Chain of Custody and Airport Searches: United States and Philippine Legal Precedents, Lecture notes of Law

Download Chain of Custody and Airport Searches: United States and Philippine Legal Precedents and more Lecture notes Law in PDF only on Docsity! 3Republic of tbe tlbilippineg ~upreme <!Court fflanila THIRD DIVISION CEllTIFIED TRUlt: COP'1 ~ oov:LA A· Clerk o Cou 1 · hi·rd Division MAR 0 1 ZG19 SUPREME COURT OF THE P•~tt ·~,.. PUBLIC INFORMATION (., ... PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, G.R. No. 229071 - versus - EANNA O'COCHLAIN, Present: PERALTA, J., Chairperson, LEONEN, GESMUNDO, REYES, J., JR., and HERNANDO, JJ. Promulgated: x------------------~~-~~~-~~~-~~:'-~~~~::-------------~~~--x DECISION PERALTA, J.: On appeal is the February 9, 2016 Decision1 and July 21, 2016 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36412, which affirmed the November 22, 2013 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, Laoag City, in Criminal Case No. 15585-13, finding accused-appellant Eanna O'Cochlain (Eanna) guilty of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with Associate Justices Rodi! V. Zalameda and Pedro B. Corales concurring; rollo, pp. 3-26. 2 CA rollo, p. 237. ~ Records, pp. 116-133. (/ / Decision - 2 - G.R. No. 229071 At the time of his arrest, Eanna was a 53-year old Irish national married to a Filipina and residing in Barangay Aring, Badoc, !locos Norte. In an Information4 dated July 15, 2013, he was charged with illegal possession of marijuana, committed as follows: That on or about [the] 14th day of July 2013 in the City of Laoag and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had in his possession, custody and control: two (2) sticks of dried Marijuana Leaves, a dangerous drug, with an aggregate weight of 0.3824 grams, without any license or authority to possess, in violation of the aforesaid law. 5 With the assistance of a counsel de parte and in the presence of a public prosecutor, Eanna pleaded "NOT GUILTY" in his arraignment.6 He was allowed to post bail for his temporary liberty, but a hold departure order 'Nas issued to prevent him from leaving the Philippines and his passport was surrr:;dered to the court for its custody in the course of the proceedings.7 Version of the Prosecution Aside from the sworn statements of other intended witnesses,8 the testimonies in open court of Security Screening Officer Dexter Suguitan (SSO Suguitan), Police Officer 3 Joel Javier (P03 Javier), and POI Erald Terson (PO 1 Terson) reveal as follows: While on his break time around 7:00 p.m. on July 14, 2013, SSO Suguitan of the Department of Transportation - Office of Transportation Security (OTS), assigned at the initial security screening checkpoint of the Laoag City International Airport, was told by CAAP9 Security and Intelligence Flor Tamayo (CS! Tamayo) that the parking space in front of the depmiure area smelled like marijuana ("agat sa marijuana"). He suspected that Eanna was the one who smoked the illegal drug, recounting that at around 6:35 p.m. he saw a ce1iain male Caucasian at the parking area lighting something unrecognizable as he was covering it with his palm. CSI Id at 1-2. Id at I. Id at 43-45. Id at 31, 40, 44-45. The presentation of CS! Flor Tamayo as a witness for the prosecution was dispensed with after the parties stipulated that the affidavit he previously executed would be his direct testimony and admitted that he did not witness the search on the person of Eanna and on his luggage (TSN, September 11, 2013, pp. 23- 25). Likewise, P03 John Edwin Padayao and Police Inspector Amiely Ann Luis Navarro were no longer presented as witnesses after their proffered testimonies were admitted (TSN, August 20, 2013, pp. 2-3). The prosecution admitted that P03 Padayao and Police Inspector Navarro have no personal knowledge of the specific source of the specimens they received on July 1 S, 2013 (TSN, August 20, 2013, pp. 3-4 ). 9 Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines oV Decision - 5 - G.R. No. 229071 was found in his possession. 12 It was shown to him while he was in front of his wife. The cigarette pack was then put on the desk, on top of one of his luggage. A camera bag (containing a Sony camera, connecting cables, headphones, an MP3 player, cigarette paper, and a pack of Marlboro) was also searched. The officer got some tiny grains after sticking his fingers into the bag. He showed them to Eanna and asked what they vvere. The latter replied that they were flavored tobacco, which he has been smoking for the past 30 years. Despite the claim, the officer directed an airport police to bring Eanna to the police station that was about 15 0 meters away. Together with his wife, Eanna was escorted by about five to six airport police. At the PNP-ASG office, his camera bag and other luggage arrived approximately 20 minutes later. They were placed on top of the table and stayed there for 30-45 minutes before the police started to search the contents and catalog the items. Prior to the inventory of the seized items, Eanna and his wife repacked their luggage as the latter still proceeded with her scheduled flight. Thereafter, with the permission of P03 Javier, Eanna went outside the office to smoke as he waited for his Batac-based Filipino relatives who arrived approximately after two hours. While smoking outside, he could not see what was happening, if any, to his luggage and camera bag. The camera crew of ABS-CBN arrived at almost 11 :00 p.m. An asset from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) called Badua and told him to come to the PNP-ASG office. He went with an off-duty security guard of ABS-CBN Laoag City. There, he was allowed to cover the incident, which became the basis of a television news report. The sticks of the alleged marijuana were shown to Eanna thrice - once at the airport and twice at the police station. On the second instance, he was shown two thin rolled sticks that were placed on top of the table in front of him. On the third time, however, he saw a thin and a fat rolled sticks made of paper that were different from what he was using. RTC Ruling After trial, Eanna was convicted of the crime charged. The fa/lo of the November 22, 2013 Decision states: WHEREFORE, accused Eanna O'Cochlain is hereby pronounced GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the charge of illegal possession of 12 Eanna contended that it was actually one rolled paper containing flavored tobacco that was broken into two (TSN, October 2, 2013, pp. 36-38). There were two red Marlboro boxes, one almost full, containing 19 cigarettes, and the other one contained pre-rolled crushed tobacco (TSN, October 2, 2013, p. 19). d Decision - 6 - G.R. No. 229071 marijuana weighing 0.3824 gram and is therefore sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00). The two sticks of marijuana subject hereof are confiscated, the same to be disposed in the manner that the law prescribes. SO ORDERED. 13 The search conducted on Eanna and his subsequent arrest were upheld. According to the RTC, the search upon his person was not unreasonable but was actually an exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and seizures. It was justified as it proceeded from a duty or right that was enforced in accordance with the aviation rules and regulations to maintain peace, order and security at the airports. In fact, Eanna's plane ticket can-ied a proviso allowing airport authorities to check on his person and baggage pursuant to the requirement of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6235. 14 Moreover, another exception to the rule is consented warrantless search and seizure. In this case, Eanna agreed to the body pat down search that was requested by SSO Suguitan. For the RTC, SSO Suguitan was a credible witness. It was observed that he was spontaneous in his testimony and that he appeared candid and truthful in his statements. There was nothing in his testimony or in the manner he testified that could arouse serious suspicion of lying. Some of his inconsistent statements, which the defense considered as in-econcilable, were insignificant and trivial as they do not impinge on any of the elements of the offense charged. Instead, the statements bolster SSO Suguitan 's credibility as they were indicia of his unrehearsed testimony. fhe RTC opined that Eanna's denial was not based on clear and convincing evidence; rather, it was bare and self-serving. His testimony was even fraught with incoherence and serious inconsistencies which he obviously committed as he desperately tried to show that what was taken from his possession was mere tobacco. Considering his flip-flopping testimony, his denial was not given credence and did not prevail over the credible testimony of SSO Suguitan and the unquestioned findings of the forensic chemist. 1:1 Records, p. 133; CA rollo, pp. 70, 136. l•I Section 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier. cA Decision ,.., - I - G.R. No. 229071 Finally, as to the chain of custody of the illegal drug seized, the RTC was satisfied that the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject marijuana. It ruled: In this case, the Court does not doubt a bit that the two sticks of marijuana presented in evidence are the same sticks of marijuana confiscated from the accused. There was not only compliance by the airport authorities of the requirements of Section 21 of the law and its implementing rules and regulations, there is a complete account of the complete chain of custody of the two sticks of marijuana that negates any doubt that their integrity and evidentiary value have been preserved. As it has been established by the prosecution, upon being informed of the arrest of the accused, after SSO Suguitan had confiscated the two [sticks] of marijuana from the accused, P03 Joel Javier, the duty police investigator at the airport at [the] time who was at the ramp outside the departure tem1inal was called and when he arrived at the place where the accused was accosted and was informed of the arrest of the accused, he took custody of the two sticks of marijuana which were then on the screening desk or table and invited the accused to the office of the PNP-CAAP Aviation Security Group located within the premises of the airport not far from the departure terminal. There, P03 Javier marked the two sticks of marijuana with E0-1 and E0-2. Upon the arrival of two Barangay ofiicials, Barangay Chairman Edilberto Bumanglag and Kagawad Benjamin Teodoro of Barangay Araniw, Laoag City which has territorial jurisdiction over the airport, and a member of the media in the person of Juanito Badua, a cameraman of ABS-CBN, Laoag, P03 Javier also conducted the required inventory not only of the two sticks of marijuana but the other belongings of the accused contained in his luggage. In the course of the inventory, POI Erald Terson, also a member of the PNP­ A viation Security Group, took pictures of the seized items as he was directed to do by their superior. Sometime later, as the accused was brought for medical examination, P03 Javier was the one who brought the two sticks of marijuana together with the prepared letter request to the Ilocos Norte Provincial Crime Laboratory Office for examination. And to complete the chain, the prosecution established that at the said crime lab, the two sticks were received by P03 Padayao who thereupon turned them over to the forensic chemist, Police Inspector Amiely Ann Navarro. As the Court takes judicial notice from the record of the case, the two sticks were finally submitted to court on July 19, 2013, received by the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Bernadette Espejo[,] who issued the con:esponding Acknowledgment Receipt therefor. Significantly relative to the chain of custody and as would have equally done by the other concerned witnesses such as forensic chemist Police Inspector Navarro who issued her written chemistry reports of the qualitative examinations she conducted on the specimens, and P03 Padayao, both of the crime lab, SSO Suguitan[,] who discovered the two sticks of marijuana[,] identified the same in open court, pointing in the process the respective markings E0-1 and E0-2 that he witnessed to have been placed by the investigating police officer, P03 Javier[,] which, after the inventory, the latter placed in a plastic bag (Ziploc). P03 Javier himself also identified the two sticks of marijuana. rJ Decision - 1 () - G.R. No. 229071 3. The drug evidence was rendered susceptible to alteration, tampering and swapping because the Ziploc where it was placed was not sealed by an adhesive tape or any means other than the natural, built-in re­ sealable feature of the plastic bag. 4. The presence of the marking "JEP" on the two rolled sticks of alleged marijuana could not be explained and the marking made thereon compromised their integrity and physical appearance. 5. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is unavailing because the police authorities deviated from the mandated procedure and offered no valid ground to show that their actuations were justified. Our Ruling The judgment of conviction is affirmed. Airport screening search is a constitutionally reasonable administrative search. The search and seizure of an illegal drug during a routine airport inspection made pursuant to the aviation security procedures has been sustained by this Court in a number of cases. 19 In the leading case of People v. Johnson, 20 we held: 19 Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airpo11s. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are See People v. Cadidia, 719 Phil. 538 (2013 ); Sales v. People, 703 Phil. 133 (2013 ); People v. Suzuki, 460 Phil. 146 (2003); People v. Canton, 442 Phil. 743 (2002); and People v. Johnson, 40 I Phil. 734 (2000) 20 Id (ff Decision - 11 - G.R. No. 229071 subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. 21 Thus, while the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,22 a routine security check being conducted in air23 and sea24 ports has been a recognized exception. This is in addition to a string of jurisprudence ruling that search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) customs search; (4) seizure of evidence in "plain view"; (5) consented warrantless search; ( 6) "stop and frisk" search; and (7) exigent and . 25 emergency circumstance. Notably, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution was patterned after the Fomih Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America.26 Having been derived almost verbatim therefrom, the Court may turn to. the pronouncements of the US Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts, which are considered doctrinal in this juric;~ 1 iction.27 Like in our country, the circumstances under which a warrantless search, unsupported by probable cause, may be considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment are very limited and that exceptions thereto are few specifically established and well delineated.28 In a similar way, the government bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search was 21 People v. Johnson, id. at 743, as cited in People v. Cadidia, supra note 19, at 556; Sales v. People, supra note 19, at 140; People v. Suzuki, supra note 19, at 159-160; and People v. Canton, supra note 19, at 758-759. See also Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018; People v. Gumilao, G.R. No. 208755, October 5, 2016 (Resolution); and Dela Cruz v. People, 653 Phil. 653, 683 (2016). 22 SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and etfocts against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 23 People v. Cadidia, supra note 19; Sales v. People, supra note I 9; People v. Suzuki, supra note 19; People v. Canton, supra note 19; and People v. Johnson, supra note 19. 24 People v. Gumilao, supra note 21, and Dela Cruz v. People, supra note 21, at 683. 25 See Martinez v. People, 703 Phil. 609, 617 (2013); Luz v. People, 683 Phil. 399, 411 (2012); Valdez v. People, 563 Phil. 934, 949 (2007); People v. Chua Ho San, 367 Phil. 703, 715-716 (1999); People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 627-628 ( 1999); and Malacat v. CA, 347 Phil. 462, 479 ( 1997). 26 Saluday v. People, supra note 21. 27 People v. Marti, 271 Phil. 51, 57 (1991). as cited in Pollo v. Chairperson·L~mstantino-David, et al.. 675 Phil. 225, 249 (2011). 28 See United States v. McCarty. 648 F.3d 820 (201 O); Higerd v. State, 54 So. 3d 513 (2010); United States v. Fo/ana. 620 F. Supp. 2d 857 (2009); and UniteJ State~ v. Aukai. 497 F.3d 955 (2007). /I Decision - l 2 - G.R. No. 229071 conducted pursuant to an established exception to the Fourth d . 29 Amen ment warrant reqmrement. US courts have permitted exceptions to the Fourth Amendment when "spec;al needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable" such as work-related searches of government employees' desks and offices, warrantless searches conducted by school officials of a student's property, government investigators conducting searches pursuant to a regulatory scheme when the searches meet "reasonable legislative or administrative standards," and a State's operation of a probation system. 30 The Fourth Amendment permits the warrantless search of "closely regulated" businesses; "special needs" cases such as schools, employment, and probation; and "checkpoint" searches such as airp01i screenings under the administrative h d . 31 searc octrme. Searches and seizures are ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing.32 However, because administrative searches primarily ensure public safety instead of detecting criminal wrongdoing, they do not require individual suspicion. 33 Where the risk to public safety is substantial and real, blanket suspicionless searches calibrated to the risk may rank as "reasonable."34 In particular, airport searches have received judicial sanction essentially because of the magnitude and pervasiveness of the danger to the public safety and the overriding concern has been the threat of death or serious bodily injury to members of the public posPc1 by the introduction of inherently lethal weapons or bombs.35 Although the US Supreme Court has not specifically held that airport screening searches are constitutionally reasonable administrative searches, it has suggested that they qualify as such. 36 Airport security searches can be deemed lawful administrative searches because ( 1) these searches constitute relatively limited intrusions geared toward finding particular items 29 United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 371 (6th Cir. 1982); Higerd v. State, id.; and United States v. Fofana, id. 30 . Griffin v. Wis., 483 U.S. 868 ( 1987). See also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47] v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 ( 1995). 11 Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 767 F.3d 1171 (2014). 12 United States v. McCarty, supra note 28, citing United States v. Aukai, supra note 28 (quoting City of!ndianapolis v. Edmond. 531 U.S. 32 [2000)). 33 Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., supra note 31. -'" See United States v. McCarty, supra note 28, citing United States v. Aukai, supra note 28 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 [1997]). 35 State v Hanson, 97 Haw. 77 (2001 \. 16 United States v. Aukai, supra note 28, citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, supra note 32; Cham/lei· v. Miller, supra note 34; and Nat'/ '/'rea1·w:1· Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 ( 1989). See also Corbell v. Transp. S'ec. Adm in. supra note 31; United States v. McCarty, 20 l l U.S. App. LEXIS 18874 (20 l l) and supra note 28; and Vunhrocklc!n v. Unit1?d Stat1?.1, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24854 (2009). / Decision - 15 - G.R. No. 229071 Furthermore, to be constitutionally permissible, warrantless and suspicionless airport screening searches must meet the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness.52 "What is reasonable depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or seizure itself."53 There can be no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.54 In other words, an administrative screening search must be as limited in its intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative need that justifies it. 55 Specifically, the Court must balance an individual's right to be free of intrusion with "society's interest in safe air travel."56 On this score, Davis again has provided a guidepost. There it was held that an airport security search is considered as reasonable if: (1) the search is no more extensive or intensive than necessary, in light of current technology, to satisfy the administrative need that justifies it, that is to detect the presence of weapons or explosives; (2) the search is confined in good faith to that purpose; and (3) a potential passenger may avoid the search by choosing not to fly. 57 In State v. Hanson, 58 the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i believed in the soundness of the logic of the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Skipwith, 59 which ruled: 52 53 54 Necessity alone, however, whether produced by danger or otherwise, does not in itself make all non-probable-cause searches reasonable. Reasonableness requires that the courts must weigh more than the necessity of the search in terms of possible harm to the public. The equation must also take into account the likelihood that the search procedure will be effective in averting the potential harm. On the opposite balance we must evaluate the degree and nature of intrusion into the privacy of the person and effects of the citizen which the search entails. In undertaking our calculation of the weight to be accorded to these three factors in the case at bar - public necessity, efficacy of the search, and degree of intrusion - we need not reiterate what was said in Moreno about the dangers posed by air piracy; suffice it to say that there is a judicially-recognized necessity to insure that the potential harms of air piracy are foiled. The search procedures have every indicia of being United States v. Fofana, id., citing United States v. Davis, supra note 40. State v. Hanson, supra note 35, citing United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, 800 F.2d 899 ( 1986). United States v. Davis, supra note 40, citing Camara v. Municipal Court, supra note 47. 55 Bruce v. Beary, 498 F.3d 1232 (2007), citing United States v. Davis, supra note 40. See also Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125 (2006). 56 United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, supra note 53. See also Higerd v. State, supra note 28; United States v. Fofana, supra note 28; United States v. Marquez, supra note 40; and State v. Hanson, supra note 35. 57 See also United States v. McCarty. supra note 28; Higerd v. State, supra note 28; United States v. Fufanc.1, supra note 28; United States v. Aukai, supra note 28; Gilmore v. Gonzales, supra note 55; State v. Book, 165 Ohio App. 3d 511 (2006); United States v. Marquez, supra note 40; United States v. Pulido­ Baquerizo, supra note 53; and United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223 (1980). 58 Supra note 35. 59 482 F.2d 1272 (1973). t1" Decision - 1 (1 - G.R. No. 229071 the most efficacious that could be used. The group being screened is limited to persons with the immediate intention of boarding aircraft. Metal detectors, visual inspection, and rare but potential physical searches appear to this court to provide as much efficiency to the process as it could have. On the other side of the judicial scales, the intrusion which the airport search imposes on the public is not insubstantial. It is inconvenient and annoying, in some cases it may be embarrassing, and at times it can be incriminating. There are several factors, however, which make this search less offensive to the searched person than similar searches in other contexts. One such factor is the almost complete absence of any stigma attached to being subjected to search at a known, designated airport search point. As one commentator has put it in the border search context, '"individuals searched because of their membership in a morally neutral class have less cause to feel insulted .... '' In addition, the offensiveness of the screening process is somewhat mitigated by the fact that the person to be searched must voluntarily come to and enter the search area. He has every opportunity to avoid the procedure by not entering the boarding area. Finally, the circumstances under which the airport search is conducted make it much less likely that abuses will occur. Unlike searches conducted on dark and lonely streets at night where often the officer and the subject are the only witnesses, these searches are made under supervision and not far from the scrutiny of the traveling public. Moreover, the airlines, which have their representatives present, have a definite and substantial interest in assuring that their passengers are not unnecessarily harassed. The officers conducting the search under these circumstances are much more likely to be solicitous of the Fourth Amendment rights of the traveling public than in more isolated, unsupervised surroundings. Our conclusion, after this tripartite weighing of the relevant factors, is that the standards for initiating a search of a person at the boarding gate should be no more stringent than those applied in border crossing situations. In the critical pre-boarding area where this search started, reasonableness does not require that officers search only those passengers who meet a profile or who manifest signs of nervousness or who otherwise appear suspicious. Such a requirement would have to assume that hijackers are readily identifiable or that they invariably possess certain traits. The number of lives placed at hazard by this criminal paranoia forbid taking such deadly chances. As Judge Friendly has stated: Determination of what is reasonable requires a weighing of the harm against the need. When the object of the search is simply the detection of past crime, probable cause to arrest is generally the appropriate test .... When the risk is the jeopardy to hundreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property inherent in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, the danger alone meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the search is conducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or like damage and with reasonable scope and the passenger has been given advance notice of his liability to such a search so that he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air. (Citations omitted.) ~ Decision - 17 - G.R. No. 229071 According to United States v. Aukai,60 US case law had erroneously suggested that the reasonableness of airport screening searches is dependent upon the passenger's consent, either ongoing consent or irrevocable implied consent. It opined: The constitutionality of an airport screening search, however, does not depend on consent, see Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315, and requiring that a potential passenger be allowed to revoke consent to an ongoing airport security search makes little sense in a post-9/11 world. Such a rule would afford terrorists multiple opportunities to attempt to penetrate airport security by "electing not to fly" on the cusp of detection until a vulnerable portal is found. This rule would also allow terrorists a low-cost method of detecting systematic vulnerabilities in airport security, knowledge that could be extremely valuable in planning future attacks. Likewise, given that consent is not required, it makes little sense to predicate the reasonableness of an administrative airport screening search on an irrevocable implied consent theory. Rather, where an airport screening search is otherwise reasonable and conducted pursuant to statutory authority, 49 U.S.C. § 44901, all that is required is the passenger's election to attempt entry into the secured area of an airport. See Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315; 49 C.F.R. § 1540.107. Under current TSA regulations and procedures, that election occurs when a prospective passenger walks through the magnetometer or places items on the conveyor belt of the x­ ray machine. 61 (Citation omitted.) Currently, US courts are of the view that the constitutionality of a screening search does not depend on the passenger's consent once he enters the secured area of an airport. The requirement in Davis62 of allowing passengers to avoid the search by electing not to fly does not extend to one who has already submitted his luggage for an x-ray scan.63 If a potential passenger chooses to avoid a search, he must elect not to fly before placing his baggage on the x-ray machine's conveyor belt.64 The right to abandon air travel must be exercised prior to commencing the screening procedures. Any other rule would allow potential hijackers to leave whenever detection seemed imminent and permit them to try again another day.65 60 Supra note 28. See Arrahim v. Cho, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32708 (2018); and Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch., 956 F. Supp. 2d 1191 (2013). 61 United States v. Aukui, id., citing United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 ( 1972). 02 According to United States v. Davis, supra note 40, "airport screening searches of the persons and immediate possessions of potential passengers for weapons and explosives are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment provided each prospective boarder retains the right to leave rather than submit to the search." It held that "as a matter of constitutional laws, a prospective passenger has a choice: he may submit to a search of his person and immediate possessions as a condition to boarding; or he may tum around and leave. If he chooses to proceed, that choice, whether viewed as a relinquishment of an option to leave or an election to submit to the search, is essenticilly a ·consent,' granting the government a license to do what it would otherwise be barred from doing by the Fourth Amendment." See also Gilmore v. Gonzales, supra note 55. 63 United States v. Pulido-Baquerizo, suprc, note 53. (>4 State v. Hanson, supra note 35, citing Uni1ed Stutes v. Pulido-Baquerizo, id. See United States v. Marquez, supra note 40; and Stat<! v. Hanson, supra note 35. cJY 65 Decision ,...,(\ - .::.... ,, -- G.R. No. 229071 the OTS is tasked to implement Annex 17 of the ICAO Convention on aviation security which seeks to safeguard civil aviation and its facilities against acts of unlawful interference, which include but not limited to: 1. unlawful seizure of aircraft, 2. destruction of an aircraft in service, 3. hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes, 4. forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical facility, 5. introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or material intended for criminal purposes, 6. use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or serious damage to property or the environment, 7. communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility. 68 Among others, the OTS has to enforce R.A. No. 6235 or the Anti­ Hijacking Law.69 It provides that an airline passenger and his hand-carried luggage are subject to search for, and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances and that it is unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to ship, load or carry in any passenger aircraft, operating as a public utility within the Philippines, any explosive, flammable, corrosive or poisonous substance . 1 70 or matena. security access passes, and determination of levels of security clearances for personnel of the OTS. the DOTC and its attached agencies. and other agencies of the government; g. Prescribe security and safety standards for all transportation systems in accordance with existing laws. rules, regulations and international conventions; h. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the DOTC, issue Transportation Security Regulations/Rules and amend, rescind or revise such regulations or rules as may be necessary for the security of the transportation systems of the country; 1. Enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, to carry out its functions and mandate including, but not limited to. the use of their respective personnel, facilities and resources; .J. Actively coordinate with law enforcement agencies in the investigation and prosecution of any illegal act or unlawful interference committed at or directed to any public transportation system; k. Perform such other functions necessary to effectively carry out the provisions of this Executive Order or as may be directed by the Secretary of the DOTC. Under the same EO, the NCASC shall henceforth act as an advisory body to. and consultative forum for the DOTC Secretary in matters relative to civil aviation security. For this purpose, the NCASC was transferred to the DOTC and its composition was reconstituted. The OTS shall continue to serve as the Secretariat of the NCASC. 68 See https://ext.eurocontrol. int/lexicon/index.php/ Acts_ of_ unlawful_ interference and https .. ' 70.com/unlawful-interference/. (last accessed on December 5, 2018). <> 9 Entitled "An Act Prohibiting Certai1; Acts Jni111ical To Civil Aviation, And For Other Purposes," Approved on .lune 19, 1971. '" Section 5 of R.A. No. 6235 states: SFC 5. As used in this Act d Decision - 21 - G.R. No. 229071 It is in the context of air safety-related justifications, therefore, that routine airport security searches and seizures are considered as permissible under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. In this case, what was seized from Eanna were two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves. Obviously, they are not explosive, flammable, corrosive or poisonous substances or materials, or dangerous elements or devices that may be used to commit hijacking or acts of terrorism. More importantly, the illegal drugs were discovered only during tL.:- final security checkpoint, after a pat down search was conducted by SSO Suguitan, who did not act based on personal knowledge but merely relied on an information given by CSI Tamayo that Eanna was possibly in possession of marijuana. In marked contrast, the illegal drugs confiscated from the accused in Johnson and the subsequent cases of People v. Canton, 71 People v. Suzuki, 72 Sales v. People, 73 and People v. Cadidia, 74 where incidentally uncovered during the initial security check, in the course of the routine airport screening, after the defendants were frisked and/or the alarm of the metal detector was triggered. Airport search is reasonable when limited in scope to the object of the Anti-Hijacking program, not the war on illegal drugs. Unlike a routine search where a prohibited drug was found by chance, a search on the person of the passenger or on his personal belongings in a deliberate and conscious effort to discover an illegal drug is not authorized under the exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement. 75 The Court is not empowered to suspend constitutional guarantees so that the government may more 71 72 73 74 75 (I) "Explosive" shall mean any substance, either solid or liquid, mixture or single compound, which by chemical reaction liberates heat and gas at high speed and causes tremendous pressure resulting in explosion. The term shall include but not limited to dynamites, firecrackers, blasting caps, black powders, bursters, percussions, cartridges and other explosive materials, except bullets for firearm. (2) "Flammable" is any substance or material that is highly combustible and self-igniting by chemical reaction and shall include but not limited to acrolein, allene, aluminum dyethyl monochloride, and other aluminum compounds, ammonium chlorate and other ammonium mixtures and other similar substances or materials. (3) "Corrosive" is any substance or material, either liquid, solid or gaseous, which through chemical reaction wear:. away, impairs or consumes any object. It shall include but not limited to alkaline battery fluid packed with empty storage battery, ally! chloroformate, allytrichlorosilane, ammonium dinitro-orthocresolate and other similar materials and substances. ( 4) "Poisonous" is any substance or materials, except medicinal drug, either liquid, solid or gaseous, which through chemical reactions kills, injures or impairs a living organism or person, and shall include but not limited to ally! isothiocyanate, ammunition (chemical, non-explosive but containing Class A, B or poison), aniline oil, arsine, bromobenzyle cyanide, bromoacetone and other similar substances or materials. Supra note 19. cff Supra note 19. Supra note 19. Supra note 19. See State v. Sa/it, supra note 45. Decision - 22 - G.R. No. 229071 effectively wage a "war on drugs." If that war is to be fought, those who fight it must respect the rights of individuals, whether or not those individuals are suspected of having committed a crime. 76 Nonetheless, there is a valid consented warrantless search in this case. The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived.77 A person may voluntarily consent to have government officials conduct a search or seizure that would otherwise be barred by the Constitution. Like the Fourth Amendment, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not proscribe 1 . 78 vo untary cooperat10n. Yet, a person's "consent to a [ warrantless] search, in order to be voiLtLLary, must be unequivocal, specific and intelligently given, [and] uncontaminated by any duress or coercion[.]"79 The question of whether a consent to a search was "voluntary" or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.80 Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether [he] was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether [he] objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence [will] be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. 81 Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.82 The government bears the burden of proving "consent."83 In the US, it has been held that when the government relies on the "consent" exception to the warrant requirement, two main issues must be litigated: did the defendant indeed consent, and did the defendant do so with 7<> n 78 See Fla. v. Bostick, 501U.S.429 (1991). Valdez v. People, 563 Phil. 934, 950 (2007). See Fla. \'. Bostick, supra note 76. 7'! Schaffer v. State, supra note 37. See also Luz v. People, supra note 25, at 411; and Valdez v. Pmple. supra note 25, at 950. xu Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 4 12 I) .S. 21 8 ( 1973 ), as cited in United States v. Henry, supra note 57; and United States v. Davis, supra note 40. See also Luz v. People, supra note 25, at 41 I; and Valdez v. f'eople. supra note 25, at 950. 81 Luz v. People, id. at 411-412; and Valdi:z v. People, id. at 950. 8 ' Luz v. People, id. at 411; and fl a!dez v. People, id. 81 United States v. Henry, supra note S7; ;111ct United Stares v. Davis, supra note 40. (/I Decision .. 25 - G.R. No. 229071 Court also discussed how, ideally, the chain of custody of seized items should be established: As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain l . f' h 99 to 1ave possess10n o t e same. In the present case, the prosecution was able to prove, through the documentary and testimonial evidence, that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved in every step of the way. Upon confiscation of the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves from Eanna, SSO Suguitan put them on the nearby screening table in front of Eanna and POl Manadao, Jr. The sticks were the only items placed on the table. 100 Thereafter, the seized items were turned-over by SSO Suguitan to P03 Javier, who placed them on a tray together with the other belongings of Eanna. 101 It must be emphasized that SSO Suguitan is an airport screening officer and not a police officer who is authorized to "arrest" or "apprehend" 102 Eanna. Hence, he should not be considered as the "apprehending officer" who must immediately mark and conduct the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items conformably with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). P03 Javier was the only one in possession of the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves from the time he took custody of the same at the 99 Id. at 587, as cited in People v. Tamaifo, G.R. No. 208643, December 5, 2016, 812 SCRA 203, 229; People v. Badilla, supra note 91, at 280; Saraum v. People, supra note 93, at 132-133; People v. Dalawis, 772 Phil. 406, 417-418 (2015); and People v. Flores, 765 Phil. 535, 541-542 (2015). It appears that Mallillin was erroneously cited as "Lopez v. People" in People v. Abelarde, G.R. No. 215713, January 22, 2018; People v. Denoman, 612 Phil. 1165 (2009); People v. Garcia, 599 Phil 416 (2009); People v. Sanche::., 590 Phil. 214 (2008); and People v. Dela Cruz, 589 Phil. 259 (2008). 100 TSN, August 20, 2013, pp. 20-21; TSN, September 4, 2013, p. 7. 101 Id. at 21-22. 102 "'Arrest'' or '·apprehend" should be understood in its traditional terminology. It contemplates one which ··eventuate in a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime" and not merely "whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." "'An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual's freedom of movement. whether or not trial or conviction ultimately follows.·· (See Terry 1· Ohio. 392 U.S. l [I 968]). er Decision - 26 - G.R. No. 229071 airport up to the time he submitted the same to the crime laboratory office. 103 At the PNP-ASG office, the confiscated illegal drug was marked, physically inventoried, and photographed in front of Eanna, with SSO Suguitan, a Barangay Chairman, a Barangay Kagawad, and an ABS-CBN cameraman as • 104 p R ,:- L b E . . 10s h . witnesses. er equest ior a oratory xammat10n, t e specimens were personally delivered by P03 Javier to the Ilocos Norte Provincial Crime Laboratory Service where P03 Padayao received them. Finally, based on the Chemistry Report 106 of Police Inspector Navarro and the stipL.'.ation of facts 107 agreed upon by the parties, the specimens tested positive for the presence of marijuana after a qualitative examination. The specimens contained in the Ziploc re-sealable plastic bag that were marked, tested, and presented in court were positively identified not only by P03 Javier but also by SSO Suguitan as the same two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves seized from Eanna. 108 Hence, it would be immaterial even if, as Eanna argues, P03 Javier had no personal knowledge of their possession by Eanna and their seizure by SSO Suguitan. Eanna contends that the two sticks of rolled paper allegedly containing marijuana were not marked immediately and were just laid bare on a table at the PNP-ASG office. According to him, the ABS-CBN video footage taken shortly before midnight, which Badua submitted and which was already edited following the news report format, showed that the two sticks were without markings at first and then with markings later on. The Court notes that the compact disk showing the video of what transpired inside the PNP-ASG office does not contain the full footage that Badua had taken. It was already edited for purposes of news report. 109 Assn ming that there is truth to the allegation that the two sticks of marijuana wen~ not immediately marked, such fact does not automatically result in an acquittal. As long as the integrity and evidentiary value of an illegal drug were not compromised, non-compliance with Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR may be excused. In several cases, 110 we affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant despite recognizing that the seized illegal drug was not immediately marked at the place of arrest. Likewise, in !O.l l<H IU) lO<i !07 108 109 11\J TSN, September 11, 2013, pp. 5-6. TSN, September4, 2013, p. 13. Records, p. 24. Id at 25. TSN, August 20, 2013, pp. 2-3. Id at 30-31; TSN, September 11, 2013, pp. 3-4. TSN, September 27, 2013, p. 11. See People v. Guillergan, 797 Phil. 775 (2016); People v. Asislo, 778 Phil. 509 (2016); People v. Yuhle, 731 Phil. 650 (2014); People v. Ludip, 729 Phil. 495 (2014); People v. Macala, G.R. No. 203123, March 24. 2014 (First Division); People v. Amadeo, G.R. No. 199099, June 5, 20 l 3 (First Division); People v. Brainer, 697 Phil. 171 (2012); People v. Bautista, 682 Phil. 487 (2012); People v. Mondejar, 675 Phil. 91 (20 I I): People v. Politico, et al., 64 7 Phil. 728 (20 l 0): People v. Resurreccion, 618 Phil. 520 (2009): and People v. Rivera, 590 Phil. 894 (2008) di Decision - 27 - G.R. No. 229071 People v. Sic-open, 111 the Court sustained the conviction of the accused­ appellant even if the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug were not immediately done at the place where it was confiscated. Here, the reason for the non-observance with the rule is justified. Im1~1ediate marking, physical inventory, and photograph of the confiscated drug cannot be done at the final checkpoint area because it started to become crowded by the constant comings and goings of departing passengers. The seized items were fittingly brought by P03 Javier to the PNP-ASG office where it was made sure that the barangay officials and a media man were in attendance to witness the regularity of the entire proceedings. The peculiar situation in airports calls for a different treatment in the application of Section 21 (1) ofR.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. To require all the time the immediate marking, physical inventory, and photograph of the seized illegal drug will definitely have a domino effect on the entire airport operation no matter how brief the whole procedure was conducted. Stuck passengers will cause flight delays, resulting not just economic losses but security threats as well. Besides, to expect the immediate marking, physical inventory, and photograph of the dangerous drug at the place of arrest is to deny the reality that the persons 112 required by law to witness the procedure are unavailable at the moment of arrest. Unlike in a buy-bust operation which is supposed to be pre-planned and already coordinated in order to ensure the instant presence of necessary witnesses, arrests and seizures in airports due to illegal drugs are almost always spontaneous and unanticipated. In our view, the period of waiting for the arrival of the witnesses did not affect the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject illegal drug, on the following grounds: First, the airport police ensured that only authorized personnel were inside the PNP-ASG office during the investigation. P03 Javier claimed that he was with SP03 Domingo, POI Manadao, Jr., P02 Caole, Jr., SSO Suguitan, SSO Bal-ot, and P/Supt. Apias. 113 It was only the members of the Ill 795 Phil. 859 (2016), citing citing People v. Asislo, supra note 11 O; People v. Mammad, et al., 769 Phil. 782 (2015); Mic/at, Jr. v. People, 672 Phil. 191 (2011); and People v. Felipe, 663 Phil. 132 (2011). 112 Under the original provision of Section 21 (I) of R.A. No. 9165, after seizure and confiscation of the drugs, the apprehending team was required to immediately conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the same in the presence of (I) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof As amended by R.A. No. 10640, it is now mandated that the conduct of physical inventory and photograph of the seized items must be in the presence of (I) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official and (3) a represenlative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof (See People v. Lim, G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018; People v. Sipin, G.R. No. 224290, June 11, 2018; People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 219953, April 23, 2018; and Peoplev. Mola, G.R. No. 226481, April 18, 2018). 11 ' TSN. September 11, 2013, pp. l 7-i 8. d Decision - )0 - G.R. No. 229071 or misidentification is insufficient to render evidence inadmissible. 126 Absent some showing by the defendant that the evidence has been tampered with, it will not be presumed that those who had custody of it would do so. 127 Where there is no evidence indicating that tampering with the exhibits occurred, the courts presume that the public officers have discharged their duties 128 properly. In this jurisdiction, it has been consistently held that considering that the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with, the defendant bears the burden to show that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by the public officers and a presumption that the public officers properly discharge their duties. 129 People v. Agula/ 30 in fact ruled that failure to comply with the procedure in Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of R.A No. 9165 does not bar the application of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Thus: The dissent agreed with accused-appellant's assertion that the police operatives failed to comply with the proper procedure in the custody of the seized drugs. It premised that non-compliance with the procedure in Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 creates an irregularity and overcomes the presumption of regularity accorded police authorities in the performance of their official duties. This assumption is without merit. First, it must be made clear that in several cases decided by the Court, failure by the buy-bust team to comply with said section did not prevent the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty from applying. Second, even prior to the enactment of R.A. 9165, the requirements contained in Section 21 (a) were already there per Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Despite the presence of such regulation and its non-compliance by the buy-bust team, the Court still applied such presumption. We held: 12() United States v. Granderson, 651 Fed. Appx. 373 (2016); United Stales v. Williams. 640 Fed. Appx. 492 (2016 ); and Uni1ed States v. A !fen, 6 Io F.3cl 5 I 8 (20 I 0). 121 See United States v. Cardenas, supra note 97. m United States v. lv!ehmood, supra note 95, citing United States v. Allen, supra note 126. 12 " See People v. Miranda, 560 Phil. 795, 8 I 0 (2007), as cited in People v. Dela Cru:::., supra note 99, at 524-525: People v. Ando, et al., 793 Phil. 791, 800 (2016); People v. Ygot, 790 Phil. 236, 24 7 (20 I 6); Peo[Jle v. Domingo, 786 Phil. 246, 255 (20 I 6 ): People v. Akmad, et al., 773 Phil. 581, 59 I (2015); People v. Baticolon, 762 Phil. 468, 482 (2015); People v. Dela Pena, et al., 754 Phil. 323, 344 (2015); People v. Tav .. ,. v. 753 Phil. 570, 581 (2015); Peonl.c v. De la Trinidad, 742 Phil. 347, 360(2014); People v. Ortega. 738 h11l. 393, 403-404 (2014); People v. Yahle, supra note 110, at 660-661; People v. Octavio, et al., 708 Phil. 184, 195-196 (2013); People v. De Mesa, el al., 638 Phil. 245, 254 (20 IO); Balarhar v. People, 632 Phil. 295, 299 (20 IO); People v. Hernande:::., l!f 11!.. 607 Phil. 617, 640 (2009); People v. /vlacatingag, 596 Phil. 376, 392 (2009): and People v. Agu/ay. 588 Phil. 247, 302 (2008). 1011 Id. d Decision - 31 - G.R. No. 229071 The failure of the arresting police officers to ro;nply with said DOB Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979 is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting ofiicers and is totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that the commission of the crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is established and the prosecution thereof is not undennined by the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board. 131 (Emphasis in the original) P l . 132 l G .1 133 d l l 134 h eop e v. Darza, Jr., Peop e v. ratz, an Peop e v. Ba a ave followed the Agulay ruling. It is unfortunate that rigid obedience to procedure on the chain of custody creates a scenario wherein the safeguards supposedly set to shield the innocent are more often than not exploited by the guilty to escape rightful punishment. 135 The Court reiterates that while the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect, in reality, it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. 136 The chain of custody need not be perfect for the evidence to be admissible. 137 A complete chain of custody need not always be proved. 138 Thus, failure to strictly comply with Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused person's arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible or render void and invalid such seizure. 139 The most important factor is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item. 140 Non-compliance with the requirements of the law is not automatically fatal to the prosecution's case and the accused may still be held guilty of the offense charged. This Court ratiocinated in People v. Del Monte: 141 Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be 131 Id. at 299-300, citing People v. De los Reyes, 299 Phil. 460, 470-471 (1994). See also People v. Naelga, 615 Phil. 539, 559 (2009). 13 ' 615 Phil. 744, 757-758 (2009). 131 667 Phil. 681, 696-697 (2011). 134 741Phil.254,266(2014). 135 See People v. Maner, G.R. No. 202206, March 5, 2018. JJG People v. Tamaiio, supra note 99, at 229; People v. Badilla, supra note 93, at 280; Saraum v. People, supra note 93, at 133; and People v. Asislo, supra note 110, at 517. 137 United States v. Johnson, supra note 125; United States v. Yeley-Davis, supra note 97; and United Slates v. Cardenas, supra note 97. 138 United States v. Mitchell, 816 F.3d 865 (2016); and United States v. Rawlins, supra note 94. 139 People v. Tamaiio, supra note 99, at 229; People v. Badilla, supra note 93, at 280; Saraum v. People, supra note 93, at 133; People v. Asislo, supra note 110, at 517; People v. Dalawis, supra note 99, at 416; and People v. Flores, supra note 99, at 540-542. 14 u People v. TamaFio, id. at 229; People v. Badilla, id at 280; and People v. Asislo, id at 517. 141 575 Phil. 576 (2008). Cf Decision - 32 - G.R. No. 229071 admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will [be] accorded [to] it by the courts. x x x We do not find any provision or statement in said Jaw or in any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary merit or probative value - to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case. 142 (Italics in the original.) We restated in People v. Moner 143 that if the evidence of illegal drugs was not handled precisely in the manner prescribed by the chain of custody rule, the consequence relates not to inadmissibility that would automatically destroy the prosecution's case but rather to the weight of evidence presented for each particular case. The saving clause under Section 21 ( 1) of R.A. No. 9165 recognizes that the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses and the admissibility of other evidence are well within the power of trial court judges to decide. The Court went on to state that under the doctrine of separation of powers, it is important to distinguish if a matter is a proper subject of the rules of evidence, which are promulgated by the Court pursuant to paragraph (5), Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, or if it is a subject of substantive law, which is passed by an act of Congress. Taking into account the distinction in criminal law that a substantive law declares what acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment for committing them while a procedural law provides or regulates the steps by \\' nich one who commits a crime is to be punished, it was concluded that the chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure; therefore, it is the Court which has the last say regarding the appreciation of evidence. Certainly, the chain of custody rule is a matter of evidence and a rule of procedure, it being ultimately anchored on the weight and admissibility of evidence which the courts have the exclusive prerogative to decide. Any missing link, gap, doubt, challenge, break, problem, defect or deficiency in the chain of custody goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. 144 Once admitted, the court evaluates it and, based thereon, 1 " 2 Id at 586-587, as reiterated in Peopfr v. Moner, supra note 135; People v. Calvelo, G.R. No. 2'.23526. December 6, 2017; People v. Tripoli, G.R. No. 207001, June 7, 2017; Saraum v. People, supra note 93, at l 33; People v. Mercado, 755 Phil. 863, 879 (2015); People v. Steve, et al., 740 Phil. 727, 739- 740 (2014); People v. Gamata, 735 Phil. 688, 700-701 (2014); People v. ladip, supra note 110, at 517; People v. Cardenas, 685 Phil. 205, 22 l (2012): People v. Soriaga, 660 Phil. 600, 606-607 (2011 ); People v. Domado, 635 Phil. 74, 93-94 (2010); Zafameda v. People, 614 Phil. 710, 741-742 (2009); and People v. Macalingag, supra note 129, at 392-393. 14' ' Supra note 135. 14 " United States v. Mehmood, supra note 95; United States v. Wilson, 720 Fed. Appx. 209 (2018); United States v. Arnold, 696 Fed. Appx. 903 (2017): United States v. Marrero, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 4570 (2016 ): Uniled States v. Mitchell. supra noie l 38; United States v. Granderson, supra note 126; L;.11ited States v. Hemphill, 642 Fed. Appx 448 (2016 ); United Stales v. Williams. supra note 126; Unit.:d ti Decision - 35 - G.R. No. 229071 of reasonable probability. 154 All that is required is that the evidence m question was the same as that involved in the offense and that it is substantially unchanged. 155 Courts are reminded to tread carefully before giving full credit to the testimonies of those who conducted the illegal drug operations and must thoroughly evaluate and differentiate those errors that constitute a simple procedural lapse from those that amount to a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the safeguards drawn by the law and the rules. 156 In the performance of this function, among the evidentiary rules ~o apply are the following: test in measuring the value of a witness' testimony, appreciation of inculpatory facts, positive and negative evidence, one-witness rule, best evidence rule, suppression of evidence, presumption of regular performance of official duty, rules on circumstantial evidence and conspiracy, and (non) presentation of poseur buyer or marked money. 157 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 9, 2016 Decision and the July 21, 2016 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36412, which affirmed the November 22, 2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Laoag City, in Criminal Case No. 15585-13, finding accused-appellant Eanna O'Cochlain guilty for violation of Section 11, Article lI of Republic Act No. 9165, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. 15 ~ United States v. Mehmood, supra note 95: United States v. Mitchell, supra note 138; United States v. Williams, supra note 126; United Stares v. Johnson, supra note ·125; United States v. Allen, supra note 126; United States v. Mejia, supra note 144; and United States v. Stewart, I 04 F.3d 13 77 (1997). 155 United States v. Johnson, id. 151 ' See People v. Umipang, 686 Phil. 1024, 1037 (2012)!' '' 157 NITAFAN, DAVID G., Annotations on the Dangerous Drugs Act, First Edition (1995), Central Professional Books, Inc., pp. l 35-146. Decision 36 - G.R. No. 229071 WE CONCUR: ~~dlStUJ'nr ~ Associate Justice ~ en ~~,,,/ E C. RijlS,JR. sociate Justice ~~~ ~· RAMON PAULL. HERNANDO Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in .PERALTA Associa~ Justice Chairperson, Third Division CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section [ 3, A1ticle VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestatiun, t c,~rtify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultatien before the case was assigned to the \\Titer or the opinion of the Court's Division. CERTIFIED TRUi: COPY ~~.~ . V.L~A~ Divis~n Clerk of Court T'·ird Oivhion MAR 0 l 2019