The Design Argument: Teleological Argument for God's Existence and Darwin's Theory, Summaries of Design

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The design argument

The different versions of the cosmological argument we discussed over the last few weeks were arguments for the existence of God based on extremely abstract and general features of the universe, such as the fact that some things come into existence, and that there are some contingent things. The argument we’ll be discussing today is not like this. The basic idea of the argument is that if we pay close attention to the details of the universe in which we live, we’ll be able to see that that universe must have been created by an intelligent designer. This design argument , or, as its sometimes called, the teleological argument , has probably been the most influential argument for the existence of God throughout most of history. You will by now not be surprised that a version of the teleological argument can be found in the writings of Thomas Aquinas.

But one might reasonably think that this needs a bit more argument: why, exactly, should we believe that the fact that plants typically act “to obtain the best result” shows that they are designed by God? Aquinas does not say. Later writers filled this gap in Aquinas’ argument, by providing reasons to think that the end-directed behavior of living things shows that the universe must have been designed. Perhaps the fullest development of this argument was provided by William Paley, an 18th century English philosopher and theologian, in his book Natural Theology. This book is filled with careful and detailed discussions of various facets of the natural world, each of which Paley employs in his argument for the existence of an intelligent designer of the universe. A representative, and historically important, example is Paley’s discussion of the eye.

A representative, and historically important, example is Paley’s discussion of the eye. Here, as in many other places throughout the book, Paley is comparing an aspect of the natural world -- in this case, the construction of the eye -- and an artefact -- in this case, a telescope. The resemblance between the two is that both the parts of the eye and the parts of the telescope are set up perfectly for a certain purpose: in this case, the production of an accurate image of physical objects on the basis of the light reflected off of those objects. Further, Paley emphasizes, in either case very small changes to the parts of the instrument, or the way that they are combined, would make the instrument wholly unable to serve its purpose.

Would we, in this case, believe that the watch must have been designed by some intelligent watchmaker or other, or would we think that, for example, the watch simply came to be by chance? The answer, Paley thinks, is clear: we would conclude that it must have been designed by an intelligent watchmaker. The opposite view seems ridiculous. But, Paley thinks, this is exactly the view into which an atheist is forced. After all, we see in the world around us many examples of things, like the eyes of animals, which show the marks of design. This is relevantly just like finding a bunch of watches without knowing where they came from: we have found a whole world of well-designed creatures rather than just a single watch; so if it was reasonable to conclude that a watch must have been designed by an intelligent watchmaker, it is that much more reasonable to conclude that the natural world we find around us must have been designed by an intelligent creator.

But, Paley thinks, this is exactly the view into which an atheist is forced. After all, we see in the world around us many examples of things, like the eyes of animals, which show the marks of design. This is relevantly just like finding a bunch of watches without knowing where they came from: we have found a whole world of well-designed creatures rather than just a single watch; so if it was reasonable to conclude that a watch must have been designed by an intelligent watchmaker, it is that much more reasonable to conclude that the natural world we find around us must have been designed by an intelligent creator. Here is one way to make Paley’s line of reasoning explicit; as above, let’s say that an object has the “marks of design” if its parts are finely-tuned to its purpose.

1. Many things in nature, like eyes, show the marks of design.
2. These things must either have been created by an intelligent designer or produced by random natural processes.
3. Random natural processes never produce things with the marks of design.

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C. Things in nature that show the marks of design must have been created by an intelligent designer. (1,2,3)

Paley’s design argument

1. Many things in nature, like eyes, show the marks of design.
2. These things must either have been created by an intelligent designer or produced by random natural processes. 3. Random natural processes never produce things with the marks of design.

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C. Things in nature that show the marks of design must have been created by an intelligent designer. (1,2,3) Consider, for example, Darwin’s discussion of the eye:

Paley’s design argument

1. Many things in nature, like eyes, show the marks of design.
2. These things must either have been created by an intelligent designer or produced by random natural processes. 3. Random natural processes never produce things with the marks of design.

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C. Things in nature that show the marks of design must have been created by an intelligent designer. (1,2,3) Darwin’s theory shows how random natural processes could, over time, produce things with the marks of design. This theory seems to destroy Paley’s argument, as Darwin himself noted in his autobiography: “The old argument of design in nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails, now that the law of natural selection had been discovered. We can no longer argue that, for instance, the beautiful hinge of a bivalve shell must have been made by an intelligent being, like the hinge of a door by man. There seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings and in the action of natural selection, than in the course which the wind blows. Everything in nature is the result of fixed laws.” Often very bold claims are made on behalf of the theory of evolution; sometimes it is even claimed that the theory shows that God does not exist. It is hard to see why this should be so. But it does seem that the theory undermines one historically important argument for the existence of God. The theory of evolution does not, however, destroy every version of the design argument, since not all versions of the design argument are based on the explanation of the features of living things.

Here is Cleanthes’ statement of his central argument: Some aspects of this argument are similar to Paley’ design argument, but there are at least two important differences. First, Cleanthes does not focus specifically on living things; the focus is on the universe as a whole. Second (and related) Cleanthes does not focus on the idea that some things we find in nature are well-adapted to their purposes; after all, the universe as a whole does not have a purpose in the obvious sense that a plant or animal does. Instead, he focuses on the analogy between the universe and the artefacts produced by human beings. The argument is thus based not on “marks of design” but rather on the similarity between the universe as a whole and artefacts, like watches.

Here is Cleanthes’ statement of his central argument: Second (and related) Cleanthes does not focus on the idea that some things we find in nature are well-adapted to their purposes; after all, the universe as a whole does not have a purpose in the obvious sense that a plant or animal does. Instead, he focuses on the analogy between the universe and the artefacts produced by human beings. The argument is thus based not on “marks of design” but rather on the similarity between the universe as a whole and artefacts, like watches. This suggests the following interpretation of Cleanthes’ argument, which is often called the argument from analogy :

1. The universe resembles human artefacts, but is greater.
2. Like things have like causes.
3. Human artefacts have intelligent designers. C. The universe has an intelligent designer, but one greater than the designers of human artefacts.

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The argument from analogy

1. The universe resembles human artefacts, but is greater.
2. Like things have like causes.
3. Human artefacts have intelligent designers. C. The universe has an intelligent designer, but one greater than the designers of human artefacts.

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Hume here is calling attention to a feature of arguments from analogy: such arguments are only so strong as the similarity between the things being compared. Can you think of uses of the sort of reasoning employed in the argument from analogy which we would ordinarily find plausible? Is Hume right that these uses are based on much closer similarity than that employed in the argument from analogy for the existence of God? This is connected to another of Hume’s criticisms of this argument: given the weakness of the analogy between human artefacts and the universe as a whole, Hume things that even if the argument from analogy succeeds in showing that the universe was created by some intelligent being, it tells us hardly anything about what that being must be like. 

The argument from analogy

1. The universe resembles human artefacts, but is greater.
2. Like things have like causes.
3. Human artefacts have intelligent designers. C. The universe has an intelligent designer, but one greater than the designers of human artefacts.

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This is connected to another of Hume’s criticisms of this argument: given the weakness of the analogy between human artefacts and the universe as a whole, Hume things that even if the argument from analogy succeeds in showing that the universe was created by some intelligent being, it tells us hardly anything about what that being must be like. 

Here’s how he puts the idea: What is Hume’s argument here? How should a defender of the argument from analogy respond?

The argument from analogy

1. The universe resembles human artefacts, but is greater.
2. Like things have like causes.
3. Human artefacts have intelligent designers. C. The universe has an intelligent designer, but one greater than the designers of human artefacts.

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Hume also gives another objection to the argument from analogy: 

The defender of the argument from analogy must have some answer. Suppose that she says: The universe, like human artefacts, is beautiful and well-ordered. Now Hume can pose a dilemma for the defender of the design argument. Consider the following principle: Anything which is beautiful and well-ordered must, like human artefacts, have an intelligent designer. This principle is either true or false. If it is false, then the argument from analogy fails, since this is the principle of like things having like causes on which the argument is based. But if it is true, then we can ask: is God beautiful and well-ordered? It is hard for the defender of the design argument to say “No.” But if God is beautiful and well ordered, then it follows from the above principle that God must have an intelligent designer. One might, then, think of this argument as a challenge: explain which properties the universe has in virtue of which it is similar to human artefacts so that God does not have those very properties, and hence himself need an intelligent designer.

One might, then, think of this argument as a challenge: explain which properties the universe has in virtue of which it is similar to human artefacts so that God does not have those very properties, and hence himself need an intelligent designer. So let’s think: what is it about the universe that might make us believe that it has an intelligent designer? Contemporary physics suggests an answer to this question, which is illustrated by the book Just Six Numbers , by Martin Rees, a well- known astrophysicist and cosmologist. Rees describes six constants which figure in the fundamental laws of nature, and to a large extent shape the nature of the universe. Here is one of them: And here’s what Rees says about the six numbers: