Indonesia—deteriorated rapidly.
  • Reasons: (1) very few Japanese administrators knew or respected the languages, customs, and traditions of the regions they ruled; (2) as the fortunes of war turned increasingly against them and they lost command of the seas, the Japanese by force of necessity became even more

exploitative and repressive; (3) their armies lived almost completely off the land; (4) the perception that Japan was very likely to lose the war.

  • Nationalist leaders now agitated for independence so that if Japan were defeated, they could present the returning Western colonialists with a fait accompli.
  • Whether the former colonies utilized the Japanese-granted independence as in Burma, or organized a formidable patriotic resistance which from the start decided to fight both the Japanese and French imperialism as the Viet Minh under Ho Chi Minh did in Indochina, the Asian peoples who confronted the returning Western powers were far different from the ones they had abandoned to Japanese occupation.
  • When the victorious Western powers in attempting to reassert their control over their old colonies used the very forces of their vanquished enemy to suppress the Asian liberation movements, the masses in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Korea painfully learned they truth that all imperialists were their enemies, whether they were white or Asians like themselves.
  • Indonesia will launch the war of independence until 1949 against the Dutch.
  • Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh will eventually win against the French in the War of Dien Bien Phu by 1954 but the US will intervene dividing Vietnam into North and South.
  • Unlike the Philippines, these Asian countries will win independence against their former colonial masters without any neo-colonial impositions on them.
  • Ironically, the US will intervene in Sukarno’s Indonesia by 1965, under the guise that Sukarno is becoming communist thereby putting in power Suharto who will be deposed by his people by 1998 The Philippine Experience Under Japanese Occupation
  • The record of the Filipinos during the war has been pictured as unique in the annals of history.
  • It has been repeatedly cited as an enduring evidence of the “special relationship” between the Filipinos and the Americans.
  • The almost universal hostility demonstrated by the Filipinos against the Japanese and their deep loyalty to the Americans were not consistent with the pattern of response in the other invaded countries.
  • For, unlike the other peoples of Asia who did not identify themselves with their Western colonizers, the Filipinos had succumbed to the subtle techniques of American domination. Philippine Experience and Response to Japanese Occupation
  • The treachery with which the Japanese executed their attack on Pearl Harbor and the bombing of military installations in the country immediately thereafter justifiably provoked strong feelings of revulsion and confirmed all the stereotypes of the evil, deceitful Japanese that were part and parcel of the Filipinos’ Westernization.
  • Concommitant with their pro-American orientation was a strong racial bias against fellow Asians.
  • Although Filipinos feared them, they also looked down on them.
  • The Filipinos had inherited this trait from the Spaniards, and American race prejudice had reinforced it.
  • Filipinos adopted the American attitude of superiority and mistakenly believed that because they were favored wards, the American prejudice toward Orientals did not apply to them; besides not thinking of themselves as Asians.
  • The failure to prepare the predetermined defense positions in Bataan was an error of the first magnitude since MacArthur: (1) insisted on his own beach defense plan; (2) for stubbornly clinging to it until December 23, 1941; (3) there was not enough time to ferry thousands of supplies; (4) almost ten million gallons of gasoline had to be set afire to deny this important war material to the enemy— Pandacan burned to the ground for two weeks as a result of this.
  • Filipino soldiers were not treated equally in relation to the American soldiers.
  • The biggest lie: Bataan defenders fought “against overwhelming odds” or “in the face of overwhelming numerical superiority.”
  • Another lie: When Corregidor surrendered, there were 10,000 USAFFE but only 2,000 Japanese soldiers on the island.
  • In the final analysis, the defenders of Bataan were defeated more by hunger and disease than by the Japanese. The Painful Truth Behind the “Death March”
  • The painful trek to concentration camps that followed the surrender of Bataan on April 9, 1942 that led to the death of many Filipino soldiers:
    1. The Japanese were not prepared to handle that many prisoners—they did not think that war would be over so soon;
    1. There was the language barrier;
    1. The tension of the victors as they moved their prisoners in the midst of a patently hostile population;
    1. The lack of food and medicines throughout the period of resistance had already weakened many of the men.

Chapter 3 - 3 —Martial Law: Japanese Style Philippine Integration Into the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere Filipino Elites’ Collaboration: From the US to Japan

  • Jan. 2, 1942—Jorge B. Vargas (appointed by Quezon as Mayor of Greater Manila), Quintin Paredes, Claro M. Recto, Benigno S. Aquino proposed to the Japanese a Provisional Commonwealth Council of State.
  • JAN. 8—Vargas, Recto, Paredes, Jose Yulo, and Jose P. Laurel paid respects to General Masaharu Homma who asked them to organize a national government supervising affairs throughout the country.
  • Jan. 23—Gen. Maeda disregarded the proposed Council, instead under Order 1 of Gen. Homma, the Executive Commission appointed Vargas Chairman of the Ex. Comm., with Departments headed by Benigno S. Aquino, Interior; Jose P. Laurel, Justice; Antonio de las Alas, Finance; Rafael Alunan, Agriculture and Commerce; Claro M. Recto, Education, Health and Public Welfare; Quintin Paredes, Public Works and Communication; Jose Yulo, Chief Justice; Serafin Marabut, Executive Secretary; and Teofilo Sison, Auditor General and Budget Director. Japanese Repression
  • Take note: Filipinos today while condemning Spanish colonialism and the Japanese military occupation continue to be blind to the evils of American imperialism failing to realize that

anyone who seeks to exercise power over a people will proceed in basically the same manner, with only differences in style to distinguish one oppressor from another.

  • Disturbing the peace and spreading wild rumors were acts punishable by death.
  • Jan. 13, 1942—the Japanese issued another proclamation enumerating 17 acts for which the death penalty could be imposed depending on the gravity of the offense—rumor-mongering, destruction of military property, pollution to drinking water, robbery, looting, concealment of clothing to avoid its being taken by the military.
  • Other orders—(1) surrender of firearms and confiscation; (2) curfew imposition: 8 PM-6 AM, then midnight-6 AM; (3) Japanese sentries posted at points between provinces and on city boundaries.
  • Arbitrary Arrests and Executions mostly done by the kempeitai (Japanese military police).
  • Buildings were taken over and used to quarter Japanese troops; private homes were assigned to Japanese officers or administrative officials and their owners unceremoniously booted out; cars and other vehicles commandeered—16,000 trucks and cars taken out of the country and a huge amount of spare parts.
  • The most widely resented of the abuses is the slapping of civilians even for the slightest offense; cases of rape common; soldiers confiscated food and personal belongings that they fancied; sometimes, due to misunderstanding caused by language problems, Filipinos were tortured.
  • Suspected guerillas were mainly detained in Fort Santiago, subjected to a variety of tortures— severe beatings resulted in broken bones; given “water cure”; fingernails and toenails were pulled; gasoline poured on extremities then ignited; hot irons applied on sex organs; many died of starvation or drowning when Pasig rose Japanese Policies of Attraction and Thought Control
    1. Of the pre-war newspapers, the Tagalog Taliba , the Spanish La Vanguardia and the English Tribune were allowed to continue publication but under rigid censorship. In June 1942, Liwayway , a popular Tagalog weekly, was also allowed to come out.
    1. American-owned publications such as the Manila Daily Bulletin and the Philippines Free Press remained close throughout the occupation.
    1. The Manila Shinbun-sya, operated by the Osaka Mainichi and the Tokyo Nichi Nichi took over press publications.
    1. To enlist the genuine cooperation of the Filipinos to cooperate in the program of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, Premier Hideki Tojo promised independence as long as the Philippines agreed to discard Western influences, develop and indigenous culture on the basis of our pre-colonial past and the use of the national language instead of English in order to Japanize all aspects of life.
    1. Both radio and print media carried lessons in Nippongo to encourage Filipinos to learn the language. Magazines featured articles on the good work Japan was doing in the Philippines and on the merits of the Japanese way of life as compared to Western decadence. Filipino Reaction to the Japanese Propaganda and Media Control
    1. There was no success by the Japanese in encouraging Filipino writers to produce short stories on such themes as hard work in the farms, neighborhood associations, and Oriental virtues.

poems about American or British heroes, legends, historic events, and patriotic songs of these two countries, even mathematical problems using US currency and tables of values.

    1. Completely banning books on the geography, history and culture of the US and Great Britain, even of the Commonwealth government and references to Quezon and Osmena.
    1. Complete supervision of public schools and the limited operation of private schools prohibiting those owned by the Chinese or enemy nationals.
    1. The Filipino language was taught for the first time in all secondary schools; NIppongo compulsory subject at all levels; English partially. The Japanese Regime and the Catholic Church
    1. Toward the Church as a political and economic institution, the Japanese were conciliatory and even accommodating, but the social and educational influence were circumscribed and the religious functions supervised.
    1. There was a close collaboration between the Catholic Church and the Japanese army— evidenced by: (a) not abolishing the Church’s tax-exempt status; and, (b) allowed it to still own lands.
    1. On the Japanese grant of “independence” to the Filipinos in 1943, the Holy See acknowledged with “most sincere thanks” the communications of Jose P. Laurel announcing his installation as president of the puppet republic.
    1. Towards limiting the Church’s social and educational influence, the Japanese abolished religious instruction in all schools and that priests and ministers were required, as of May 1942, to secure permits from the Bureau of Religious Affairs before solemnizing marriages.
    1. As of 1943, parish priests were being required to use the pulpit to convince the people that it was useless to resist Japanese rule.
    1. The Protestants were the most harshly treated, principally because Protestant leadership was mainly American and their ministers were interned in Santo Tomas Internment Camp. Filipinization Moves Propaganda
    1. Japanese attempt to attract Filipinos by seeming to favor their old nationalist demands.
    1. The isolation of American clergymen.
    1. The Japanese allowed the publication of letters—if they did not actually instigate in their writing—demanding complete Filipinization of the clergy, the sale of all the landholdings of the Church, government control of curricula and textbooks of private schools, and the exclusion of non-Orientals from their faculties.
    1. In 1944, the press played up the 72nd^ anniversary of the execution of Fathers Burgos, Gomez and Zamora and reminded newspaper readers of the cause for which they had suffered martyrdom. Japanese Control of Philippine Social Institutions
    1. The establishment of the Constabulary Training Academy on May 1942 to train Constabulary soldiers and officers for three months to improve their efficiency in the maintenance of law and order—actually for suppressing resistance to the Japanese regime.
    1. A Government Training Institute was established so that the bureaucracy can be fit to perform duties under the New Order.
    1. Creation of the neighborhood association on August 1942 to maintain peace and order (including organization of nightly patrols), composed of a group of five to ten families living in contiguous areas.
    1. The creation of Kalibapi or Kapisanan sa Paglilingkod sa Bagong Pilipinas on Dec. 30, 1942 with Benigno S. Aquino as director-general and all Filipino citizens must join.
    1. The dismantling of Young Philippines, Democrata Party, Ganap , Popular Front; Civic organizations such as the National Federation of Women’s Clubs, Young Men’s Christian Association, Young Women’s Christian Association, the Philippine Association of Women Writers, the Philippine Veterans Association, and the Filipino Nurses Association and their membership absorbed into the Kalibapi.
    1. The creation of a Junior Kalibapi which took in young Filipinos from 7 to 18 who “showed promise of usefulness and service to the New Philippines and has two branches: (a) Kabataang Maghahanda for children 7 to 15; and (b) Kabataang Katulong for young people 16 to 18. Immediate Economic Goals
    1. The immediate economic goal is to extract from the occupied territory supplies and equipment for Japan’s current war needs—through: (a) outright confiscation or at least full control and management of financial institutions and public utilities; and. (b) the manipulation of production and distribution to make extraction more efficient.
    1. The long-range economic objective was to prepare the Philippines for her role in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere—integrating the Philippine economy into Japan’s autarkic plan— placing her on an equal footing with other imperialistic states. Means to Execute Economic Goals
    1. The use of military currency to hide plunder—by paying on commandeered food and other military needs with a currency worth only the paper and ink needed to produce it—having no foreign exchange value, cannot even be exchanged for Yen.
    1. Through the control of the banking system—by taking over American and other foreign banks and turning them over to the Bank of Taiwan for liquidation.
    1. Taking over the railroad company, the Manila Horse-Owners’ Association, the Manila Electric Company, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, the management of the Manila Gas Company.
    1. In July 1942, the Philippine Copra Purchasing Union was established taking sole charge of buying copra from the producers.
    1. Military ordinances issued in July put the import and export business under army control—by establishing the Philippine Export Control Association and the Philippine Prime Commodities Distribution Control Association with the prerogative of controlling the distribution of low-grade cotton textiles, matches, salt, tobacco, lard, soap, and paper.
    1. To supply the army and Manila’s population, a Foodstuff Control Association was set up in August. Some Result of the Economic Policies
  • A. The deterioration of the Japanese money was due to three factors:
    1. The increasing scarcity of commodities;
    1. The great amount of military notes that