Download Understanding the Concept of Intelligence: A Historical Perspective and more Study notes Psychology in PDF only on Docsity!
WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?
FRANK N. FREEMAN University of Chicago
The designersof mental tests have frequentlysaid that it is not
onlyunnecessarybut probablyfutile to raisethe questionwhichis the subject of this article, and that the answerwould^ be of no use if we could find it. Physicists have been able, it is pointed out, to measure
electricity without knowingits nature, and, it is asserted,we can do the same with intelligence. It is unlikely that the argumentby analogy throws much light on the value of the quest for informationregardingthe nature of
intelligence, but even the analogy of the physical sciences should suggest that it is productive to analyze the facts which appear on the surfaceof things and to penetrate, so far as we may be able, into the deeperconstitutionof the materialwith which the sciencedeals. In psychology,then, we may expect to deriveprofitfroman examina- tion of the nature of intelligence. Both in the measurementof intel- ligence and in the attempt to set the conditionsfor its proper devel- opment, an understandingof its nature should^ be of value. It may fairly be said that psychologists are agreed in the belief that mental tests, particularlyintelligencetests, have indicated the existence of general intelligence or general capacity. They are not agreed,however,^ regardingthe exact nature of generalintelligence. To put the matter briefly, it is agreed that^ intelligence is, but it is not agreedwhatit is. Thereis also (^) pretty generalagreementthat tests have shownthat intellectual capacity is not a mere collection^ of specialized,discon- nected capacities. The fact of correlationbetween individual tests and between (^) groups of tests indicates that there is a high degree of relationshipbetween^ various^ mental traits or the compactgroupsof traits which are measured by the particular tests.^ Furthermore, there is a certain system in the correlationbetween mental traits. Tests of some traits or tests of some types correlateregularlyto a 253
254 THE^ SCHOOL REVIEW^ [April
high degree with other tests. Particular^ pairs of tests, moreover, correlatemore highly than do other (^) pairs of tests. In general, tests which requirethe manipulationof ideas correlatewith one another to a high degree as comparedwith tests of sensory capacity, motor reaction, or perception. There is an organizationamong the intel- lectual traits (^) accordingto whichsome areknit togetherratherclosely while others are more (^) largely independentof one another. The evidencefromthe correlationbetweenmental tests indicates the substantialcorrectnessof our common-sensejudgmentsconcern- ing the existenceof degreesof intelligence. In ordinarylife, we pass judgment concerningthe relative intelligence of individuals^ of our acquaintance. Some^ we call dull, and others^ we call bright. We do not mean by this that one individual is incapable of doing certain specializedtasks and that the other^ is capableof doing these special- ized (^) tasks; we mean that the one will be founddeficientin all sorts of tasks demanding intellectual capacity, whereas the other will be found competent in all kinds of intellectual performance.These generalizedjudgments are not inconsistent^ with the recognitionof a certain (^) degreeof specializationwithin the generalfield of intellec- tual activity. We may approachthe further (^) question as to what intelligence is, first, (^) by makinga survey of the definitionswhich^ have previously been offeredand, second, (^) by attempting to find a definition of our own. Many attempts have been made to describe or define intelli- gence. Binet, in a study whichhe madein the^ middlenineties,sought for a measureof intelligencein tests of attention. Ebbinghaustook as his guide in the search for an intelligence test the conceptionof
intelligenceas the ability to combineor to see the relationbetween items of experience. Spearman,in his first (^) experiments,came to the conclusionthat intelligenceis ability to discriminatefine (^) differences. Burt definedintelligenceas "the (^) powerof readjustmentto relatively novel situations (^) by organizingnew psycho-physicalcombinations."' Binet, as quoted by Terman, describesintelligenceas "(i) the tend- ency of thought to take and maintain a definite direction, (2) the (^1) C. Burt, "ExperimentalTests of General (^) Intelligence,"British Journal of Psychology, III^ (igog), 168.
256 THE SCHOOLREVIEW^ [April
to define (^) intelligence in terms of capacity for adjustment; that is,
intelligence is defined as having objective rather than subjective significance.This brings the definition of the term into larmony with the definitionof feeble-mindednesswhichhas (^) long been current. A feeble-mindedperson has been describedlegally and otherwiseas one who is incapableof taking care^ of himself^ and of makinga living in the ordinarysituations^ of life. This, of course,does not mean^ that
every person who fails to succeed^ is feeble-minded.A person may fail for other reasons. Furthermore,it does not mean that material or vocational successis a completemeasureof intelligence. A person
may seek other kinds of success than material^ or financialsuccess. In such cases, he is to be measuredin terms^ of his aim or in terms^ of the kind of success^ that he seeks^ rather^ than in terms of financialor materialgain. The criterion,however,remainsone of adjustmentor of behavior. Whenwe analyze the conditionsof success, even the broadtypes of success which^ have been mentioned,we find, as has alreadybeen hinted at, that they are not to be reduced to a single trait. A split here arises (^) among the contributorsto the symposium. Some would include all of the traits which make for success, but others would narrow them down to those traits which we ordinarilydenominate intellect. Some, for example,would include (^) perseverance,emotional
balance, freedomfrom^ undue^ suggestibility,and energy. The writer was disposed to include such traits as these in intelligence and to interpretit in this broad^ fashion. The prevailingopinion,however,is that it will (^) promoteclearness of thinking and of the analysis of capacities to distinguishbetween the temperamental,emotional, and volitional traits, which are fac- tors in successfuladjustment,and the intellectual traits taken in the narrowersense. With this view the writeris now in agreement. It is, after all, a matter of terminology,and the questionis, Which use of the termis the most serviceable? We may conclude,then, that intel-
ligence refersto certain^ of the mental factorswhich^ produceor tend to producesuccessfuladjustment. Spearman'has made the most elaborateanalysis of intelligence (^1) C. Spearman,TheNatureof "Intelligence"and thePrinciplesof Cognition.Lon- don: Macmillan & Co., 1923.
1925] WHAT^ IS INTELLIGENCE^?^257
of any writer. He conformsto the view that the term (^) "intelligence" shouldbe employedso as to excludethe non-intellectualtraits, such as temperament,will, and social attitudes. Within the field of intel- lectual operations,however, he makes a novel distinction. He lays down two sets of principles;one set he calls qualitative principles and the other set quantitative principles. The qualitative principles comprise a description of the manner^ in which thinking proceeds. They are three in number^ and concern^ the apprehensionof experi- ence, the eduction of relations, and the eduction^ of correlates.^ We should (^) ordinarilydescribethese processesas perception,apprehend- ing the relation between objects, and passing from the idea of an object and^ a particularformof relationto the idea^ of a secondobject. The last processis illustratedby thinkingof a word-"white"-and of a relation-"opposite"'-and fromthese (^) educingthe word"black." These qualitative principlesdo not furnish the basis for distinc- tions among degrees of intelligence, accordingto Spearman. They merely furnish a description of the functioning of intellect which holds (^) good whereverit is found. Individualdifferencesare due to the existence of quantitative principles. These concern the amount of energy at the disposal of the nervous^ system. An individualposses- ses a certainfixed amount of nervousor mental energy, and it is this which distinguishes him from other individuals. This hypothesis goes beyond the descriptive account of intelligence, which is our immediate topic, and we shall return to it in connection^ with an attempt to explain the nature of intelligence. The recent (^) summaryof the criteriaof intelligenceby Thorndike' distinguishesbetween the criteriawhich^ are actually used and those which he regards as theoretically correct. Intelligence tests actu- ally depend, he says, on knowledgeof facts, mental maturity, and, to a lesser degree, ability to learn. The capacities which psy- chologists hold to be the chief constituents of learningare adapta- bility to a novel situation and relational thinking. The last item refersto Spearman'stheory. If the writer'sinterpretationof Spear- man is correct,relationalthinkingis not a criterionfor the measure- ment of individual differences. I E. L. Thorndike,"Measurementof Intelligence,I: The PresentStatus,"Psycho- logical Review,XXXI^ (May, 1924), 219-52.
Z925] WHAT^ IS INTELLIGENCE^?^259
The earlier (^) attempts to define (^) intelligence sought to identify it with one of the recognizableintellectualtraits^ or^ processes. We have already seen examples of this type of definition. It appears in the identificationof intelligencewith attention, with discrimination,and with combiningor associative (^) ability. The difficultywith these sug-
gestions is that they are partial. All of these processes as well as others, such as memory, are necessary to intelligence. It cannot, therefore,be identifiedwith any one. A second type of suggestion seeks to escape from the difficulty
just mentioned by identifying intelligence with the sum total or compositeof the more^ particulartraits. Thus, the personwith good memory, good ability to concentratehis attention, keen discrimina- tion, and^ ready associationmay be regardedas the intelligentperson. This point of view admits of variations in the relative excellenceof the various forms of mental activity in particularindividuals and recognizesthe possibility of some compensationamong traits. The definition of intelligence as a composite does not, however, give a satisfactory explanationof the fact that some tests are^ much better measuresof intelligence than others. Furthermore,it does not dis- tinguishbetween^ relativelymechanicalor routineoperationsand the process of novel adjustment, and psychologists have become con- vinced that this distinction is a vital one. A third (^) suggestionabandonsall attempts to defineintelligencein terms either of single mental processes or of their composite and resorts to a purely objective descriptionin terms of the capacity for making adjustments to new situations or ease of learning. This is the definition which is perhaps most widely accepted. It has the merits of objectivity, simplicity of meaning, and emphasis on the adaptive character^ of intelligence. The objections to it are, first, that it fails of a real (^) psychologicalanalysis and, second,that it is too inclusive. Some formsof learning-for example,the developmentof manual skill-would (^) commonly be regardedas at least poorer evi- dences of intelligence than are other forms. Again, as has already been pointed out, successfuladjustment demands traits of will and of emotion as well as intellectual^ traits. Particularattention (^) may be given to the hypothesisof Spearman because of the elaboratenesswith which he has developed it., He I (^) C. Spearman,op.cit., chaps.i, ix, and (^) xxi.
260 THE SCHOOLREVIEW (^) [April
explainsintelligence,or the generalfactor^ which^ is his substitute^ for intelligence, as the stock of energy in the brain or nervous^ system. Every mental^ process,he suggests, is dependenton this generalfac- tor and on a specific factor. The general factor is common to all mental acts and is constant for the individual. It consists of the energy which is at the disposal of the whole brain. The specific factor is the structureof some (^) particulararea or group of neurones in the brain. These neural groups are describedas the "engines," whichare set in operationby the mental (^) energy. The variousspecific factors are not correlatedwith one anothernorwith the generalfac- tor. Individualdifferencesare (^) explainedthus: "Oneman may excel anotherin total output (involvinghis amountof disposable'energy') or else only in output of some special kind (making calls upon the efficiency of^ his^ corresponding 'engines')."' The^ first^ difference would be a differencein intelligence and the second a differencein
special capacity. If the adjustment notion is merely a formulationof the surface facts of observation, Spearman'ssuggestion carries us beyond the reach of observationaltogether. Its merit is that it apparentlycon- forms to the statistical facts of the intercorrelationbetween tests. It presents certain (^) difficulties,however, when we attempt to think
through its implications from the psychological and physiological points of view. Spearman'sexplanationin detail is something like this. A par- ticulartest, say an oppositestest, correlatesvery closelywith another
test, say a completion test. This is because each depends chiefly on the generalfactoror the store of energyin the brainand (^) very little on the structureof the brain. Two other (^) tests, say a test of speed of movement and a test of pitch discrimination,correlatescarcely at all. This is because (^) they depend almost (^) entirely on the structureof two areas or groups of neurones (^) and require scarcely any nervous
energy. This seems suspiciouslylike an explanationad hoc, for it is difficultto imaginewhy an oppositestest shouldrequiremoremental energy than a pitch-discriminationtest, and^ it is difficultto conceive physiologicallyof a condition^ in which the operation of one set of neurones takes place with the expenditure of almost no nervous
' C. Spearman, op. cit., p. 136.
262 THE SCHOOLREVIEW (^) [April
The formulawhichhas been (^) proposedaccords,furthermore,with the fact, already noted, that intelligencemust be so defined that it includesall the ordinaryintellectualoperationsand is not confinedto any one. Memory, for example, is necessary in order to give the material of thought which is to be woven into new patterns. Dis- crimination and analysis are required in order to provide the ele- ments which enter into the new combinations. Association and synthesis are obviously important stages in the process. Concept formation (^) representsa kind of pattern formation of a rather slow and unattentive sort, and reasoningis thought organizationmade formal and with its stages explicitly thought out. Thus we seem to have the kind of formulawe need-one which can be applied to the various intellectual^ processesand which^ finds^ in these various^ pro- cesses a common^ characteristic. As the definitionhas been stated, it emphasizesthe existenceof ideas and their^ controlas the essentialcharacteristicsof intelligence. This may seem to some to make the definitiontoo narrow. It could be broadenedby substituting "elements^ of experience"for "ideas" or "thought,"but the writerbelieves that the emphasison ideation in a definitionof intelligenceis justified. It does not exclude either scientificor mechanicalachievementfrom the realm^ of intelligence, since even materialobjects and conditionsabove the level of purely routine or habitual action are dealt with by means of ideas. What are the physiological implicationsof this definition? It obviously emphasizes the process of breaking up old, habitual or native, neural^ associationsor connectionsand formingnew ones. It involves analysis and synthesis among the neuronegroups. This is precisely the sort of thing of which the high-gradebrain^ is capable. Flechsig pointed out years ago that the chief large morphological differencebetweenthe brainsof the highestmammalsbelowman and the brain of man is in the extensivenessof the associationareas in the latter. These areas are the ones which do not mediate either specificsensationsor specificmovements. They make possible con- nections, patterns. The high-gradebrain^ in the evolutionaryseries, then, is one which^ permits of the extensive^ formationof new neural patterns. So, by analogy, we may plausibly conceive of the high- grade individual^ brain, among human brains, as the one which is
Z925] WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE?^263
by nature furnishedwith the mechanismof association,permitting ready and extensive formationof new patterns. The step from this abstractpsychologicaland (^) physiologicalanal-
ysis to the facts of observation^ is not a long one. The bright indi- vidual is the one who can readilyapprehendnew ideas. His mind is flexible. He can abandon old beliefs and adopt new ones when the new ones better meet the conditions. He can follow an intricate discussion, one having many elements^ which must be apprehended in their relation to one another. Suggested solutions of a problem come to his mind readily, and the ideas which thus appear out of the limbo of his experiencesometimes seem at first sight to have little bearing on the case. He can discover for himself the remote connection which makes the fact pertinent, while his duller witted companioncan recognizeit only when it is explicitly pointed out to him. All of these characteristicswill be seen to conformvery well to the definitionof intelligenceas facility of pattern-forming.
