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C HAPTER 14
Peace and violence
Helen Dexter
A BSTRACT
In this chapter, students will learn about two concepts that are central to security studies and yet tend to receive little analysis in their own right: vio- lence and peace. The chapter highlights that both concepts are complex and contested. Rather than try to settle on a definition of either, the chapter is structured around a series of questions that serve to explore the complex nature of violence and peace. As such the chapter asks: what is violence? How do we come to know it? Does violence work as a means of resistance? What does this mean for our understanding of peace? Finally, if there is no fixed definition of violence or peace, what does this mean for security studies?
C ONTENTS
z (^) Introduction: on violence 207 z (^) Security studies and violence 209 z (^) Is all violence physical and visible? 209 z (^) Everyday violence 211 z (^) Peace 212 z (^) Measuring peace: two approaches 213 z (^) Non-violent resistance 214 z (^) The effectiveness of non-violent action 217 z (^) Conclusion 219
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z Introduction: on violence
In On Violence Hannah Arendt noted that violence as a subject is both taken for granted and, at the same time, neglected. ‘No one engaged in thought about history and politics,’ Arendt (1969: 8) wrote,
can remain unaware of the enormous role violence has always played in human affairs, and it is at first glance rather surprising that violence has been singled out so seldom for special consideration. (In the last edition of the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences ‘violence’ does not even rate an entry.)
How much has changed since Arendt wrote On Violence in 1969? One might argue that this entire textbook is about violence in one form or another. But it is only in the third edition that violence as a concept gets its own chapter. Political thinkers have long debated the relationship between politics and violence: can there be politics without violence?Are human beings naturally disposed towards violence? Does the nature of the international system mean that violence between states is inevitable? Traditional theories of international relations and security studies have equated the ability to deploy violence with power and security. Rarely, however, do we stop to consider what is violence (see Box 14.1). If nothing else, this chapter will demonstrate that violence is a complex and con- tested term. The aim of this chapter, however, is not to settle on one definition of violence or to render it less complex but rather, as Kilby (2013) suggests, to under- stand why violence as a concept is so complex and to consider what it means to ‘understand violence’. Kilby (2013: 263) argues that ‘[a]ll sociologists (and crimin- ologists, historians, philosophers, political theorists, psychologists and victimologists) know this: violence – and the actors, discourses and institutions that render it a reality, and are its reality – is a multidimensional, yet contingent and unstable phenomenon.’ The example of violence that is associated with war illustrates this point (see also Chapter 12). How do we come to understand what war is? How is war ‘rendered a reality’ and which actors and sites should we look to? War is not just an event that takes place on a battlefield. War and the practices that support it are deeply embedded within social relations. We come to know about war not just through personal experience but via films, novels, history books, the media, computer games, sites of remembrance and national days such as Remembrance Sunday or Armed Forces Day. War and violence are deeply entwined with identity politics, from shaping national identity to influencing what society views as manliness and masculinity. One academic discipline alone is unlikely to give us anything near a holistic under- standing of violence. Cultural and media studies scholars, political theorists, sociologists, historians, economists, psychologists and psychiatrists could all con- tribute to understanding the examples above (and this is far from an exhaustive list). To make matters even more difficult, the actors, sites and practices related to violence are not fixed and neither is our relationship to them. This makes a ‘true’ and comprehensive understanding of violence always beyond our reach. If violence is indeed, as Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois (2004) suggest, a ‘slippery concept’, what does this mean for the idea of peace?
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z Security studies and violence
Violence is at the centre of security studies. It is recognized as both the cause of insecurity and the means to acquire it. Traditional security theorists equate military power with security. The more tools of violence a state has, the more it can project power. Those who argue that security derives from emancipation recognize that violence is a key source of insecurity for individuals and that for many people the source of that violence is their own state. Even within this more critical approach to security studies, however, violence is still often viewed as a means to produce security (albeit as a last resort) via actions such as humanitarian intervention. Often debates within security studies focus on distinguishing legitimate violence (humanitarian or emancipatory violence for example or that which is considered to be in self-defence) from illegitimate violence (such as terrorism or genocide or violence that is considered to be an act of aggression rather than in self-defence). Some forms of violence such as suicide bombings or chemical weapons provoke cultural fascination or moral indignation. Other forms of violence such as the use of precision-guided munitions, are more likely to be considered rational, proportional or just. There is an assumption then that violence, when used in the right way and for the right reasons, works. Not all violence is considered a security threat and deter- mining the level of threat from violence does not necessarily relate to its prevalence or severity. Take for instance the fact that, according to the Global Terrorism Database, between 2000 and 2015, 90 people were killed in the UK in attacks labelled ‘terrorism’ (START 2016). Between 2009 and 2015, in England and Wales, 936 women were killed by men, 598 of whom were killed by their current or ex-partner (Brennan 2016). While states dedicate vast sums of money to coun- terterrorism measures, domestic violence services remain underfunded and domestic violence rarely features in security studies curricula.
z Is all violence physical and visible?
Violence has often been understood as something that is intentional and direct, which has an immediate effect and produces visible, physical harm. This positivist approach restricts violence to that which is observable (Winter 2012). However, not all harm is immediate or visible. Some of the worst instances of human suffer- ing cannot be reduced to the deliberate act of an identifiable agent. Should the suffering and deaths of those living in extreme poverty not be considered a form of violence also? This is the question posed by German philosopher Fredrick Engels. In The Conditions of the Working Class in England (1845), Engels wrote about the conditions faced by industrial workers at the height of the Industrial Revolution. His work drew on what he witnessed during his stay in Manchester, UK, between 1842 and 1844. Appalled by what he saw, Engels passionately and provocatively questioned how violence is defined, arguing that social relations can also be a form of violence. The notion that violence derives from structures rather than just the deliberate act of an identifiable agent is now perhaps most closely associated with the work
BOX 14.2 Engels on violence, poverty and inequality
When one individual inflicts bodily injury upon another, such injury that death results, we call the deed manslaughter; when the assailant knew in advance that the injury would be fatal, we call his deed murder. But when society places hundreds of proletarians in such a position that they inevitably meet a too early and unnatural death, one which is quite as much a death by violence as that by the sword or bullet; when it deprives thousands of the necessaries of life, places them under con- ditions in which they cannot live – forces them, through the strong arm of the law, to remain in such conditions until that death ensues which is the inevitable consequence – knows that these thousands of victims must perish, and yet permits these conditions to remain, its deed is murder just as surely as the deed of the single individual; disguised, malicious murder, murder against which none can defend himself, which does not seem what it is, because no man sees the murderer, because the death of the victim seems a natural one, since the offence is more one of omission than of commission. But murder it remains. From The Conditions of the Working Class in England , first published in 1845. For a useful analysis of this quote see Winter (2012)
of Johan Galtung. In his 1969 article ‘Violence, Peace and Peace Research’, Galtung set out the concept of structural violence. He argued that violence is present when a person’s bodily or mental potential is limited in a way that was preventable. Galtung offers this example:
if a person died from tuberculosis in the eighteenth century it would be hard to conceive of this as violence since it might have been quite unavoidable, but if he dies from it today, despite all the medical resources in the world, then violence is present according to our definition. (1969: 168)
For Galtung then, defining what is and what is not violence is context-specific. The same act (such as dying from a disease) can be considered violence in one context but not in another. The example of tuberculosis also demonstrates the other significant aspect to Galtung’s definition – that violence need not involve kinetic/physical force. Galtung draws a distinction between direct violence and structural violence. Direct violence involves an identifiable person who acts to carry out violence against another identifiable person – a subject who acts against a subject. Structural violence, how- ever, does not require an identifiable actor. Thus, Galtung argues that
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‘[r]evolutionary violence, community-based massacres and state repression are often painfully graphic and transparent. The everyday violence of infant mortality, slow starvation, disease, despair and humiliation that destroy socially marginalized humans with even greater frequency are usually invisible or misrecognized’ (2004: 2)
z Peace
So far we’ve seen that violence is a complex phenomenon of which we can only ever have a partial understanding. What does this mean for our understanding of peace? Ultimately, peace, like violence, is experienced at multiple levels and is an elusive and political term. Peace can be defined in negative terms – as the absence of conflict or physical violence – or in positive terms as the presence of social justice or the absence of structural violence. In an expansive and multidimensional definition, then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (2014) suggested that peace
cannot be decreed solely through treaties – it must be nurtured through the dignity, rights and capacities of every man and woman. It is a way of being, of interacting with others, of living on this planet. Peace means access to edu- cation, health and essential services – especially for girls and women. It means giving every young woman and man the chance to live as they choose. It also means developing sustainably and protecting the planet’s biodiversity. More than ever, it means living with others on the basis of tolerance, respect and mutual understanding.
When we speak of peace do we mean peace between states, peace between com- munities or peace between individuals? Is the end of formal armed conflict enough to declare ‘peace’? For many, the experience after a formal peace accord has been signed is little different from that during armed conflict. For example, despite the signing of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali in June 2015, high levels of violence persist there. At the time of writing, thousands of people continue to flee their homes and around 135,000 Malians continue to live in exile (Pes 2016). There is also an important gender dynamic to post-war violence. While men are more likely to die during violent conflict, women are more likely to be victims of post-war violence. Gender violence such as rape, forced pregnancy and marriage, trafficking for prostitution, and domestic violence tends to spike after war formally ends. Speaking to the United Nations, former Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (2009) acknowledged that
women face appalling violence – especially sexual violence – in the anarchy generated by conflict and its aftermath. Yet post-conflict gender-based violence often remains below the radar screen, since a cessation of conflict is often mistaken for the full return of peace.
What sort of violence needs to be absent for a person to experience peace? Regardless of the level of political violence, does someone experience peace if they
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BOX 14.3 When is war better than peace?
In 2015, researchers from McGill University in Canada interviewed 60 Ugandan children who were conceived after their mothers were abducted and raped by members of the rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) during the civil war that devastated Uganda between 1986 and 2007. Working with Watye Ki Gen, a collective of women who had suffered at the hands of the LRA, the children, aged between 12 and 19 and now residing in north Uganda, were asked to describe their experiences during and after the war. The researchers found that the children felt their lives had actually been better during the war than after. Being the children of rebels (some were fathered by Joseph Kony himself, the leader of the LRA), they felt stigmatized and excluded even by their own family. While wartime brought with it violence, starvation, destruction and terror, the children felt a sense of belonging within the LRA that was replaced by fear and hate when the conflict ended (see Denov and Lakor 2017).
z Measuring peace: two approaches
Launched by the Institute for Economics and Peace in 2007, the Global Peace Index (GPI) is an annual report that attempts to quantify peace by measuring a number of internal and external indicators. It produces a ranking of 163 states according to their peacefulness. The indicators used by the GPI range from internal to external dimensions, including homicide rates, availability of arms, political instability and the impact of terrorism in the case of the former; and military expenditure, armed service personnel numbers, relations with neighbouring countries and financial contribution to UN peacekeeping missions in the case of the latter. According to these indicators, the 2016 report concluded that 81 countries became more peaceful, while 79 countries became less peaceful. The 10 most peace- ful countries from 2015–16 according to the GPI were developed and predominantly European countries: Iceland, Denmark, Austria, New Zealand, Portugal, Czech Republic, Switzerland, Canada, Japan and Slovenia. The approach to measuring peace taken by the Global Peace Index raises methodological and theoretical questions. The GPI defines peace simply as the ‘absence of violence’ but offers no clear theoretical framework for defining or measuring violence. Its indicators are a combination of quantitative and qualitative factors; combining them together in order to produce a ‘score’ does not illuminate anything about how these factors relate to each other. For instance, if a state has a
live in fear of violence in their own home, if they cannot walk home at night for fear of being attacked or if they fear for their lives when stopped by the police? Does a person experience peace if they suffer economic or social discrimination?
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characterized by violence. States, non-state groups and individuals continue to use physical violence in order to pursue their political objectives. The military remains a revered organization within the state and joining the military is a mainstream and respectable career. The idea of humanitarian military intervention is now firmly estab- lished in international politics and included in the principle of the responsibility to protect (see Chapter 16). There seems to be an assumption that if the ‘international community’ is to act in response to repression or the mass abuse of human rights that act will need to involve the use or threat of violence either directly or by support- ing proxy forces. It seems common sense that violence and oppression can only be successfully challenged by more effective violence. Should we then think of violence as a necessary evil? There is a growing body of literature that challenges the assumption that violence and repression are most effectively resisted by the use of counterviolence (e.g. Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Nepstad 2015). This literature highlights the grow- ing use and success of non-violent action to counter repression and affect political change. Non-violent action (sometimes also referred to as civil resistance) involves engaging in conflict but without using violence or the threat of violence. Non-violent action is not passive nor does it involve ignoring or avoiding conflict. Conflict is still viewed as a mechanism for bringing about social change, the crucial difference being that proponents of non-violent action argue that conflict need not involve violence. Rather than trying to kill or destroy an opponent, non-violent action seeks to alter social relations. Not all actions that do not involve violence would be classed as non-violent action (otherwise we could include waking up or making coffee as civil resistance). Non-violent action involves acting against violence (Vinthagen 2015: 2). For Vinthagen (2015), then, non-violence is defined always in relation to violence. Perhaps the most famous theorist of non-violent action is Gene Sharp. His 1973 book, The Politics of Nonviolent Action , is akin to a handbook for non-violent resistance. It sets out techniques that Sharp argues are applicable in a variety of situations. Ultimately, Sharp (2013: 17) argues that
In political terms, nonviolent action is based on a very simple postulate: people do not always do what they are told to do, and sometimes they act in ways that have been forbidden. Subjects may disobey laws they reject. Workers may halt work, which may paralyze the economy. The bureaucracy may refuse to carry out instructions. Soldiers and police may become lax in inflicting repres- sion; they may even mutiny. When all such events happen simultaneously, the persons who have been ‘rulers’ become just other persons. This dissolution of power can happen in a wide variety of social contexts.
Sharp sets out 198 non-violent techniques, divided into three categories: protest and persuasion, non-cooperation and non-violent intervention. Methods of protest and persuasion are mainly symbolic or communicative acts designed to express the nature of the resistance. They can be used to communicate a message and to attract or gauge support. Acts of non-cooperation involve the disruptive withdrawal of participation. This might involve strikes or boycotts, for example. Non-violent
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BOX 14.5 Action without violence: key terms
Non-violent action : acting against oppression, injustice or violence without the use or threat of the use of violence. Civil resistance : collective campaigns, run by civil society without engaging in the use of violence or the threat of violence. Civil disobedience : breaking or challenging the law in order to fight or highlight injustice or oppression. People power : pressure exerted by grass-roots movements, public demonstrations or public opinion. It is a term associated with the empowerment of the general public against formal political forces or corporate interests.
Usually, when we think of a determination to avoid violence we think of terms such as pacifism. Although the terms pacifism and non-violence are sometimes used interchangeably, not all pacifists engage in non-violent action and not all non-violent action is carried out by pacifists. Non-violent action might be chosen because of its tactical usefulness rather than out of a wholesale rejection of violence. Non-violent action is sometimes classed as either principled or pragmatic. Principled non-violence normally stems from a religious, ethical or moral rejection of all violence and as such is considered a way of life rather than a tactic. The strategic deployment of non-violent
intervention involves taking direct action in order to cause disruption. Examples of non-violent intervention might be occupations, sabotage of property, roadblocks or sit-ins. Non-violent intervention can also be creative such as political theatre or the setting up of alternative institutions (such as a grass-roots university such as the Melbourne Free University). Sharp’s work has been very influential. He has been nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize on four occasions, most recently in 2015. His work is considered essen- tial reading for anyone interested in non-violent resistance and his theories have been credited with guiding non-violent resistance campaigns in Iran, Turkey, post- Soviet states and beyond. His work is not without criticism, however. Sharp presents non-violence as a set of tactics that can simply be adopted by choice. His work pays little attention to specific political contexts that might shape the potential for violent and non-violent action. For Sharp, participation is something that people can simply choose to withhold. His theory does not take account of the extent to which violence is embedded in social relations and cultural practices. His theories are also premised on a situation of resistance in the face of authoritarianism. Violence in Sharp’s theory is visible and obvious. It is not clear how successful his approach would be in counter- ing structural violence, where violence is not visible but normalized and deeply entwined in everyday practices.
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resistance campaigns were nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counter-parts’ (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 7). Perhaps surprisingly, their research suggests that non-violent campaigns are more likely to be successful regardless of the regime type being targeted by the resist- ance campaign and regardless of how likely or severe a violent response from the regime is. So, whether faced with a democratic or non-democratic, powerful or weak, violent or passive regime, non-violent action is still more likely to be success- ful than a campaign of violent resistance. Chenoweth and Stephan’s research makes an important contribution to the debate about how best to bring about progres- sive political change. Their research suggests that change brought about via non- violent means is more likely to be lasting and peaceful than that achieved by violent means. In making this case, the authors have examined the types of campaigns and dynamics of conflict that make non-violent resistance more or less likely. They suggest that:
Among the 323 campaigns, in the case of anti-regime resistance camps, the use of nonviolent strategy has greatly enhanced the likelihood of success. Among the campaigns with territorial objectives, like anti-occupation or self- determination, nonviolent campaigns also have a slight advantage. Among the few campaigns that do not fall into either category (apartheid campaigns for instance) nonviolent resistance has had the monopoly on success. The only exception is that nonviolent resistance leads to successful succession less often than violent insurgency. Although no nonviolent succession campaigns have succeeded, only four of the forty-one violent succession campaigns have done so (less than 10 percent), also an unimpressive figure. The implication is that campaigns seeking succession are highly unlikely to succeed regardless of whether they employ nonviolent or violent tactics. (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 7)
In making sense of the success of non-violent campaigns, Chenoweth and Stephan argue that increased levels of participation are what give non-violent campaigns the advantage over violent ones. While participation in non-violent campaigns is not risk-free and can involve significant sacrifice, the barriers to participation in non- violent resistance campaigns are lower than those employing violent tactics. In most contexts, it is easier to join a protest march, sit-in or strike than it is to join an armed militia. Weapons are expensive and difficult to come by, however the tools of non-violence are all around us. Lower barriers to participation mean more people involved with a campaign and this can increase the resilience of the campaign against repression. Repression against non-violent civilian movements is more likely to provoke a negative reaction both from the regime’s own supporters at home as well as with international audiences undermining the credibility of the repressive regime. While states are reluctant to be seen to give in to violent demands, non-violent actors are more likely to be viewed as credible political actors and are more likely to be engaged in political dialogue.
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BOX 14.6 The People Power Revolution, 1986
2017 marks the thirty-first anniversary of the People Power Revolution in the Philippines. On 22 February 1986, huge crowds of people took to Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (known as the EDSA), one of the main thoroughfares in the capital, Manila. Although protesters were threatened by tanks and armed troops, ordinary Filipinos stood their ground for four days – dancing, singing and praying in the street. In what became a defining image of the revolu- tion, nuns handed out flowers and food to troops. This and other actions represented a non-violent revolution (also known as the EDSA Revolution after the highway it took place on). It resulted in the overthrow of President Ferdinand Marcos’s corrupt and violent authoritarian rule that began in 1965. The People Power Revolution came about after three years of rising tensions and popular demonstrations. Marcos called a snap presidential election on 7 November 1986. Although Marcos was declared the winner, few believed his victory was legitimate. In the wake of the election result, Marcos’s political opponents and key voices in the Catholic Church called on the Filipino people to act. It is estimated that two million people participated in the People Power Revolution. President Marcos and his family fled the Philippines on 25 February 1986.
z Conclusion
Violence plays a dual role within security studies as both a source of insecurity and means to achieve it. Traditionally, security studies has restricted its focus to exceptional instances of physical violence (war, terrorism, torture etc.), while ignoring the violence that is normalized and routinized or derived from social structures. Although violence is central to security studies, security theorists rarely stop to examine violence as a concept, focusing instead on distinguishing legitimate violence from illegitimate violence. This chapter sought to demonstrate that violence and peace are complex and contested terms that have no fixed or easy definition. Neither concept can be fully defined in the abstract but can only be understood in context. Dante is credited with saying ‘I love to doubt as well as know’. This is a useful ethos to adopt for those studying peace and violence. It is perhaps more important to realize what we cannot know about these concepts as what we can. Uncertainty can be a good thing when it prompts us to ask questions about things we have previously taken for granted. The literature on non-violent action uses empirical examples to demonstrate that, while violence and repression are very much a part of our world, they need not be met with more violence. Lasting progressive change can – and is more likely to – come about through non-violent methods.
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