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C HAPTER 20
The United Nations
Thomas G. Weiss and Danielle A. Zach
A BSTRACT
In this chapter, students will learn about the principal organs of the United Nations and their role in maintaining international peace and security, the world body’s primary mandate. It provides an overview of the UN system as well as a short history of its contributions to security studies. It also addresses key threats confronting the globe in the twenty-first century – such as terrorism, mass atrocities and weapons of mass destruction – and assesses the UN’s capacity to meet these security challenges.
C ONTENTS
z (^) Introduction 299 z (^) The Security Council 300 z (^) Increased access by actors other than states 306 z (^) The General Assembly 307 z (^) The Secretariat 308 z (^) Other UN organs and actors 310 z (^) Twenty-first-century challenges 311 z (^) Conclusion 315
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z Introduction
The United Nations (UN) was conceived during the Second World War and born in June 1945. This second experiment in universal international organization followed the failed League of Nations that had emerged after the First World War
- the so-called war to end all wars. The mass death and destruction, unconscionable atrocities and human suffering caused by a further round of great-power armed conflict prompted a further effort to institutionalize collective security. The UN embodies the latest attempt at international cooperation ‘to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’. The world organization’s hierarchy of functions and tasks is reflected in the prin- ciples and values of the UN Charter, the world organization’s ‘constitution’ (Simma 2012). The preamble expresses its main purpose, the maintenance of international peace and security, and to that end it outlawed the use of force except in self-defence or with express authorization from the Security Council. Indeed, such other main tasks as ensuring respect for human rights and promoting economic development were seen more as instrumental to the primary security function rather than as crucial in themselves. The charter’s foundation is state sovereignty – the sanctity of a state’s monopoly on the use of force and authority over a defined population within territorial borders. As Article 2(7) clearly states, ‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’. While the UN’s founders had high hopes that the world body would play a cen- tral role in managing the majority of the globe’s security affairs, the onset of the US–Soviet rivalry quickly dashed such aspirations. Other than buffer forces and observers, or ‘peacekeepers’, the UN’s security machinery was essentially marginal- ized for most of the Cold War. It was not until the Iron Curtain fell and later the Soviet Union imploded that the UN assumed a more substantial role in international peace and security. The UN comprises nearly every country on the planet. To be precise, 193 states are members, a nearly fourfold increase from the original 51 in 1945. The organ- ization’s global legitimacy constitutes one of its fundamental strengths. When discussing the past, present and future of the United Nations, it is crucial to distinguish between the three facets of the UN: the intergovernmental institution (the ‘first UN’), the administrative entity (the ‘second UN’), and the collection of non-state actors that routinely engage the world body (the ‘third UN’) (Kennedy 2006; Weiss and Daws 2018; Weiss et al. 2017). The first UN is an arena for state decision-making and negotiation. Member states constitute the world organization and fund its activities. Although actors other than states are increasingly involved in security issues (as part of the problem and the solution), states remain the dominant actors in the realm of international peace and security. The second UN comprises leaders and staff members serving in myriad departments, agencies, programmes and commissions. The Secretariat, headed by the secretary-general, is the core of the administrative apparatus. The lack of commitment, resources and political will among member states often inhibits the
The United Nations System
GeneralAssembly SecurityCouncil Economic andSocial CouncilSecretariat Trusteeship
Council UN Principal
Organs
Notes: 1 All members of the United National System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB). 2 UN Office for Partnerships (UNOP) is the UN’s focal point vis-a-vis the United Nations Foundation, Inc. 3 IAEA and OPCW report to the Security Council and the GA. 4 WTO has no reporting obligation to the GA, but contributes on an ad hoc basis to GA and Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC) work on, inter alia, finance and development issues. 5 Specialized agencies are autonomous organizations whose work is coordinated through ECOSOC (intergovernmental level)and CEB (inter-secretariat level). 6 The Trusteeship Council suspended operation on 1 November 1994, as on 1 October Palau, the last United Nations TrustTerritory, became independent. 7 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) arenot specialized agencies but are part of the World Bank Group in accordance with Articles 57 and 63 of the Charter. 8 The screteariats of these organs are part of the UN Secretariat.^ This Chart is a reflection of the functional organization of the United Nations System and for informationalpurposes only. It does not include all offices or entities of the United Nations System
Published by the United Nationsl Department of Public Information DP/2470 rev.4 — 15-00040 — July 2015
Subsidiary Organs Main and other sessional committeesDisarmament CommissionHuman Rights CouncilInternational Law CommissionStanding committees and ad hoc bodies
Related Organizations
HLPF
High-level Political Forum on sustainabledevelopment
Advisory Subsidiary Body
Subsidiary OrgansFunctional Commissions
CTBTO Preparatory Commission^ Preparatory Commission for theComprehension Nuclear-Test-Ban TreatyOrganization IAEA
1,3^ International Atomic Energy Agency ICC
International Criminal Court ISA
International Seabed Authority ITLOS
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea OPCW
3 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons WTO 1,4^ World Trade Organizations
Funds and Programmes
1
Research and Training
UNDP
United Nations Development Programme
- UNCDP
United Nations Capital Development Fund
- UNV
United Nations Volunteers UNEP
8 United Nations Development Programme UNFPA
United Nations Population Fund UN-HABITAT
8 United Nations Human Settlements
Programme UNICEF
United Nations Children’s Fund WFP
World Food Programme (UN/FAO)
UNIDIR
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research UNFPA
United Nations Institute for Training and Research UNSSC
United Nations System Staff College UNU
United Nations University
Other Entities ITC
International Trade Centre (UN/WTO) UNCTAD
1,^ United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development UNHCR
1 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNOPS
United Nations Office for Project Services UNRWA
1 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East UN-Women
1 IUnited Nations Entity for Gender
Equality and the Empowerment of Women
Specialized Agencies
1,
FAO
Food and Agriculture Organization ofthe United Nations ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organization IFAC International Fund for Agricultural Development ILO^ International Labour Organization IMF^ International Monetary Fund IMO^ International Maritime Organization ITU
International Telecommunication Union UNESCO
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNIDO
United Nations Industrial Development Organization UNWTO
World Tourism Organization UPU
Universal Postal Union WHO
World Health Organization WIPO
World Intellectual Property Organization WMO
World Meteorological Organization World Bank Group
7
- IBRD
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development • IDA
International Development Association • IFC International Finance Corporation
Peacebuilding Commission
Counter-terrorism committeesInternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)Crime Prevention and Criminal JusticeNarcotic DrugsPopulation and DevelopmentScience and Technology for DevelopmentSocial DevelopmentStatisticsStatus of WomenUnited Nations Forum on Forests
Regional Commissions
8
ECA
Economic Commission for Africa ECE
Economic Commission for Europe ECLAC
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean ESCAP
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific ESCWA
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
Departments and Offices EOSG
Executive Office of the Secretary-General DESA
Department of Economic and Social Affairs DFS
Department of Field Support DGACM
Department for General Assembly and Conference Management DM^ Department of Management DPA^ Department of Political Affairs DPI
Department of Public Information DPKO
Department of Peacekeeping Operations DSS
Department of Safety and Security OCHA
Office for the Coordinaton of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights OIOS
Office of Internal Oversight Services OLA
Office of Legal Affairs OSAA
Office of the Special Adviser on Africa PBSO
Peacebuilding Support Office SRSG/CAAC
Office of the Special
Representative of the Secretary-General forChildren and Armed Confict SRSG/SVC
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General onSexual Violence in Conflict UNISDR
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNODA
Uniterd Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs UNODC
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime UNOG
United Nations Office at Geneva UN-OHRLLS
Office of the High Representative for
the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked DevelopingCountries and Small Island Developing States UNON
United Nations Office at Nairobi UNOP
United Nations Office for Partnerships UNOV
Other Bodies^ United Nations Office at Vienna Committee for Development PolicyCommittee for Experts on Public AdministrationCommittee on Non-Governmental OrganizationsPermanent Forum on Indigenous Issues UNAIDS
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS UNGEGN
United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names Research and TrainingUNICRI
United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute UNRISD
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia(ICTY)Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT)Military Staff Committee
Peacekeeping operations and political missionsSanctions committees (ad hoc)Standing committees and ad hoc bodies
InternationalCourt of Justice F^ IGURE
20.
The United Nations system
BOX 20.1 US hegemony at the UN
The end of the Cold War facilitated Security Council action, but the switch from a bipolar to a unipolar world left the USA unchallenged as the remaining superpower. With military expenditures equal to the rest of the world combined at that time, Washington’s approval, or at least acquiescence, is essential to political as well as operational functioning of the world body in the security arena.
The reality of asymmetric US power is that even a diminished hegemon may choose to ‘go it alone’, which generates legitimacy crises for the United Nations. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, without council approval and in the face of worldwide opposition, was a vivid illustration. Finessing the council in the Iraq case, however, should be seen in historical context. The USA has vacillated between multilateral and unilateral urges not merely since 1945 but since the Senate refused to join the League of Nations, the brainchild of US President Woodrow Wilson (Luck 1999). Addressing a number of priority security threats (including terrorism and nuclear proliferation) would seem, by definition, to require multilateral cooperation even for a superpower. This was clearly the position of the Barack Obama administration in early 2011, as articulated by UN ambassador Susan Rice, who asserted that it would be not only ‘immoral’ but ‘dangerous’ to be indifferent to cross-border problems and thus ‘short- sighted’ to hold back funds for the UN given its huge responsibilities in peacekeeping and other areas. However, the election of Donald Trump and growing populism worldwide portend a possible shift of the pendulum back towards unilateralism.
10 rotating members (there were six from 1945 to 1965) that are elected for two- year, non-renewable terms and cannot veto decisions. Given the fundamental changes in world politics over the past six decades, it is no surprise that the council’s permanent membership does not mirror the con- temporary distribution of power, globally or regionally. While defeated and occupied in 1945, Japan and Germany are now world heavyweights – the second and fourth largest financial contributors to the UN’s regular budget (the USA is the largest, and China is the third) – but they do not have a commensurate voice in the Security Council. Neither do such regional powers as Brazil, India, Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa. Over the years, the council’s anachronistic composition and veto privileges have been heatedly debated and targeted for reform. Given the political impossibility of garnering consensus on proposed reforms, however, such efforts have been futile
- as the outcomes of the 2005 and 2015 World Summits vividly illustrate (Weiss 2005). Moreover, the P-5 do not all have equal capacity to influence or ignore the Security Council, as the discussion of US hegemony in Box 20.1 illustrates.
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blue berets were crucial to sustaining peace in many places, and in 1988 they received the Nobel Peace Prize. By contrast, the Security Council invoked Chapter VII a mere five times in that same period. Twice it authorized the use of force: in 1950 on the Korean peninsula in defence of the south against the communist north – only possible because the Soviet Union had boycotted the council; and in 1960 in newly independent Congo – an outpost where major powers had few strategic interests. Once it invoked Chapter VII to impose a ceasefire between Israel and its Arab neighbours and twice to impose sanctions – against Rhodesia and South Africa – motivated largely by human rights violations by white minority regimes. The latter two cases may be seen as a precursor to the council’s intimate linkage of human rights with international peace and security in the post-Cold War era. The end of the East–West rivalry made cooperation among the P-5 more feasible at the outset of the post-Cold War era, thus revitalizing the Security Council as the guardian of world peace. Several new operations began in ‘flashpoints’ of the East–West struggle (Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Namibia, El Salvador and Nicaragua), but the real breakthrough came from the invocation of Chapter VII authorizing military force to roll back Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in 1990. The dramatic decline in vetoes is also illustrative of changes in council dynamics in the new era: between 1946 and 1986 the veto was wielded 212 times, as compared to 54 times between 1987 and 2016. The number of resolutions also doubled in half the time, 593 in 40 years versus 1,473 in the next 30. What became known as ‘second-generation’ peacekeeping included electoral assistance, human rights monitoring and even weapons collection, activities once seen as within the domestic jurisdiction of states. However, these operations were still based on the principle of consent, and peacekeepers remained bound by restrictions on the use of force. The 1990s witnessed a radical shift in the nature of UN operations, from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, as well as an ever-widening scope for what the council judged to be a ‘threat to international peace and security’ (the basis for decisions; see also Chapter 21). Breaking new ground, the council called interference with humanitarian action and violence against civilians ‘threats to international peace and security’; it authorized military operations to such war-torn places as Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Kosovo and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In Haiti, the council even determined that the overthrow of a democratically elected president and accompanying instability were a threat to the peace. In contrast to earlier peacekeeping, these new operations were authorized under Chapter VII and thus were coercive rather than consensual. After Kosovo in 1999 – other than a small British deployment in Sierra Leone in 2000 and a smaller essentially French one in eastern Congo in 2003 – there was no substantial multinational military effort. The post-September 11 nadir in coercive protection lasted until Security Council Resolution 1973 of March 2011, which authorized ‘all necessary measures’ against Libya to protect civilians. That same month, the UN Security Council authorized the ‘use of all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians’ in Côte d’Ivoire. However, UN soldiers on the ground did little until action led by the 1,700-strong French Licorne force. The shift
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from civilian protection to regime change in Libya, however, led to a backlash against the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P). The Security Council was paralysed on decisive action regarding the Syrian civil war, which commenced with Bashar al-Assad’s brutal repression of civilian protests in 2011 and continued. Unsurprisingly the council was powerless to react to Moscow’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014, owing to Russia’s veto power. Aside from the questions of where and when the UN might intervene to maintain or enforce peace, questions of funds and resources for these operations have also been important. The top three financial contributors to UN peace operations were the United States, China and Japan; but according to 2016 published statistics the top troop-contributing countries to UN missions were Ethiopia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Rwanda and Nepal. The majority of UN military personnel come from two regions: Central and South Asia and Africa (CIC 2010). Lacking its own capacity to deploy military operations, however, the world body often authorizes coalitions of the willing or regional bodies – such as the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – to assume command of such missions. At the end of 2016, NATO alone had 18,000 peacekeepers in the field, down from 84,000 in 2010, accounting for 88 per cent of military personnel in non-UN-led missions (CIC 2016). Extending beyond any traditional interpretation of Chapter VII, the world body has even assumed what some see as ‘neocolonial’ administrative and coercive responsibilities of a state, as in post-war East Timor and Kosovo. European organizations have been especially helpful partners in the UN interim administration Mission in Kosovo. In addition to the use of military force, the Security Council has increasingly relied on two other coercive measures – economic sanctions and international criminal prosecution. Indeed, in the post-Cold War period the council imposed dozens of sanctions, including against such non-state actors as the Union for the Total Inde- pendence of Angola and al-Qa’ida. First levied in this period against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1990, blanket trade sanctions were at the centre of controversy owing to their devastating humanitarian impact. In response, the council began applying only targeted sanctions via arms embargoes, financial asset freezes, travel bans and commodity boycotts (Cortright and Lopez 2000). International criminal tribunals were another invention. In the wake of genocide and other crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the council established judicial bodies to try those responsible for heinous acts in the conduct of war. These tribunals have had mixed results. Case completion was slow: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda existed for a decade, from 2005 until 2015, indicting a mere 93 individuals and sentencing 62, while the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, established in 1993, remains operational, having indicted 161 persons and completing 154 proceedings of the accused with 83 sentenced over a decade and a half. Moreover, many of the key perpetrators remain free. In addition to criticisms about effectiveness and costs, some have questioned whether they actually inhibit peacebuilding and national reconciliation. Nonetheless, the war crimes tribunals have contributed to the development of international criminal law – for example, that rape can be a form of genocide – as well as the 1998 creation of the International Criminal Court and other
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In the early post-Cold War period, council presidents also began briefing the media, thereby drawing public attention to the body’s negotiations and decisions. Celebrities have contributed to enhancing the council’s visibility, as they have used their status to cast a spotlight on issues such as humanitarian crises and the plight of women and children in armed conflict. They have even made statements before the Security Council, urging members to halt atrocities in war-torn countries.
z The General Assembly
The General Assembly is a more inclusive arena for deliberations by states than the Security Council. Indeed, each UN member state has equal status in the body and one vote – concrete evidence of the ‘sovereign equality of all its Members’ called for in Article 2(1). Unlike the Security Council’s decisions, which are binding, however, the General Assembly’s resolutions are ‘recommendations’. They are adopted by a simple majority, except for those identified as concerning ‘important questions’, which require two-thirds of the members present and voting. According to Article 18, these include ‘recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security [and] the election of the non-permanent members of the Security Council’. Charter Articles 11–12 grant the General Assembly the ability to discuss such issues and make recommendations to states and to the council, but not while a dispute or situation is being considered by the Security Council. In practice, the assembly has considered conflicts regardless. When the council is unable to act due to actual or threatened vetoes, the General Assembly has served as an alternative avenue for addressing security issues. Reso- lution 377(V), titled ‘Uniting for Peace’ (UfP), was a watershed. It created a parallel authority in the assembly by establishing:
procedures by which a simple majority of the Security Council on a procedural vote (not subject to veto) or a majority of UN member states can convene the Assembly in ‘emergency special session’ on twenty-four hours’ notice to consider and develop collective responses to a crisis when the Security Council has been unable to act. (Peterson 2006: 104)
While the assembly cannot make binding decisions, through UfP it can endorse coercive actions. Adopted in 1950, it was a means to allow what many saw as ‘blue- washed’ US military action in Korea – originally authorized under Chapter VII – to continue despite the Soviet Union’s return to the council after an earlier boycott owing to Taiwan’s occupancy of the ‘Chinese seat’. Over the years, this procedure has been used sporadically (10 instances to be exact), the last time being against Israel in 1997 for its policies in the occupied territories. Some member states and civil society organizations called for its invocation to address the Syrian civil war given Security Council paralysis to halt the carnage. Since decolonization, the so-called Global South (what was formerly called the ‘Third World’) constitutes a strong majority in the General Assembly. Thus, smaller
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and weaker member states – and even middle powers when not elected to the council
- prefer the democratic assembly, in which they have a role in security matters. In particular, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) – the 120 members and 15 observers among developing countries that form a bloc – has staunchly defended self- determination, sovereignty and non-intervention, which are linked to many Security Council deliberations. Moreover, Third World resistance to white-minority rule in Rhodesia and South Africa was important in mobilizing international action against those rogue regimes, which eventually led to action by the council. Similarly, the Global South has consistently advocated in the assembly for the Palestinian cause in spite of council action (or inaction); over the past six decades, the assembly has passed a never-ending stream of resolutions concerning Israel and the occupied territories. The General Assembly’s endorsement of the responsibility to protect in 2005 contributed to the emergence of consensus around the norm as did its debate during its ‘inter-active dialogues’ in 2009–17, which resulted in a growing show of support for its implementation (see Chapter 16).
z The Secretariat
International civil servants comprise the UN’s administrative apparatus, or Secre- tariat. At the helm is the Secretary-General, who is appointed by the assembly on the recommendation of the council. In reality, the P-5’s veto power makes the selection process for the Secretary-General into an exercise in geographic horse- trading (the position usually rotates from region to region, and after two terms) in which the qualifications of the individual candidates are often a secondary concern (Newman 1998; Gordenker 2010). Brian Urquhart argued that efforts are made to select a candidate who ‘will not exert any troubling degree of leadership, commitment, originality, or independence’ (Urquhart 1987: 227–8). The selection process was relaxed in 2016, which led to an improved consideration of qualifications and set aside the regional rotation, resulting in the selection of António Guterrres (Weiss and Carayannis 2017). Charter Article 100, however, requires that the organization’s top civil servant and other UN personnel perform their duties independent of governments, and it obliges member states ‘not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities’. In order to fulfil his (not yet her) mandate for security matters, it is essential that the Secretary-General does not incur the wrath of any of the P-5. The ill-fated first incumbent Trygve Lie – who resigned after Moscow’s opposition to his conduct in Korea – once described the post as ‘the most impossible job in the world’ (Rivlin and Gordenker 1993) (see Box 20.2). While the largest financial contributors to the world body often complain that the second UN is a sprawling bureaucracy, such criticisms are exaggerated. The UN Secretariat itself employs some 44,000 personnel to administer the affairs of the globe. Similarly, the UN’s regular budget is limited in light of the tasks that fall under the organization’s purview. Although it has risen over the past seven decades, from $21.5 million in 1945 to $5.4 billion in 2016, when adjusted for inflation the change is not nearly as substantial (Myint-U and Scott 2007: 126–8). The regular
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international political context during their tenures (Ramcharan 2008). Despite Cold War constraints, Lie managed to bolster his investigatory and conflict prevention responsibilities. Hammarskjöld was the intellectual force (along with Canadian minister Lester Pearson) behind the creation of Chapter VI peacekeeping operations. Meanwhile, U Thant carved out a role for the Secretary-General as an independent mediator, while Pérez de Cuéllar – whose tenure extended into the post-Cold War period – enhanced the thirty-eighth floor’s (the top floor of the UN’s headquarters in Manhattan) capacity for fact-finding and observation, oversaw the initial expansion of peacekeeping, and helped quell turmoil in such Cold War flashpoints as Central America, Afghanistan, Cambodia and southern Africa. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was one of the most influential in the security arena, overseeing the development of more muscular peace missions and drafting An Agenda for Peace (1992), a text that ‘still defines the conceptual framework through which (for better or worse), the UN thinks about its work in the political field, formalizing concepts such as peacebuilding, early warning, preventive deployment and peace enforcement’ (Myint-U and Scott 2007: 94). Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2001 along with the world organization, also left a considerable legacy. Perhaps because he had been Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping during the disasters in Rwanda and Bosnia, he was the first Secretary-General to take a visible and public position on controversial human rights positions, including the responsibility to protect, while overseeing a dramatic expansion in peace operations. His successor, Ban Ki-moon, consolidated that expansion and created the new Department of Field Support to enhance their effectiveness. He also actively sought to advance the climate change and R2P agendas. Ban’s self-described ‘invisible’ diplomacy meant that his use of the bully pulpit usually followed, not preceded, pronouncements by major powers and regional organizations. António Guterres assumed the helm of the world body in January 2017. Expectations were high in light of his accomplishments in his decade (2005–15) as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and president of Portugal, and the perceived need for UN reform (Weiss and Carayannis 2017).
z Other UN organs and actors
The three other principal organs – ECOSOC, the ICJ and the Trusteeship Council
- are less central to understanding the UN’s relevance for security studies. ECOSOC’s purview spans economic, social, cultural, education and health as well as human rights. Charter Article 65 grants ECOSOC the power to ‘furnish information’ to the Security Council and requires it to assist the council upon request. Historically the link between these two bodies has been weak, even non-existent. In the late 1990s, however, the Security Council sought to engage ECOSOC with a possible role in the UN’s post-conflict peacebuilding. Resolution 1212 of November 1998 formally called upon ECOSOC to assist Haiti with a long-term sustainable development programme, and in response ECOSOC created an Ad Hoc Advisory Group to make recommendations and implement them. In collaboration with the Security Council, ECOSOC also created a working group on Guinea-Bissau.
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However, ECOSOC’s ineffectiveness prompted the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) to recommend the creation of a new body. In late 2005 the Security Council and General Assembly approved similar resolutions calling for the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission to address coordination problems that often hamper efforts at building lasting peace. The initial decade of work by this commission indicates that it has helped add value in a number of countries where multiple inputs were required in the aftermath of conflict (Jenkins 2012), but that much work remains to be done to take advantage of the UN’s comparative advantage in this arena (Browne and Weiss 2015). The International Court of Justice may be considered part of the world body’s peaceful settlement of disputes machinery. However, disputing states must voluntarily consent to the court’s jurisdiction, and decisions normally take years. Given that states generally consider peace and security matters too important to be settled by 15 jurists and too urgent to wait, the ICJ has not handed down decisions or opinions that have actually resolved armed conflicts. Even when such cases are brought before the court, moreover, compliance with the ICJ’s ruling is not obligatory – as illustrated by the US’s refusal to implement the judgment of Nicaragua vs. the United States. The Trusteeship Council, the successor of the League of Nations mandates sys- tem, was established to oversee the transition from foreign to self-rule in colonies, a topic linked to international peace and security. For decades it worked closely with the General Assembly and, in areas designated as ‘strategic’, the Security Council. The last remaining ‘trust territory’, Palau, became independent in 1994, and so this principal organ is now dormant. The 2005 World Summit agreed to eliminate the Trusteeship Council, but this would require a Charter amendment, hardly likely. The UN’s own funds and programmes – especially the largest humanitarian players, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP) – are often present on the landscape in security crises and work side-by-side with UN soldiers in a substantial ‘business’ (Weiss 2013). The specialized agencies depicted in Figure 20.1 are part of the UN system; but they are more peripheral to security studies for two reasons: they are not directly responsible to the UN Secretary-General and their main activities are in economic and social development.
z Twenty-first-century challenges
In the new millennium, the UN finds itself amid a sea change in security affairs. While interstate disputes (its original justification) will always pose threats to international order, intra-state conflicts – often linked into global arms, trade and drug trafficking networks – are widespread and constitute substantial threats to regional and even global stability. Alongside changes in warfare and the security problems posed by so-called fragile states, the world organization confronts the intertwined threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
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Peace enforcement operations were a key UN response to the actual and potential international instability emanating from war-torn societies (see also Chapter 21). As mentioned earlier, the UN has proved incapable of conducting large-scale military operations, as illustrated by the failures to halt massive killings and displacement in Bosnia and Somalia. The United Nations has relied on coalitions of the willing and regional organizations – options that are not without their problems. With the exception of NATO and the European Union, regional bodies generally are ill- equipped militarily. In addition to operational issues, making use of subcontracted forces also raises questions of accountability. The involvement of regional heavyweights in neighbouring country conflicts can shift local balances of power and serve interests other than human protection. NAM rhetoric often emphasizes, for example, that humanitarian intervention may be veiled imperialism. In places where valuable natural resources, such as diamonds, constitute the basis for sustaining war economies, the Security Council has imposed commodity embargoes on states as well as non-state actors, and investigative panels have been created to monitor compliance. Here as elsewhere, however, non-compliance with council sanctions is a considerable obstacle to their effectiveness. In addition to addressing conflicts once they erupt, the UN has attempted to focus on the phases before and after wars. Over the past two decades, the world body has increasingly engaged in conflict prevention, particularly since the council’s failure to respond to the Rwandan genocide. UN secretaries-general have been at the fore- front of such efforts. Boutros-Ghali’s seminal An Agenda for Peace (1992) emphasized the importance of preventive diplomacy, while Secretary-General Annan’s Prevention of Armed Conflict pledged to ‘move the United Nations from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention’ (Annan 2001: 1). Ban’s Implementing the Responsibility to Protect also emphasized prevention among R2P’s three pillars (Ban 2009). António Guterres announced that prevention was one of his priorities. A crucial component of conflict prevention entails tackling the so-called root causes of conflict, which have economic, social, environmental and institutional origins. Hence, structural prevention involves efforts to foster socioeconomic development and good governance. In a 2006 report, Annan expanded the concept to include ‘systemic prevention’, which aims to address international-level factors that enhance the risk of conflict such as the global illicit trade in small arms. Given the extensive scope, structural prevention is a nebulous concept that is hard to imple- ment; it involves virtually every acronym in the UN system. At the other end of the spectrum, post-conflict peacebuilding missions aim to assist countries to make the transition from violence to peace and prevent the recurrence of warfare. Core tasks include: weapons collection; elections monitoring; assistance with rebuilding governmental institutions; judicial reform; training of police forces; and human rights monitoring. In the most drastic cases, the UN along with other international organizations has sometimes assumed core state functions. The record of such efforts is seen by many to be positive – if one measures success as the absence of recurrent large-scale violence. However, in some places, such as Central America, crime is endemic and levels of socioeconomic inequality have increased, while in others, such as Cambodia, democratic rule is precarious. Overall, the extent to which peacebuilding missions have created conditions for lasting peace
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is mixed, and a general conclusion is that longer-term commitments are required (Paris 2004; Jenkins 2012).
Terrorism
Al-Qa’ida’s attacks on US territory brought into stark relief the destructive capacity of non-state actors in a globalizing world, which has been reinforced in past years by the Islamic State’s ruthless attacks against civilians in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Europe and elsewhere. Terrorism, however, has been on the UN’s agenda for decades. Indeed, the General Assembly – serving as the lead UN actor due to the Cold War stalemate in the Security Council – has addressed it since 1972. Although unsuccessful in reaching an agreed-upon definition of terrorism, the assembly, particularly its Sixth Committee, has facilitated 13 international legal conventions spanning such issues as hijacking, bombings and use of nuclear material. The spate of terrorist bombings in the late 1980s and 1990s spurred the Security Council to act. It imposed sanctions on rogue states such as Libya – which was shielding suspects in the bombing of Pan-Am flight 103 – and Afghanistan, which was providing sanctuary to Osama bin Laden and al-Qa’ida. In the wake of 11 September, in Resolution 1368 the council for the first time deemed self-defence a legitimate response to a terrorist attack, thereby endorsing the US war in Afghanistan to change the Taliban regime. Subsequently, Resolution 1373 required all states to implement specified measures to combat terrorism, including changes to national legislation, and established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to monitor their implementation. In 2004, the council was concerned about terrorists’ acquiring nuclear capabilities. It passed binding Chapter VII Resolution 1540, which requires states to ensure appropriate measures to control and account for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Kofi Annan established a policy working group to explore how the UN should respond to terrorism. He also convened the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004) to recommend a comprehensive UN approach to security, including antiterrorism. He also called attention to human rights violations perpetrated in the name of fighting terrorism – Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib being hallmarks. After three decades of grappling with this issue, the 2005 World Summit still was unable to agree on a definition of terrorism. The lack of consensus among member states is especially problematic in light of the Security Council’s authorization of self-defence as a response to terrorism (Boulden and Weiss 2004).
Disarmament and non-proliferation
Disarmament and non-proliferation were central at the UN’s establishment. The Charter refers to the regulation of armaments, specifying roles for the General Assembly, Security Council and Military Staff Committee, while Articles 11 and 47 allude to disarmament. Key components of the UN’s machinery are the General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission and the permanent Conference on Disarmament, which is an autonomous forum that reports to the assembly and is linked to the Secretariat.
T.G. WEISS AND D.A. ZACH
